





PHILANDER P. LANE

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COLONEL LANE
(From a photograph taken in 1863, age 41)

PHILANDER P. LANE

COLONEL OF VOLUNTEERS

IN THE CIVIL WAR

ELEVENTH OHIO INFANTRY

By

WILLIAM FORSE SCOTT

of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, Veteran Volunteers

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To
SOPHIA BOSWORTH LANE
WHOSE WISH WAS
THE CHIEF INCENTIVE TO THIS WORK
THE DEVOTED WIFE AND COMPANION
OF COLONEL LANE THROUGH THE
FIFTY YEARS FROM THEIR MARRIAGE
TO THE END OF HIS LIFE

FOREWORD

As one draws on toward the close of life, its conditions and purposes take on a new meaning. Its hardships and disappointments appear as but the lessons of experience, and count in the long run as stepping stones to better things. These trite observations are illustrated by numerous examples in our American life, and perhaps nowhere more clearly than in the life and character of the great Civil War President, Lincoln; in whom we trace, as the result of hard conditions of early life, that wisdom and patience and gentleness that have immortalized his name among men.

I esteem it a privilege to contribute a brief foreword to this history of a man of men, whose virtues I esteemed and whose friendship I highly valued. He was a noble character,— one of those products of American life, which, like Lincoln's, combined sterling qualities of manhood with gentleness and courtesy. The parallel does not end here, for there was much in Colonel Lane's makeup that suggests the great "Commoner",— patience, loyalty to principle, and the same quality of sturdy Americanism so admirably emphasized by the lamented Roosevelt.

We know only the general conditions of his boyhood; but enough appears to show that he was thrown very early upon his own exertions for livelihood and made his way unaided to final success, in a business that stood as one of the highest character and influence in the early up-building of the City of Cincinnati. In the early "fifties" Colonel Lane was generally recognized as one of the important factors in the welfare and widely extended fame of the city of his adoption eulogized by Longfellow as the "Queen City of the West".

There were great men in those days,— and Colonel Lane was of them,— earnest, intelligent and self-reliant men who wrought great things. Later, when the threat of

disunion roused the latent Americanism of the Republic, Colonel Lane was among the first to respond to the call to arms; and that part of his life-history is the subject of these memoirs. He bore a gallant part, and lived to see the Union restored and its flag honored and respected by the entire Nation.

In the fulness of time he was laid away, honored and respected by his fellow citizens, and mourned as only those are who have lived up to the measure of opportunity without fear, without reproach. Surely all is well with such a man in the great hereafter. His memory is a precious heritage to his family and an inspiring example to his fellow citizens.

LEWIS M. HOSEA.

PREFACE

This book was at first only a manuscript narrative of the life of Colonel Lane in the army during the War of Secession, written for the private use and pleasure of his family. The materials were letters he wrote from the field to his family and others, some personal papers of the time preserved by him (including a few official documents), some papers he wrote on various occasions after the war, and the official records of the War Department. It is believed that many of his papers were lost in a fire which destroyed his home in 1885.

The available matter found in his letters and papers was remarkably scanty. His letters seldom contain more than bare mention of military affairs in which he took part, tho some of them discuss the general political and military conditions and operations of the time at length. A small pocket diary for the year 1862 (the only one preserved) contains but little that is now of use beyond the fixing of dates. His official reports and letters printed in the records of the War Department are very few in number and very brief,—a striking exception to his constant insistence, in all other duties, upon full compliance with the Army Regulations. Much the greater part of the narrative was thus necessarily worked out from the official records of the campaigns in which he was engaged, with some aid from books written by other officers.

Under these circumstances the reader will see why a complete or satisfactory record or story could not be made. But that has not prevented those who have read the manuscript from persisting in a wish to have it printed. This has led to an extensive revision, with the result that the manuscript has been much reduced, partly rewritten and here and there readjusted, so as to bring it into the ordinary form and proper proportions of a printed book. Whether with success is yet to be seen.

Two things have been much in my mind while on this work: One, that out of a quantity of meager and largely casual materials, quite commonplace as one would suppose on taking it up, comes a fine character,—an American volunteer soldier of high intelligence, patriotism, unswerving purpose, devotion to duty, great achievement, and unconscious heroism; and the other, that tho this characterization only gives Colonel Lane the place in the history of the war that he amply earned, he is still only one of a large number of equal desert. It may be said safely that the volunteer army in the great war was full of officers and soldiers who displayed all the virtues I have credited to him, endured the burdens as steadily and self-denyingly as he, and improved or sought as eagerly as he any opportunity toward the winning of the great cause. So I have felt in writing this story of Colonel Lane, that I was writing the story of a thousand other colonels in that war that saved the country.

That there may be no adverse comment upon Colonel Lane in relation to the criticisms upon certain generals and campaigns which the reader will find, I ought to say that they are in no way drawn from or suggested by anything found in his writings. I alone am responsible for them. As to General Rosecrans, indeed, Colonel Lane personally liked him, was on friendly terms with him from the beginning of the war, thought him a great strategist, and felt that a great injustice was done when he was removed from command. These opinions were widely held, indeed, and Rosecrans has not lacked zealous defenders.

In fact, the very high respect and esteem in which Colonel Lane was held by all who knew him personally was due, in part, to his habitual fairness and toleration,—his patient and kindly consideration for the shortcomings of others. It was only where he thought right or justice was infringed that he was immovably set against any yielding.

WM. FORSE SCOTT.

New York,
May, 1920.

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PHILANDER P. LANE

I

1861: APRIL — JULY

The Guns of Sumter — Enlistment Under the Three-Months Call — Organization — Camp Dennison — Re-enlistment for Three Years — Reorganization of Eleventh Ohio Infantry Volunteers

The call of President Lincoln, April 15, 1861, for 75,000 men was instantly followed in Ohio, as in all the other free States, by a rush of volunteers, far more than the number called. The quota of Ohio was 10,153, but within a week twenty regiments of infantry and many smaller bodies for cavalry and artillery were in camps for organization or offered and awaiting orders, the whole number being more than double the quota. And still there were many companies, raised at the same time and temporarily organized at their home towns and offered to the Governor, which could not be accepted because too many. In fact the Governor had already much exceeded his authority in accepting the eager volunteers. Many or most of the disappointed companies, however, maintained their organization and went on drilling, with the aid of such instructors as could be found who had professed some knowledge of military service, and anxiously awaited events. This was the case of a company raised and organized in Cincinnati April 17, 1861, by Philander Parmele Lane.

Colonel Lane was born in the old Dutch town of Nassau, in Rensselaer county, New York, October 5, 1821, the fourth child and first son of David Lane and Melinda Parmele. The parents were both born in Connecticut, at Killingworth, David on March 8, 1788, and Melinda

probably a little later. They were both of Scotch descent, but their ancestry has been traced only so far as that it is known that Melinda was one of the daughters of Josiah Parmele, who was born in Connecticut and was a millwright. Both families appear to have lived at Bolton, Conn., at the time of the marriage of David and Melinda, which must have been in or about 1813. It is said to have been "soon afterward" that they moved to Nassau, where, according to family tradition, David engaged in "the leather business"; but whether as a tanner or a merchant is not known. Whatever it was he dropped it when, in 1828, he moved with his family from Nassau to Portage county, Ohio, in the "Western Reserve" of Connecticut. This emigration was probably induced by the advice or example of friends or relations in Connecticut, there being at that time a great movement from that State to the Western Reserve.

In Portage county David Lane took up a large tract of land, chiefly, if not wholly, a primitive forest, and began the great labor of reducing it to a farm. He was a man of remarkable physical strength and untiring industry; and, as his sons grew up and became strong enough to use the clumsy tools and implements of the time, of course they had to share his work. But, just as he allowed no respite for himself, so he allowed little to anyone else. On the contrary, necessity, as he saw it, imposed additional labors upon him. There had to be some one in the country able to do the work of a blacksmith and wheelwright, and his mechanical ability and strength made him the man. So, to the work of the farm he added a forge and wagon shop; and that he had a pride in his own handiwork is proved by at least one fine example of his skill in wrought-iron that is still preserved. Probably it was in this shop that Philander found he possessed that special ability in mechanics out of which grew his life-work.

No doubt these doubled labors were often too heavy and exacting for growing boys, but the pioneer fathers who saw no limit to labor did not foresee certain of the results. Many of their sons (not to speak of themselves) suffered throughout their lives from the severe physical strain and the repression of youthful spirits. Some of

them rebelled as they grew toward manhood, seeing only unending toil, with what appeared to them to be little compensation and scanty time or opportunity for recreation, and as soon as they reached majority, or even earlier, left what they felt to be a grinding and narrow life. Naturally their attraction was toward the towns and cities, as offering employments furthest removed from the irksome toil "from sun to sun" on a backwoods farm.

Philander Lane was one of these, tho, in addition to the desire to escape, he had an ambition for learning, for which he had had as yet but small encouragement or means. There is a family tradition that he "ran away" from home while a boy, but whether to escape the hard life or "to seek his fortune", or both, is not told. If he did run away in his minority, he returned; for it is certain that he left home in the usual way at the age of twenty-three, and went to some place in western Pennsylvania, to try his fortune in the lumber business, then growing important along the upper tributaries of the Ohio. Not satisfied with this, after two years' trial, or not yet successful in it, he returned to Ohio and was employed by Bill & Brother, machinists, who had a shop at Cuyahoga Falls, not far from the family home.

Here he found the natural field for his taste and genius, and rapidly developed skill and originality in mechanical work. For some reason not now known he went to Ashland (perhaps also to Akron), and finally to Massillon (all in Ohio), still working at his chosen trade, until, in 1848, he was an accomplished journeyman machinist. In that year, with his last employer, he took the bold step of going to Cincinnati, then the largest city in the west except Saint Louis, looking forward to setting up there for himself. The first two years there he worked as a journeyman. Then, in 1850, he established his own shop — a machine-repair shop, in Pearl Street — and employed one journeyman. And from this small beginning, by his untiring labor, exceptional skill and distinguishing integrity, there grew up within ten years the extensive machinery, engine and foundry plant of Lane & Bodley, who, when the war broke out, were the largest builders of engines and milling machinery within a wide

region, having especially an extensive business in the lumbering and sugar country of the south.

The only person who was able to distract his attention in this early industrial development at Cincinnati was Miss Sophia Bosworth, whom he met there soon after he established his own business. She was so distracting, indeed, tho only nineteen, that within a year they were married — July 18, 1851. She was born at Marietta, Ohio, the daughter of Charles Bosworth, who was born in Massachusetts in 1797. He was the son of Salah Bosworth, also born in that State, who was a volunteer in the Revolutionary army, tho then very young, and who moved from his home in Boston, with Charles and his ten other children, in 1816, to a farm near Marietta (part of the lands of the famous Ohio Company of Massachusetts), and died there in 1823.

Thro her father she had the further distinction of direct descent from both Myles Standish and Priscilla Mullins, the son of the doughty Myles and the daughter of his elusive Priscilla marrying and reaching Sophia Bosworth in the sixth generation.

Philander and Sophia — the very names have a quaint flavor of the sentimental and pleasing tales of old! — lived happily together until his death, nearly fifty years, having had seven children who reached maturity; and she, in her 89th year, is still living.

Coming thus from Colonial ancestry on both sides, Colonel Lane was an unqualified and uncompromising patriot and American. He was a zealous Whig of the Clay-Harrison-Taylor times, and became an enthusiastic Republican when that party arose. With "Western Reserve principles," he was irreconcilably opposed to slavery, and especially to the domination of the political affairs of the country by the selfish and insolent slave-holders who had so long controlled Congress and the government.

He had a wide personal acquaintance in the south, and he was in New Orleans on business in January, 1861, when the Secession Convention of the State was sitting there; but yet he came home feeling sure there would not be war. To him at that time war was unthinkable. But the rapid succession of dire events following soon

showed his mistake; and when, finally, Fort Sumter was threatened and then actually attacked, his indignation and patriotic rage knew no limit. With breathless anxiety he waited the action of Lincoln, and felt a certain great relief upon the news of his call for troops, received at Cincinnati, April 16, 1861. He saw his own instant course.

He was then thirty-nine years old, had a wife and four children, from infancy to eight years, and a large and complicated business, the management and responsibility of which rested chiefly upon him. But, dropping all other affairs, he joined actively that day in raising volunteers. The serious drawback of his years and private affairs made him unwilling to be leader, but, urged by others, he consented, and next morning issued a call. This was April 17. He wrote the call himself. The meeting was to be held that night, at half-past seven, "at Ohio Medical College south side of Sixth Street west of Vine next to the Engine house for the purpose of Organizing a Military Company for the protection of our homes."

At the foot of the paper was a notice that "The Stars and Stripes will be Raised on Lane & Bodley's shop corner of John & Water Streets and saluted with thirty-four Guns at 5½ o'clock this evening."

Some of you who read these pages must have heard those guns. There were thirty-four, of course, for the thirty-four States, tho one of them (Kansas) had just been admitted (its star not yet officially on the flag) and eight had then seceded. But it was Lane's opinion (as it was of most of the loyal men) that "seceding" did not take them out of the Union nor release them or their people from the obligation of obeying the laws of the United States.

The meeting that night must have been crowded and spirited. Volunteers signed a roll to the number of 119, an organization was effected, a name was chosen (according to the custom of the time)—"The Union Rifles," and an election for officers was held. The choice was Philander P. Lane as Captain, George P. Darrow as First-Lieutenant and Frederick Lenner as Second-Lieutenant. And George W. Johnson was elected Orderly-Sergeant.

The most of these volunteers were workmen in mechanical shops in Cincinnati, a large part of them coming from Captain Lane's shops. Many of them being married and unable to incur expenses beyond the ordinary, Captain Lane issued immediately an "appeal", addressed especially to "the Ladies of Cincinnati", with a subscription paper (evidently written by himself), to aid in the equipment of the company, a step which indicates a purpose to maintain the organization whether it then went into the army of the United States or not. The appeal said, indeed, that the company was raised "for our mutual defense" and was "ready to hazard their lives for the protection of our homes and country." But this last phrase was immediately followed by — "*The issue is upon us. Will we bow our necks to the Traitors or vindicate the principles of '76?*"

This language, together with Colonel Lane's statement after the war — "My company was not so fortunate as to be accepted under the first call for troops, but we kept up our organization as a company and were among the first to be ordered to camp under the second call, of June, 1861"— seem to show that, first of all, the company meant service in the general army of volunteers and that it was offered under the call for 75,000 as soon as it was organized. Still, at that time the Secessionists in Kentucky were very active, noisy and threatening (tho the State did not actually secede), Cincinnati, like other border towns, was filled with secession "sympathizers", and there was real, tho unreasonable, apprehension of attack, so that organization and preparation for "home defense" must have been much in the minds of the people.

The subscription paper ended with the names of the elected officers, followed by "Capt. Rosecrans graduate of West Point, Drill Master". This was William S. Rosecrans, who had been an officer in the regular army, specially distinguished in military science, had resigned to engage in commercial business, but had never succeeded, and who was now employed as manager by one of the "Coal-Oil" companies at Cincinnati, then trying to introduce the newly-discovered petroleum. He could not long have drilled the "Union Rifles", for in May he was serving as Engineer on the staff of General McClellan,

who was then in command of the "Ohio Militia", and on May 16 the War Department recalled him to the regular army service as Brigadier-General. Three months after he was thus announced as Drill-Master to Captain Lane's company he was in command of an army in Virginia of which that company was a small fraction. Again, early in 1863, it came under his command in Tennessee, in the Army of the Cumberland, and remained with him to and thro the disastrous battle of Chickamauga, which was followed by his removal from command in the field.

Captain Lane must have kept the claims of the "Union Rifles" before the Governor and the military authorities at Columbus thro May and into June, and he had a friend there in Jacob D. Cox, a Cincinnatian, who was one of the three brigadier-generals of the Ohio Militia (commissioned at the same time with McClellan as Major-General, under a special law of April 23, 1861) and was assisting in the organization of the new troops.

About the middle of June General Cox was put in command of troops — the "Second Brigade" (no division organization yet appeared); — and he ordered Captain Lane's company into rendezvous. This was the order:

"Head Quarters,
Ohio Militia and Volunteer Militia.
Adjutant-General's Office
Columbus, June 19th, 1861.

Special Order No. 364.

Report your Company at Camp Dennison Monday morning next. You are assigned to the 11th Reg: 2. Brigade, General Cox commanding.

H. B. Carrington
Adjt Gen

By order of Commander-in-Chief.
To Capt. P. P. Lane,
Cincinnati.

This "Commander-in-Chief" (tho the Governor held that office nominally) was really the famous George B. McClellan. He had been captain of artillery in the regular army, had resigned in 1857, to engage in railway building, and in 1860-61 was President of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad (from Cincinnati to St. Louis), and was living in Cincinnati. At a meeting of half a dozen leading citizens of Cincinnati, at the Burnet House, on

Sunday, April 21, it was agreed to ask the government to entrust Captain McClellan immediately with the local command and defense, and a telegram was sent to Washington, asking that he be "appointed to organize forces and take command at Cincinnati." It was signed "Wm. J. Flagg, S. F. Vinton, W. S. Groesbeck, L. Anderson, Rutherford B. Hayes, George E. Pugh." Here was the "home defense" purpose again: apparently even these men supposed that Cincinnati was in danger.

McClellan must have been present at this meeting or directly in communication with those who were. He had just received two or three proposals from the Governors of New York and Pennsylvania for service in the organization of their State troops, and he had decided to go to Harrisburg to see Governor Curtin about the one that most attracted him. He started the next day (22d), but stopped at Columbus, and on the 23d met Governor Dennison (who had known him as a railroad man), and, as "requested by several gentlemen of Cincinnati, gave him information" of the conditions at that place.

But they must have talked of other things, for the Governor, who had been four days without reply to telegrams he had sent to Washington relating to the raising and organizing of the Ohio contingent, and who now, therefore, "felt compelled to assume extraordinary responsibilities", agreed with McClellan upon immediate action. The legislature being in session, he had a special bill drawn and presented, which was immediately passed by both houses; and the same day, under this law, he commissioned McClellan Major-General in the Ohio Militia and gave him command of all the State Militia and all the volunteers enlisting under the call for 75,000. McClellan at once accepted and entered upon the duties of the office. This was warmly approved by General Scott, then the head of the armies; but on May 3d the War Department created the military "Department of the Ohio" (which embraced Ohio, Indiana and Illinois) and assigned McClellan to its command as a Major-General of the United States Army (the first one appointed during the war),—the first of the extraordinary acts of the government in the amazing career of this incapable general. General McClellan at once assumed

command under this assignment, but yet retained the command of the Ohio Militia and volunteers under his earlier commission, and held on to it even after he was permanently out of the State and commanding a general army in the field.

The Eleventh Ohio Infantry, to which Captain Lane's company was assigned by the order of June 19, was originally one of the "three-months" regiments accepted under the call of April 15 for 75,000 men. It had been assembled at Camp Jackson, near Columbus, organized there, and mustered into service April 20, and was then, early in May, moved to Camp Dennison, near Cincinnati, and kept under training there; but had not been sent into the field. Its time of enlistment would expire July 26; and when Captain Lane's company arrived at the camp the question was already under agitation among its members, as well as among those of the other three-months regiments there, whether they would continue in the army by enlisting again, for the three years required by the second call for volunteers. In the Eleventh a large number declined, but enough remained and reenlisted for three years to justify the preserving of the regimental designation; so that the three-years Eleventh Infantry was the original Eleventh reorganized. Five of the original companies, however, chose to be mustered out at the end of their three-months term (C, E, G, I and K), new companies were to be received in their place, and the old ones remaining had to be filled up by three-years enlistments.

Captain Lane's company was one of the new ones. Tho it was designated as "K" in the regimental line, that does not show that it was the last to be received, but was due to the accident that the original company K had just vacated the position by muster-out.* In fact it was the first company of the new regiment to be mustered-in, which, as officially reported, was done on June 19.† Five

* The organization of infantry regiments at that time was in ten companies, designated by the letters A to K, omitting J.

† In a letter dated July 12, 1861, Captain Lane said "My company was mustered in on Saturday." The last preceding Saturday was July 6, but the Ohio Adjutant-General's records repeatedly state the date of mustering Company K as June 19, which was

other companies (A, B, D, F and H) were mustered-in on June 20; two others (C and G) at later dates down into September, and E late in December. The tenth and last company (I) was not raised and added until October, 1862, when it was done as part of the energetic work of recruiting by Captain Lane, who had been sent to the State from the field for that purpose. But it is said, in a history of the Eleventh Ohio (written by two officers in it), that it was the *first three-years regiment of Ohio.**

Camp Dennison (named for the then Governor) was one of the first of the camps built for the rendezvous of volunteers. It grew to be a very large camp, and was more or less filled with troops, coming, training, equipping and going, throughout the war. It was twelve miles northeast from Cincinnati, on the Marietta & Cincinnati railroad.

"Monday morning next" in Captain Lane's order to move to the rendezvous was June 24. On that day he wrote to his wife from Camp Dennison—"I am in camp. We brought out about 50 men, some drunk, some sober. I have a great responsibility, but I will try and do my duty." The "brought out" means from Cincinnati to the camp, and it suggests that some of his men had not found it convenient to report for duty when they were notified of the marching order or to stay with the column on the march to the camp. Drinking at that time, especially among workingmen, was very common, and the average volunteer was at first quite "independent", having little idea of discipline or of the obligation he had assumed of close obedience to orders.

The Captain could not take out all the men he had originally enrolled, because their enrollment was made when the call was for men for three months and before there was any purpose of calling for three years. A re-adjustment, in fact a reenlistment, was required. Those

not a Saturday. He may refer to his own muster-in as Captain, which would be necessary to complete the company organization, but this is officially given as July 7. It may be that the muster-in was on Saturday, July 6, but that the officials, for some reason, dated it "as of" June 19.

* "History of the Eleventh Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infantry: Compiled by Horton and Teverbaugh": Dayton, 1866.

who could not, or would not, go for three years dropped out, and, probably, some new men came in. But, when finally mustered-in for the Eleventh Ohio, the company-roll showed 86 men and 3 officers,— Captain Lane, First-Lieutenant George P. Darrow and Second-Lieutenant George W. Johnson, the latter taking the place of Lenner of the original company, who dropped out. The field officers of the reorganized regiment were Colonel Charles A. DeVilliers, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph W. Frizell and Major Augustus H. Coleman. The colonel of the original regiment had resigned.

The choice of DeVilliers for colonel proved to be a terrible misfortune for the regiment. If it was not ruined by his year of command, it was only because there was among the inferior officers and the men enough of sterling qualities, with zeal in the cause and endurance of continuing neglect and bad administration, to bear their disgracing incubus until it could be thrown off.

DeVilliers was an example — a rather extreme one — of a peculiar class of officers who appeared in the volunteer service early in the war, under the anxious search for men experienced in the instruction and drill of new soldiers. The instant, pressing need of training led to an eager acceptance of the help of any one who had or professed to have any knowledge of such work. Tho the small regular army was depleted of its younger officers, to serve as instructors and field-officers in the volunteers, the number so used was very far from supplying the hundreds of new regiments called out. Any one who had been an officer or soldier in the army or in the volunteers in the Mexican war was now sure of a respected position, tho in that short war the most of the volunteers saw no important service. But there were in the country many foreigners who had been minor officers or soldiers in the armies in Europe, and others came over as military adventurers when our war broke out. These were looked up to with a kind of awe by the credulous American militia, and, with surprising ease, with little or no inquiry as to their history or real capacity, and without trial, they obtained many important military positions. Germans were the most numerous, but there were English, French, Austrians and Poles.

When the new Eleventh Ohio was assembling in this rendezvous-camp the Eighth Ohio was already in adjoining quarters. The parade-ground employments of that regiment were much enlivened by the activities of a small, dapper, very alert man as drill-master. He was conspicuously "foreign" in appearance, of very dark complexion and sharp features, wore a smart red and gold cap, bright blue tight coat and red trousers, and was highly conceited in manner and talk (he spoke English fluently, tho with bad pronunciation); and he appeared to be acting as a "sort of Inspector-General" of the camp, tho it does not appear that he had any real official position. The soldiers commonly spoke of him as "the Major" and supposed him to be Major of the Eighth Ohio, but he was not. He was always active and conspicuous, and he made the green soldiers gape with astonishment at his brilliant sword-play and bayonet-gymnastics on the Eighth parade-ground. He was the wonder of the camps and, in the ignorance of the time, was believed to possess all military science and arts. He was, or was believed to be, a Frenchman. If so, he had probably been a minor officer in the French army or a fencing-master; but his former career was unknown and no care was taken to inquire into it. When his true character came out he was believed to be a disreputable adventurer,—probably a good guess. This was Colonel DeVilliers.

When the colonelcy of the Eleventh became vacant by the resignation of Colonel Harrison, who commanded in the three-months service, there was an "election" in the regiment for his successor.* DeVilliers was easily a candidate, was elected, and the Governor gave him the commission, probably influenced not alone by the election, but also by the reports of the rare qualifications of the candidate. Afterward his enemies said that his candidacy and election were due to intrigue. Very likely they

* Colonel Lane has frequently criticized, with just severity, this vicious practice of electing officers in the volunteer regiments, tho he was himself elected both as Captain and as Colonel. It is impossible to defend the great wrong. The cost of it in waste of life and property and demoralization of the volunteers was immeasurable. In many regiments, however, if not in most, it was stopped after one or two years of experience.

were due to a concealed plan, for a much abler man would have been found in either the lieutenant-colonel or major, or indeed in almost any one of the captains. But this knowledge and understanding came too late. When DeVilliers was chosen the Eleventh Ohio was thought to be rarely fortunate in getting such a paragon of military ability for their instructor and commander. But he proved to be almost unwholly unfit for the place; and, so far from developing the capacity of his regiment, his persistent failure in duty and misconduct prevented that development as far as it could be prevented. If he was not a mere charlatan, his regiment was at least never benefited by his supposed knowledge and skill. It had never any effective drilling or maneuvering by him in either the rendezvous-camp or the field. His inefficiency in actual service in the field was so frequently shown that he lost all confidence and respect of the regiment, and by the end of a year his incapacity and misconduct had become so notorious and intolerable that he was finally ordered before a court-martial, tried on charges of gross misconduct, breaches of discipline and criminal acts, convicted, and at once cashiered.

II

1861: JUNE — JULY

The Second Brigade Ordered to the Field — Receives Arms — First March — Captain Lane on Special Duty, Patrolling the Ohio — Invasion of Virginia — The Kanawha Movement

The first stage of the unfortunate condition of the Eleventh Ohio thus described came to an end on July 7, 1861, when it was ordered to move immediately to Gallipolis, an Ohio town on the Ohio river, just below the mouth of the Big Kanawha. The men had not yet been armed, but now, while they were packing up under this order, they received their first guns. These were muskets of the old flint-lock make, recently altered by rifling the barrels and substituting percussion-locks.

The regiment was then, of course, obviously unfit for military service, but that was true of most other regiments in the Northern armies, and true of their enemies in the Southern. The companies had been together in camp but two weeks, some even less; they had a colonel who had not drilled or instructed them; their drilling otherwise had been irregular and probably much of it misdirected or incompetent; many or most of them had had no instruction in arms; three had not yet been mustered into the service, in fact were not yet completed or fully organized; and the seven others had only within a week or two been mustered-in. In short, they were little better than if a body of citizens hastily assembled and armed for an emergency.

On July 7, within a few hours after receiving the order to move and the muskets, the men were marched to the nearest station, put into cattle, coal and box cars, and started for the field. Tho it is spoken of as "the regiment" there could not have been more than the seven

companies which had been mustered-in, probably less than 600 men in all; but Captain Lane was there with 71 men of his Company K. In the haste of the movement, however, both of his lieutenants were left behind, and the duties of all the company officers were upon him.

At Chillicothe at midnight the train halted and remained several hours. The people turned out with a big "reception", marching to meet the volunteers with flags and a band of music, and the women prepared a bountiful meal for all. Captain Lane wrote that they had "all the substantials and delicacies that could be produced and with a hearty welcome", and finally "a God-speed in our great task of suppressing the rebellion." This incident is mentioned because it is an example of the way in which the volunteer regiments were treated by the people, not only at their home towns on assembling and on leaving, but in other towns, where they were strangers, on their road to the field. There were thousands of these scenes, ending only with the greatest of all on the return to the north at the end of the war.

At Hamden Station the men were transferred to a train on the Hocking-Valley railroad and went on to Oak Hill (or Portland) in Jackson county, then a terminal station, where it arrived late in the afternoon of July 8. From here there had to be a march of thirty miles, to Gallipolis.* The weather was hot, the men had had no training in marching, only a few could have had experience in long walks, they wore the close-fitting boots of civilians at that time (shoes for men were little known until after the war), they had had little or no sleep the night before in the rough cars, they had no doubt been eating too much, and they now carried, each, the heavy old musket, a full knapsack, blankets, extra clothing, and such other extra personal luggage as every green soldier feels that he must add to the regular and sufficient army supply.

The original purpose of this movement was a campaign in the Kanawha valley under an order of General Mc-

* Why this movement was not made by steamboats up the river I do not learn. That was obviously the easiest and quickest way. One has to guess that either boats were not available or that there was apprehension of being fired upon from the Kentucky shore.

Clellan, issued July 2 at Grafton, Virginia, which called three regiments from Camp Dennison as soon as they could be got ready, but the immediate reason for the abrupt march of the Eleventh Ohio, before it was fully organized or equipped, was one of the wild rumors that were very common at that time of an "attack by the enemy." The Secessionists of Kentucky were about to cross the Ohio and take Gallipolis, it said. So, when the Colonel began the march from Oak Hill he was in such thoughtless apprehension that he fancied "the enemy" on the Ohio side of the river. Accordingly he drew up his men, told them they were now "in the enemy's country" and might be attacked at any time; that they must, nevertheless, reach Gallipolis, and as quickly as possible; that every man must keep to his place in the ranks, and that anyone who fell out would be shot as a deserter. Rashly assuming that a forced march was required, he set out about 7 o'clock for an all-night march. Without thought for, or else indifferent to, the heavy handicap of these conditions, and without even the prudence of beginning with a slow movement and making frequent short halts for "breathing," the excited Colonel urged the men on at a fast walk from the first and attempted to keep it up thro the night. Naturally, within a few miles the whole column was in disorder, and its condition constantly grew worse.

But human nature and human endurance are beyond the control of colonels. The same men who, after training or the experience of a campaign or two in the field, could march thirty miles in a day or a night without serious fatigue or straggling, were now badly broken up within ten miles. As Captain Lane tells the story of this attempt at a rapid continuous march, "within the first few miles the men showed signs of distress," their "set features, heavy breathing and limping steps threatened speedy exhaustion"; the Colonel "rode from head to rear, from rear to head, of the column and, with oaths and vile abuse, strove to maintain the cruel, idiotic march." To relieve their swollen feet, many took off their boots and walked in stockings, while others cut their boots open. One after another the articles of extra clothing and luggage were thrown to the roadside, but yet the suf-

ferers began to fall out and lie down, and the number increased rapidly, while the others, tougher or more resolute, plodded along with little or no semblance of ranks or order. Long before the march was half done the number of delinquents was so great that the idea of punishment would have been highly absurd.

This is a picture of the first march of many a regiment of the green volunteers, except as to the lack of good sense and the harshness of the commanding officer.

Arriving at the village of Centerville, after ten miles of this reckless waste, Captain Lane, with sound discretion, took the responsibility of saving his men in spite of the marching order. Hardly more than half the men were up in his or any of the other companies. He ordered a halt and rest. Some people of the village appeared and offered him the use of the church, in which the seats would furnish better beds than the roadside; and he found means of sending back on the road and bringing up his disabled men. Other captains, learning what he had done, followed his example, quite ready to share his fate in disobeying orders and overriding the Colonel's lurid idea of discipline. So the most of the column spent the remainder of that night in rest.

At daybreak the aching pains of the tyros were much soothed in the news that the citizens were already up and cooking a breakfast for them. With this delightful refreshment and mental comfort, the war-worn heroes set out again, and, having no colonel, made easy marches, and reached Gallipolis, in fair order, in the afternoon. Some who had been riding in borrowed wagons got out on approaching the town and marched, to escape the disgrace of being seen in an unsoldierly position. The fact is, however, after all, that this march — thirty miles within some twenty-two hours, in hot weather — would have been creditable to old soldiers.

The rash little Colonel, with a small part of his men who must have had special experience afoot or unusual endurance, marched all night, and halted in Gallipolis early in the morning. And it proved, as might well have been foreseen, that there had been no real occasion for haste. The Colonel none the less loudly repeated his threat of court-martial for every officer and man who

had fallen behind; but in this, as in other cases, the threats ended the matter.

Active service for the regiment (or, at least, for Captain Lane and his company) began at once; and for them the next five months were crowded thick with heavy labors, many marches, and the often repeated excitement of expected or actual conflicts with the enemy. That night, the Captain says, the company had "good quarters on the wharf-boat." The next morning, July 9, under an order of General Cox (who had already reached Gallipolis, with another regiment of the brigade), Captain Lane took 40 of his men on the steamboat *Leslie Combs* and moved down the river. He was to patrol the Virginia shore in the hope of catching or tracing a party of marauders who had just held up and plundered the steamboat *Fanny M. Burns*, but he also "carried dispatches" for two Kentucky regiments which were moving up the river. He seems to have then known that the dispatches "related to the Kanawha movement," of which much is to be said later.

He was to have his men and arms concealed, himself wearing civilian dress, and to try to get into communication with any parties of men on the Virginia side, without risking a landing. He saw a number of such parties, but they were all dumb to his arts, and he learned nothing. Finally he did land with a detachment (why he did so, in view of his order, does not appear) at a place which appeared to him to offer some promise, and searched the neighborhood, but without result. He continued this search that day and night, reaching a point some fifteen miles below Guyandotte (a Virginia town near the Kentucky border), there meeting the two Kentucky regiments and delivering the dispatches; and then found himself ordered to Guyandotte, where he landed with his men the night of July 10, at the end of "a fine trip of thirty-six hours". He remained there one day, and then, under further orders, moved with his detachment on his boat up to Point Pleasant (a small town of historic interest in the Indian wars) in Virginia, just above the mouth of the Big Kanawha, landing there the night of July 11.

There was a "reign of terror" at that time in western Virginia. Secessionist and Union men had been inter-

mingled thruout the region, but, under the truculent aggressiveness of the Secessionists, many Union families had been driven from their homes. Point Pleasant was nearly deserted, and Captain Lane quartered his men in abandoned houses, while he occupied the judge's chambers in the court-house. It does not appear whether the remainder of his company, or of the regiment, was then ordered to Point Pleasant, but on the 12th he says "only three companies" of soldiers were there; nor whether he was the commander of the post; but he had the complex difficulty common at that time to Union officers commanding posts in the border slave states, in dealing with citizens alleged to be hostile; for some of the suspected were guilty and some were not. So he writes "I expect to make ten or twelve arrests to-night of Secession leaders. I find a much worse condition here and along the border than I expected. The Union men are cowed down and have to run for their lives." And he gives instances of their persecution. Four days later he writes "We have many of the F.F.V's under arrest and many more ought to be." Then, as if in connection with the treachery of the "Secesh", he goes on—"Our pickets were fired on twice last night, and we were under arms nearly all night". If this firing was really at the pickets, it was, probably, merely desultory, by individuals—the "pot-shots" to which the savage but cowardly partisans in the South were much addicted,—as there could not have been any organized force of the enemy near enough to the Ohio at that time to justify a fear of any real attack.

On the 17th the companies at Point Pleasant were sent on boats up the Big Kanawha, to rejoin their regiments in "the Kanawha movement" already referred to. Meantime, under the orders of General McClellan, General Cox had moved his brigade, on boats up the Kanawha, to the mouth of Pocotaligo creek, twelve miles below Charleston, and Colonel DeVilliers had gone up with the remainder of the Eleventh Ohio from Gallipolis. A day or two later one more company (G) arrived from Camp Dennison for the Eleventh, making now eight companies in the field. The night of the 19th Captain Lane and his company thus rejoined the regiment and encamped with it at Pocotaligo creek.

There was immediately very interesting news of the war. On the 16th, near there, occurred the "Battle of Scarey Creek", in which the Eleventh had an unforeseen and humiliating share. Colonel DeVilliers was captured, thro his own folly, tho neither he nor his regiment took any part in the engagement. But of that later.

III

1861: JULY

Under McClellan in Western Virginia — His Battle of Rich Mountain — First Campaign on the Kanawha — Battle of Scarey Creek — Capture of Colonel DeVilliers

Arriving in the field in Virginia, the regiment now came directly under the command of General McClellan, as part of his army in action. From the latter part of May this promising general had been laying plans and making movements for the occupation of all western Virginia.* Indeed his ambition soared so far as that he contemplated, first, victory in a decisive battle, then a march thro the country, leaving it securely Union behind him, either over the mountains to Staunton on the Shenandoah and thence southwestward to the New-river country, or up the Kanawha and New rivers and thro the mountains to Wytheville and thence down the valleys of the Tennessee into eastern Tennessee, where the Union men would rise and call for arms; and he would thus "break the backbone of Secession". His paper plans were always comprehensive and his combinations for movement always sure to win, tho they never did win, even once, in all his career. General Scott, who was very friendly to him, avoided refusing flatly, but he mildly suggested that the plan of crossing the mountains was rather premature and that the march proposed would present the difficulties of a rather long line for supplies.†

* It was not yet a separate State as "West Virginia."

† But this was only a modest curtailing of an earlier plan, upon which he proposed to march with 80,000 men up the Kanawha and New rivers, over the mountains and down the James and take Richmond; or, with a larger army, to march from the Ohio upon Nashville and thence to the Gulf, taking either Pensacola, Mobile

Tho not wholly within the purpose of this narrative, some account of the doings of McClellan in western Virginia would be interesting. Indeed, the peculiar purpose of military operations in that country in 1861 ought to be explained anyhow, as Captain Lane and the Eleventh Ohio had an active share in them.

Thruout the war the government felt a keen interest in the position of the Unionists in western Virginia and North Carolina and eastern Kentucky and Tennessee. They were especially always in the mind and plans of Lincoln, who not only had a deep feeling of sympathy with those sorely tried but faithfully loyal sufferers, but also saw the great political value of the occupation by Union troops of that region. He had, further, the encouragement of bold political action in the Virginia section of the region, where the autocratic course of the leaders in the southern part of the State in forcing upon the unwilling convention at Richmond, in April, an "Ordinance of Secession" was bitterly resented. Forty counties in the west held an election in May and chose delegates to a convention, which began sitting May 13, at Wheeling, repudiated the alleged secession, declared the State still in the Union, elected a Governor and other State officers, and took steps which brought about finally the division of the State and the creation of West Virginia.

Accordingly, in execution of a policy of careful protection and conciliation, the government determined to occupy western Virginia, as the nearest of the territory in question. For this purpose General McClellan, having been already assigned to the command of the newly formed Department of the Ohio, was naturally chosen to conduct the military operations, the western parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania were added to his Department, and he received instructions from Washington in the

or New Orleans, as might be desired. General Scott left this foolish paper with Lincoln, only commenting that, even if either campaign were possible, only 75,000 men were called out for all purposes, that their three-months terms of service would expire before McClellan could organize and start, and that transportation by land would take twice the time and cost five times as much as by water and be infinitely more difficult.

policy and purposes proposed. This was at the time of the election just mentioned and when there were no rebel troops (no definite body of them) anywhere west of the Shenandoah.

One would assume that, under these circumstances and in view of the urgency of the purpose, McClellan's movements would be prompt and rapid. There were then not less than twenty regiments of the three-months men available in Ohio, Indiana and western Pennsylvania, as well as four or five of western Virginia and eastern Kentucky, and half that number were enough at that time to occupy every strategic point between the Shenandoah and the Big Kanawha. But he engaged himself only in elaborate preparations and writings, and let time and opportunity slip away. True, his men had not yet much training, but in that respect the rebels were no better off, — much worse, in fact, as was shown in subsequent disclosures historically as well as in the first engagements.

He established his headquarters in Cincinnati early in May, with a large and imposing staff, and began that work of elaborate scientific preparation which was the most distinguishing feature of his military career. Preparation, as he saw it, was without limit; he was never, in his own judgment, ready for action, or at least was never furnished with the number of troops and quantities of supplies he reported to be essential to his plans,* tho he was in fact always much stronger in both than any enemy he met.

On May 26, however, at Cincinnati, he issued a volume of papers. He had determined to place troops at several points on the Ohio, ready for the "invasion" of Virginia, — at Bellaire, Marietta, Gallipolis and Ironton. Not only Ohio troops were ordered for this, but he notified Brigadier-General Morris, at Indianapolis, to "be ready to move to-morrow, with two Indiana regiments, to Wheeling or Parkersburg", and that five or six more regiments would probably be required. The same day he sent an order to Colonel Benjamin F. Kelley, to "make a forward movement" with his First Virginia regiment

* His reports to the Adjutant-General during June and July amply support this, as well as many reports in later campaigns.

on Fairmont (a few miles northwest of Grafton, a town on the Baltimore & Ohio railroad in Virginia); another to Colonel Irvine, to move from Bellaire to Wheeling with his Sixteenth Ohio regiment, occupy that place and move on to Fish creek, in support of Colonel Kelley; and another to Colonel Steedman, to move from Marietta, with his Fourteenth Ohio, to Parkersburg, occupy that place, and thence by rail toward Grafton.

The same day he issued from Cincinnati a proclamation
“**TO THE UNION MEN OF WEST VIRGINIA:**

“The General Government has long enough endured the machinations of a few factious rebels in your midst. Armed traitors have in vain endeavored to deter you from expressing your loyalty at the polls. Having failed in this infamous attempt * * * they now seek to inaugurate a reign of terror and thus force you to yield to their schemes. * * *

“The General Government has heretofore carefully abstained from sending troops across the Ohio, or even from posting them along its banks, tho frequently urged by many of your prominent citizens to do so. I determined to wait the result of the late election, desirous that no one might be able to say that the slightest effort had been made from this side to influence the free expression of your opinion. You have now shown, under the most adverse circumstances, that the great mass of the people of Western Virginia are true and loyal to that beneficent Government under which we and our fathers have lived so long. * * *

“The General Government cannot close its ears to the demand you have made for assistance. I have ordered troops to cross the river. They come as your friends and brothers—as enemies only to the armed rebels who are preying upon you * * * All your rights shall be religiously respected. Now that we are in your midst, fly to arms and support the General Government.”

The same day he issued from Cincinnati an address
“**TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE EXPEDITION:**

“Soldiers! You are ordered to cross the frontier and enter upon the soil of Virginia. Your mission is to restore peace and confidence, to protect the majesty of the law, to rescue our brethren from the grasp of armed traitors. You are to act in concert with the Virginia troops and support their advance.

“When, under your protection, the loyal men of Western Virginia have been enabled to organize and arm, they can protect themselves, and you can then return to your homes with the proud satisfaction of having preserved a gallant people from destruction.”

On the 27th of May, then, immediately after proclaiming these patriotic and lofty purposes and issuing these

resolute orders, we expect to see the redeeming General on the "soil of Virginia", in the saddle at the head of his army, with his trumpeter sounding the thrilling *Forward!* But he was, in fact, in his Cincinnati office, writing more on his purposes and plans. And he did not appear in Virginia for nearly four weeks.

The regiments designated did, however, cross the river and move "toward Grafton," and Colonel Kelley "occupied" that village, without an engagement (unless a merely nominal one), a small body of guerrillas who had burned a bridge near there running away into the mountains. Then that regiment, and the others as they appeared in the region, simply lay in camp awaiting orders or the General.

When he (at Cincinnati, May 30) heard of Colonel Kelley's arrival at Grafton, he telegraphed the Adjutant-General at Washington, that he "had the honor to report the successful occupation of Grafton without the loss of a single life." Then for three weeks more he remained at Cincinnati, doing nothing more to occupy Virginia or forward the campaign, except to order into the State, along the Baltimore & Ohio road, all the troops he could reach in his Department, the equivalent of nearly twenty-five regiments. There were at that time no organized rebel troops worth mentioning in that part of the State, nor indeed anywhere west of the Shenandoah.

But the rebel authorities, being thus freely informed and allowed ample time by their enemy, were quite awake to the military advantage of being first on the ground. And for them there was another impelling cause of action. The wide-spread Unionism in the country was well-known and gave them great concern. Nothing would do for that but suppression by the presence and activity of armed forces. This was at first left to the management of the authorities of the seceded State. General Robert E. Lee (not yet risen to fame) was then in command of the "Virginia Forces" (State militia) and had his headquarters in Richmond. He understood the political importance of holding the western region quite as well as Lincoln did, and, therefore, tho his "Forces" were meager and very poorly armed and equipped, his plans included the occupation of as many places there as prac-

ticable (in view of other demands upon him), especially for the gathering into his ranks as many of the citizens as possible.

If General McClellan foresaw this policy and movement, or understood it — as it would seem, in common sense, he must have done,— he was indefensibly delinquent in delaying so long his occupation of and defensive measures in the disputed country.

The problem of military occupation and defense was simple and, for the most part, not of great difficulty. The greater part of West Virginia is mountainous, but about one-third, lying along the Ohio and across the two Kanawhas, with wide valleys and low hills, is available for cultivation. The New river, rising in North Carolina and running northwardly thro old Virginia and north-westerly thro the mountains, joins with the Gauley, above Charleston, to form the Big Kanawha, and so flows quite across the State, dividing it, one-third to the south and west and two-thirds to the north and east. This southwest portion is almost entirely a vast area of irregular mountains and has no streams or valleys of great size. During the war there were only one or two tolerable, tho often steep and difficult, roads by which it could be crossed and only a sparse and very ignorant population. In the portion north and east of the Kanawha there are several considerable rivers, flowing to the Ohio, with comparatively large valleys; and there were then several "turnpike" roads, many "dirt" roads, a large population and many towns. In the northeast quarter of this section the mountains take the form of several high ridges, lying parallel with each other, remarkably straight and uniform in structure, running nearly north and south, with narrow valleys between. In each valley a river flows northward and is spanned by a bridge of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad. In the westerly ridge were Laurel Mountain and Rich Mountain, the former about twenty miles south of the railroad at Grafton and the latter ten or twelve miles further south. Two of the turnpike roads mentioned crossed all these ridges, by convenient passes, and connected the Ohio with the Shenandoah. One ran by Laurel Mountain, the other by

Rich. The Baltimore & Ohio road, across the northern end of the country, was then operated from Baltimore to Parkersburg, and was of great value to the government for the transportation of troops and supplies. There was no other railroad west of the Shenandoah, and the wagon-roads leading up the Big Kanawha, and especially those from the head of navigation on that river up the New river country, as well as by Lewisburg and Covington, were therefore of great importance.

It thus seems clear that to occupy and hold western Virginia the first, and the one essential, thing to do was to take possession promptly of the Kanawha and the lower part of the Gauley and New rivers by a strong force, with five or six batteries, commanded by a trained general. Tho the protection of the Baltimore & Ohio road was essential, that could be provided for by placing smaller forces in front of it, with provision for quick reinforcement from a base at Parkersburg or Wheeling; for the danger to the road would be rather from small raids than from any set campaign. There was no probability of an attempt by the enemy to occupy permanently the northern part of western Virginia, because of the great difficulty of moving a large army westward across the several mountain ranges and maintaining its transportation and the great risk of having it cut off by a movement south from the Baltimore & Ohio road or north from the Gauley river. Moreover, there was no such enemy army available at any time in 1861. But McClellan's course was, to plant nearly all his forces and guns on the railroad and for the next two months merely hold them in camp, while he left the center of his field (the Kanawha valley) to take care of itself.

The inevitable result was, that the enemy seized the opportunity thus offered him. General Lee, then commanding the "Virginia Forces", had special orders to occupy as far as practicable the western part of the State. If he was in need of information of McClellan's purposes he found it in McClellan's egotistic publication of them in May. Within a few weeks his troops held all the country of the New river and the Kanawha, down nearly to the Ohio, and another body was marching from

Staunton thro the mountains, to seize the two pikes at Laurel and Rich mountains, where McClellan could and should have had fortified posts a month before.

Thus, to redeem his obvious faults, McClellan was compelled to engage in two aggressive campaigns. The one in the north, against the enemy's positions at Laurel and Rich mountains he commanded personally; and he was so busy with preparation for it that, for a time, he gave no attention to the other, but permitted the enemy not only to take possession but to fortify on the lower Kanawha.

The rebel General Garnett, sent by General Lee, late in June, to hold Laurel and Rich mountains, had about 4,500 men and 12 field guns, a force hastily recruited, untrained and poorly armed. He posted Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram, with two regiments, 1,100 or 1,200 men and 4 guns, at Rich Mountain, with orders to establish a fortified camp. Laurel Mountain being nearer McClellan's position he retained there the greater part of his troops, less than 3,500, under his personal command.

McClellan had about Grafton 20,000 men for service and 34 guns, all of his troops being superior to Garnett's in arms and in training. After weeks of special preparation he moved into the field with some 13,000 men and 24 guns, posted half his forces, under General Morris, in front of Garnett at Laurel Mountain, to threaten attack but await further orders, and moved on himself with the other half, twelve miles further, against Rich Mountain. He appeared before Pegram's position on July 10 and began work, as a military engineer, upon a plan of scientific approaches. He had already written to General Scott that he would "never throw his men into the teeth of artillery and intrenchments if it is possible to avoid it"; but Pegram's defenses were only hastily constructed intrenchments eked out by barricades and manned by his 1,100 or 1,200 men with their 4 field guns.

General Rosecrans, who commanded one of McClellan's brigades, proposed to him that he be sent around Pegram's left flank, to get the road in his rear, but was only snubbed for his pains. The next day, however, McClellan was willing to consider the plan, and finally consented to try it. Rosecrans promptly set out with his

brigade at noon, worked his way thro the forest and up the ravines, and by three o'clock reached the road on the mountain top three miles in rear of Pegram's camp. Pegram had provided against such an attempt by posting 300 of his men and one gun at that place, under a captain. This little force gallantly resisted Rosecrans's advance, but was soon defeated by his far larger command and driven off to the east. Rosecrans sent a courier to report his success to McClellan, but the man was captured on the way and McClellan spent all the night at work on elaborate approaches and emplacements for his 12 guns. At daylight his pickets discovered that the enemy had evacuated the position during the night. At the same time he heard from Rosecrans, and a little later had a report from Morris that Garnett was retreating and that he was in pursuit. Thereupon he sent to Washington two reports of his victory and moved over the mountain eastward, to Beverly, where, within the next few days he wrote several more reports of the campaign, each one further magnifying his achievements. Several times he wrote, not only that the enemy had much exceeded him in numbers, but that he had "defeated two armies"!

The whole "Battle of Rich Mountain" was, as thus shown, only the engagement of Rosecrans, upon his own initiative, with his brigade of nearly 3,000 men, with a rebel force of 300 men and one gun under a captain; but, within two weeks, on McClellan's reports alone, it led to the amazing act of the government in calling him to the command of all the armies; and his career was then for a year and a half an unbroken story of vast sacrifices and humiliating failures.

When McClellan thought he was about to begin his campaign against Garnett he at last gave attention to the Kanawha valley. But, taking advantage of his delays, as already said, the enemy had occupied the country in force. General Wise was on the Kanawha, with a body of troops which he called "Wise's Legion", variously reported to number 5,000 to 7,000, with 10 guns, and General Floyd was on the New and Greenbrier rivers with 6,000 men and 8 or 10 guns, known as "Floyd's Army." But, tho both generals were in that country for a year,

their support of each other was never effective, because of mutual jealousies.

To meet these forces and hold the Kanawha, McClellan made provision which would seem to be remarkably inadequate, as will appear in his order. This he issued at Grafton, Va., on the 2d of July; and it gave directions in such detail as to leave little discretion to the commander of the troops it ordered out. It was directed to Brigadier-General Jacob D. Cox, of the "Ohio Militia", at Camp Dennison, Cincinnati, and required him to "assume command of the First and Second Kentucky infantry and Twelfth Ohio infantry, expedite their equipment and call upon the Governor (of Ohio) for one company of cavalry and six guns, move them by rail to Gallipolis; with the regiment first ready go to Gallipolis, take command of the Twenty-first Ohio there; cross and occupy Point Pleasant; with the next regiment that arrives occupy Letart's Falls (on the Ohio, Virginia side, below Gallipolis); move the other two to mouth of Ten-mile creek (on the Ohio, Virginia side, ten miles below Letart's); leave one regiment at Point Pleasant in reserve; intrench two guns at Letart's and four at your advanced position on the Kanawha; remain on the defensive; hold the rebels near Charleston until I can cut off their retreat by movement from Beverly.* If you are certain I am hard pressed, seek to relieve me by rapid advance upon Charleston, but place no credit in rumors, for I shall be successful."†

How General Cox was to do all that with the four regiments does not appear, since the order required all of them to be posted directly on the Ohio river; but, as the Eleventh Ohio closely followed them into Virginia, it must be that some later authority was received or assumed by Cox, under which he added at least that one regiment to his command. None of McClellan's many printed official reports show that he gave any instructions for the Kanawha movement after the order of July 2; but he said, in a report on July 6, that he had "ordered

* Beverly was just east of Rich Mountain above mentioned and quite 120 miles from Charleston.

† He was then preparing for the "Battle of Rich Mountain": ante, page 28.

a movement in force up the Great Kanawha ", and in another report, on July 12, he said "with the Gauley Bridge held, as it probably is by this time by General Cox, the occupation of Western Virginia is on a safe basis "; and in another report, on July 13, he said "I hope General Cox has by this time driven Wise out of the Kanawha valley."

That is, McClellan expected an inexperienced militia general to take new and untrained troops, four or five regiments, get them armed and equipped, move them more than a hundred miles to the Kanawha, place them in four positions along a line of twenty miles, intrench the six guns in two batteries, and yet move his command nearly one hundred miles up the Kanawha, the upper half of the movement being thro a very difficult mountain country, when all bridges over the lateral streams were destroyed, take Charleston and Gauley Bridge, both of the first importance to the enemy and both fortified; and get all this done inside of ten days. And yet he himself, in the north of the State, with more than twenty regiments, including those of longest training, with at least 34 guns, spent over six weeks in preparing for and making an advance of but twenty to thirty miles over a comparatively easy country, against an enemy of hardly one-fourth his own strength!

What happened was what would naturally be expected. For himself, with his far superior forces and guns, he was able, practically, to surround his enemy and, after a small and extremely unequal engagement, drive him from the region and harass his retreat, taking one-sixth of his men, when he ought easily to have captured the whole. For General Cox there could be no flanking, because his force was too small and there were no roads available for that purpose in the wild mountains which composed the country and crowded up close to the Kanawha ; so that he was compelled to oppose his enemy only on the narrow front permitted by the banks of the river, while there were many streams falling into the river, thro deep and rocky ravines, all the bridges being destroyed by the enemy as he approached. He was, therefore, necessarily occupied in continuous hard work seventeen days in making the hundred miles up the

Kanawha, and twelve days of that time (after the affair at Scarey creek*) in forcing the enemy out of the Charleston and Gauley Bridge positions. In view of the peculiar and constant difficulties of the country and of the obstructed and defended road and the bridgeless streams, the march should be credited as one of remarkable speed.

As it happened, the most conspicuous and effective force in overcoming the delays and hastening the march lay in Captain Lane and his Company K. With much ingenuity and skill, and working night and day, he and his company (assisted at times by details from other companies) rebuilt the old bridges, improvised new ones, cleared away the heavy obstructions thrown in the road by rocks and felled trees, and for miles improved the way for guns and wagons.

On receiving the order of July 2, at Camp Dennison, General Cox set about its execution with all speed, but each of the regiments was more or less lacking in equipment. There were not yet even enough guns for the men. It was impossible at that time for the government to get all the arms, clothing and equipage so suddenly required for a large army. At least one of Cox's regiments was not supplied with muskets until the hour it marched. General McClellan's order shows that he then knew these troops were not yet ready. But within five days some of them were moving, and, altho it took two days to reach the Kanawha by the route ordered, Cox had them all there on the 11th. At the mouth of the Pocotaligo creek (a large stream on the east side of the Kanawha) he was stopped by the presence of the enemy and the destruction of the bridge over that creek. Here he made a temporary defensive camp and "intrenched" his remaining four guns, as ordered.

It will be remembered that he was not ordered to make an aggressive campaign for the present, but was to be on the defensive and was not to advance upon Charleston (twelve miles further up the river) unless in a certain contingency, which, indeed, never arose. Simply to await events or further orders now appears to have been his

* See page 33.

whole duty; tho, of course, meanwhile he occupied himself actively in training his new men, securing his position, and seeking information of the position and movements of his enemy.

When Cox first moved up the Kanawha, Wise moved down from Charleston and destroyed the Pocotaligo bridge; and when Cox established himself at Pocotaligo, Wise was only a few miles in front, in observation. A few days later (July 16) Cox sent Colonel Norton, with part of the Twenty-first Ohio (his own regiment) and of the Twelfth Ohio, 1,200 men and one gun in all, up the west side of the river for a reconnoisance. Norton was not to bring on an engagement, but when, within a few miles, he came to Scarey creek, a stream flowing into the Kanawha from the west, thro a deep and rocky ravine, he was fired upon from the other side by an enemy concealed, but evidently of considerable number, with two or three guns. Being only on a reconnoisance, he should have fallen back, out of fire, and tried to learn the strength and purpose of the enemy; but, being inexperienced and a brave man, he considered himself in a battle and undertook to hold his ground and return the fire. The "battle" was thus fought across the ravine, which Norton could not, or did not, reach: probably he could not have found a passage across it if he had reached it. Wise seems to have had the greater part of his forces there and was himself in command.

Norton soon fell, wounded, as well as several of his men, and his command, unable to advance and not ordered to retire, became confused, fell back in disorder, and retreated to the camp at Pocotaligo, having lost two killed, six wounded, and six officers and a few men captured. Wise, in a delirium of joy,* crossed the ravine by a circuit and followed almost to the camp.

But this was not all the disaster. Colonel DeVilliers, who had just joined the little army, with part of the Eleventh Ohio, left the camp with two or three other officers (one a colonel) and rode up the east side of the river, to observe Norton's movement, for entertainment. Hearing the firing, and the view being obstructed, they

* Official Records, War Dept., vol. 2, p. 291.

rode down to the river, and finding a "flat" at hand were ferried over, and immediately rode into the enemy's lines. They said afterward that they were betrayed by the display of a United States flag. So Wise had as prisoners three colonels and three minor officers (Norton's wound being so severe that he could not move and one of his staff remaining to care for him), with a few men.

This was the "Battle of Scarey Creek", of little more consequence in military view than if Wise had driven in a picket; but it at once became in the excitable imagination of the time a "great victory" on one side and a great disaster on the other. Morally it did have, temporarily, a good effect on the rebel side and a bad one on ours.

McClellan had instructed Cox (the paper does not appear in the official records, there is only a reference to it in one of McClellan's reports to the Adjutant-General) to "occupy Ripley with one regiment and move with four on Charleston and the Gauley Bridge, and also to occupy Barboursville and Guyandotte." But it does not appear that any more troops were ordered out for these purposes, nor that Cox had more than the five regiments already mentioned. Ripley was forty miles to the left, while Barboursville and Guyandotte were far in his rear. And yet McClellan at the same time, in providing for unlimited strength in the forces with himself, telegraphed to the Adjutant-General that "the Indiana and Ohio troops (all of them, as the context shows) are necessary to my success," that is, against the enemy in his immediate front. A day or two later his demand was "Please send me some more regular officers; some old (that is, regular) regiments if possible." And a few days later he calls for "a brigade of the old regular infantry and some companies of the regular cavalry." He already had more than 20,000 troops at hand, with many regular officers (four of them being his brigadier-generals and several serving as colonels of volunteers), while his enemy numbered less than 5,000, all having had less training and experience than the greater part of his own troops, and while in his Kanawha forces there was not, so far as is known, even one regular officer.

In view of his orders to Cox and of these circum-

stances, McClellan's expectations of the Kanawha campaign can only be characterized as absurd; and it is not surprising that when he heard of "Scarey Creek" he was unreasonably angry and disgusted. He criticised Cox (to others) with harsh injustice, without waiting to learn the facts, and by repeated messages to Washington much injured his reputation, without sending any definite news or statement relating to the engagement but his own abuse. On July 19, in a telegram to the Adjutant-General, he said "Cox checked on the Kanawha. Has fought something between a victory and a defeat. Will start as soon as possible to cut off Wise's retreat and relieve our credit. In Heaven's name give me some general officers who understand their profession. I give orders and find some who cannot execute them unless I stand by them. Unless I command every picket and lead every column I cannot be sure of success."

For egotism, arrogance and foolishness this has no parallel except in his own similar later ebullitions in other fields. Little more than a month later, when he was in immediate command of the great army at Washington, he was writing, privately, just such egotism relating to the General-in-Chief, the President, and most of his Cabinet. He had then, as he said, only one "friend" in the government. The Secretary of War did appreciate his genius; but even he was not long in being found out and placed among the "incompetents," as he called them.

On July 21, in a private letter (published by his family), he wrote

"Cox lost more in getting a detachment thrashed than I did in routing two armies. The consequence is I shall move down (that is, from Beverly) with a heavy column, to take Mr. Wise in the rear. It is absolutely necessary for me to go in person. There is no one I can trust. I don't feel sure that the men will fight very well under anyone but myself. I expect to leave by the day after to-morrow at the latest."

On the day before this letter he had telegraphed to the Adjutant-General that he intended to make this march against Wise immediately: on the day after it he telegraphed General Scott that he had "suspended" it, —as if it were of no great importance. He never recurred to it.

He was quite serious about the "two armies." It was not merely a playful expression in a private family letter. He had issued, on the 16th, a formal congratulatory address to his army which began

"SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF THE WEST: * I am more than satisfied with you. You have annihilated two armies commanded by educated and experienced soldiers," etc.

It would be amusing, if it were not painful, to see such blind egotism in a man of so much intelligence, education and experience. He gets the "two armies" by making one of them out of Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram and his temporary detachment of 1,100 men from Garnett's command, the other being the remainder of about 3,400 with Garnett.† If there were thus two armies in front of him, then he had four armies to oppose them,—his own, Rosecrans's, Morris's and Kelley's,—any two of them being much superior, in both numbers and power, to the whole of Garnett's forces taken together.

It was simply not true that "Cox lost more" etc. In Colonel Norton's misfortune at Scarey Creek there were two killed, six wounded and six missing. McClellan's official reports of Rich Mountain and Garnett's retreat (made before he wrote the letter of the 21st) show thirteen killed and fifty-four wounded and omit the missing, tho there must have been some.

Again, on July 22, in another report to General Scott, he proposed to "send two or three regiments and a better general to reinforce Cox," and asks if that would be approved. As he was in unqualified command of the Department and had himself planned the Kanawha campaign and determined what troops were to go, he knew he needed no approval for sending such a reinforcement, so that his motive in bothering the Commander-in-Chief with it must have been his vanity in bringing up the subject again. It was then ten days after the end of his own campaign, there was no enemy within a hundred miles of him, and he had from ten to fifteen regiments which had done no material work in his campaign, but

* There was no "Army of the West." That was only McClellan's own phrase for glorification.

† See page 28.

had been lying in camps near by for six or seven weeks. He could easily and safely have sent, not only "two or three", but twice as many, to reinforce Cox, and should have done it.

It is noticeable that in the same paper he refers to " McDowell's check " at Bull Run, but in a very different tone, as if it were merely a misfortune, tho it was in fact a very great and shocking disaster, thro McDowell's unfitness for such a command; but McDowell was a " regular " and a personal friend.

Finally, and perhaps worst of all, he does not see the folly of criticising an inexperienced militia general for failing to defeat Wise at the first encounter, with a small brigade of the newest troops, while, in the same breath, he proposes to do it with a " heavy column " of the best-trained troops, led in person as an " absolute necessity " by the best general he knows of — who is himself.

He had known General Cox, if not in Cincinnati before the war, at least from the hour when, together, they began service in the war, had worked in close relations with him in the organization and disposition of the Ohio troops, and thus had good opportunity to judge of his capacity; he had himself chosen him to command the Kanawha expedition, selected the troops he was to have, knew that at least part of them were green; and he had given detailed and limiting instructions for their disposition and movements. And yet he writes, even to the Adjutant-General of the Army, " In Heaven's name give me some general officers who understand their profession " ! just as if Cox had been imposed upon him, without his choice, by some one else.

When he wrote these disingenuous and unmanly things, however, his head had been turned by vanity over his great victory. With an army which was, in action, more than five times the strength of Cox's and more than three times that of his immediate enemy, he had cleared the Cheat river country in the north, and was busy writing many glowing reports to Washington.

IV

1861: JULY — AUGUST

Cox Defeats Wise on the Kanawha — Takes Charleston and Gauley Bridge — Captain Lane as an Engineer — Builds Many Bridges and the Gauley Ferry with Great Speed and Ingenuity

Returning now to Captain Lane and the Eleventh Ohio, tho their fortunes were modified by the removal of McClellan from immediate command, it was still some time before the forces on the Kanawha were well supported in respect to the purpose for which they were sent there. When McClellan left (near the end of July) he wanted to take with him 15,000 of the troops. As the Government at that time was ready to give him everything possible, he did get the greater part of that number; and he selected the best regiments. He left only the three-months men and newer three-years men; but the former were then being released on the expiration of their term of enlistment, and they were soon all gone.

General Rosecrans, who succeeded McClellan in command of the Department, seeing the field thus practically stripped of troops, called upon the governor of Ohio to send him some of the three-years regiments he was then organizing. McClellan, on learning this, telegraphed the governor not to do it, but to send all troops to him at Washington. It was his peculiar obsession, shown in a number of instances in his career, that no other part of the field in the war was really important as compared with that directly under his own command. Rosecrans did, however, get more troops, and, after providing for the protection of the Baltimore & Ohio road, he was able to have two, and finally three, small brigades in the Kanawha valley.

Meantime, in July, while McClellan was still lying in

camp at Beverly, exulting over his success at Rich Mountain, General Cox, meanly ill-treated and practically abandoned by him, as already described, tho still expected to force his way up the narrow and easily defended valley of the Kanawha against an enemy superior in numbers and guns, was steadily doing his duty, without complaining and without the advertisement of repeating reports, learning by experience in daily action how to meet and to oppose his enemy, and winning the ground by untiring care and persistence. He gained perfect success in the campaign, and did his duty so well that McClellan's successor in the command officially wrote of him with high appreciation again and again. He was soon in command of a division; later of the army in the Kanawha region; later, transferred to a broader field in the Department of the Ohio and in the Army of the Cumberland, he held yet more important positions, and finally commanded an army corps; and after the war held high office in the government.

He was not disheartened by Colonel Norton's repulse, nor did it in the least alter his movements, tho it must have had temporarily a demoralizing effect upon his command. With his practically isolated brigade he simply kept at work, feeling sure it would redeem itself from the false imputation it had had to bear. Fortunately, he did not then know of McClellan's injustice to him. He had been directed to get Charleston and Gauley Bridge, and to that job he applied all the abilities he had until results should prove whether or not it was possible to do it with the means allowed him.

The first step must be to cross the Pocotaligo, and to do that he must replace the long bridge destroyed by the enemy. In the arrival of Captain Lane and his company, the night of July 18, he had the means. Captain Lane was full of mechanical resources, his company was largely composed of mechanics used to heavy work, and another company of the regiment supplied more. For some reason Company K was not landed till the night of the 19th; but, beginning early on the 20th, the zealous Captain and his men took only seventeen hours for the construction, from improvised materials, of a rude, but substantial, floating bridge by the side of the destroyed

one; and on the 21st the troops and guns were moving over.

This compelled Wise to retire to his fortifications a little below Charleston. He had now 4000 men in three fortified positions, with 10 guns. Cox had five regiments, two nearly full and three small, and 4 guns, about 3000 men in all. But the Eleventh Ohio was increased by the arrival of a new company (G) from Ohio, adding 80 or 90. Cox pushed forward, with the Eleventh Ohio in advance, now (since the capture of its Colonel) commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Frizell, a bold and capable officer. Wise imagined Cox receiving heavy reinforcement and hastily abandoned the position and the town (July 24), retreating toward Gauley Bridge, forty miles above, closely pressed by Cox. On the 29th, without fighting, he left the very strong Gauley position, burning the big bridge over the Gauley, and retreated up the mountain to Lewisburg, thirty miles further. Thus, within two weeks after "Scarey Creek", the little brigade forced its way fifty miles up the river and possessed all the Kanawha.

Wise merited the scornful comments of his rival, General Floyd, upon this retreat. He could have held back such a force as Cox's almost indefinitely if he had been a soldier and of cool judgment. Half a dozen streams falling into the Kanawha and passable only by bridges offered fine positions for defense, his left flank always protected by the Kanawha and his right by continuous rocky hills. As Cox had not enough men for safe flanking operations, he could only drive ahead on the one narrow road to the front.

This road lay close along the river, crossing a number of streams at their mouths, the smaller ones fordable, but seven or eight requiring bridges, to replace those Wise had destroyed. Captain Lane's success with the Pocotaligo bridge threw all this work upon him; and he won the respect and admiration of the whole command by his ingenious devices and the zeal, energy and untiring labors of himself and his men. Within ten days he built five important bridges and as many lesser ones.

It being impossible to get and ship bridge timber and tools in time and there being no saw-mill within reach,



he did all this work with axes and hand-saws, augers, spikes and trees felled near, except that for the Elk river bridge, near Charleston, he found some milled timber in the town. This bridge was the largest, but it was a "wire" bridge (that is, suspension), and Wise's men had got only one span (about forty feet) effectively destroyed. Captain Lane put a span of timber in its place and made the other repairs required, all between four o'clock p. m. and two a. m. On the 28th, between Charleston and Gauley, the zealous engineer noted, "Built four bridges within last three days."

But he and his company were doing more than bridge-building on this march. They had a part in driving the enemy. In the march upon Charleston, after crossing the Pocotaligo, the Eleventh Ohio had the advance, at least on the day the town was taken, and Company K was in front. There was some exchange of shots,—not much, but it made the first definite engagement of the regiment with the rebels. Lieutenant Johnson, with a part of the company, in his eagerness got separated from and ahead of the remainder, led by Captain Lane on the other side of the road, and, as it happened, was the first to enter the enemy's intrenchments.

In view of the bad condition of the roads and the absence of bridges above Charleston, General Cox gained time by moving the main body of the troops on boats up to the falls (about half way to the Gauley), where they landed and marched on as rapidly as the road permitted. But Wise had destroyed the long bridge over the mouth of Gauley, and the whole army halted. The energy of Captain Lane and his pioneers had, however, completed the bridges from Charleston up, and they reached the Gauley little behind the main column.

Here was the most serious problem the new "Chief-Engineer" had met, tho there were others to come. General Cox left it to his discretion. The one important thing was, to get the men and artillery across at the earliest hour possible. The bridge destroyed was five hundred feet long, the abutments one hundred and fifty feet apart. The stream was three hundred feet wide at ordinary water, swift and turbulent, interspersed with large rocks which rose above the water at a low stage and

were buried at a high stage, and there were deep holes between them. To rebuild on the old abutments would certainly take too much time. To build a lower, and therefore shorter, bridge would probably take no less time, and its approaches would be steep and difficult for wheels. The currents and the rocks made a floating bridge impossible.

Captain Lane decided upon a ferry as the only means practicable under the circumstances; but the swift and irregular currents presented special difficulties and compelled great caution. There were some flat-boats below the falls in the Kanawha, but they could not be got up. The Gauley above the bridge was so shallow and so filled with rocks that timber could not be floated down. He sent back for a steamboat hawser, to be used as a cable, and set about building a boat with such planking and timbers as could be found or cut near by with axes. On the fourth day he finished a boat sixty feet long, eighteen wide, with a capacity of two hundred men or four loaded army wagons and their animals, or two guns and their caissons. Of course it had to be built and caulked bottom up and on the shore, and its great weight made it very difficult to turn it over and into the water safely without a derrick, but this was accomplished successfully by simple mechanical means. The hawser was dragged across and secured at both ends, a "walk" was built along the outer side of it, on which the men could pass to work the boat, which was secured to the cable by guide-ropes at stem and stern. Six men on the "walk," pulling on the cable, could then easily propel the boat with full loads. On the 4th of August, the fifth day after beginning, the ferry was in regular operation, carrying over the troops and trains.

This kind of employment of Company K (it was aided more or less by details from other companies, usually from B and G, which contained many mechanics) must have had a salutary influence upon the development and health of the men, being done, as it was, for an obviously highly important purpose and under the immediate observation of the officers and men of the brigade. Captain Lane writes at this time, "Our position as a company is very desirable one and is the only one so far as I know in

the volunteer service. We have less sick, better food, better order, and retain more of our self-respect than any other company in the brigade." About the same time he wrote that he had 83 men present (i. e., of Company K) and not a man sick.

V

1861: AUGUST — NOVEMBER

Reorganization of the Army — “The Brigade of the Kanawha” — Second Kanawha Campaign — First Fighting of Captain Lane and his Company — Battle of Carnifex Ferry — Gauley Ferry Lost in a Flood — Captain Lane Builds Another in Four Days — Colonel De Villiers Returns — Causes Much Trouble

Meantime General Rosecrans, in command of the Department of the Ohio and of the “Army of Occupation of Western Virginia”, had organized his army into four brigades. The first three were retained in the north. The fourth was to be called the “Brigade of the Kanawha” and to be commanded by Brigadier-General Cox. It contained the First and Second Kentucky, the Eleventh, Twelfth, Nineteenth, Twenty-first and parts of the Eighteenth and Twenty-second Ohio infantry and the “Ironton” (Ohio) company of cavalry. The order does not mention artillery in the Kanawha Brigade, but there was one battery of four guns. The number of men in the brigade can now only be estimated. We cannot know whether the regiments were full or had full numbers present. Some of them surely had not. But the total present was probably more than 4000 and certainly less than 5000.

The prospect of aggressive operations in western Virginia was much better under Rosecrans than under McClellan. Rosecrans would at least fight and would not wait, like McClellan, until he was in every way overwhelmingly stronger than his enemy. But he proved to be conspicuously lacking in some of the qualities necessary to a successful independent commander in the field. He was impulsive and got into difficulties where prudence or foresight would have prevented; he was repeatedly

surprised, and felt it a sort of injustice to find that his enemy was ready for him; when he was campaigning under specific orders he had a curious way of acting as if the orders did not exist and he was to do whatever the immediate hour suggested to him; he repeatedly stopped an important movement, even tho ordered by a superior officer, for some unimportant or even irrelative reason; and, tho he was free from the inordinate vanity and egotism that were so great a fault in McClellan, in their place he had an extreme jealousy of the promotion of any general to a rank higher than his own. But he would fight; and he did fight several battles heroically, tho not always successfully, because he lacked judgment of his enemy's plans and movements.

He realized that the forces on the Kanawha must be increased, to meet the peculiar difficulties of that country and the increasing strength of the enemy there, but he did not act upon that judgment for a month. Then, with characteristic zeal, he went himself, but, with characteristic failure to see the need of prompt action, instead of sending his troops by the rivers on boats (which would have taken but five or six days) he marched them across the country, from near the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, taking ten or twelve days, and, tho he arrived in time, it was on the very eve of serious danger to the Kanawha Brigade.

While the Gauley ferry was being built the Kanawha Brigade was not otherwise much occupied, tho detachments of the men got some training and experience in various scouting expeditions into the neighboring country, but as soon as the ferry was in operation the greater part of the brigade crossed, and, from time to time, made scouting expeditions up the Lewisburg pike and on lateral roads. These reached as far as "Camp Lookout", about fifteen miles, and Big Sewell Mountain, thirty miles, from Gauley. The belief in the brigade at that time was that Wise and his command were directly in front; but in fact he had retreated beyond Lewisburg and gone into camp at White Sulphur Springs, from where he wrote several reports and letters to Richmond, repeatedly insisting that he needed two weeks time for resting and refitting there, tho his real reason was, undoubtedly, to show his inde-

pendence of Floyd, who was assuming to be in command of all the forces in the region.

But Floyd was now moving west thro the mountains to the Kanawha and to his childish and irreconcilable, but entertaining, quarrel with Wise. Meantime also General Lee had come out in person, to direct or oversee operations in western Virginia, but it does not appear that he remained long or took command in any action or went further west than White Sulphur.

A curious bit in the correspondence between Lee and Wise at that time shows that Wise had called urgently for more arms, especially for "1000 percussion muskets," and that Lee replied that the State had none and that the only guns available that he knew of were flint-lock muskets. It should be remembered that Lee's command then was only of Virginia State troops: he had no Confederate command.

But the mild pressure of Lee was not so much of a spur to Wise as his jealousy of Floyd. On the 7th of August Floyd appeared and assumed to be in control, as of course, of all operations against Cox. He told Wise he was going to move down the Lewisburg pike and attack him at Gauley Bridge. Wise (to Lee) strongly "dissented", demanded that the two commands be assigned to separate fields of operations, and thought it "best to assign him (Floyd) to guard the Fayette and Beckley roads and me to the Lewisburg pike and Summerville roads." The Fayette and Beckley roads were west or south of the river, where there were no Yankees, unless in foraging, while Lewisburg and Summerville included the only region where real operations were probable or then practicable. But Floyd was so slow that, tho Wise's ingenuous proposal failed and both remained east of the river, Wise did get out by the end of the month and take some active part in the campaign.

General Cox during the second and third weeks of August kept portions of his command in movement between Gauley and Big Sewell Mountain, repeatedly meeting bodies of the enemy, and finally establishing the fact that Floyd was at Big Sewell with all his command. Several brushes with the enemy resulted in no loss until the 16th, when two men of the Eleventh Ohio were

wounded,—not badly, but the first men struck in the regiment in the war. On the 19th, however, in a more important clash, one of its men was killed, the first in the war, James Roach, and two captured — all from Company B.

Tho the Eleventh seems to have been the most conspicuous regiment in these affairs, Captain Lane and Company K did not share in them. They were held at Gauley, probably on guard and operation of the ferry; but near the end of the month, at Captain Lane's special request, he was relieved there and, with his company, joined the regiment up the road. After ten days, however, the whole regiment was replaced by another, a larger one, and ordered back to Gauley. In the interval, tho, on September 3rd, it fell into another conflict with Wise, who must have found himself rested and willing to operate on Floyd's left.

Wise found the Union troops in bivouac on the Lewisburg pike, behind Big creek, a couple of miles up the road from Gauley Bridge with its advance at Honey creek, a mile or two further. He appears to have employed his whole force, tho without the boldness which might have given him some success. The Eleventh advance fell back from Honey to Big creek on his approach, as it ought to do, and Wise, elated by this, moved on and fired from several field guns, at a safe distance, frequently throughout the day, but without otherwise attacking and without any effect. Colonel Frizell, commanding the Eleventh, replied with one gun to some extent, but ceased that and only held quietly to his position. Wise remained there a day or two, and then withdrew; and thereupon made a long, detailed, official report of the affair, with a map showing the positions and neighboring country. In this report he represented his doings as a battle and a victory, while the reports of the Union officers mention it as only one of the incidents of the campaign. But Wise had a vivid imagination and was much given to lurid literature.

The Eleventh was getting useful lessons in the arts of war now,—how to watch the enemy and yet protect themselves, how to meet or make an attack and keep their heads, how to grapple cheerfully with the difficulties and

bear philosophically the hardships of the work, thus developing into efficient soldiers. Captain Lane's request to be sent to join the regiment in this active service brought him and his company a share in these valuable experiences. Their first real trial by fire he used to describe with humorous appreciation. The Eleventh, being in front, found the enemy in position, sheltered by a thicket, and obstinate. The first two or three companies were thrown into line across the road and ordered to advance, Company K being on the right. On the right of the road was a small spur or ledge of a hill, around which it curved. As soon as this bend was passed the enemy opened fire upon the line. Captain Lane turned to his men, to order them to return the fire, but, to his great amazement, he saw no men. Shocked and bewildered, he yet swiftly scanned the ground to the rear and saw that there were at least some men behind the projecting ridge; and then found the whole company there! They had instinctively taken shelter, just as they would have done individually in civil life if they had suddenly found shots flying. It was often the case in the war that green soldiers shrank from their "baptism of fire." Exceedingly wounded in pride and in great anger (General Cox just then came up), he "beat" the men back into line, again led them forward, when they fought well; the enemy was driven off, their camp was taken, and that evening peace was restored over a supper furnished by the enemy's provisions. Captain Lane takes care to do justice to his men in the comment — "These men were not yet soldiers. Six months later they could charge the enemy in solid line and show as little fear under fire as under a shower of snow balls." That too was the general experience in the war.

But they did very well in a shorter time than six months. Only a day or two after the affair just mentioned, September 4th, they had an opportunity to show that they were not lacking in courage. When Floyd moved down the Lewisburg road, on his way to Summersville, as hereinafter to be told, Cox, inferior in strength and supposing Floyd's objective to be Gauley Bridge, prudently fell back. Wise, being left by Floyd to hold the road, pushed after Cox, assuming that he was beating

him. The Eleventh Ohio, again in the post of danger, held the rear. The pressure becoming close, Cox sent back six companies of another regiment, to increase his rear-guard. Lieutenant-Colonel Frizell, Eleventh Ohio, commanding the rear, then, in the night, established a line of defense across the road, sheltered by trees and thickets, and undertook to hold it. Companies G and K, with Captain Lane in command, formed the right wing of the line. At daybreak the enemy advanced and, finding Frizell's line, made a general attack, and soon a direct charge against its right. The G and K men received this assault with courage, without flinching and with such good effect from their steady fire that the rebels were driven back in confusion and made no attempt to renew the attack, firing only casually and at long range from the shelter of trees and rocks; and Colonel Frizell held the position all day and until Wise finally withdrew.

No doubt the K men were influenced by that lesson of the day or two before, as well as by the fine example of their captain. For his example was one of clear courage and resolution on both occasions. During the attack on the 4th he simply remained at his post, directing the fire of his men carefully and coolly, as if not at all disturbed. He does not tell of it himself, and does not mention this engagement in his letters or other papers so that it can be distinguished as one in which he took part, but he was observed from other parts of the line. A soldier who was there, in another company, and who, like many other soldiers at that time, was an amateur "correspondent" of home newspapers, wrote to his home paper an account of the engagement, in which he said that the charge was "repulsed with severe loss to the enemy, four of Company K being wounded. Captain Lane, tho in the midst of the fight, displayed admirable coolness and bravery."

There are many other instances of this steadiness and courage of Colonel Lane in dangers, but, like this one, they are usually found outside of anything written or said by himself.

In the Kanawha Brigade at this time they were looking daily and anxiously for news of the approach of Rosecrans from the north, with more men and guns.*

* See page 45.

Already his march had taken more time than he had set for it. Floyd was strong enough, with good management, to defeat Cox east of Gauley Bridge, or below if he could safely cross the Gauley; but, notwithstanding his "biggity" announcement to Wise already mentioned, his resolution failed when he had made half the distance, and he turned off to the north, to occupy Summerville, a town twenty-five miles northeast of Gauley Bridge. He may have had an idea that this movement would flank Cox out of Gauley Bridge and compel him to retreat to Charleston; but he seems to have been ignorant of Rosecrans's march, which was directly toward Summerville. Floyd's cavalry advance reached Cross-Lanes, near Summerville, September 8th, and caught a small detachment (part of a company) of the Seventh Ohio infantry (not of the Kanawha Brigade), whose proper guard duty had been neglected, and killed or captured the greater part of it. Floyd lost no time in reporting this "battle", in extravagant language, to Richmond, and the officials there celebrated "another crushing defeat of the enemy on the Kanawha." If he had waited a bit and skilfully questioned his prisoners, his report would have been sobered. He had hardly settled himself in Summerville with his pleasing reflections when he was surprised to learn of an enemy near at hand, coming from the north.

To reach Summerville he had had to cross the Gauley, at Carnifex Ferry, about thirty miles above Gauley Bridge. He immediately abandoned Summerville and fell back to Carnifex Ferry, taking a very good defensive position in a bend of the river, sheltered by a thick wood and covering the ferry crossing. Rosecrans found him there a day later, on the 10th. The two forces were about equal in numbers and guns, tho Rosecrans's guns were probably much better; but Floyd's peculiarly strong position for defense put any attack upon him at great risk. Rosecrans finally advanced, however, late in the afternoon, and there was a hot battle, with varying hopes, until night put an end to it. Rosecrans had gained ground, but had had severe losses, due to the necessity of open frontal attack. But Floyd was not equal to the occasion, was unnecessarily alarmed, and thought only of getting away. He spent all night moving his army back across

the river; and in the early morning Rosecrans's reconnoitring parties found the position abandoned and Floyd's rear guard on the left bank.

As Floyd obviously must be retreating to Lewisburg, and probably in haste, to avoid an attack by Cox on his right, Rosecrans ought to have vigorously pushed a crossing and pursuit. But he was dilatory and ineffective, and it was more than a whole day before he moved over even a detachment. Yet he was very anxious about Cox, fearing that Floyd would strike him with his larger forces above Gauley Bridge; and he sent several messages to Cox during the day.

But he did not yet understand Floyd. That general was not at all seeking another fight. Cox was in fact twenty miles above Gauley Bridge, with a considerable part of his brigade, but he had not yet heard of Carnifex, nor even of Rosecrans's arrival. Floyd could easily have given him serious trouble, but he was thinking only of Lewisburg, and hurried by Cox's ground, so near that his movement was easily observed; and Cox was perplexed as to what his great haste could mean. But, feeling sure that it was caused by Rosecrans's advance, he concentrated and followed up the retreat, sending back a courier to get a report to Rosecrans. The next day, the 12th, he had his first news of the battle at Carnifex, in a letter from Rosecrans; but did not yet know that Rosecrans had that morning got one brigade across the Gauley, with orders to reinforce him.

Rosecrans was still perversely slow. On the 14th and on the 16th (still near Summerville) he wrote to Cox, in the first letter proposing and in the second giving directions for a movement against Floyd in force; but said nothing of speed nor of any cause for his own delay. He ought to have been on the Lewisburg pike himself, with the greater part of his troops, early on the 12th, in vigorous pursuit. Under the circumstances Floyd's defeat, if he should resist, or his capture or dispersal if he should not, would have been practically sure.

Finding that Rosecrans was not pressing his advantage in force, as expected, Floyd stopped short of Lewisburg, got his breath, and, being undisturbed, considered that he had won the contest. Accordingly, the War Office

at Richmond learned that he had been attacked by far superior numbers, that he had steadily repulsed all assaults, with great losses to the enemy, and that, seeing he would be overwhelmed the next day by increased forces, he deemed it prudent to retire his little army, which he had done in perfect order, after remarkably small losses.*

But, if Rosecrans was not then very zealous against Floyd, Cox's brigade kept at least part of his men busy on and near the Lewisburg road. The Eleventh Ohio in particular, under the active and courageous Lieutenant-Colonel Frizell, pressed closely upon his rear or western front, with sharp fighting at times. But Rosecrans had lagged so much in following up his advantage gained at Carnifix that any further movement against Floyd would not be a pursuit, but only a renewal of the effort to drive him back into the mountains. He did finally take the field himself, and, with a force now much stronger than Floyd's, slowly pushed him toward Lewisburg. So slow, indeed, it was that he did not reach Big Sewell Mountain, thirty miles from Gauley Bridge, until September 23. His advance finally reached the top of the mountain and found the enemy holding it in a fortified camp; but he did not venture an attack. He seems to have been much mistaken in estimating Floyd's strength and in his belief that another force, under Lee, was waiting its opportunity to strike from the Huttonville road on the north-east. Lee had come down from the north of the State on hearing of Floyd's defeat, and remained about Lewisburg and Big Sewell until early in November, directing affairs generally, but not taking command of troops in active operations. By his unvarying patience and courtesy he had gained the confidence of both Floyd and Wise, but he could not reconcile them: nobody could. All the troops were finally called the "Army of the Kanawha", however, and Floyd was placed in command. This clipped Wise's wings, but had no other effect upon him; and he

* One of the principal causes of the prolongation of the war is to be found in the almost universal perversions of the truth in the reports of campaigns and engagements sent to the Richmond government. That government lost the war in spite of an almost unbroken series of "victories."

was at last ordered to Richmond and sent with a brigade of Confederate troops into North Carolina, while Lee, in November, was sent to Charleston, S. C., to command a Confederate department.

For two days after reaching Big Sewell Rosecrans maneuvered in a desultory way, with a few unimportant skirmishes, and then withdrew and slowly fell back to Gauley Bridge. He reported that he did this because of lack of force enough, want of transportation, and almost impassable roads; but his forces already exceeded Floyd's and the War Department was ordering six more regiments from Pittsburg to reinforce him, while the difficulty of transportation and bad roads was but temporary, the latter being due to rains, which were usually, at this season, followed by fine weather. Continuous bad weather could not be expected till late in November.

Tho the most of the Eleventh Ohio was with its brigade on the Big Sewell movement, Captain Lane, with his company, was retained at Gauley Bridge, to make sure of the protection and operation of the ferry, since the supply of the army above depended upon it. There was a sudden great rise in the Gauley, from a phenomenally heavy rain, and it was with great anxiety that he saw the big torrent rushing down and rapidly rising in height. In spite of the unceasing care and labors of himself and all his men, the swift flood at last carried away the cable, all the boats but one, and the lumber and timbers collected and prepared for reserve. It was said to be the greatest flood the country had known.

It was now impossible for the army to cross the Gauley, if compelled to retreat, and at the same time impossible to supply it with food and ammunition where it was. Captain Lane keenly felt the weight of the disaster and the urgency of action. He wrote in a private letter "I felt as if I had the whole army on my back." There would have to be some fall of the flood before a new cable could be carried over and secured, and it would take time to get a new one anyhow. Meantime he had every man and axe he could find hard at work, getting out new materials, to be ready for the first hour when reconstruction could possibly begin. Tho he does not say so, he must have worked, in reliefs, by night as well as by day.

On the 2d of October, only four days after seeing nearly all the product of his former labors swept down the flood, he sent the first wagons, loaded with supplies, over the new ferry. In respect to time this was a remarkable performance, against the great obstacle of the high water, which was still running at flood.

But neither the restoration of his communications nor the fine October weather nor the coming of reinforcements induced Rosecrans to proceed with the campaign. He had said, in a report, that the country he was yielding could be "retaken when we require" and that "the troops would move nearer to the Gauley, to get their pay and clothing." Of course they could get pay and clothing just as well at Big Sewell, by only bringing the paymaster and quartermaster up there; but he really had also the idea of going into winter-quarters, tho the winter was yet some time ahead. Whether due to him or not, this idea got among the men, and they were to some extent demoralized by the fixed belief that they were now to lie for four or five months in comfortable camps, perhaps back on the Ohio.

So, by the middle of October, all the troops were back on and behind the Gauley, but were not paid. The paymaster had not come, and did not come until near the end of the month. Lying thus idle in camp the men were much discontented by the failure of what they considered a promise of their pay (but few had received any pay since entering the service, from four to five months before) and by the lack of definite news of winter-quarters.

One incident of this period is of special interest, as it was in Captain Lane's personal service. A small force was kept at Summerville, already mentioned, as a kind of outpost of the Kanawha army. Captain Lane "had occasion" (he does not say what) to go there personally. The distance was twenty-five miles and the road hilly, very rough, and often thro woods and narrow ravines. Guerrillas were much on such roads, in the hope of getting one or several Union men or soldiers; and some of the citizens who professed to be Union men were more than suspected of treachery, really harboring them and giving them information of any Union movement. Captain Lane de-

cided to go by night, and, for some reason not given, went alone. He rode thro the night without stopping, cautious in passing any house or other possible lurking place, and keeping his arms always ready for instant use. Nothing happened, but he writes "It was a lonely ride." He does not speak of his return to Gauley, from which it is to be assumed that he returned with troops.

One of the grievances of the soldiers at Gauley was removed by the appearance in camp of the paymaster, who arrived near the end of October, and immediately had many of the officers and sergeants busy on the preparation of the "muster-and-pay-rolls" required for his use. For the Eleventh Ohio, however, this agreeable experience was abruptly marred by a disaster. Its Colonel returned from his three months captivity, and of course resumed command of the regiment. He had notified the brigade commander that he was coming, and the regiment was turned out, on formal parade, to "welcome" him, tho to nearly all the officers and men the occasion was anything but welcome. At the best there was in his regiment but little respect for him or confidence in him, and what there was had been diminished by the circumstances of his capture.* As there was little or no evidence of his adventures after his capture beyond his own story, and, as that story contained many fearful and hairbreadth perils and deeds of daring, he found few believers. He may have been in one of the escapes of officer prisoners from Libby Prison, but also may have been merely one of those exchanged: no one seems to have taken the trouble to make an inquiry, and his loquacious boasting was left to free play. He had little or none of the personal dignity that induces respect for an officer, and some of his tales of dangers and daring were openly ridiculed as being only lying inventions.

During his absence the regiment had been finely developed under the Lieutenant-Colonel and Major, and had become at least the equal in discipline and efficiency of any regiment in its army. Now, under the new regime, it fell rapidly into a bad condition of discouragement among both officers and men. By his erratic performance

* See page 33.

of his own duties, his rash orders, violent language and many threats of punishments that were never attempted, he broke down discipline instead of strengthening it; and, what with this and his obvious lack of a real knowledge of drill and maneuvers, he hampered and irritated the officers; and frequently during the winter got into a quarrel with one or another of them, indulging in the most vulgar and insulting language. During the next four months after his return he made his camp the scene of unhappy turmoil, involving both officers and men. The Lieutenant-Colonel and one of the captains resigned in disgust, seeing no other way to escape their share of the trouble. The Major (Coleman) accepted the place of Lieutenant-Colonel, hoping to see soon the natural end of such a condition; and the end did soon come. But it was to Captain Lane, much more than any other man that the regiment owed its release from the dreadful handicap. It was he who took the risks and responsibilities of action, endured the disgrace of arrest and court-martial and a long period of conspicuous deprivation of his command, with constant anxiety as to the result for the regiment and for himself. But his final exoneration and success were complete. It is not too much to say that, by risking the sacrifice of himself, he saved his regiment from ruin.

VI

1861: NOVEMBER — DECEMBER

Battle of Cotton Hill — Captain Lane Saves Gauley Ferry Under Fire — Holds Outpost Against Floyd — Conflict With DeVilliers — Builds Another Bridge — Winter-quarters at Point Pleasant

Early on the morning of November 1, 1861, when the Paymaster was ready to begin paying the Eleventh Ohio at Gauley, a gun was heard, fired from the south side of New river, opposite the mouth of the Gauley, and a shell struck in the camp of the regiment. Naturally, all other considerations were suspended. While the excited wonder was still on another shell struck. No damage was done. The Paymaster moved himself and his money to a safer place, and, tho the shelling continued during the day, he resumed his work after a time; and by night had paid off all that regiment.

Floyd had crossed the New river from Big Sewell, moved down the south side, and planted a battery of two guns on the front of a high and very steep hill having a bold face rising almost directly from the water's edge, directly opposite the mouth of the Gauley. He meant to annoy and disorder Rosecrans's camp and destroy the ferry. One of his two guns got the direct range of the ferry, and his sharpshooters, concealed by rocks and trees along the shore, stopped the use of a piece of the road which lay open and exposed just east of (above) the ferry.

Captain Lane had been relieved of duty at the ferry (as there was no movement of troops now, the operation of it was only routine work for a small party) and was in camp with his regiment at some distance. When the shells began to strike near the ferry, some one there sent a messenger in a rush to tell him. He could answer only

that he had no authority and that the message should have gone to Colonel DeVilliers. The messenger ran to find the Colonel. He had taken no action in the emergency, and did nothing now but send the man to Captain Lane with authority to do what he thought best. Angered by this cowardly shuffling off of responsibility, but seeing the importance of instant action, the Captain at once ran down to the ferry. He found thirty or forty men there, sheltered, but in a helpless state of mind, while the ferry-boat was at the other side of the river, clearly in sight from the rebel battery. A shell had just struck dangerously near it. He called for four men to go over with him and move the boat out of range. Three did volunteer, and with these he crossed on the "walk" attached to the cable, which, like the boat, was fully seen from the battery, and, with strenuously rapid labor, they released the boat and hauled it up stream and behind a projecting point of rocks. The movement took time enough, however, to enable the rebels to get in three more shells, which he describes as "two very close and one wild."

Tho the Captain was much vexed by the manner in which this affair was thrust upon him, it added to the reputation he had already gained for ready resource and unshirking behavior in danger. The promptness, courage and success of his action were quite in the line of what had already been seen in his service.

But the ferry was put out of use while that battery remained there, except under the cover of night, a condition that proved very awkward. For Rosecrans was not able to dislodge Floyd's guns for seven days, and every day the camps at Gauley and just below were teased by the shelling, tho no serious injury was done by it. The sharpshooters, however, having a shorter range, wounded a few men and killed or wounded a number of horses and mules.

Whether Rosecrans knew of Floyd's movement down the New river does not appear. He probably did know, but yet, if he did, it is curious that he did not occupy this hill opposite his ferry and camp. The road on that side of the river ran close behind the hill (curved around it, in fact), and the nature of the ground was such as that

one brigade could have held both hill and road against the whole of Floyd's force; and Rosecrans had three brigades at hand.

Floyd was engaged in what he considered a momentous campaign. The authorities would not, or could not, increase his army to 10,000, as he had repeatedly urged, to enable him to plant himself firmly on the Ohio, but he could show that he deserved it. When Rosecrans retired from Big Sewell to Gauley, Floyd was satisfied that it was a defeat, and he proposed to Lee a joint movement with an ambitious goal. He was to cross the New river, move down the left bank, by Fayetteville, and take Cotton Hill (the hill opposite Gauley, on the river-front of which his guns were now planted), while Lee should advance on the Lewisburg road and make a determined attack upon the Gauley position. By co-operation Rosecrans would be decisively defeated, or at the least driven down and out of the valley. Floyd would then occupy and easily hold all that part of the State south and west of the Kanawha, if not also a portion north and east.

Lee was not so hopeful; in fact he disapproved of the scheme as quite impracticable,—as indeed it was, from lack of force, lack of transportation, bad roads constantly getting worse and the peculiar great strength of Rosecrans' position behind two rivers. One cannot but wonder that Lee had the patience to treat Floyd's plan respectfully, but he listened to it and finally consented to the trial of one feature of it,—an attempt to take and hold Cotton Hill.

Floyd accordingly crossed the New river with the greater part of his "army"—about 4000—and marched down the Fayetteville road. He wrote afterward, when he was accounting for his failure, but in cautious language, as if Lee had neglected to make the expected attack on the Lewisburg road on the north side, but there is nothing in Lee's reports or correspondence to give any color to such an expectation; and there are other instances in Floyd's career of disingenuousness.* Floyd, indeed, knew that Lee had just been compelled to send

* John B. Floyd, of Virginia (formerly Governor), Secretary of War in the cabinet of Buchanan. Used his office in 1860 to aid the seceding States in seizing United States forts and arsenals;

his best or most experienced troops (Loring's Brigade) a hundred or more miles away, to reinforce "Stonewall" Jackson in the Shenandoah valley. It would have been a mere waste of effort, or worse, to throw his small remainder against Gauley Bridge. It ought to be said, however, that Lee did have a hope, if not more, that Floyd's movement would "cause the enemy to withdraw from the Gauley", but that is one of the rather many instances in which Lee's military judgment was poor.

Floyd left behind, at Big Sewell, the "Legion" of Wise, saying, in contempt, that it was "so insubordinate and ill-disciplined that it was unfit for military purposes"; but, privately, he would have been glad of any kind of a reason for keeping Wise out of the campaign.

If Rosecrans knew of Floyd's movement he took no steps to interfere with it. He must have known the disadvantage to him, or worse, of letting his enemy get possession of Cotton Hill. One of his brigades placed across the Fayetteville road, east of the hill, could have prevented it, and, with a couple of regiments in reserve, could have brought Floyd's enterprise to naught and put him out of account for months. But he did nothing about it; and, within a few days after crossing the New, Floyd's advance occupied Cotton Hill and he was encamped a short distance east of it. There he remained a week, undisturbed, while he planted the battery already mentioned on the river front of the hill.

There is no indication in Rosecrans' reports or correspondence that he had any knowledge of this until the shells began to fly on November 1. Then he busily set about dislodging Floyd, but he found it a long and awkward job. He sent General Benham, with his brigade,

and ordered large quantities of small arms removed from arsenals in the North to those in the South, together with heavy guns from the Pittsburg arsenal. He had 121 of these guns shipped to southern forts before the work was discovered. He resigned and fled from Washington under charges of complicity in a fraud upon the Interior Department, for which he was later indicted. His reward was a commission as Major-General in the Confederate army. He was in command at Fort Donelson when Grant attacked it, and was so afraid of being captured that he fled in the night, leaving an inferior officer to surrender the fort.

some eight miles down the Kanawha, to cross and get the Fayetteville road near the mouth of Loop creek, while General Schenk, with another brigade, made a persistent but futile effort to cross New river above Floyd's position. For seven days the only thing accomplished was the crossing of Benham's brigade. Schenk could not yet get over, without going too far up the river for safety, and Benham, slow and lacking in energy, failed to make the advance required. Meantime the two guns and the riflemen along the shore kept up daily practice, to the great annoyance and mortification of the whole command.

Floyd knew what was being done against him. From the front of Cotton Hill, with a glass, he could see the greater part of Rosecrans's camps, and reconnoitring parties must have reported to him Benham's position and Schenk's efforts. On the 7th, having no stomach for another battle, tho superior in numbers to either of the two brigades, if not to both, he decided to withdraw, and did that night withdraw the two guns and the sharpshooters, but still occupied, with part of his command, the west or south end of the hill, which was higher than the river end and wooded.

As it happened, it was Captain Lane and his company, later supported by the remainder of his regiment, who brought the situation to a fighting crisis. He had been ordered to build two scows large enough to carry troops, and they were done on the 7th or 8th. What use they were intended for does not appear. A fair guess is, that they were for Schenk's crossing above the Gauley, tho they may have been for crossing Cox's men at the mouth of the Gauley, in which service, apparently, they finally were used.

The shelling and sharpshooting having ceased late on the 7th and the two guns having apparently disappeared from the brow of the hill, a reconnaissance was ordered. Why it was not made from Benham's brigade, already on that side of the river, is not learned. Captain Lane was chosen for the service, probably by General Cox, because of his skill in the use of boats (both rivers being then high from the recent rains) and his proven courage. At night of the 9th he received an order to move at three a. m., with his company, cross the river by boat, and

find what the enemy had done on the hill. He was ready on time, but found only 37 men of his company fit for the duty (the regiment was much reduced at that time, from hard service, detachment &c, and mustered for duty much below 300), but with the 37 he set out in the two boats he had built. He was to run down the Gauley and pull with oars across the mouth of the New, but a heavy rain that day had raised the Gauley to a very swift current, the boats were caught in it and swept down the Kanawha toward the falls. This was great danger, and it was only with desperate efforts that the boats, after a mile or more, could be worked out of the flood of the channel and into the slower current at the side. They finally escaped the peril and reached the shore on the side they started from. But the Captain was not daunted: he was intent only on obeying his order. With great labor they hauled the boats up along the shore to the Gauley, up that river to a possible crossing place, pulled over to the left side, and again ran down, this time taking great care to keep in the shore current and to work up into the New river along its right shore with every energy. This brought them into comparatively easy water, and, with the strongest men at the oars, they got over the New without mishap, and landed at the upper side of the foot of Cotton Hill.

But several hours had been lost and dawn was now appearing. Captain Lane was very anxious to get to the top of the hill without being met or seen by the enemy. Leaving a small guard with the boats, with the remainder he climbed the hill as fast as possible, tho its steepness and roughness,—small, difficult ravines, rocks and tangled thickets — made the work slow at the best. The gun of one of his men was fired by accident. This halted him for an anxious minute or two, but no sound from an enemy following, he was reassured and hurried on to the top. Here, in the misty light of early day he found the field abandoned, the guns gone, and no enemy in sight.*

Taking a position with prudent care for retreat, if

* Captain Lane says, in a paper written long after the war, that he was ordered to cross and "take that battery," but that was one of the lapses of memory in old soldiers. Of course minor officers seldom know the plans or purposes of their generals or the dis-

compelled, he sent out small parties to scout in several directions; and, finding no sign of the enemy near, he advanced himself, and found him about a mile from the Gauley front, at the interior or southeastern end of the hill (where it was the highest) and sheltered by a wood.

This took some hours and, seeing by Captain Lane's advance that the enemy had left the front of the hill, General Cox sent over the remainder of the Eleventh Ohio — then little more than 200 for duty — under Colonel DeVilliers, whose order was to "occupy and hold the crests if possible". At the same time he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Enyart, with 200 of his regiment (First Kentucky), to cross just below the hill, reach the Fayetteville road and the left of the battery position. Again appears the puzzling question, why was this latter movement not made by Benham's men? He was already on that road, a few miles below, with his whole brigade. If there was a strong force of the enemy between him and Cotton Hill, it would be far too strong for Enyart's 200. The only explanation suggested by reading the records lies in the marked inertia of General Benham, a charge which seems to be fully justified in the perfect hail of orders and messages sent to him by Rosecrans within the week with no effective results.

Whatever the reason was the whole affair was now left to Cox's brigade, tho still on the north side of the river. Seeing that DeVilliers had landed his contingent of the Eleventh Ohio and advanced beyond sight, General Cox, for some reason not found, sent over no more troops until night; and that regiment held the hill (that half nearest

positions of the enemy. They know little more than their immediate orders and the enemy's position as they then see it. It would have been an extraordinary thing indeed, to send a captain and 37 men to attack a battery on a high hill, very difficult of ascent, manned and guarded by a larger number and in the front of a force of several thousand. It must have been known to Rosecrans (or Cox) that the guns were gone, at least from that site, and it was necessary to learn what the position was. So Captain Lane's movement, delicate and dangerous tho it was, was reconnoitring, tho probably with direction to hold the hill, if practicable, until he could be reinforced. Indeed, a letter he wrote soon after the affair, when it was fresh in mind, points to the real purpose of his important expedition.

the river), with several skirmishing advances and retreats, throughout the day (Sunday, November 10). This was very creditable to the small command, tho also a proof that Floyd had now no great force on the hill and expected to abandon it.

Captain Lane's share in this day was characteristically steady and self-reliant. He had no instruction for action beyond the stage he had reached, but he understood it to be his duty to remain in immediate observation of the enemy until relieved by orders or driven back by attack. Accordingly, after making sure of the position of the rebels by feeling their pickets, he disposed his men where they could best watch and yet quickly concentrate for defense or retreat if compelled. He then sent a man back to the river, to report the situation. He had had skirmishing in fixing the rebel position, but as yet not loss.

His messenger saw Colonel DeVilliers at the river, where he had landed,* made the report, and was sent back with an order to him (Lane) to report in person at the

* Captain Lane tells of two incidents of this arrival of DeVilliers which are very amusing, not only in themselves, but in Captain Lane's taking them so seriously. His indignation, however, was more than justified. The Colonel came over in a row-boat with three men, two at the oars and one steering. On landing he ordered these men to remain in their seats, then called off the sergeant commanding and one man from the guard Captain Lane had left in charge of his two large boats, directed the man to hold the bow of his rowboat to the bank, ready for instant use, and the sergeant to remain there in command of the four and shoot at once any of them who attempted to leave, while he provided for the sergeant himself by declaring his intention to cut his head off if he failed in any of these duties. This ridiculous stuff seems almost incredible, but tho it comes only from the men thus marked for sudden slaughter, and so must be taken with some allowance, there were many such incidents in the career of this curious mountebank in office. The men directly concerned in the Colonel's careful provision at the boat account for it upon the simple tho harsh theory that he was thinking only of his personal safety. Perhaps they did not then know that it is the duty of a commanding officer to avoid exposing himself unnecessarily, tho that rule is supposed usually to apply to the field of action in front rather than to a position in the rear!

The other incident was in an absurdly comical scene, tho both actors were hotly in earnest, one of them righteously angry enough to knock the other off the earth. The Colonel must have known of the misfortune by which the boats were carried down on the flood,

landing at once. As I find nowhere any comment upon this astonishing order, I would make allowance for the possibility of circumstances not reported which might make it seem less unreasonable. What it did was to take away the commanding officer from a small party of troops in a dangerous position directly in front of the enemy, and take him so far away that he could not return, at the best, for nearly an hour, meantime not knowing what was happening at his post. If it was necessary to see the Captain, the Colonel should have gone at least as far as to the top of the hill before sending for him. If he had done that, he would have met him much sooner and kept him from his post less than half an hour.

As it was, the Captain hurried down to the river, and the Colonel, without asking for further report or information, at once began to berate him for not getting across the river earlier, and filled the air with violent and vulgar abuse and epithets, applied to the Captain and his men and all the regiment.* Captain Lane, tho in a deep rage, commendably restrained himself and waited for the end, only keeping ready for action if he were struck or approached. When the truculent little Colonel's wind was spent, he was so far from ordering any one to execution that he directed the Captain to take that portion of the regiment now landed to the position of his company on the top of the hill and command the whole till further orders. It was barely in time, for the enemy was showing

inasmuch as they were hauled back along the front of the camps, and undoubtedly the Captain had reported it on the way; but, whether he knew it or not, he now worked himself into such a passion he would listen to nothing. In the coarse and profane language he was given to, he declared the Captain was unfit to command, and that he had failed to cross the river and get up the mountain from cowardice; and all the time he was flourishing in the air a cavalry sabre (he carried it constantly, instead of the proper infantry officer's sword) as "wildly as a madman." Captain Lane at first tried to speak, but seeing the uselessness of it and unwilling to lower his dignity in a quarrel, he was silent, only keeping his hand on his pistol "if the fellow came near me."

* When he was under court-martial trial some months later a number of similar affairs of gross insults to his officers appeared in evidence under the charge of "conduct unbecoming to an officer and a gentleman."

signs of activity. Closer skirmishing followed, soon afterward Major Coleman appeared — an experienced soldier and very capable officer — and took command; and finally Colonel De Villiers came, as he ought to have done long before. There was a good deal of desultory fighting, with no definite gain that day.

As the battle here the next day had a decisive result (tho it was not improved) and was the most important one the Eleventh had up to this time, some account of it ought to be given. It was known as "Cotton-Hill" or "Blake's-Farm" in the Kanawha army, but is "Gauley-Bridge" in Phisterer's "Statistical Record".

Cotton Hill is a ridge or "hog-back", about one and a half miles long, lying northwest and southeast. The northwestern end rises to a head or promontory, several hundred feet high, overhanging the river, with a precipitous, rocky face, inaccessible except that at a few places footmen may climb up thro narrow gorges. Behind the head, on top, the land falls away into a "saddle", making a fairly workable tract large enough for a small farm, which was then occupied by a farmer named Blake. Southeast of this farm rose the true hill, higher than the river end and then covered with forest. The southwestern side of the ridge is deep and steep, but to the north and east of it the land is considerably higher, so that from there the hill is easily reached.

Floyd had had a couple of regiments encamped at the foot of the southwest side, on the Fayetteville road, which there curves southward to get around the base of the hill, but he withdrew them when he did the guns; and his whole force was now on the Fayetteville road, east of the hill. Thus there was nothing to prevent Benham's brigade from moving up the Fayetteville road to the southern end of the hill, a movement which would have induced Floyd to give it up at once; and there need have been none of the labor and cost to Cox's men of taking it by attack on top.

When the Eleventh Ohio detachment arrived in support of Lane's company, it was posted, with that company, beyond Blake's farm, and finally, under Major Coleman, advanced to an attack. The rebels soon broke and fell back thro the wood on to the higher ground.

Getting aid, however, they returned and, in a counter-attack, drove the Eleventh men back to the edge of Blake's farm. Here, behind a ravine, a defense was undertaken and the rebels were held until another detachment of the regiment arrived.* Then the advance was renewed and the rebels were driven farther than at first,— beyond the farm and well up the wooded hill at the outer end of the ridge. Night coming on the command was posted in a good defensive position, its left holding the ground nearest the New river ferry, and remained there during the night.

If it were not Floyd in command it would be remarkable that this small force — less than 250 — was allowed to remain on the hill. With any boldness he could easily have destroyed it in a single movement. He does seem to have had an idea of his opportunity. In the night a feeble attempt upon it was made, under which its left wing, under Major Coleman, moved back a few hundred yards and lost six men captured (Lane's company was, as I gather, on the right), but just then two companies of the Second Kentucky, sent over by General Cox, arrived to reinforce, and Coleman recovered his ground. Some firing then followed upon all parts of the line, but seemingly without any set purpose, and, after an hour or two, the enemy retired without having accomplished anything and without any spirited effort.

During the night four more companies of the Second Kentucky came over from Gauley, thus raising the command to about 600 men, but it was impracticable to bring up even a small gun. General Cox too came over, to direct operations. At daybreak (the 11th) began an advance of the whole force, by General Cox's order but under immediate command of Colonel DeVilliers. The rebel pickets were soon uncovered and driven in, and the main body steadily pushed again onto the wooded hill, tho keeping up a constant fire. Judging the enemy's force there to be much superior to his, General Cox halted this movement; but it had gone far enough to bring the Fayetteville road into view to the southeast, and the

* Apparently the detachment taken up the hill by Captain Lane on his second ascent was not all of the 200 the Colonel was bringing over; but a part came over after the Colonel arrived.

enemy's baggage train was seen there, moving toward Fayetteville. Floyd was preparing for full retreat, as was further shown by the fact that Enyart's detachment of the First Kentucky (that first sent over) now moved up the Fayetteville road, by the southwest and south side of the ridge, and in the afternoon was on Laurel creek, at its southernmost point, where it remained until the next day.

General Cox did nothing more, not even "feeling" the enemy more than he had done with his contingent on the hill. He could now easily communicate with General Benham, a few miles down the road (as of course with Rosecrans across the river), and one would expect to hear that Benham was ordered to move at once up the road, at least so far as to determine what Floyd was doing or what his position was. And so he was ordered (as soon as Rosecrans learned from Cox that Floyd's wagons were moving) to move up immediately; but he says, in his report, that he received the order at 11 p. m., while Rosecrans says, officially, that his acknowledgment is dated 7 p. m. Whatever the hour was, Benham's idea of "immediate" was such as that, as his report says, he began his march "next morning" (the 12th) and spent the day up to 4 p. m. in reaching, on the Fayetteville road, the right of Cox's position on the hill, a march of eight miles. Here his advance had a slight skirmish (probably with a small section of Floyd's rear guard, left in observation), and he bivouacked for the night. During the night his picket or scouts reported hearing wheels moving up the Fayetteville road, but it was not till "next morning" again that he sent a reconnoitring party to learn what it meant. He waited till after 4 p. m. of that day (the 13th) for this party to return, and then advanced. Of course he found no enemy; and he marched ten miles (to and beyond Fayetteville) without seeing one. Floyd had passed there the afternoon of the 12th, more than a whole day and night ahead of him.

Early in his operations Rosecrans had sent General Schenk, with his brigade, a few miles up New river, to try to make a crossing at a long-abandoned ferrying place, in the hope of getting the Fayetteville road above Floyd's position, and six days of labor were spent there

in making boats or floats and getting them down the bluff to the water. This was just done when the river rose high and the crossing was declared impracticable. But Floyd was then (night of 12th) known to be in retreat; and on the 13th Schenck's brigade was brought down across the Gauley and put over the Kanawha where the first detachment of the First Kentucky men had crossed, thus placing it on the Fayetteville road, several miles in the rear of Benham's brigade. Schenck then followed up Benham, and was directed by Rosecrans to take command of both brigades.

On the 14th Benham moved on and that night was ten miles further toward Raleigh, tho he had been twenty-four hours or more in doing it. Under these persistently adverse conditions, disgusted with Benham and hopeless of recovering the prey he had believed surely in his hand, Rosecrans stopped the movement, and Schenck ordered Benham to return to Fayetteville, which he did promptly and within one-fourth the time he had used in marching the same distance in the other direction.*

A certain hasty judgment, characteristic of Rosecrans, may well be said to have led to his failure in this campaign. There was, in fact, no good reason why he could not cross New river some miles above the place attempted by General Schenck. Without any certain information he believed that General Lee was on the Lewisburg road with a strong force, ready to attack him at Gauley Bridge, and, so, of course, able to prevent his sending a brigade any distance up New river. He could have learned, without serious difficulty, that the force remaining after Floyd crossed was practically insignificant and that after November 5th Lee was not there.† Schenck could easily

* General Benham was a regular army officer and evidently a man of education and cultivation, but he was possessed of a remarkable inertia or timidity, and was habitually neglectful or careless as to orders and instructions. The records show that from November 2 to 13 Rosecrans sent him forty written orders and messages, with information and instructions in many details, but there is no sign of any energy or activity or carefulness in him. Why Rosecrans did not supersede him with another commander is a problem; but some weeks later he did order him under arrest for some other gross neglect.

† On that day Lee left for Richmond under orders.

have been over and in control of the Fayetteville road before the 10th, and then, cut off on his only road on both flanks, Floyd's whole command would have been taken, if only Schenck and Benham attacked and pressed him with energy.

On the 13th, when it was certain that Floyd was in full retreat and Benham was at Fayetteville, in pursuit, Cox's men were withdrawn from Cotton Hill to their camp at Gauley. They were in high spirits and proud of themselves. As they saw it, all the fighting had been done by them, and Floyd's whole army was beaten. And when they learned that Benham and Schenck were in pursuit, taking wagons and picking up prisoners without a battle, they claimed that the hard work and dangers and conflict were theirs, while the other brigades reaped the credit. That is the way soldiers talk, because, usually, they know only what occurs immediately under their observation and do not know the causes or meanings of operations or movements as a whole. But they were really entitled to high credit. They had been two days and nights on the field, in immediate contact with the enemy, under constant excitement and probably with little or no sleep. Tho they had not fought any large part of Floyd's forces, as they, or some of them, seem to have imagined, they had finally beaten those they did meet, and in their several advances and retreats had been under fire a dozen times, several times quite hotly; and they had borne all the loss in men in the whole affair. They had, in short, successfully maintained the most important action in the field that had yet fallen to their brigade.

The Eleventh Ohio had, indeed, borne the hardest part. The most of the work and all the losses had been in that regiment. And Captain Lane and his company had done the most, or at least had been the longest on the field and most at risk. Their adventure in crossing the two flooded rivers in the night and climbing the high, steep hill, to meet an enemy of unknown strength, would make a thrilling story. The particular part taken by the Captain and his company in the various fights of the 10th and 11th is not known. What he wrote about the actions was but little and was all of a general character.

A day or two after Cox's men got back into camp

Benham's brigade was brought back, while Schenck's was left at Fayetteville, where Rosecrans now intended to erect defenses, to be held indefinitely as the outpost of the army on that side of the river. But there were to be no more field operations until spring: indeed no more were practicable, the roads having become quite impassable and sure to be kept so by the winter storms.

That was Floyd's view too, and, partly for that reason, partly because half his men were sick and all demoralized, at the end of November he moved thro the mountains southeastward and encamped on the Virginia & Tennessee railroad, near Newbern.

There was nothing now to prevent the Kanawha Brigade from talking all the time about winter-quarters, and the only other subject of much interest was that of furloughs. General Rosecrans had, a month or more earlier and rather rashly, promised the winter-quarters. It was, indeed, especially important that soldiers should have sound shelter in a region in which winter is usually a close succession of rains and snows. A plenty of timber was at hand, and only axes and other tools were required for the building of huts. But the men hoped to be quartered in the milder and drier country (and nearer home!) on the Ohio, tho they knew some troops must remain on the Kanawha. Meantime many were allowed furloughs and the others counted the time for the coming round of their turns.

Captain Lane had been for some time anxious to get a leave. Not only his desire to visit his family (he had then four young children), but his manufacturing business, which had suffered much during his six months army employment, kept his mind much concerned. His letters from the middle of October, or earlier, show that he was anxiously hoping and planning to go home. At the end of October he thought he was near it, but Floyd's irruption stopped all thought of it for the present. When that episode was ended other obstructions appeared. About all the other officers wanted to go too. The Lieutenant-Colonel and the Major went, on sick leave, and then the Colonel went (and entertained the admiring people in Ohio with "lectures"); and, finally, the Cap-

tain agreed to wait while his First-Lieutenant went home. The fates were against him; and thus kept him on the ground when there was another bridge to be built! As if he had not already done, in work of practical great advantage to the operations of the army, much more than any other officer in it.

As it had been determined to maintain a strong post at Fayetteville, it was essential to have a sure line of supply for it. That must be by a good road on the south or west side of the river, from the head of steamboat navigation, which was just below the mouth of Loop creek, twenty miles below Fayetteville. This road had been neglected for a long time, especially that portion along the Kanawha, which was now much obstructed by fallen trees and rocks and wash-outs, while the bridge over the mouth of Loop creek had been carried away by a flood.

Captain Lane was, apparently, the only "Engineer" and Company K the only body of "Pioneers" or "Pontoniers" in the army; and the work fell upon them. But Company B was also put under the Captain's command to assist. With a detachment of Company K, leaving behind all arms and equipments except blankets and haversacks, he went down the road from Gauley to Cannelson, ten miles, on the north side of the Kanawha, to get the tools and materials for the bridge-building and move them to the south side by steamboat. On the way down he found one of his company, a guard, carrying his gun, and took him along, thus having one gun in his party. Owing to various causes of delay it was dark when the landing on the south side, below the mouth of Loop creek, was made. The remainder of the command was to cross the river a little below the Gauley, on scows, with two wagons, which were to bring provisions, axes and other pioneering tools and the arms and ammunition of Lane's detachment, and were to work their way down the old road on the west side, clearing it enough, if practicable, to enable them to reach Loop creek by night. If that were found impossible, then a party was to march on to Loop creek, carrying provisions and arms for the men with Captain Lane. This latter party did get thro to the creek by dark, but the creek was "booming", from the rains, and they could not cross. The date of

this expedition is not found, but it was in November, 1861, apparently just before the 20th.

A day of continuous rain was followed by a heavy storm of rain, sleet and snow, which went on all or most of the night, at times with great violence. The Company B men were found to be on the upper side of the creek, with the arms and provisions, but there was deep darkness and the torrent was impassable. There were several log cabins near, unoccupied, and Captain Lane and his men settled in the one best adapted for a post, and soon had a fire in the big fire-place. That was their only comfort. They had set out with one day's rations in haversacks, but, with the usual hunger and improvidence of marching men, they had eaten all within half the day.

The position was dangerous. All the region beyond the picket-posts was infested by bands of guerrillas, and there was a road down the left bank of Loop creek by which they had sometimes come for sharpshooting practice on the steamboats on the river or the soldiers on the Gauley road. They had once or twice brought down a small field-gun and interrupted operations on the river for a short time. Floyd's retreat may have drawn them off for the present, but there was no knowing as to that. Captain Lane set a picket post of one man with the gun up this road, provided for relief every two hours, and all the remainder were devoted to warming and drying themselves and trying to sleep in the cabin. There was some sense of security in the fierce storm, which, with the intense darkness, would make any attack very doubtful and difficult; but there must have been much anxiety, especially in the Captain's mind, as his men were in a corner from which there was no escape and the one gun could not do much. The steamboat captain had insisted upon taking his boat back to Cannelton as soon as he had got the men and materials landed, unwilling to risk a stay on the enemy's side over night.

Here was the incident of the bursting of the chimney, a tale Colonel Lane was fond of telling as one of the humorous experiences of his camps. The big fire-place had been built of stone, the back of it being a single large stone with a smooth face, well adapted for reflecting

the heat of a fire. The men were greatly pleased with its effective service that cold, stormy night. But they did not know what was in it or behind it. The house had not been occupied for some time, the many rains of the season had saturated the chimney, and some water must have found its way into crevices of the big stone or behind it, which the great heat finally converted to steam.

About midnight, when all the men were asleep or drowsy, there was a tremendous explosion and the room was instantly filled with broken stone, ashes and embers from the fire. Every man sprang to his feet while he grabbed for his gun. Of course the one idea was, that a shell had struck in the house and exploded. But no other sound followed, two or three men ran out, but found no sign of an enemy; the picket with the gun ran in to learn what the shock was, and reported all quiet on the road. A blaze quickly started on the hearth showed no damage but in the back of the fire-place, where there was a great cavity.

Meantime the blankets were burning from the scattered fire and fragments of hot stone, and the house was in danger. Jerking up the blankets and scraping the debris into the fire-place, followed by handfuls of brush as brooms, the men were at the same time in a dispute as to the cause of the catastrophe. Most of them clung to the shell theory until the cleaning-up failed to produce even one fragment; and there was no one hurt. All agreed at last that the explanation of the Captain was right, that it was an explosion caused by steam from water confined in some way in or behind the big backstone; and a good part of the night was spent in speculating on the extraordinary event and joking on the conduct of individuals.

This was not the last of the terrors of that stormy night. The lone picket-guard, an hour or two later, caused another abrupt excitement by falling into the house upon the sleeping men; but we will leave that, with other amusing incidents, in the Captain's reminiscent papers.

With the earliest light the harassed and hungry soldiers turned out to learn their further fortune, with an immediate strong desire toward the food supply. The storm

had ceased, but all the world was saturated and the creek was a roaring torrent. Their provisions and arms were on the other side, but there were no means of crossing. To bring over the steamboat (if it would come) and transfer around the mouth of the creek would take much time; and there must be a direct passage anyhow, in order to carry on the bridge-work effectively. A little way up the creek the gorge was narrow, and there some tall trees were felled so as to lie across above the water. A rude foot bridge was thus made, and the arms and rations brought over.

All other considerations were lost for the present in the joys of cooking and eating a substantial breakfast, except that the busy Captain was meanwhile surveying the site and planning his bridge. With his habitual energy, he soon had the whole detachment actively cutting, hauling, and pushing the various parts of the work; and before night he had a substantial bridge practically completed. It took longer to recover the old road, the eight or nine miles up to Cotton Hill, from its very bad condition. When done, however, the supply of the post at Fayetteville direct from the steamboat landing was assured, and at the same time the demand upon the road on the north side was much diminished. That road between the landing at Cannelton and Gauley Bridge had become almost literally impassable, much of it reduced to a bed of mire several feet deep.

It was here and at this time that Captain Lane saw the sunken team of four mules and a wagon of which he tells in his essay on "Mud." All soldiers who had any real campaigning experience in the South were familiar with such scenes, tho the Captain's tale went rather further than any I could tell of what I saw. Nearly all roads in the southern States were "dirt" roads, running over the natural surface of the ground, exceedingly dusty in dry weather and exceedingly muddy in wet weather. Heavy and frequent rains marked the winter in most parts of the South, and the soil became a thick sponge two or three or more feet deep. Abandoned wagons and ambulances, now and then even a gun or caisson, broken down and abandoned horses and mules, were familiar sights, while dead horses and mules at the road-side were

too numerous to count. Any Wagonmaster was an expert in the art of getting animals and wagons out of the mire with ropes and doubled teams and levers of fence-rails or heavy poles. But what Captain Lane saw on the Lewisburg pike below Gauley Bridge was a wagon sunk in the road until the bed reached the mire, with its four mules still hitched to it and sinking more and more by their struggles, like a man caught in quick-sands, until only their heads were above the half-fluid mass. And there of course they died. No wonder the men felt assured of winter-quarters, for there could be no campaign without wheels and mules, even tho the men might pick their way without regular marching.

Thus, for Company K and Captain Lane, the four months of most strenuous and exhausting labor and marching, hardships and fighting, ended, as they had begun, in the building of a bridge of immediate and great importance to the service of the army. Within that period, with the aid of details from other companies, they had constructed four big bridges, half a dozen or more smaller ones, the long and dangerous ferry on the Gauley twice, and eight or ten boats large enough to carry troops and wagons. It is quite safe to say that they had done more toward the practical and effective service of the army than any other troops in it.

With Schenck's brigade now in a strong outpost at Fayetteville, it was not necessary to maintain a large force at Gauley. General Cox placed one regiment of Benham's brigade there as a fortified post, another at Summerville on his left, others at other posts; and withdrew his own brigade to Charleston, where he established the headquarters of the District and had a portion of the brigade prepare their quarters for the winter. For the remainder, including the Eleventh Ohio, he got leave to send them down to the Ohio and quarter them at Point Pleasant. Early in December, to their great joy, they were settled there, almost at home and free for months from marches, labors and threatened attacks. Of course they all wanted to go home, and many did get leave; but it was easy for their friends to come, by rail and river; and the little town was filled with social activities and improvised entertainments for several months.

Captain Lane's pleasure, however, was lost in his anxiety to see his family and attend to his business at Cincinnati. His wife had come up to Marietta (her old home) with the children a month or more before, to meet him as soon as he could get the leave he had been counting upon five or six weeks; but private communication between the army and the State was at that time surprisingly slow and uncertain, and she gave up her hopes for the present and went back to Cincinnati. Much disappointed on learning this, he wrote her at once (December 6) to come up to Point Pleasant and to bring her mother, saying they could stay at the "Virginia Hotel". They must have come immediately, as a later letter shows that they had been at Point Pleasant and had returned to Cincinnati before December 20. He had not been able to apply for the leave of absence he had so long wanted, the last reason being the absence of Lieutenant Johnson. That officer returned a few days before the 20th, and the application was sent in at once. But the routine of such things was usually (to the mind of the applicant) cruelly slow, and it was several weeks before the leave was received.

But other events now crowded the field for Captain Lane and the regiment, much more important than any leave of absence, and he was prevented from using it. The Colonel, since his return to command at the end of October, had been so abusive and tyrannical toward the officers, so neglectful of duty, and so vociferous in threats and insulting language to any one who displeased him, that the regiment was constantly in turmoil; order and discipline were much broken down, and demoralization of the command was in rapid progress. Proceedings to remove the Colonel were undertaken, in which Captain Lane was the principal figure, but their culmination and final success were not reached till some months later, and the episode is therefore left to the events of 1862.

VII

1862: JANUARY — MAY

Driving Out Colonel DeVilliers — Captain Lane Leads the Movement — Files Charges Against the Colonel — Is Himself Put Under Arrest, Deprived of His Sword, and Has Charges Filed Against Him by the Colonel — Long Wait for the Court-Martial — Captain Lane's Campaign Against Whiskey — Colonel DeVilliers Arrested and Brought to Trial — Convicted and Cashiered — Captain Lane Tried on the Colonel's Charges, Acquitted and Restored to Duty

The year of the greatest trials of the Eleventh Ohio, of the hardest labors, of the most profitable experiences, and of its steady and rapid development as effective soldiers. But, for Captain Lane, it was all that and much more. As an engineer, he exceeded the achievements of 1861. As a recruiting officer in Ohio, he succeeded not only in replacing all the losses of the regiment, but in filling it up to the maximum,— a condition never reached before. As an officer burning with zeal in the great cause and with a mind single to the best development of the regiment and the good of the service, he planned and, at great personal risk and sacrifice, resolutely fought out to success the dismissal from the army of the unfit Colonel. No wonder that before the end of the year he was the foremost man of the regiment.

The very beginning of the year was marked by the undertaking, led by Captain Lane, to force Colonel DeVilliers out of the regiment. It was his greatest battle and greatest success during the war. It proved his courage and his capacity for self-sacrifice in the highest degree; and, so far from crushing him, as he keenly feared from the beginning of the attempt, it led, indirectly and

wholly unforeseen, to his becoming the Colonel of the regiment himself.

In so large an army of volunteers as that in the Civil War, hastily assembled, containing, comparatively, very few men of military training, with no system or standard in the selection of officers, it was inevitable that many unfit men would be commissioned. The "line" (company) officers were, relatively, better than the "field" officers (majors, colonels and lieutenant-colonels), because, as a rule, they had proved at least their zeal in the cause and energy in action by "raising" their companies. But the field-officers were mostly commissioned thro the "influence" of political or social friends of conspicuous position; their possession of military capacity remained to be tested by trial. It is true, a number of the field-officers were men of former experience in the regular army or in the volunteers in the Mexican war; but another class was that of certain foreigners who had had experience in the armies of European monarchies. Some of these were naturalized Americans, but many were still aliens and many came to America after the war began, confident of obtaining positions much higher than any they could hope for in their own countries. Some of these foreigners were very troublesome, from their lack of adaptability, and some were impostors or mere adventurers. Little or no care was taken to learn their antecedents and in some cases the only knowledge obtained of them was in their own tales.

The Eleventh Ohio Infantry had the great misfortune to get for its colonel one of these impostors. He was said to be French, but he spoke German fluently, his former career was unknown, and when he was dismissed in disgrace from the Eleventh Ohio he disappeared so completely that he was never heard of again.* Whatever connection he may have had with a European army, he proved to be a man of low breeding, of no high purpose or sense of honor, and without personal honesty. He showed knowledge and skill as a drill-master in sword and bayonet exercise, tho his regiment profited little or nothing by them. It seems that the only thing

* But see page 104.

he tried to do with any persistence was to bring his command under "discipline", but he was so conceited, mercurial and impatient that he could not wait upon the necessity (for green volunteers) of laying the proper ground by constant drilling and practice in the primary school of the soldier. So he tried to reach his end by erratic violence and harshness, personal ridicule and insult, and wholly failed. He was, however, very alert mentally and physically, made a smart, soldierly appearance, had an ingratiating address toward superiors, and to them in his earlier service appeared to be a capable officer. Even General Cox wrote of him, on his return from prison, in a manner which, later, must have brought him mortification and regret.* Colonel Frizell, of the Eleventh Ohio, was much better qualified to form a correct judgment, as appears by his letter to Mrs. Lane, written December 27, 1861.†

Colonel DeVilliers had been in the field but two or three days, and on no important duty, when he was captured.‡ He had hardly returned to his command (November 1, 1861) when his ability and courage were put to test (at the battle of Cotton-Hill, as already described) and failed. His vicious and insulting abuse of Captain Lane and his company at that time was soon followed by similar instances in dealing with other officers of his regiment, while many of the non-commisioned officers and soldiers were subjected to his vituperation and silly threats of impossible punishments. Disrespect and contempt for him spread thro the regiment and was not carefully concealed by either officers or men. He lost hold of the regiment practically, while discontent, disorder and danger of demoralization were only too apparent. To most of the officers the situation became intolerable. Privately nearly all wanted to get rid of

* See General Orders No. 27, Head Quarters Kanawha Brigade, October 9, 1861.

† Referring to Captain Lane's arrest (see page 82) he wrote "I can well assure you that the brave and gallant Captain will soon be honorably discharged (from arrest) and his persecutor receive such treatment as his ungentlemanly course to officers so richly merits."

‡ See page 33.

him, but for any action there must publicly be a leader, tho the position must be one of serious risks, from which, naturally, most men of inferior rank would shrink. There were but few of the officers who could reasonably be called upon to undertake it. Either of the two junior field-officers would fall under the imputation of seeking his own advancement. A lieutenant would lack weight because of his inferior rank. So the leader must be a captain.

Captain Lane had been the first to suffer conspicuously, and in his case the Colonel had followed up his first offense by an exasperating petty persecution. The Captain had a plenty of courage, braced up by righteous indignation at the injustice of his own treatment and that of others; but, in his simple-minded directness of speech, he had openly expressed his opinion of the Colonel personally and of the bad influence of his conduct upon the regiment,— indiscreet, of course, to say the least, but also a breach of military discipline and law. An obvious handicap, too, this was in his heading the movement against the Colonel, but his mind was made up to accept any risks in the clear duty to himself and the regiment as he saw it. It is true, he exaggerated the possible evil results to himself, but that made his act in taking the leadership all the more creditable to him. He reduced the whole case to the simple proposition that either DeVilliers or himself must be driven from the army, and he would think of no compromise.

Soon after the regiment reached Point Pleasant, to go into winter quarters (early in December, 1861), consultations of company officers were held and Captain Lane became their spokesman in requesting the Colonel to resign. Seeing that they had a set purpose, he finally said that, if the officers and men (i. e., the regiment generally) should ask it, he would resign. He fancied that they would not commit themselves to writing, but they did. Captain Lane soon had a petition signed by a number so large as to make it certain that the Colonel could not have many friends in the regiment. When he saw this he denied that he had given such a promise, but said that if all the officers, or a majority of them, should really demand it, he would resign. Then, curiously enough, he

himself called a meeting of the officers. Perhaps he thought they would not dare to make the demand openly, for (apparently) he was himself present. There were then eighteen officers in camp (the other six or eight were absent sick or on furlough), and sixteen attended the meeting; and their vote was unanimous for the resignation. But his word was worth no more now than before. He refused, and in a passion declared he was the Colonel and would be the Colonel in spite of them.

Captain Lane immediately set to work in drawing up charges against him for court-martial, a step which he had quite expected he would have to take. He finished them the same night and handed them in the next morning, December 27, 1861. He must have felt a sense of relief in reaching at last a definite, clear-cut issue; but yet his troubles were only just begun.

At that time an order for the court-martial required could be made only by the general commanding the Department, who was General Rosecrans. But the charges could reach him only thro the "regular military channel" (as it was commonly called), that is, the person making them must deliver them, in writing, to his immediate commanding officer, he to his immediate commander, and so on, each commander endorsing upon the paper his approval or disapproval or recommendation. Thus the first officer to see Captain Lane's charges was the one accused. It is not now known what he did with them nor what endorsement he wrote upon them, if any. But what he did on seeing them was clear and quick.

Captain Lane delivered the paper at the regimental headquarters and returned to his company with much relief of mind in the performance of a high duty. It was the regular hour for drill. He ordered out his company and was engaged in drilling on the parade-ground when an officer arrived with an order from Colonel De-Villiers, putting him under arrest and demanding his sword. The Colonel did not wait until the Captain was off duty, but put this humiliation upon him in the presence of his men and in a public place. No charge was made, no cause for the arrest was stated, and the Captain knew of no cause unless it was in the filing of the charges against the Colonel; but that he had the right to do, not

only in the mere nature of things, but under the Articles of War. The fact was that the Colonel was in a reckless rage. Likely he had a vague idea that the filing of the charges could be punished as an act of insubordination.

The effect of an arrest is to deprive the officer of his command and of regular service and "confine" him to his quarters, the next junior officer taking over his command. So a captain arrested must stay with his company while his lieutenant controls it.

When the Colonel's head cooled he saw that he had gone too far, especially in depriving the Captain of his sword. Probably now, for the first time during the quarrel, he read the military law. The Articles of War require an officer under arrest to give up his sword only when a specific charge is made of criminal conduct; and the filing of charges against a superior officer, so far from being a crime, is a right expressly recognized by the Articles.

The Colonel within two days sought to repair the mischief he had done, but, instead of taking the reasonable and manly course of frankly admitting his blunder and apologizing, he only sent for the Captain (December 29) and offered his sword to him. The Captain demanded an explanation and a statement of the cause of his arrest, and refused to receive his sword without it. The mean-spirited Colonel would not comply. He sent for the Adjutant and ordered *him* to return the sword; but he was still met with a refusal to receive it. Then he directed the Adjutant to take the sword to the Captain's quarters and, if he then still refused it, to leave it there.* At the same time he (the Colonel) ordered the Captain to return to duty and resume his command. The Captain declined to do either until he was told why he had been arrested,—that is, he refused to be released from arrest!

However, he seems to have then consulted someone, and to have been advised that he "could not make any point in refusing my sword and that my only redress was in preferring charges for false imprisonment." This was not correct advice as to the law, for the acts of the

* If the Adjutant did this — and it seems he did — he must have been a "weak sister." It was not at all within his duty.

Colonel in the arrest and taking the sword were clearly usurpation of power and furnished ground for another charge against him, under one of the Articles of War. The Captain says, however, that he did prefer a charge of "false imprisonment", but he does not tell what was done about it, and such a charge does not appear among the papers nor in the proceedings of the court-martial. Perhaps it was thought good policy to drop it, to avoid as far as possible the appearance of a personal quarrel.

The war was now on. It could end only in total defeat of one side or the other; but, for the present, Captain Lane did nothing more in it than to prepare his evidence for the prosecution, tho he or some other officer at some time added further charges, based upon other tyrannical acts of the Colonel, committed while awaiting the creation and sitting of the court and while he (the Colonel) was under arrest.

The Colonel would have liked now to placate the Captain, knowing there were many witnesses against him and knowing also that there was ground for yet more serious charges if enemies should discover the evidence of them. But the Captain was perfectly implacable. He was quite settled in mind to risk his position and army career, and (as he then imagined) himself, in the cause of justice and the good of the service. He wrote to his wife at this time—"I have come to the determination deliberately to follow the thing as long as there is a place to hang a hope on, and one or the other of us must be dismissed from the service in disgrace".

"I have feared that I might have General Cox as my opponent in this matter, but I have strong hope that his good sense will dictate the proper course for him. I have right on my side and I will prevail against all that oppose; and if it is necessary for me to fight General Cox, I will do that: it will only prolong the struggle."*

A few days later he wrote her—"I promise you I will

* His fear of General Cox's position was, I think, due to his knowledge of the General's character,—cautious and moderate in all things, considerate and unpartisan in any controversy, and perhaps rather likely to be imposed upon by a skilful pretender. And his unlucky certificate of Colonel DeVilliers' ability already mentioned (page 80) had been published in the regiment. But

do my best to drive such a scoundrel from the American army and from a country of freemen." This "promise" was not due to her asking it: on the contrary she shrank from the contest, because of fear of the possible consequence to him and the family of a failure, naturally not fully understanding the affair, but feeling keenly the apparent disgrace of his public arrest and loss of his sword. It was probably this that led him to write, in this last letter—"Do not let my children suppose that I am dishonored, but teach them it is better to die in defense of a right than to live in luxury and submit to a wrong".

Fortunately, he did not foresee the further sacrifice and humiliations he must endure to reach the decisive act in the struggle, tho his course would certainly have been just the same if he had foreseen. It was full ten weeks from the day he filed the charges when, at last, he heard the welcome call of the case for trial. This delay, in the dark and full of anxieties—for he could get no news of action by the authorities, except that of the arrest of DeVilliers upon his charges,—was heart-breaking and seemed almost intolerable. The bad effects, morally, of the uncertain conflict upon the company and the regiment, the lack (real or fancied) of whole-hearted sympathy among his fellow-officers, the natural (tho mistaken) apprehensions and doubts of his wife and personal friends at home as to the necessity or wisdom of his undertaking, and finally his fear (unreasonable tho it was) of a disastrous result to himself, even if DeVilliers were also destroyed,—the situation must have been a constant distress to him, tho it could never shake his fixed purpose. He was penetrated by the conviction that he was right, and he did not permit himself to doubt his final triumph, however much the labor and pain might be. It was all a strikingly fine exhibition of his strong character.

The authority to order a court-martial lay with the

he must have formed later a very different judgment; and there is no doubt that, privately, he now sympathized with Captain Lane and his purpose and was sincerely desirous to help all he could (in view of his position) to rid the regiment and brigade of its incubus.

Department Commander, General Rosecrans, and he, or his Judge-Advocate-General (the prosecuting officer) did not consider the case as one for a special court. It was, therefore, left to await convenience or occasion for a general court to try accumulated cases. So the order was not issued until February 26, 1862, two months after Captain Lane's charges were filed. But he did not know — could only surmise — the causes of delay, and so was almost daily looking for news of action. It is quite possible that this delay was, in part, due to mere neglect or official indifference to the need of prompt action for the good of the service. The administration work of the Department must have been much influenced by the slipshod, happy-go-lucky methods of its head.

Officers and men under charges are off duty and often under arrest, or even under guard, in disgrace in any event, tho a trial might prove them not guilty; the other officers and men see it all; and there is usually more or less demoralization. In common sense and common right, therefore, a military trial ought to be speedy. The case of Captain Lane seemed to him of great importance, not merely to himself, but far-reaching (as indeed it was), and, not knowing why it dragged, looking every day vainly for some sign of progress, his anxious thoughts and feelings can well be imagined.

Colonel DeVilliers' character justified a suspicion that he would suppress the charges against him or, at least, withhold them as long as possible from his brigade-commander; and Captain Lane was determined, in that event, to insist upon filing another set directly with General Cox. Accordingly, six days after he first filed his charges, he sent a duplicate set to General Cox, at Charleston, and at the same time asked leave to go up to see him. The leave was granted, and on January 8th he reached Charleston, saw General Cox, dined with him that day, and on the next returned to Point Pleasant.

His interview with the General must have been satisfactory. He does not tell what occurred, nor whether the duplicate set of charges was officially accepted and filed; but the General found occasion to constitute him a "bearer of dispatches" to General Rosecrans at Wheeling. Probably the chief reason for this mission was to

enable him to see General Rosecrans, in the hope of assuring and expediting the court-martial. Incidentally, he was probably advised to ask at Rosecrans's headquarters for immediate approval of the application he had made in December for a leave of absence, and to make use of it at once. At any rate he stopped at Point Pleasant only long enough to get the next boat to Wheeling, took aboard at Marietta his wife and three children (Laura, Harry and Bertha), and landed at Wheeling on the 11th. Unluckily, General Rosecrans was absent,—gone to Washington.

Whether he was able to do anything more than to deliver his dispatches does not appear, but he must have received his leave of absence; and he left the same day, by boat, landed with his family at Marietta, stopped there two days and, as appears in his diary, went to church on Sunday " (the first time in seven months) ", " attending Lotta Bosworth's wedding at 6 a. m. on Monday ", and on the 14th went on to Cincinnati, beginning that day his twenty days leave of absence, the first he had had since he enlisted nine months before.

More than half of this leave he spent in travelling to and from Cleveland and Streetsboro (Portage county), where certain of the Lane family affairs required his personal attention. Before and after this journey he spent a few days at Cincinnati with his family and in the affairs of his firm, which had suffered much by his absence. He was constantly anxious about the case of DeVilliers, however, and wanted to be on the ground. The day before his leave was up he was again at Point Pleasant. But he was to endure another whole month of delay in the case, with more troubles.

One thing occurred in his absence, however, which gratified him, as being an earnest of his progress toward the court-martial so much desired. When his charges were seen at Department Headquarters, Colonel DeVilliers was ordered under arrest. It does not appear whether he was deprived of his sword (probably he was, since some of the charges against him were of criminal character), but he remained under arrest and without command (Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman commanding the regiment) until he was tried and cashiered.

Notwithstanding his arrest the Colonel continued his plotting against Captain Lane, but, worse than that, the damage to the morale of the regiment, due to his lack of efficiency in command and the now notorious antagonism between him and the most of the company officers, had reached a stage greatly discouraging to all. The position of the late Lieutenant-Colonel (Frizell) had become intolerable to him, thro the Colonel's conduct, and he had gone home and resigned in disgust. One of the best captains (Drury) followed his example.* Others held on only in the hope of Captain Lane's success.

But even this condition of the regiment was not enough trouble for Captain Lane. During his absence his company had been put under the command of a lieutenant transferred from another company (B); and this officer, from either weakness of character or indifference to duty, had failed to get control of the company. The discontented and mutinous men in it (some are found in any company of volunteers), aided by the general bad spirit in the regiment, had nearly ruined its discipline and obedience.

Among other evils the whisky-drinking in the camp was at its worst. There had never been any effective restraint upon it in the army, because up to that time the general public opinion was not really opposed to it; and the men and officers who were accustomed to drink regarded any attempt at restraint as an interference with personal rights. Yet probably every camp in the army was under orders absolutely forbidding the bringing in of liquors. But the devices of the drinking men and their confederates outside, with lack of vigor and persistence in the officers in enforcing the orders, assured a means of supply, small in some commands it is true, but existing in all or nearly all.

Captain Lane saw little control of the evil in the regiment when he returned to Point Pleasant and less in his

* Six months later Frizell was commissioned Colonel of one of the new Ohio regiments (94th) and became highly distinguished in service in Kentucky and Tennessee. Drury joined the same regiment as Captain, and was killed in the famous battle of Perryville.

own company. He had set himself uncompromisingly against it from the beginning, and had tried repeatedly to get the other officers to join in efforts toward its real suppression, but he met small encouragement. This was, no doubt, one reason why the bad element in his company was hostile to him. They must have remembered, among other things, his conspicuous descent upon the keeper of the store on the wharf-boat at Point Pleasant soon after the regiment arrived there for winter-quarters. Suspecting that an increase in drinking was due to a concealed trade carried on by this man, he went himself, with a file of soldiers, searched the boat, and found and dumped into the river nine barrels of whisky. If this act added any to the number and strength of his friends, it must have increased more the number and hostility of his enemies. It was no doubt one of the causes of the peculiar personal obstruction he found in his company after returning from his leave, tho his determined course in recovering control and discipline and resisting the attempt of the Colonel to appoint its non-commissioned officers were causes enough. It reached such a pitch as that, at the end of some particularly trying day, he wrote in his private diary (February 23, 1862) "My men all hate me." But this pitiful entry was to be followed by another, seven months later, which shows that all the companies then joined in a vote (when he was absent from the regiment), by which they called unanimously, or practically so, for his promotion from Captain to Colonel.

To-day it seems singular that the officers of the regiment did not, as a body, share in a determined course to prevent the men from getting liquor,* but they left

* Tho public opinion was then generally opposed to drinking, there was, practically, little effort to restrain it. Most of the officers of the army, regulars and volunteers, drank more or less, and freely. The army Commissaries kept a supply of whisky, which they sold to officers at cost, like provisions, tho forbidden to supply it to soldiers. The whisky was called "commissary" and was the occasion of much levity, joking and camaraderie among the officers. Very many officers were court-martialled for drunkenness or for drinking on duty, many punished, and some dismissed. And yet the Government encouraged the drinking by supplying at least a large part of the whisky they drank!

Captain Lane practically alone in it. A letter written four or five months after the raid upon the wharf-boat shows that he was still struggling unsuccessfully against the evil. He says he is glad the regiment is out in the field again, because "there will not be as much whisky for a time. How it is to be checked is more than I can tell. If I had three or four to stand by me, I would hope for a reform, but as I am alone what can I do?"*

It was with a heavy heart, then, that he resumed the company command the day after his arrival at Point Pleasant (February 3) and set himself to the work of recovering it from the low condition it had fallen into under the several demoralizing influences described.

The result of the Colonel's venture in the arrest of the Captain was far from satisfactory to him; he was further angered by it, indeed, and spurred on to another attempt. He found two soldiers in Company K — a sergeant and a corporal — who could be influenced by the flattery of his attention, and he descended to plotting with them against Captain Lane. He probably hoped to discredit him in his company and annoy him so far as to bring him to resign in disgust. And he undertook to reward the soldiers in advance. On the first of January, 1862, he issued a formal regimental order appointing the sergeant to be First-Sergeant of the company and the corporal to be a sergeant. As he had, probably, not read the law when he ordered the Captain to surrender his sword, so, probably, he did not read the law when he made these appointments.

Under the Army Regulations the commanding officer of a regiment had the power to appoint the sergeants and corporals in a company, but only "upon the recommendation of the company commander". This is based, of course, upon the good sense and necessity of things, since

* It ought to be said, however, that the vice was probably worse in his company than in the others, because so many of its men were workingmen of low social degree in a river city. The towns and cities on the great rivers of the west during the high steam-boating period were notoriously overrun by its worst vices. Cincinnati, Louisville, Cairo, St. Louis, Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez — were "sinks" of drunkenness, gambling and yet lower life.

no one can know so well as the captain the fitness of his men for the several positions and services required.

Captain Lane took this bull by the horns at once. He acknowledged the order in writing the same day it was issued, and added — “I would refer you to paragraphs No. 73 and No. 80 of the Revised Army Regulations. I have not been advised with or consulted in regard to the promotions named in the order and shall disregard it as an illegal act”. Number 73 was the one which required “the recommendation of the company commander” for the appointment of his sergeants and corporals, and Number 80 provided that “The first, or orderly, sergeant will be selected by the captain from the sergeants”. Thus the Colonel had had no power in any event to appoint the First-Sergeant.

The ill-balanced Colonel, in his rage against the Captain actually used the Captain’s refusal to recognize the “promotions” as the basis of one of the charges he made against him in the court-martial now appealed to by both parties. The two misguided soldiers were disposed to insist upon their rights under the “promotions”, but the Captain seized the first chance they gave him in refusal or neglect of duty in their old positions, and put them under arrest for disobedience of his orders. The sergeant appears to have yielded, but the corporal was, later, so troublesome that the Captain had him reduced to the ranks as soon as circumstances brought Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman into command of the regiment. Thereupon he too preferred charges against the Captain for court-martial. He got over his disorder, however, became a good soldier, and a year later was promoted to sergeant, and became First-Sergeant near the end of his term of service. But while the struggle between the Colonel and the Captain was in progress both these soldiers tried secretly to help the Colonel by finding matter for charges against the Captain, tho nothing was found.

The charges of the reduced corporal against Captain Lane appear to have been filed directly after he was reduced. What they were is not now known, but the time and circumstances indicate, pretty surely, that they were instigated by the Colonel and were based upon the Captain’s refusal to recognize the promotions. A court to

try them was appointed and assembled with remarkable speed. It tried the case only ten days after the corporal was reduced, and apparently at Point Pleasant. Captain Lane appears to have paid little attention to it. The only record or statement of any kind that I find relating to it is an entry in his diary on February 24, 1862: "Court-martial on McGowan's charges against me. Verdict not known yet." The Captain must have been promptly acquitted, as he never afterward refers to the matter; and he went the next day to Charleston on the business of his own charges against DeVilliers.

But this affair was only an incident in the campaign of the truculent Colonel. A few days after Captain Lane resumed command of his company at Point Pleasant he received a message from General Cox, calling him to Charleston. He was then busy (whenever off regular duty) in the preparation of the testimony to support his charges against the Colonel, and he spent two days more in that work. Then he went to Charleston, arriving on February 9, but found that General Cox had gone away. He waited a couple of days, but the General was not heard from, and he had to return to Point Pleasant without seeing him.* He learned then, however for the first time, that Colonel DeVilliers had, a month before (early in January), filed charges against him for a court-martial and had demanded his arrest. He could not then learn what the charges were, but he did learn that General Cox had not acted upon them and had not considered an arrest, from which he inferred that the General regarded the charges as trivial or founded in malice. Finally, however, they were forwarded to Department Headquarters, and Captain Lane was tried upon them (with additions, based upon later acts) by the same court which tried DeVilliers.

Then, for a month, he could only wait and hope for news of the court, in unceasing anxiety and yet eager for the trial any day, spending half that time at Point Pleasant and half in going back and forth between there and Charleston under orders and notices relating to the sitting of the court,— which was to be at Charleston.

* Apparently he did see him a week later, at Point Pleasant, but he does not tell what General Cox wished to see him about.

What wounded him the most of all at this time, perhaps, was that, from the time he filed the charges he had to endure the coldness of many of his fellow-officers, who hedged when it was seen that the struggle must damage some one (not willing to be identified with the losing side), and the constant disrespect and covert shirking of duty among the men who considered him in disgrace and likely soon to be out of the army. But yet, excepting that his comments on the character of the Colonel were usually unqualified and in vigorous words, the only bitter thing he is found saying during this period relates to these hedging officers. In a private letter to his partner at Cincinnati, written soon after the trials of DeVilliers and himself by the court-martial, but before the result was known in either case, speaking generally of the other officers in the regiment and their attitude toward the cases, he says they "are as intelligent a set of men as you would be likely to get together, but their vacillation and indecision and want of any fixedness of purpose in this matter surprised me. A majority of them were ready to jump into the boat that was likely to win, with no other compass than self-interest."

But the Captain was more or less diverted from his troubles, and much comforted, by the news of the war in February. His diary contains more about that than about his own affairs. Foote's capture of Fort Henry, Grant's of Fort Donelson and Burnside's of Roanoke Island especially filled him with joy. He thinks Foote and Grant great heroes, says he has "read their reports twenty times and will continue to read them until the next victory." He "thinks the rebellion virtually crushed and not much more to be done," tho, in writing this optimistic opinion, he was trying to comfort his wife, who was much troubled by what appeared to her his great dangers and his long absence.

At last the painful delays of the court-martial came to their end. On March 1, at Point Pleasant, he had notice that it would sit at Charleston on the 5th. He was there at one o'clock in the morning, but the members of the court were not all there until the 7th. His diary on the 8th reads: "My case called at 1 o'clock.

Pleasant day." " My case " means, not the case against himself, but his case against DeVilliers: but it was postponed to the 10th. On the 9th his diary only says " Sunday. Went to church. Pleasant day."

Now, after more than ten weeks of keen anxieties and many struggles, tormenting him in a hundred ways, came the day which, to his simple, honest mind, appeared big with fate. But it was a very welcome day, and he was ready and confident.

Here ought to be told just what was to be tried,—what the two cases were. They were both to be tried by this court. A court-martial must be composed of officers of whom at least some are of rank superior to that of the officer under trial. So the "President" of this court was a Brigadier-General—Hugh Ewing, a son of the famous "Old Tom Ewing" of Ohio and a brother of the General "Tom" Ewing who was distinguished in the war in Missouri, as well as brother-in-law of General Sherman.

The case against DeVilliers was called first, on the morning of March 10. The charges against him were, in form, but one charge, with many "specifications." This charge was "Violation of the 83rd Article of War," which was "Any commissioned officer convicted before a general court-martial of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed the service."

Whoever aided Captain Lane in preparing the charge and specifications was little, if any, more skilful than himself in the work. They show lack of experience and good advice. The specifications disclose ground for making charges under two or three others of the Articles of War,* as well as under the 83rd. In fact eight of the specifications do not come under Article 83 at all; but, as it happened, this defect did not prevent a conviction. We have not a copy of the proceedings of the court — only of the charges, specifications, conviction or acquittal and sentence,— but we can assume that the court treated the charges against DeVilliers as if amended at the trial to conform to the evidence presented.

* It should be noted that the Articles of War are not a code devised by the War Department or subject to its modification, but are statute law, enacted and amended only by Congress.

There were thirteen specifications under the charge against him. The first was upon a gross and vulgar insult to Lieutenant McAbee, of Company F of the regiment;* the second, upon the insult to and personal abuse of Captain Lane and his company on the occasion of the action at Cotton Hill already mentioned; the eighth, upon an insult to and personal abuse of Lieutenant Alexander, of Company B (afterward Adjutant and killed in action); the ninth,* the general charge that he was "in the habit of insulting officers under his command and making use of unofficerlike and ungentlemanly language;" the third, that on November 11, 1861 (at the battle of Cotton Hill) he "made a speech" to officers and privates of the Second Kentucky infantry, in German, in which he used the "reproachful and provoking language"—"Gentlemen: I am glad you come; the officers and men of the Eleventh Regiment are cowards"; the fourth* and fifth, that he had obtained a sum of money from the sutler of the regiment upon a false and fraudulent (written) statement; the sixth,* that he had seized (without authority) certain cattle in the country near Gauley Bridge, sold them to the Quartermaster and kept the money; the seventh,* that he had plundered the house of a citizen at Point Pleasant and had taken from it a sum of money, silver-ware and much other personal property, all of which he had appropriated to his own use; the tenth,* that he had arrested a citizen of Mason County, Virginia, and two negroes, slaves of other citizens of that county, and refused to release them until he was paid a sum of money for each of them, and had appropriated the money to his own use; the eleventh, that he had brought two soldiers of Company K to his quarters, put them under oath and required them to give information upon which charges might be made against their Captain (Lane), and this after Captain Lane had filed charges against him; the twelfth, that, while himself under arrest, under charges, he had advised a corporal of Company K not to obey an order issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, then in command of the regiment; and

* See pages 103, 104.

On the specifications marked thus * he was found guilty, on the others not guilty.

the thirteenth, that he had delivered to General Cox a letter which was addressed to General Rosecrans, containing charges against Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, then in command of the regiment, made by two privates at his (DeVilliers') suggestion.

This thirteenth specification is not clearly drawn, and it must seem, to most readers, rather indefinite. It was, I think, intended to charge a violation of the army regulations in trying to reach Department Headquarters directly with charges against a regimental officer, instead of taking the required "military channel" thro the brigade-commander, and, at the same time, "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" in acting personally (being then under arrest, he had no official command) for private soldiers in promoting their charges. It must have been well known to him that the soldiers could have filed charges against the regimental commander in the regular manner, thro their captain, and that they would be duly forwarded thro the brigade adjutant, unless obviously trivial or false or malicious. The explanation is, naturally, that these charges were really his own and that the soldiers were meanly used as a cover in an attempt to injure Colonel Coleman. The comment already made upon a lack of good sense in DeVilliers seems quite justified.

When the case was finally called and the trial begun Captain Lane found himself excluded from the court-room, altho he was the accuser and had filed the charges. Whether this was due to a rule adopted by this particular court or by the Judge-Advocate-General of the army at that time I do not know. It was a serious disappointment and discouragement to Captain Lane, who thought it highly important that he should be present, to aid the Judge-Advocate with information and suggestions. The fact was, that he distrusted the Judge-Advocate, because he had heard that, on the boat on the way up to Charleston, he was "drinking more than was good for a judge-advocate," that he had got a favorable idea of Colonel DeVilliers and assumed that the charges against him were filed by a "sore-head," and because he could not get him to spend any time in conferring on the case before the trial. But, tho he could not be present in the

room, he stood outside the door and wrote questions to be asked the witnesses, and must have been able to send them in; so that the rule of exclusion seems to have been enforced in form only. DeVilliers must have been present, tho I do not find it said that he was, nor whether he had counsel, nor what defense he made. But to the charge and all specifications he pleaded "Not guilty."

Captain Lane must have had many witnesses ready, as he says not one-third of them were examined, altho the trial occupied two days. One of his witnesses was the Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the regiment (Coleman), who told him, when he came out, "how things stood."* So it was probably on Coleman's information that he wrote in his diary, at the end of the first day — "Many of my charges thrown out." By "charges" here he means the specifications, for there was only one charge (as stated above) and on that DeVilliers was found "guilty," as he was on six of the specifications. In fact, as the limited record we have shows, none were "thrown out", as Captain Lane understood, but all were considered in the final verdict, tho as to seven the ultimate finding was "not guilty." Anyhow he learned enough on the second day to give him the satisfaction of writing in his diary — "I think I have won. DeVilliers is proved a scoundrel."

But near the end of the second day a sensational event brought the Colonel's trial abruptly to a close and made it not necessary to call more of Captain Lane's witnesses. It had happened that a detective of the Cincinnati police was at Charleston, a man known to Captain Lane and probably to General Cox. Upon certain testimony given on the first day, this detective was sent by the court at once to Point Pleasant. The next day he telegraphed a report. He had searched DeVilliers's quarters and found there "a lot of stolen property under lock, a trunk packed ready to ship, filled with stolen goods, a lot of money —

* Without the full record of proceedings, this account has to be limited and unsatisfactory. I do not find that Captain Lane ever had a copy or applied for one, tho he could have obtained it. It would be highly interesting (and entertaining) to read the discussions in that court and the testimony, especially if DeVilliers or counsel for him took an active part.

over \$1000, probably stolen," and papers showing a preceding shipment. It also appeared that there was "an accomplice at Charleston."

The court thereupon closed the trial (the civil courts would now take charge of the criminal acts, i. e., in addition to the action of the court-martial), ordered the accomplice arrested and sent under guard to Wheeling for trial, changed DeVilliers's arrest to "close confinement" ("they have got him here in jail," writes Captain Lane on March 15), and, for the purposes of a final judgment on the trial, "took the case under advisement." That ancient phrase always sounds particularly wise, judicial and carefully considerate of the interests involved, but quite too often, as in this case, it only covers unnecessary and injurious delay.

When the work of the court was completed, it was necessary to send the proceedings to Washington for approval or disapproval, because only there was the power to order execution of the sentence in such a case; but in this case, as the evidence made a conviction and dismissal certain, "the good of the service" loudly demanded that the officials should lose not a day in reaching final action. The Colonel was in deep disgrace and in prison for crime; the Captain who had brought him to judgment was himself in disgrace by arrest* and compelled to remain in camp, seen by all to be without authority, awaiting judgment on the charges against him, conditions only too favorable to the malcontents and demoralizing the whole body. But it was two months after the real decision of the case by the court (at the end of the trial) when the judgment was announced in the regiment! One could safely risk his salvation upon the proposition that there was no sufficient reason for all this delay.

Immediately after the trial of DeVilliers Captain Lane was put under arrest and called for trial on DeVilliers's charges. This arrest, tho really only formal, was necessary under the practice, because the penalty, if he were convicted, would be dismissal. He had expected arrest long before; and the Colonel had tried to have him ar-

* See below, on this page.

rested, but had failed, probably because General Cox believed, as already said, that his charges were induced by malice.

There were three charges against Captain Lane, alleging violation of the 6th, 7th, and 9th Articles of War, and under each charge one specification. Article 6 provides that "Any officer or soldier who shall behave himself with contempt or disrespect toward his commanding officer, shall be punished according to the nature of his offense, by the judgment of a court-martial."

The specification was, that "on sundry occasions in December, 1861, in the presence of various members of his company, Captain Lane did behave himself with contempt and disrespect toward his commanding officer, Colonel Charles A. DeVilliers, applying the term 'scoundrel' to his said commanding officer."

Article 7 provides, that "Any officer or soldier who shall begin, excite, cause or join in, any mutiny or sedition in any troop or company in the service of the United States, or in any party, post, detachment or guard, shall suffer death or such other punishment as by a court-martial shall be inflicted."

The specification was, "that between the 15th and 31st days of December, 1861, the said Captain Lane did write or cause to be written a petition requesting Charles A. DeVilliers, Colonel of the 11th Regt. O. V. to resign his commission; and that in his efforts to procure signatures to the said petition the said Captain Lane made such false statements as were calculated to create a feeling of hostility and prejudice against the said Colonel Charles A. DeVilliers and his lawful authority."

Article 9 provides, that "Any officer or soldier who shall strike his superior officer, or lift up any weapon, or offer any violence against him, being in the execution of his office, on any pretense whatsoever, or shall disobey any lawful command of his superior officer, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall, according to the nature of his offense, be inflicted upon him by the sentence of a court-martial."

The specification was, "that on the 1st day of January, 1862, by the order of Colonel Charles A. DeVilliers, commanding the 11th Regt. O. V., 2nd Sergt. John Girten of

Co. K, 11th Regt. O. V. was promoted to 1st Sergeant of said Co. K, and Corporal Elliot McGowan of Co. K was promoted to Sergeant in said Co. K, and that the said Captain Lane refused to acknowledge said appointments and did place the said John Girten and Elliot McGowan under arrest, because of their having obeyed the orders of the said Colonel DeVilliers."

To all the charges and specifications Captain Lane pleaded "Not guilty."

Courts-martial take their methods and practice, substantially, from the civil courts, and "Not guilty" does not mean a denial of the facts alleged, but a denial of a violation of the law, even if the facts can be proved as alleged. In fact, all of the allegations in the specifications were substantially true, except the one that "false statements" were made in obtaining signatures. Captain Lane *had* spoken with contempt and disrespect of the Colonel and *had* characterized him as a "scoundrel," both directly and to others; he *had* written the petition requesting the Colonel to resign and obtained signatures to it (which, taken alone, was insubordination, tho hardly to be construed as "mutiny or sedition"); he *had* refused to recognize the Colonel's promotions in his company, and *had* put under arrest the two promoted, for disobedience of his own orders; so that, practically, the only question for the court was, whether these acts constituted violations of the law as charged.

Unfortunately, as in the other case, we know nothing of the proceedings of the court upon this trial, who the witnesses were (except one), what the evidence was, nor anything from which one could guess at the result. But the trial was short, not much evidence could have been required for the prosecution, and the defense must have been merely an explanation of the provocations and proof that the statements made in obtaining signatures to the petition were not "false". The diary on that date (March 12) shows that Captain Lane was much relieved in mind, tho it says only "DeVilliers does not make much of a case". And the next day he was back at his quarters at Point Pleasant, under arrest, to begin that unhappy experience — "waiting for the verdict," knowing that he would not be relieved of the arrest until

the verdict was officially declared and having at least some fear in the possibility that the relief would be by dismissal from the army.

For, notwithstanding his frequently expressed confidence in a favorable result, he was extremely uneasy. Tho he magnified the chances of disaster, they were real chances. Under strict construction his acts had made him liable to punishment under either or all of the Articles of War invoked against him. Under Article 6 it would be some form of humiliation, and perhaps a fine. Under Articles 7 and 9, it could be extreme, that is, either "death or such other punishment" as the court might decree (tho, if "death", it would be subject to the approval or disapproval of President Lincoln). While a death penalty was, practically, inconceivable under the circumstances, yet the alternative "such other punishment" might be of a character not much less painful to a man of high nature.

So Captain Lane evidently had the possible outcome often in mind during the three months between the filing of the charges against him and the official news of the judgment,— a period of infernal inward disturbance it would be to any one. He felt compelled to tell his wife of it, and at last did so, tho not till after the trials were over and the probabilities could be judged; and then he took care to couple the statement with what he artlessly thought an artful device to overcome her fears, saying that the other officers were offering to "take his chances" of the penalties for different sums, "from 25 cents to 5 dollars." Looking on from outside the field of these events, however, one sees that the only dread he could reasonably have — tho that was enough — would be the dread of the consequences of delay in the rendering of the judgment, the character of which was now a foregone conclusion.

To close the episode without the interruption of an account of other events during the two months between the trial and the official announcement of the judgment, it appears that during that period he remained at Point Pleasant, still under arrest and without position or duties. A significant disclosure of his state of mind at this time is found in his diary on March 24, when only two weeks

of the two months waiting were gone — “The monotony of my life is intolerable”.

On May 5 an officer (Captain West) from headquarters at Wheeling, casually stopping at Point Pleasant, “brought news of the cashiering of Colonel DeVilliers”, — the first news to reach Captain Lane since the trial. To that statement in his diary that day, he adds only the words “York evacuated” (meaning Yorktown, Virginia, in McClellan’s campaign against Richmond), one of the many bits which show that his eager interest in the operations of the war gave him some relief of mind from his personal troubles. But Captain West’s news was only “camp news”, and it included nothing about the case against himself.

Three weeks before this the regiment was moved to Winfield on the lower Kanawha, for the beginning of the spring campaign in the Kanawha district. Captain Lane remained at Point Pleasant (deprived of service by his arrest), and must have found a certain comfort in being for a time out of the camp, where he had to feel his humiliating position every day; but the day after he heard Captain West’s story he followed to the camp at Winfield, probably feeling sure that the end of his trials was now near.

In fact the end had already been reached, apparently a full month before, certainly more than two weeks before. It is a shameful proof of mismanagement of administration in the Department, that he was not informed and at once released from arrest when the judgment was finally approved as rendered by the court. Nothing but gross neglect of officials can explain this period of delay. In the “Horton & Teverbaugh” history of the regiment it is stated that the judgment of the court-martial was approved April 4, 1862. That date may not be correct (no authority is given), but the printed official record of the judgments, sentence and orders in both cases, issued from Department Headquarters at Wheeling and showing the official approval, is dated April 23, 1862. The Department must, therefore, have had the approval at least some days before April 23 (for the official routine and the copying and printing); so there could have been no reason why they

were not communicated to General Cox and to Captain Lane on or before the 23rd, if not on the 4th, of April.

Two days after Captain Lane arrived at Winfield the regiment was moved up the Kanawha, to its old ground at Gauley Bridge, and he went along. They reached Gauley on the 9th, and the same day he received his first certain news of the end of his long war, in an order releasing him from arrest and putting him in command of his company. His diary of that date reads only "Was released from arrest. Have been under arrest two months"; and after that nothing more appears in his diary at any time relating in any way to DeVilliers or either of the cases.

The judgments we
DeVilliers, on the fir
charging gross insu
officers, or both, he r
"not guilty" on the second and eighth; on the ninth
specification, charging a "habit of insulting officers under
his command &c," he was found "guilty"; on the third,
charging the use of "reproachful and provoking lan
guage", insulting to the officers and men of his regiment,
in a speech he made in German to officers and privates
in another regiment, "not guilty"; on the fourth and fifth,
charging the getting of money by fraud from the
regimental sutler, "guilty" on the fourth and "not guilty"
on the fifth; on the sixth, charging the seizing
of cattle in the country, selling them to the Quarter
master and keeping the money for his own use, "guilty";
on the seventh, charging the plunder of a citizen's house
and keeping the goods, "guilty"; on the tenth, charging
the arrest by him of a citizen and two slaves of other
citizens and taking money for their release,* "guilty";
on each of the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth, charging
an abuse of his position in requiring two soldiers of
Company K, under oath administered my himself, to
aid him in finding ground for accusing their Captain,
advising a certain soldier in Company K not to obey a
certain order issued by the Lieutenant-Colonel command

* As showing how pitifully small or weak was good sense in this man, he did these reckless acts (reckless because sure to be disclosed) for \$11.50 from the citizen and \$10 each for the negroes!

ing the regiment, and making an improper attempt, thro two other soldiers, to get charges made against the commanding officer of the regiment, "not guilty". But the field of all the material specifications was substantially covered by the verdict "guilty" on the first, fourth, sixth, seventh, ninth and tenth specifications; so that, finally, "Of the Charge" (violation of the 83rd Article of War) it was "guilty".

And thereupon he was sentenced "*To be dismissed from the service of the United States and forfeit all pay and allowances. And the Court orders his property to be seized by the Commanding Officer of his post and held, subject to future and legal disposition.*" (The italics are in the original.)

The judgment and sentence ~~were~~ ^{that} approved except as to the order to seize ~~pirney~~ ^{property} being "referred to the United States Dist^ri^ct^y or action",— i. e., for criminal proceeding ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ courts.

Whether he was indicted or criminally prosecuted in a civil court we cannot now tell. There is no later reference to him of any kind in any of the papers I have seen, except one scrap, in a slip torn from a newspaper, showing no place or date or what paper contained it, tho I think there is evidence in the slip that the paper was printed during the war, probably toward the end. It reads — "Charles DeVilliers has been arrested in Baltimore on a charge — which he admitted — of passing a worthless check. He is the individual of whom Colonel Ellsworth learned the famous Zouave drill, and was at one time Colonel of the 11th Ohio Infantry".

Captain Lane ought to have had (no doubt he did have) unmeasured credit and gratitude for this great service and achievement. By his unshakable conviction of duty, his courage, tenacity and self-sacrifice, he had rendered a service of supreme value to his regiment, to the army, and to the country. The cost to him had been terrible, but it is sure that he felt amply repaid for all in his success,— perhaps especially in having kept his "promise" to "drive such a scoundrel from the American army".

In the case of DeVilliers' charges against Lane: on the first charge, that of violation of the sixth Article of War,

and on the specification under it, that he had " behaved himself with contempt and disrespect toward his commanding officer ", the Captain was found " not guilty "; on the second charge, that of violation of the seventh Article of War, and on the specification under it, that he had written and procured signatures to a petition requesting Colonel DeVilliers to resign, " not guilty "; and on the third charge, that of violation of the ninth Article of War, and on the specification under it, that he had refused to acknowledge the appointment by the Colonel of two non-commissioned officers in his company and put these men under arrest for obeying the Colonel's orders, " guilty ":

"And the Court did therefore honorably acquit the prisoner *Philander P. Lane*, Captain of Company K, 11th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry". * * * " Sentence approved. The Captain is ordered to duty with his company." (The italics are in the original.)

It will seem curious to one not experienced in courts and military affairs, that Captain Lane was found " not guilty " under the first and second charges and specifications when the facts alleged against him were notoriously true and were not denied, and that he was found " guilty " under the third charge and specification, and was then " honorably acquitted ". The reasons must have been that the Court was satisfied that at least the first and second charges were made in malice, and that the Captain's provocation was great, if not, indeed, a justification; while, as to the third charge, that it was merely fatuous, since, under the Army Regulations, a colonel had no power at all to appoint a first-sergeant and could appoint sergeants and corporals only on the recommendation of the captain. That is, that the court used an underlying discretionary power to defeat a malicious prosecution.

VIII

1862: MAY — AUGUST

Third Kanawha Campaign — Fremont's Campaign for the Liberation of East Tennessee — The Kanawha Forces Under Cox to Co-operate — Cox Reaches Princeton — Fremont Fails and Cox Falls Back — Eleventh Ohio in Reserve on New River — Battle of Lewisburg — Captain Lane on Scouting Expedition — Builds Flying-ferry on New River — Commands Corps of Sappers-and-Miners — Makes Forced March to Relief of Gauley Bridge — Another to Relief of Charleston — Sent to Ohio on Recruiting Service

Captain Lane's great zeal in the war was not in the least cooled by the injuries he had to endure in the affair of DeVilliers. The arrest, irksome tho it was in the extreme, at least gave him time for the news of the war, and he thought much and wrote often about it; and with never-failing hopefulness and assurance of final success. He was so eager to do his share that, as we have seen, when his regiment was ordered into the field for the next campaign, he went to join it there while still under arrest and unable to act, so that he might be on the ground for service the moment he was released. The troops were then moved up the Kanawha for another campaign, and he hopefully went with them, tho still without official authority or position, but, as it happened, his release and restoration to duty came the very day of the end of this movement, at Gauley Bridge, May 9, and he was at once actively employed under orders for immediate march in the campaign now to be described.

There had been, in March, a change in the department organization. The "Mountain Department" had been created, embracing all the mountain region of Virginia west of the Shenandoah and all of the present West

Virginia, and Major-General John C. Fremont placed in command. The Kanawha, Gauley and New rivers region became the "District of Kanawha" in this department, under General Cox.

The first service assigned to Cox under Fremont's command was a joint campaign for the relief and occupation of East Tennessee. The object was one that Lincoln had deeply at heart, as already said, from the beginning of the war. He was much impressed by the facts that there was (in 1861) a real and strong Union sentiment in the greater part of the South and that in certain large districts (especially the mountainous ones in five or six States) the Union men were strong enough to control if assured of the support of the government. But the best field for occupation was eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina. That region held by a Union army would present a most effective object-lesson to all parts of the South politically, and, to the distinct military advantage thus gained locally, would be added the greater one of cutting off all communication and transportation between Richmond and all the great region west and north of the Tennessee river. There would be, practically, a stronghold for the Union from the Ohio to Chattanooga. If 50,000 men should be required to hold the country after it was occupied, there was no more valuable service to which that number could be put in the war. But a comparatively small army of Northern men would answer, since an army of Union men of no mean size could be raised within a hundred miles around Knoxville.

If Lincoln had been willing to neglect the great subject — as he was not — he would yet have been prevented from forgetting it, for even a day, by the importunate appeals to him by the people and especially by their representatives at Washington. One of the Senators from Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, and two of the Representatives in Congress, Maynard and Clements, were constantly calling upon him for help; and "Parson Brownlow", editor of the "Knoxville Whig", the widest-known and most feared journalist in the South, preached every day in his paper unqualified Unionism, detestation

of slavery, and the right of the Union men to recognition and support.

So Lincoln tried, from the summer of 1861, again and again and again, to get some general to make the campaign, or at least energetically try it. Four different generals he specially ordered and instructed to that end, and six different times he tried to push them on to action, only to be balked by their delays or neglect of opportunity or their incapacity. At last, the last one, in 1863, after delaying his campaign five months, moved upon Knoxville and took it without a battle, when other events had made it easy to do, but when time had largely reduced the advantages of the occupation and when thousands of the Union men had been killed or driven out.

In his message to Congress in December, 1861, he treated the subject at length; and followed up his recommendation by going personally before the proper committee, to urge the construction of a railroad, to extend from the terminus of one of those already in operation in Kentucky toward Knoxville, immediately for the purpose of supplying troops to be posted in East Tennessee and ultimately for the benefit of the country. Then a bill for the purpose was presented in the House, but was not finally passed.

In 1861 McClellan proposed two routes for a campaign, and when he was moving against Garnett in July he was thinking of following up his expected success by marching on one of them into East Tennessee; but when he was called to the command of all the armies, and could send any other general, with whatever forces he might assign to him, he gave no further attention to the subject for six months.

When Rosecrans succeeded McClellan in command in western Virginia, in August, 1861, and Lincoln called upon him for a plan of campaign into Tennessee, he was zealous enough, but he thought it necessary first to drive the enemy out of the Kanawha district and, even for that purpose, to increase his army. And he did get more troops, but then he wasted the rest of the year in halting and futile local movements, resulting in no gain of territory. The next spring, however, he prepared and submitted to the War Department a comprehensive plan of

campaign and urged that he be supplied with troops to carry it out; but in March he was displaced in command by Fremont.

Then Fremont was called by Lincoln into special consultation on the problem and given special instructions for a campaign to be begun in April. But he delayed until McClellan's failure before Richmond enabled Lee to send a considerable army to the Shenandoah, under Stonewall Jackson, who drove Fremont, as well as Banks and McDowell, back upon the Potomac.

Meantime McClellan had highly recommended for promotion Don Carlos Buell, a friend of his in the regular army, then a brigadier-general of volunteers, with the assurance that he would take Knoxville. Buell was accordingly promoted to Major-General of volunteers, placed in command in Kentucky, relieving Sherman; and immediately troops began to pour into his camps. Within six weeks he had 90,000 men, or five times the number allowed to Sherman in the same command.

He too had a consultation with and direct instructions from Lincoln. He was expected, after providing against the invasion of western Kentucky, to march himself thro Cumberland Gap and establish a permanent post at Knoxville. In January, 1862, after two months of preparation with no sign of movement, he answered repeated inquiries from Lincoln only by saying he was not yet ready, and wrote of other fields as if of much more importance. Even McClellan finally sharply criticised him and reminded him of the initial promises and expectations. But his large command had filled his mind with a dream of the conquest of the Mississippi valley, and he was jealous of what he thought the rivalry of Halleck and Grant in that field. He finally moved to Nashville, when Grant had prepared the way by opening the Cumberland, and wholly abandoned the campaign of East Tennessee, altho after Grant's capture of Fort Donelson it would have been a holiday march. Eight months later, when he had defeated Bragg at Perryville and pursued him nearly to Cumberland Gap, he could have gone on and taken Knoxville with but one or two divisions; but he halted, and, when called to account, answered that the roads were narrow and rough. He was thereupon (October, 1862)

relieved and replaced by General Rosecrans, who had abruptly come into high favor upon his victory at Corinth. Rosecrans was, indeed, entitled to credit for heroic fighting at Corinth, tho his obstinate disobedience of repeated orders from his superior officer prevented the total defeat of the enemy.

On this promotion Rosecrans was again urged by Lincoln to bend his efforts promptly to the recovery of East Tennessee, and two routes were suggested to him. He was ready with sympathy, good intentions and plans, but his head was full of other things. As was the case with Buell, his elevation filled him with ambition for a wide field. First of all he must defeat Bragg in southern Tennessee. He spent the whole year in trying to do that, from Murfreesboro to Chickamauga, and ignored Knoxville except on paper. Indirectly, however, in August, 1863, when he drove Bragg in upon Chattanooga, thus compelling him to bring troops from Knoxville for reinforcement, he made it easy for Burnside to take Knoxville from the north.

Finally, early in 1863, Lincoln sent General Burnside, from the Army of the Potomac, to Cincinnati, to command in eastern Kentucky, and urged upon him his persisting purpose to get East Tennessee and uphold the Union men. It was a curious choice, for, tho Burnside had a high reputation for patriotism, intelligence and ready submission to orders, he had none for initiative, energy or determination. So again there was a record of unnecessary delays. Burnside found much to do in the civil affairs of the department; there was trouble from small bodies of the enemy at different places; the return of certain troops was awaited; the roads were too bad for transportation. At last, again, when Rosecrans was advancing upon Bragg at Tullahoma, in June, and again when he began the Chickamauga campaign in August, Lincoln urged Burnside to move. Then, when Lincoln's patience was worn out, near the end of August he did move; and, Bragg having called away nearly all his troops from Knoxville, Burnside marched in with flying flags and bands of music, and was received with the greatest rejoicing as the "Savior of East Tennessee."

In striking contrast to all these generals who saw difficulties always in the way, there was one who only asked leave to go and take Knoxville. That was George H. Thomas, then a brigadier-general, posted at Somerset in Kentucky, not far from Cumberland Gap, with six regiments of volunteers. In October, 1861, he asked General Anderson, then commanding in Kentucky, to give him four more regiments and let him march upon Knoxville. He was confident he could take it; but for some reason not known Anderson did not act. In November, when Sherman succeeded Anderson in command, Thomas renewed his proposal "earnestly" and said he was sure he would take Knoxville and cut off all communications between Virginia and the south-west; but Sherman was compelled to decline because he then had but 18,000 men in the whole State, while the enemy was constantly making and threatening inroads from middle and western Tennessee.

Thomas's ten regiments would have numbered on the march probably 6000 men. No other general dreamed of going with less than several times that number. It is an infinite pity that Thomas was not supported. He would surely have taken Knoxville and could have raised 20,000 Union men in East Tennessee, poorly armed no doubt, but yet as well armed as their enemies.

This view is well supported by the fact that when, in November, 1861, a report was spread in East Tennessee that Thomas was coming, the Union men rose in arms, organized, quickly got control of the whole country, and held it several weeks, in the belief that a Union army was coming to support them. The rebel government was greatly alarmed, and it regained possession only by sending two considerable forces into the country and fighting for it; and then held it by a long course of bloody terrorism.

Thus Lincoln was entirely right as to the people; and so he proved to be as to the political and military advantages of the occupation when it was once accomplished. No occupation of territory during the war caused more disaffection in the Confederacy or more anxiety in its Richmond councils, while its armies in Virginia were

seriously straitened in provisions, which could now come only over the inadequate and badly managed lines thro the Carolinas.

Returning now to the Kanawha, in May, 1862, we are at the beginning of the only campaign that ever made any actual progress toward the relief of East Tennessee until the one of General Burnside in August, 1863, above described.

Fremont's plan was approved by Lincoln before the end of March, 1862. Fremont was to provide for the protection of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, and then, in April, march with 20,000 men southward along the narrow valleys between the ranges west of the Shenandoah, and thence along the route of the Virginia & Tennessee railroad to Newbern and Saltville. Cox was to march from Gauley Bridge with 7000 men up the New river to Blue Stone river, up that river directly south to Princeton and thence thro the mountains, and join Fremont about Saltville. The combined forces were then to move as rapidly as practicable directly toward Knoxville; and Cox's route was to be the line of supply, by wagons, from a base to be maintained at Gauley Bridge.

Cox was to march on the first of May, and he took care to be ready and on the road that day; but Fremont, who should have started full two weeks earlier, delayed his affairs and did not get started until the 12th of May. He was then too late. He had not made forty miles when his march was blocked by Stonewall Jackson, who had been sent from Richmond to operate in the Shenandoah valley; and Jackson drove him back upon the Potomac. Cox, who had then reached Princeton, was thus left in a remote wilderness, with a force too small to make the campaign alone and too small even to maintain itself there under the changed conditions due to the abortive campaign of McClellan against Richmond.

In his preparations in April for the campaign Cox scraped together all the men he could possibly take from post and guard duty in his territory, and thus had about 8000 men in hand. It was necessary, however, to leave a substantial number, to protect his rear and hold the intended base at Gauley on the Kanawha. These provisions seem to have required about 3000 men, and there

remained hardly more than 5000 for the march to the south.

The troops left behind consisted chiefly of the Third Brigade of Cox's command, as then organized, commanded by Colonel George Crook, of the Thirty-sixth Ohio, composed of the Eleventh, Thirty-sixth and Forty-fourth Ohio infantry, with 100 cavalry and a battery of 4 mountain howitzers. Tho a small brigade, Crook had made it the most reliable and effective in the District of the Kanawha.

Some separated companies of other regiments were posted as guards at Gauley Bridge and Charleston, Colonel Crook was directed to hold Lewisburg with two of his regiments, while the third — the Eleventh Ohio — was temporarily detached and placed at Fayetteville and Raleigh Court-House, south of New river, on Cox's road of supply and under his direct orders.

Thus the Eleventh Ohio, tho rendering service of special importance essential to the success and the safety of the troops in the campaign, was not in the marching column, nor in any engagement, excepting in the petty incidents of scouting and picketing. It did not even take part in a small, separate campaign or raid made by Colonel Crook with the remainder of the brigade upon the Virginia Central railroad. What it did will be told after completing the account of the controlling campaign.

By way of reconnoitring and clearing the road to his front, General Cox, at the end of April, sent forward one brigade under Colonel Scammon, of the Twenty-third Ohio. This brigade marched from Fayetteville to Raleigh and thence on to Blue Stone river, a tributary of New river, where, on May 1, the enemy was found and resisted the advance. Cox pushed on his supporting column and Scammon moved ahead, up the Blue Stone, forty miles further due south, to Princeton, and occupied that town, after a sharp fight, on the 15th.

McClellan had been so ponderous and slow in his Richmond campaign that his adversary (Johnston) not only sent more troops to Jackson, on the Shenandoah, but assigned several brigades of local troops, as well as one brigade of regular Confederates, to service in the southwest of the State. General William W. Loring, a West

Point regular, was placed in general command in this latter field, and he had one very good brigadier in General Henry Heth, also a West Pointer. Two other brigades or divisions, sent into the mountains, toward Princeton and the Blue Stone, were commanded by Generals Williams and Marshall; but these two appear to have acted as if each had an independent "army", much after the foolish example of Floyd and Wise already mentioned. But then Humphrey Marshall was another of those roaring old politicians who encumbered the Confederate army as "generals". Between the two they lost a good opportunity to make serious trouble for Cox. Marshall did, however, by sending two regiments, drive out the small detachment Scammon had posted in Princeton. But the next day (17th) Scammon came up, with the remainder of his brigade, and in a spirited attack put Marshall and all his men to flight and held the town.

These events, with information from reconnoisance and scouting, now showed Cox that his position was one of grave danger. He found the enemy in front and on his left flank in numbers larger than his own, and another body, of unknown number, was reported in Wyoming county on his right. He knew that Loring, with at least one brigade, was in his rear, north of New river, within striking distance of Lewisburg, where he had only the two regiments under Crook; and there were roads in his rear by which the position at Princeton could be cut off from Raleigh and New river. Further, tho he now had news of Jackson's aggressive campaign on the Shenandoah, there was an ominous lack of news of any movement of Fremont southward. This combination of adverse circumstances, impossible to foresee, now put Colonel Crook's command at a risk greater than had been considered and compelled Cox to withdraw to a position safer for his own forces and at the same time nearer to Crook. So he prudently decided to abandon Princeton and fall back beyond the east-and-west roads north of it, which he did on the 18th, retreating down the Blue Stone ten miles, to a defensive position at Flat Top Mountain, where he opened communication with Crook, established a fortified camp and remained, awaiting events and orders. The wisdom of this movement was amply

justified when information of conditions elsewhere was received; but Loring, mistakenly accepting as true a boastful report of Marshall, that he had defeated Cox and forced him to retreat, at once undertook to "destroy Cox" by an attack upon his rear.

About the 12th, while Cox was marching south on Princeton, Colonel Crook, with the available parts of the Thirty-sixth and Forty-fourth Ohio, had marched from Lewisburg, by White Sulphur Springs, against the Virginia Central railroad, which ran from Charlottesville to Covington and Clifton Forge. He was successful, penetrating beyond (east of) Covington, breaking up the road and destroying bridges, and returning safely to Lewisburg by the 20th; but he had found about Covington a substantial body of the enemy, part of Loring's command.

On the 20th these troops, with others provided by Loring, forming a brigade of about 3000, with 8 or 10 guns in three batteries, the whole commanded by General Heth, under Loring's orders marched west from White Sulphur, to take Lewisburg. Crook expected such a movement and, in view of his inferior strength, he could have justified a retreat. He had his two regiments of infantry and one hundred cavalry, about 1200 men, with two howitzers. However, Heth reports that he had but 2100 men in the battle (that is, not the 3000 just mentioned), including 150 cavalry and his three batteries.

Crook took position on a low ridge, just west of the town, and waited attack; and Heth attacked as soon as he could get into position. Heth's artillery must have been poorly used, since there was enough of it in numbers to win the battle alone. The contest was obstinate for an hour, Crook yielding no ground; and it was ended by a daring charge made by Crook's right wing, which broke Heth's lines and completely routed him. Crook had not enough men to risk in pursuit, but on the field he took 4 of Heth's guns, 300 small arms and 100 prisoners, besides killing and wounding 150 more. Heth's report frankly admits the disparity of the forces and his rout, and charges the disaster bitterly to the quality of his men.

This victory assured the safety of all Cox's forces for the present, and made Crook Brigadier-General of Vol-

unteers. It was, however, a peculiar trial to the Eleventh Ohio, which was almost within sound of the guns, on the other side of New river, doing nothing of note, while the remainder of its brigade was achieving great distinction.

Another result of the victory was, that it encouraged General Cox to plan a raiding campaign against the Virginia & Tennessee railroad on his own account. Partly with that purpose he set about opening a road directly across the country, to connect his position at Flat Top with Crook's at Lewisburg, so that all his troops could quickly be joined at any time favorable to a rapid march to Newbern. Meantime Fremont telegraphed him that he was urging the War Department to send him (Cox) more troops, so that East Tennessee could yet be gained,—that is, by Cox's army,—on the Princeton-Newbern route, but under his (Fremont's) command. But the situation in Virginia, east of the mountains, was then very discouraging to the government; and at last, May 27, Fremont telegraphed to Cox, in effect, that he was now entirely diverted to the defense of the Shenandoah valley against Jackson and that "You must do the best you can". On the 29th he threw out his last word in the matter, in a telegram to Cox, proposing that he "make a dash" on the railroad (Virginia & Tennessee), to break the road and return. But Cox saw further ahead than Fremont could, and gave up thought of an East Tennessee campaign for the present. He answered the telegram proposing a "dash" (Fremont had not made it an order), that he thought it best to await the recovery of the control of the Shenandoah. And he was clearly right. Under the circumstances at the time he could not have remained on the line of the railroad, if he reached it, more than a day or two, and the damage he could do within that time would not only be small, as compared with the cost of doing it, but would be repaired as soon as he retired.

East Tennessee had to wait and suffer a year longer.

But a connection between Flat Top and Lewisburg was important for other purposes, even if, finally, it should not be for that one; and Cox went on with the work on a connecting road.

During this period — or at least thro May and into

June — the Eleventh Ohio was, practically, in an independent service, occupying all the country between Flat Top and Gauley Bridge, with headquarters at Raleigh Court-House. General Cox frequently sent down orders, and Colonel Coleman kept the regiment busily at work in scouting, now and then to a considerable distance, especially eastward on both sides of the New and westward into Wyoming. Captain Lane had fully his share of these movements.

As a type of that kind of war work (which was very common in all the armies in the field), and at the same time to keep up the story of his personal service, one of his scouting expeditions is here described. All of the incidents related would be found repeated in one or another, or many, of the "scouts" of the war. On May 14 he had just arrived at Raleigh, in a heavy rain, bringing up from Fayetteville six companies of the regiment, including his own, when he was ordered to march, with two companies (K and B), as rapidly as practicable, to Woodrum's Mill on Wolf creek in Monroe county, where there was reported to be the rendezvous of an organized body of "bushwhackers". This place, by the route he must take, was over forty miles southeast of Raleigh, and he would have to cross both New and Greenbrier rivers.

He started at 6 a. m. on the 15th, with 96 men of the two companies and 4 officers besides himself. He had for guide a man of the country named J. C. Gurton, who proved to be capable and faithful. He must have carried rations for five days, tho he does not speak of that. With halts for rest, they marched till 5 p. m., when they reached the New river, above a place called Rich Ferry. They had then to go four miles up the river, to the home of William Richmond. The road was a path which ran directly along the shore, sometimes near the level of the water, sometimes high above it. It was a rough mountain gorge.

The other shore was, or was supposed to be, picketed by the enemy, and it was prudent to wait for the night; but the night proved to be very dark, closing in with thick clouds and rain. The path was often found to be on a narrow strip of rocky ground, dangerously near the torrent, so that much of the way the men had to go single

file and slowly, sometimes feeling their way, under the direction of the guide, by the rocky wall on the right hand. It was 10 p. m. when they reached Richmond's, all safe.* They had the reward of clearing weather, a fine night, a good supper and plenty of hot coffee. The Captain says "it was a beautiful bivouac that night".

Richmond had brought in 30 Union men, to join Captain Lane's command, armed with the rifles and shot-guns of the country, some with flint-lock muskets. They were to enlist in the Union army, but they wanted first to go on the expedition to Woodrum's. It is a safe guess, indeed, that it was upon Richmond's instigation that the expedition was ordered and that some of his men, as well as himself, had private hopes of wreaking vengeance upon personal enemies among the bushwhackers. Richmond himself was a remarkable man,—of great strength and courage, an uncompromising Unionist and the natural leader of the Unionists of his region.

Next morning Captain Lane organized Richmond's men into a company, with him as captain, and the whole body crossed the river, using a large boat, and marched five miles, to a crossing of the Greenbrier. Not being sure of finding boats at the crossing, Captain Lane had prudently sent some canoes up the Greenbrier, and they proved to be his only ferry-boats. The time required in

* Captain Lane wrote home, with keen interest, of the grandeur and beauty of the scenery of this day's march. He makes a fine picture of the lofty heights, the great cliffs and huge rocks, the roaring streams and many cascades (there had been much rain), and contrasts the splendid natural scenery with the desolation brought by the war upon the homes and farms of the poor mountaineers. He rested for an hour at Bragg's Mill on Pinch-Gut creek (there are many anecdotes of the extraordinary place-names of that region), and observed the coming and going of the mill-customers. The miller was a woman and all the customers were women (the men were all away, no one would tell where,—most of them hiding from enemies in the mountains or hunting them as bushwhackers), some coming afoot, some on old horses or mules. One "young lady" (as he gallantly calls her) of nineteen came afoot, with a bushel of corn in a bag on her back. She had carried it five miles. When her "turn" (corn) was ground she shouldered the bag again "and tripped off up her mountain path as lightly and gracefully as our city ladies would move on Fourth Street."

crossing so many men in a few canoes caused much anxiety, for surprise was essential to the success of the expedition, and Woodrum's was only ten miles further. As a precaution against the news of his march flying ahead of him, Captain Lane had taken every man and boy he could on the way and marched them along with him under guard, at the same time warning the women of the danger for them if they should spread the news. So, from the Greenbrier he made the march as rapidly as possible, reached the mill before dark, caught Woodrum at home and effected a complete surprise. But the bushwhackers were not there,— gone only that morning.

Captain Lane put the miller and his family under careful guard, while detachments were sent out to scour the country and bring in all the people, to prevent the enemy from learning of his presence. At the same time he had the premises searched and found ample evidence that the mill was really the rendezvous it had been reported. The grounds had been used for camping with horses, there were boxes for guns and ammunition, mess-chests and other military articles, while Woodrum's sullen silence and ill-concealed enmity confirmed the other proof. But no one would admit any knowledge of the direction or purpose of the movement of the band that morning.

Captain Lane went into bivouac. In the morning he put his men out of sight, waited for the inhabitants to come to the mill with their grist and questioned them; but there were no men among them, and not much was learned until two boys appeared, each about twelve years old. They said they were cousins, the sons of two brothers named Sanders. These men were notorious Secessionists and bushwhackers, a terror to Unionist families in several counties for murder and persecution. The boys supposed Lane's men to be a certain band of guerrillas they had heard much of as the "Moccasin Rangers", and when they recognized some of Richmond's Union men, they supposed them to have been captured by the Rangers. They were so much pleased with this idea and the privilege of going among the armed men (a privilege allowed with a purpose) that they talked

freely.* This led to the Captain's marching immediately upon another guerrilla rendezvous and the sending out of a special scouting party to catch the two Sanderses, but neither of them was caught.

The miller Woodrum was obstinately silent or sullen, but enough was learned to show that he was intimately connected with the rebels and the guerrillas, and Captain Lane felt fully justified in exacting such compensation as there was in having his men well fed upon the eggs, chickens and hams found on the place, an agreeable change of diet which braced them up well for the next leg of their march.

The Captain had not been directed to go further into the enemy's country, but, upon the information now obtained, he hoped to gain, substantially, the object of the expedition by a quick movement upon the Roberts tobacco factory, ten or twelve miles still eastward. Here was a Secessionist center and, as reported, another guerrilla rendezvous. But, since he was now going on his own responsibility, he meant to take as little time for it and incur as little further risk as possible. Looking out that his men were in as good condition as possible for fast marching, he pushed on without a halt of any length, arrived early in the afternoon, again with a surprise. In fact, his advance guard nearly caught one of the Sanders brothers at the factory. He had barely time to run to his horse and reach him first. This escape troubled the Captain, because the man galloped away on the road to Union, the county-town of Monroe, twelve miles distant, where there was an established camp and headquarters of rebel troops and surely some cavalry. He had also information of another body of rebel troops at Red Sulphur Springs, eight miles south of the tobacco factory. He had found no guerrillas at the factory, tho he learned they were often assembled there; but he was

* It may seem hard or unfair to use information unwittingly given by the young boys to capture their fathers; but it must be remembered that the fathers were already known to be guilty of many crimes against Union men, relying for immunity upon the lawless condition of the country, that the boys were old enough to understand and to boast of their fathers' deeds, and that there were Union men present who had suffered, or knew of the death or suffering of their relations or friends, at their hands.

now more than fifty miles from his own camp, the country hostile on all sides, and he had no mounted men. It would be reckless to go further, reckless to remain even a few hours where he was; and he had done all that was practicable under his orders. His duty was clearly to counter-march for Raleigh and to move as fast as the condition of his men would permit.

But there was a large stock of tobacco in the factory and the owners were Secessionists and allowed the use of their place as a rendezvous for the guerrillas. The Confederate government had out a standing order, requiring owners to destroy all tobacco and cotton upon the approach of Union troops, and this stock had been appraised for that purpose. Captain Lane decided not to destroy the tobacco, hoping that his refraining would induce the owners to hold it and that it might be captured by a foraging train from Lewisburg, sent upon the information he would give. But he let his men take all they wanted for their personal use and put good loads of the coveted weed upon several horses the men had picked up. Then he turned back upon the road to the Greenbrier. Wishing to avoid Woodrum's Mill, he found a road nearer the New river, and marched steadily till dark (it was now the 17th), when he bivouacked at the farm of one Landcraft, said to be a Union man.

More Union men having come in and joined Richmond's company on the march, the column now numbered 150, and the provisions were failing. The farmer Landcraft being on friendly terms with the soldiers as a Union man, Captain Lane proposed to buy of him what "meat" (bacon and hams) he could spare. Landcraft said that he had none,— it had all been used or taken by the rebels. But an experienced scouting soldier is shrewd in observing signs. On some clue a good supply was found concealed on the place, from which the Captain says "we helped ourselves." And he adds, indignantly, "Such Union men, who send Union soldiers starving from their doors, are a disgrace to the cause." He might have said, with at least equal logic, that, if Landcraft had no meat, then that found could not have been his, and must have been sent by a benign Providence for the hungry soldiers.

By noon the next day the Greenbrier was reached,

the canoes found where they had been concealed, and the crossing made safely, tho slowly. The march was then comparatively free from danger, and the foot-sore men had some respite. The New was crossed and Richmond's home reached at five p. m. Here was found an order from Colonel Coleman, directing Captain Lane to return to Raleigh at once. But many of the men were jaded, many foot-sore, and he decided to bivouac at Richmond's and march at five in the morning. Between that hour (on the 18th) and five p. m. he made the remaining twenty-six miles to Raleigh. On the road he received three more messages from Coleman, who had become very anxious for his safety. This was due to the failure of Cox's march for Newbern, his retreat from Princeton, and the closing in of the rebel forces, already mentioned, all of this being then unknown to Captain Lane. In fact Cox and Coleman had feared that the detachment was lost; and they now had the pleasure of congratulating Captain Lane upon his judicious and energetic management.

As already said, this expedition was a typical "scout". In hundreds of instances during the great war some or all of the same experiences were met. The figure of a "Captain" Richmond, too, was common, and the striking incidents of his stormy career were, substantially, repeated in many other cases.*

* One of his adventures occurred not long before this Monroe county scout. After many attempts upon him by guerrillas, he was captured at his house by a band of them and sent off to someone's "headquarters" under a guard of three men. The guard was mounted and he was mounted behind one of them. It would not do to trust him on a separate horse, tho of course the three were armed and he was not. He knew he would be killed when he was delivered to a commanding officer. By some art of his or oversight of his captors, they had failed to get his pocketknife. Seeing that the double-laden horse kept lagging behind the others, he managed to open the knife in his pocket, waited an opportunity when the guards were not looking back, abruptly seized the hair of the man in his front, jerked back his head and cut his throat, seized his rifle, threw him off, and instantly shot and killed one of the other guards. The third galloped away in fright, and Richmond rode back to his home, fifteen miles, covered with his victim's blood. The women were equal to the times. His wife had him quickly change his clothes, and while she went and buried the bloody garments, he took some provisions and his captured

Events quickly justified the anxiety about the exposed position of Captain Lane beyond the New and Greenbrier. Generals Heth and Loring had two brigades of Confederates in the eastern part of the county (Monroe), portions of them being within three or four hours march of the Roberts factory when Captain Lane was there, and a movement westward was then intended. In fact Heth's advance to attack Crook at Lewisburg, already described, followed closely upon his (Lane's) countermarch.

Crook having firmly established himself at Lewisburg by defeating Heth and Cox being settled indefinitely at Flat Top, the proposed direct road between them became very important. They were hardly more than thirty miles apart, but the wild gorge of New river lay between and there had never been any means of crossing but the rudest ferries at the very few places where the river was not in rapids or cascades, each ferry being merely a small "flat" operated by pulling on a rope stretched from bank to bank, but impracticable in the frequent rises of the water. One of these ferrying places was a few miles above the mouth of Greenbrier, near the present town of Hinton, and was known as Pack's Ferry.

When Floyd retreated from the country a few months before, he obstructed the road from Raleigh to Pack's Ferry, a work most effectively done, there being plentiful materials in the great forest trees of the country, which were felled across the road, and rocks thrown down from cliffs and precipitous slopes. Captain Lane says that he found miles of the road filled with such trees and rocks. General Cox's staff engineer, sent to inspect the road, reported that it would be impossible to open it within any

rifle and hurried off to his hiding haunts in the mountains, knowing that there would be a search for him.

He had a sister of the like courage. Just before Captain Lane's expedition, when guerrillas appeared in the neighborhood, probably to get her brother, she rode from her father's house, in the night, six miles, to warn him, riding in the darkness the same path along the New river which Captain Lane found so difficult and dangerous for footmen. About the same time she joined her father in defending their home against a set attack of guerrillas, taking a rifle from a weak-kneed male inmate, with caustic reproaches, and using it effectively. But such events were only too common in the war, especially in the mountain regions.

time practicable for the purpose intended. An officer sent down with a detachment of the Twenty-third Ohio (apparently to try the job), returned and reported that the road could not be reopened and that a sufficient ferry-boat could not be built because no materials were to be had.

But Cox regarded the passage as necessary, because, without it, either he or Crook might be compelled to fall back on Gauley. Remembering Captain Lane's exploits as a practical engineer, he consulted Colonel Coleman, with the result that Lane was ordered to take two companies and open the road, and, on getting that done, to establish a post at the ferry and build a boat large enough to carry 200 men or two loaded army wagons. The order was received by Captain Lane at Raleigh May 24, four days after his return from the Monroe county scouting. At that time Cox had news of Crook's signal defeat of Heth, upon which his spirits rose to a hope or plan of being ready for a quick junction of his troops and Crook's upon any favorable opportunity for a bold independent campaign against that Virginia & Tennessee road.

Early on Sunday, the 25th, Captain Lane marched from Raleigh with 140 men of Companies K and G and 4 wagons. The evening of the 26th brought them to the beginning of the blockade on the Pack's Ferry road. All the 27th and till noon of the 28th he kept half his men vigorously at work on the road, while the other half maintained the several picket-guard posts required. There were various reports of parties of the enemy in the vicinity and it was thirty miles from the nearest Union post.

With axes, bars, hand-spikes and levers of all kinds and sizes the seventy men attacked the blockade upon a plan of cutting a passage but ten feet wide. This was probably not so wide as the staff-engineer had assumed to be necessary, but it was wide enough for the immediate purpose, and the Captain clearly realized the value of the earliest possible use of the road. In the same economy of time, the removed material was not dragged away, but only piled up alongside the passage, so that there was, more or less, a wall close on each side. By noon of the 28th the Captain sent to Colonel Coleman a report

that the Raleigh road was clear to Pack's Ferry, and the weary pioneers moved on to the bank of the river and prepared their bivouac for the night. Not all were allowed rest, however. On a report that a party of the enemy had been seen lurking on the other side of the river a detachment was sent over in the night to reconnoitre, returning after daybreak without result. That morning all the command not on guard-duty was at work preparing for the boat-building and scouring the country for tools and lumber. The post at Raleigh had been able to supply only axes, while augers, saws, planes and other tools were needed.

The ferry had long been owned and operated by a man who lived there, on a farm occupying all of the small area of tillable land, having a house and outbuildings remarkable in size for that country, and some slaves. He was also the Baptist minister of the region. Captain Lane applied to him for any lumber or materials he had that could be used in building a boat, but he said he had none. While detachments of his men hunted the farms south of the river for materials, the Captain crossed with a guard and hunted the north side; but all returned with either little or no success. Then he went again to the reverend person and told him that he must have lumber and that, if it could not be had otherwise, he must tear it from some of the buildings on the place, but the good man said he knew of none nearer than a certain mill, where there was a plenty. This mill was twenty miles away and that much further in the enemy's country. Something in the man's expression in saying this aroused the Captain's suspicion; and he went out and sent small parties to search thoroly the whole place. One of them soon ran in to report the discovery of a large lot of planks artfully hidden in an old building. It had been provided by the pious owner before the Union army appeared in the country, expressly for building a new boat.

While the men were gleefully drawing out the lumber the Captain went to the house and "politely requested my reverend friend to lend me his yoke of oxen, to haul it down to the river". Encouraged by his success in borrowing the oxen, he then asked his reverend friend to "lend him the use of his blacksmith shop for a few days".

In short he quickly turned the whole place into a boat-building plant, and took care to have the doings of the minister constantly watched. There was the further good fortune of finding a sufficient quantity of tow and caulking materials concealed in one of the barns,— which had been forgotten by the owner, like the lumber.

Two great “poplars” (tulip-trees) near the river were felled for gunwales; and, with every possible man at work, at the end of two days a substantial boat was in the water — forty feet long and twelve wide,—“as tight as a bell and floated like a duck”, as the much pleased builder wrote to his wife.

The position of the detachment was so remote and exposed as to invite attack. A bold raider could easily cut it off from either Raleigh or Flat Top, while a small party with a single field gun, on the north side of the river, could break up the camp. Captain Lane had no means of reconnoitring to a distance and was thus at the risk of a surprise. He had asked for cavalry and, after three days, seven were sent him,— too small a party to be of any important use; but later the number was increased to thirty, and two companies of infantry (of the Twenty-third Ohio), with two howitzers, came in from General Cox. With this reinforcement the position and the ferry were fairly safe.

The new boat was to be moved by a “pulling-rope” stretched across the river or by large oars, or by both, and a two-inch rope or hawser known to be at Gauley had been sent for, but before it arrived the river suddenly rose (from heavy rain) and the rush of the current prevented the use of the oars. Tho this difficulty was not surprising, it pointed to the danger of having some important movement of troops interfered with by a sudden rise, which might be high enough to put out of use the oars and the pulling-rope. Captain Lane thereupon decided to make it a “flying-ferry”, (sometimes called “flying-bridge”), a form not often used, but known from ancient times. The current at Pack’s, being quite evenly swift, even at low water, was well adapted to the purpose, and the river could only rarely rise so high as to prevent the running of such a boat.

Accordingly, he built a crib and sunk it, loaded with

stone, in the middle of the stream, four hundred feet above the line of crossing. One end of the hawser was then anchored to the crib and the other fastened to the middle of the upstream side of the boat, and a guy-rope was run from the hawser to each end of the boat. When such a boat is ready to start, the guy at the outer end is shortened and the current, then striking the boat at an angle, drives it out from the shore. As it cannot go down the stream, because held by the hawser, it must go across, on the principle applied in sailing a ship "to wind'ard".

The soldiers were much amused by the incredulity of the natives on seeing or hearing of the movement of the ferry, who fancied there was some unholy trick in practice. The old negro ferryman, who had been pulling a "flat" across there all his life, refused to go on the boat, in the fear that only the devil could make it run without the labor of any man.

Captain Lane and his men wanted to get back to their regiment at Raleigh when their road and ferry work were done, and Colonel Coleman was equally desirous to avoid any further separation of his companies. On his urgency General Cox released them on June 12, and the next morning they marched for Raleigh, leaving the Twenty-third Ohio detachment to guard and operate the ferry. They bivoucked half way, dreaming of the lighter work and comforts of a real camp, but, when he was about to resume the march early the next morning, the Captain received from General Cox an order, to return to Pack's and build another boat. So their march was a counter-march, and the next morning, Sunday, they were at the ferry at work upon the new job.

The second boat was to be larger than the first,— fifty feet in length; but with more men and wagons now available the search for lumber could be carried further. The tall poplars for gunwales had to be brought from a distance, because, as they could not be hauled, they must be found on the bank of a stream above the ferry, in a place convenient for throwing the great logs into the water, to be floated down. Tho the work on the second boat was thus double that on the first, it was done by practiced hands, and the new boat was launched within a few days.

It was intended to fasten the two boats together, stem and stern, and move them as one. This required a re-adjustment of the flying-apparatus, but the Captain was much gratified to find that the two moved even better than the one had done. The wonderful ferry was completely successful. It would now carry about five hundred men at a time, or five or six wagons or guns and caissons.

Captain Lane was now in great reputation in the army; and, with commendable recognition of the accomplishment of all this heavy and skilful work on the road and the ferry, under peculiar difficulties and with such limited means, General Cox, on June 22, issued "Special Orders, No. 25", by which Captain Lane and his company were constituted a "Corps of Sappers and Miners for this Column, to be placed on extra duty and relieved from all guard and scout duties; and will be under the orders of Colonel Whittlesey, Chief-Engineer."*

There was one purpose of immediate importance, however, in making this order, namely, to leave Captain Lane and his men free from all employment except that upon the ferry. Rebel forces were now hovering about the region, considerable bodies approaching the ferry, and General Cox was anxious to have the passage ready for full use at the earliest time possible. He increased the number of men at the ferry to eight or nine hundred and added a full battery of artillery. The enemy were watching, with the purpose of attacking upon any favorable opportunity, but did not find courage to try until some six weeks later.

When this order was issued the work on the ferry was not all done, and the "Sappers-and-Miners" remained there ten days longer, completing and correcting their work and adjusting the operation of the boats, so that

* Captain Lane, in a letter to his wife, tells of this order, and says "it is an honorable distinction". And he adds, with justifiable pride, "I am now in the position held by McClellan in the Mexican war". But McClellan would not have thought of building a ferry in such a place, with such materials and tools. He would have called upon the Government to send a vast quantity of materials and tools fitted specially for the purpose, and then waited for it to come, in the serene assurance that the responsibility was then on the Government and not on himself.

little instruction would be required by green hands. Indeed, the detachment now wanted to stay at the ferry. The air and the water were fine there, their tents had been sent up from Raleigh, and they were raising bowers to shelter them in the hot mid-day sun. They were so near the end of their special work that on Sunday, June 22, the two companies "celebrated" by taking a whole day for rest, the first workless Sunday for five weeks. They did not even "attend service", did nothing but "wash up" and "loaf". The Captain thought this remarkable enough to put in his diary. But any colonel is troubled by the separation of his companies, and Colonel Coleman got the two under Captain Lane ordered to move to Raleigh as soon as their work at the ferry was completed. Accordingly, the last improvements and additions being finished on the 5th of July, on the 6th they marched for Raleigh, and the next day settled in the camp of their regiment.

Unfortunately, the use of the remarkable ferry was short-lived. Loring's rebels were watching its construction, their pickets were seen on the other side of the river from time to time, and a body of them was encamped on the river near "The Narrows", eight or ten miles above. But Loring was cautious about attacking. It was just a month after Captain Lane left the ferry, finished, when, under Lorings's orders, Colonel Wharton came, with 900 men and 2 rifled 10-pounders, to destroy the ferry and the camp. He did not venture to cross the river, but tried a safer course by planting his two guns on an elevation on the east side, half a mile above the camp, and posting sharpshooters along the shore opposite it. This was the morning of August 6.

It seems rather discreditable to the officer commanding at the post, that he did not know of the presence of the enemy until the shelling began. The first effort of the enemy was to reach the boats, and one of them was struck before they could be moved out of range. But the damage done was not material, and it was repaired within a day. For the rest, the attack was only an annoyance. The guns were turned upon the camp, but did no harm, and the sharpshooters were not bold or skilful enough to get one victim. The howitzers and field guns on our

side made a good defense, and at night the rebels withdrew, their imaginative colonel reporting to Loring another victory. Loring apparently believed his tale, for he immediately sent to his War Department one of those ridiculous reports so common (on both sides!) during the war, saying that Colonel Wharton had killed twenty of the Yankees, had destroyed their boats, broken up their camp and compelled them to throw their supplies into the river to prevent their capture, every item in the report being wholly imaginary.

But only ten days later the ferry had to be destroyed by General Cox, when he abandoned the country under orders to move, with the greater part of his troops, to eastern Virginia, to reinforce Pope's army, then opposing the advance of Lee toward the Potomac after the calamity of McClellan's failure at Richmond.

Captain Lane remained at Raleigh with the regiment from the 8th to the 25th of July, but repeatedly off duty for two or three days at a time because of illness. The ten weeks of continuous severe labor and special responsibilities were followed by the natural reaction. Indeed, he had been a full year under a great strain of both nervous and physical powers. The extraordinary labors he was charged with during the five months of the Kanawha campaigning from July to December '61, immediately followed by the four months of keen anxieties in the struggle to free the regiment from DeVilliers, would be strain enough upon the health of any one, and he was not of robust constitution. The ten weeks more of hurried labors and constant anxieties under a new test of his abilities brought him to the limit of endurance. During July he was compelled several times to ask for relief from duty for a day or two at a time. When he "felt better" from time to time, however, he took the usually light duty of "Officer-of-the-Day", and the resting, coupled with new marching orders for his company, braced him up.

There was a raid by rebel cavalry upon Summerville (northeast of Gauley Bridge) on July 24, which caused much alarm at Gauley and Charleston; and a call was made upon the Raleigh troops for help. Several companies of the Eleventh Ohio were ordered out, and Cap-

tain Lane was glad to go in command. He marched July 25, on two hours' notice, and, with some rest on the road during the night, made the forty miles to Gauley within twenty-five hours,— a remarkably good march. Two companies were then sent on to Summerville, to re-occupy the post. With the other companies (including K) Captain Lane went into camp at Gauley, where they remained until August 10. During this period, to keep the men occupied and escape the discontent sure to arise in camp in idleness, he had the men daily on drill and under inspections, tho only early or late in the day because of the great heat of the weather.

On the 10th the garrison at Charleston was alarmed by a report of an intended attack. Captain Lane was ordered down with the companies of the Eleventh he then had in camp. He started immediately, at six p. m., and, with a rest of two hours in the night, reached Camp Piatt, ten miles above Charleston, before ten a. m., doing better, relatively, than even in the march from Raleigh to Gauley. It was a waste of effort, however, there being no sufficient cause for the alarm; and he was, the same day, ordered to return to Gauley. But this march was easy, a bivouac over night being allowed.

The commanding officer of the regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, had become much concerned about Captain Lane's health, seeing that he could not supply the place of so valuable an officer if his illness should be serious or long. There was no colonel since DeVilliers was dismissed (the regiment had been so diminished in numbers that it was not entitled to have a new colonel), the major at that time was of little use, because of a certain antagonism of officers and men toward him (due to his having been appointed by the Governor from "outside"), and Captain Lane thus happened to be the commander's right-hand man. He did not like to apply for a sick-leave, and the Colonel finally proposed to get him ordered to go to Ohio on recruiting service. This would accomplish two highly desirable purposes at once and would avoid the discredit of "going home sick". General Cox gladly approved, and on August 15 issued a formal order directing Captain Lane to proceed at once to Ohio on recruiting service for the regiment and con-

tinue until further orders. He started at once (expecting the order, he had got ready), rode down to the "Falls", the head of navigation on the Kanawha, and on the morning of the 17th the "*Silver Lake*" was carrying him down the river, the happiest man in the army.

IX

1862: AUGUST — OCTOBER

Eleventh Ohio in “Army of Virginia” Under Pope — Camp at Washington — Battle at the Stone Bridge on Bull Run — Again Under McClellan — Campaign of Antietam — Battles of South Mountain (or Sharpsburg) and Antietam — Colonel Coleman Killed — In “McClellan’s Bodyguard” — Returned to the Kanawha

But often the best-laid schemes of men go wrong. Captain Lane was hardly half-way on his journey when his regiment was assembling under urgent marching orders for the east; and he just missed one of the greatest campaigns in its history. As Captain Lane was not in this campaign, it is not described in this book; but, as his company and regiment had a very effective and honorable part in it and one result of it was a great change in his service in the army, a brief account ought to be given.

When McClellan's campaign against Richmond collapsed, in June, 1862, Lee determined upon an aggressive campaign in the north. He had already an army on the Shenandoah under Jackson and Ewell, and now, with large reinforcement, he moved to Charlottesville and took general command. McClellan lay idle in his camp on the James, afraid to move. Halleck, then “General-in-chief,” organized at Washington another army (the “Army of Virginia”) under General John Pope, and gave him, among others, all troops in western Virginia.

The troops under Cox on the Kanawha were then ordered to join Pope, but their commander was not included in the order. Cox begged leave to go in command, and got it. By the rivers and the Baltimore & Ohio road he moved all his available men to Washington, reaching there August 25. They were then provisionally organ-

ized as a division, in two brigades, of which the First was composed of the Eleventh, Twelfth and Twenty-third Ohio regiments, commanded by Colonel Scammon, of the Twenty-third.

On the 27th Colonel Scammon was sent with the Eleventh and Twelfth Ohio, by rail from Alexandria, to reinforce a New Jersey brigade then holding "the stone bridge" on Bull Run, a conspicuous position in the famous battle of July 21, 1861. They arrived in the afternoon, only to find that the New Jersey brigade had just been attacked and driven off. The two regiments were at once engaged in the hottest battle they had known up to that day. Without knowing it they were opposing a determined effort of General Stonewall Jackson, with two divisions, to get possession of the bridge. Forced from one position to another in several struggles, and Jackson having got the bridge, the two regiments were withdrawn at night and moved back to Alexandria. Their losses were the severest in their history. The Eleventh lost, among others, its Adjutant, Alexander, who was mortally wounded and died in hospital.

Cox's division remained in camp near Washington until Lee crossed the Potomac, early in September, after defeating Pope at Manassas. All troops were then concentrated and sent against him; and McClellan, in spite of his repeated failures and persistent disobedience, was placed in command. His dilatory methods at once appeared. He was nearly two weeks on the march to Sharpsburg, less than a hundred miles from Washington.

On this march, at Frederick, on the 12th, Moor's brigade (the Second) of Cox's division had a sharp engagement with a raiding force of Lee's cavalry, in which it suffered some loss in all its regiments, including the capture of Colonel Moor. The Second brigade was then reorganized, the Eleventh Ohio was added to it, and General Crook placed in command. And the division was attached to the Ninth Army Corps, commanded by General Reno, which was part of General Burnside's "left wing" of the army.

The Ninth Corps was the first to reach and strike Lee, near Sharpsburg, thus opening the great battle of "South Mountain". Cox's division was conspicuously engaged,

especially all the regiments of Crook's brigade, the Eleventh Ohio, with the others, suffering severely; and the Corps commander, Reno, was killed. McClellan then allowed Lee two whole days to choose another position, when he attacked him, on the 17th, in the famous battle of "Antietam." Cox had succeeded Reno in the command of the Ninth Corps, leaving Crook to the command of his division. The chief part in the battle for the possession of the stone bridge on Antietam creek fell to this division. After repeated assaults it took the bridge in a splendid charge, and then held it permanently. The Eleventh Ohio again lost many, and among its killed was its noble commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman.

McClellan's conduct at Antietam is wholly indefensible. Whatever his plan of battle was, there was a conspicuous lack of co-ordination of his forces in action. Here and there a corps or a division was left to a desperate and prolonged struggle, with the advantage to the enemy, while other troops lay idle within full hearing or sight of the battle. When, at night, the battle ended, two whole corps had been in it only nominally. A concerted attack the next day would have defeated Lee, but McClellan lay in camp two days, "waiting for reinforcements," altho he already outnumbered Lee two to one; and then he permitted Lee to recross the Potomac, unmolested, within a few miles of his camp. And even then he made no pursuit, but remained in camp six weeks, "getting ready" and having grand reviews, while Lee was resting and reinforcing hardly fifty miles away. On one occasion his explanation of his delay was, that "the horses had sore tongues and were much fatigued", a report which brought from Lincoln one of the few bits of sarcasm found in his writings.* And it was on a visit to McClellan at this time that he made the famous remark, that it was not an army he saw, but "only McClellan's bodyguard." Finally even Lincoln's patience failed, and when McClellan at last crossed the Potomac

* October 24, 1862, Lincoln telegraphed McClellan—"I have just read your dispatch about sore-tongued and fatigued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?" A. Lincoln."

and, instead of moving against Lee, went into camp again, he peremptorily removed him, and never again called him to service.

While McClellan's army thus lay idle in camp in September there were loud cries from western Virginia for help, the enemy having taken the Kanawha valley down to Charleston and driven the garrisons from many posts between the Kanawha and the Ohio. General Cox was ordered by Halleck to return with his division; and he was promoted to Major-General for his fine service in the late campaign and his command of the Ninth Corps at Antietam.

Finding that the Union troops in the Kanawha region had been reduced to mere garrisons at posts, the rebel General Loring set out from Salt Sulphur in Monroe county, to redeem the country. But first, toward the end of August, he sent a body of cavalry under General Jenkins, to raid the posts north of the Kanawha. Jenkins rode north along the Greenbrier to Huttonsville, then turned west and captured half a dozen small posts, destroyed such supplies as he found, threatened Point Pleasant, forded the Ohio at Ravenswood, made a spectacular circuit of twenty miles in Ohio, recrossed at Racine, then crossed the Kanawha at Buffalo, and, by the way of Logan Court-House, rode to meet Loring at Charleston. But Loring was not there yet and Jenkins did not venture to attack the post, but rode on to Raleigh. He had done something he could boast of, but nothing of substantial military value.

As to Loring, he was too cautious to move until he felt assured the field was easy. About September 7 he marched from Salt Sulphur, with 5000 men, crossed New river above Fayetteville, drove the small garrison there back upon Gauley Bridge and then both garrisons down to Charleston. On the 12th he reached Charleston, but found the post evacuated, all the troops and supplies having been safely removed to the Ohio. He then settled comfortably for a stay at Charleston and issued a proclamation "To the people of Western Virginia," in which he said he had reclaimed their country for them and "you can now act upon your obligation to support your Government and serve in the army." But there was no re-

sponse, and he found nothing to do but enjoy his conspicuous position as commander for a month.

Relieved from service with McClellan's army of the Potomac, Cox's division set out on the 8th of October for its old field in the Kanawha valley, carrying with it a very handsome acknowledgment of its services, with thanks and high praise, from General Burnside. It was so much delayed for trains on the Baltimore & Ohio road that it did not reach Clarksburg until the 15th. There Crook's brigade was stopped and encamped, with the purpose of marching across the country to Gauley Bridge, while the remainder went on to Parkersburg, under Cox, to be moved up the Kanawha by boats or by land, as might be practicable.

X

1862 : AUGUST — OCTOBER

Captain Lane in Ohio — Fills the Eleventh With Recruits — Organizes and Commands Troops in Defense of Cincinnati Against Bragg — Promoted to Colonel — Rejoins in Virginia and Takes Command — Finds Bad Conditions and Begins Reforms.

Meantime Captain Lane had been very active and very successful on his recruiting service. He was in Ohio two months, but unexpected events threw him, under orders, into a very different service during three weeks of that time. He arrived at Cincinnati the 18th of August, was in Columbus the next day, and for two weeks was busy in selecting recruiting officers and getting them at work in the important towns in his quarter of the State, at the same time picking up many men himself. Then the service was suddenly checked and he himself taken off it during three weeks, as one of the results of the operations of the enemy in Kentucky.

General Bragg was marching north, thro Tennessee and Kentucky, driving General Buell toward Louisville, and General Kirby Smith, who, tho commanding a separate Confederate Department, was, practically, Bragg's right wing, was moving directly toward Cincinnati. It was the common belief, both north and south, that Bragg and Smith had a fixed purpose of "going to the Ohio". No doubt that was their underlying purpose; but Bragg lacked a daring spirit, delayed his march in Kentucky, permitted Buell to cut him off from Louisville and, some weeks later, to defeat him at Perryville and drive him out of the State. Smith was hardly more aggressive, but he had a much smaller force — only 12,000 to 15,000 — and, tho a portion of his troops, at their extreme advance, appeared within a few miles of the

Ohio, opposite Cincinnati, there was no attempt to attack.

Smith's movement did, however, cause much alarm in Ohio, where, of course, his strength was much exaggerated; and all other affairs were subordinated to the work of concentrating defensive troops at Cincinnati and along the river above. Such regiments and detachments of the regular volunteers as could be reached and many companies of the State militia were hastily collected at Camp Dennison and Cincinnati, and all officers of the volunteers who happened to be available (at home on leave or on special service) were impressed and employed in organizing and training this mixed provisional army. Captain Lane, with his long and active experience in the field, was a highly valuable acquisition, and General Wright, commanding at Cincinnati, loaded him with orders and employments, in advising as to the measures for defense, organizing the incoming troops, training the militia, and finally marching in command of different bodies to the supposed fields. He first led a force of 1300 militia to Anderson's Ferry, and then, when Smith was reported to be nearing the city, he crossed the river and held Fort Mitchell and vicinity with 2200 volunteers and militia; and, at last, when the militia was well under the command of other officers, he was assigned to the command of the One-hundred-and-eighteenth Ohio infantry, which had arrived to take the front.

There was a little skirmishing or picket-firing beyond the forts in Kentucky, but Smith himself, much further south, turned off to the west, and marched to Frankfort, where Thomas promptly attacked him, drove him south, and ended his campaign.

The scare being over, General Wright relieved Captain Lane (September 20), and he at once resumed his work of recruiting for his regiment. The same day came news of the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, killed in battle at Antietam.

One effect of this episode of an advance upon Cincinnati was an increase in the number of recruits, and within three weeks more there were enough to fill the regiment. An entire new company was raised at Dayton, under the immediate service of Joseph P. Staley, who had been a lieutenant in the Eleventh. This company became

"I", Staley being commissioned Captain, and the regiment had now, for the first time, the regulation number of ten companies. Another company was raised at Cincinnati, immediately under Captain Lane's direction, to take the place of the old Company E, which had become much diminished in number and was finally disorganized by the resignation of all its officers, the remainder of the men being distributed into other companies. Thus the zeal and practical labor of Captain Lane, within two months and with hardly more than five weeks' actual employment, had brought his regiment up to full strength, and beyond the number at which it was entitled to have a colonel again. He was greatly pleased, as indeed were all in the old regiment.

This achievement, added to those in the field for which he was already highly respected, led the regiment to call for his promotion. In their camp at Antietam, in the old American fashion, they had an "election" (without his knowledge) and a petition was sent to the Governor to make him Colonel. There seems to have been no dissent among the men and the officers were unanimous. The Governor said he would do it on the approval of General Cox, which was at once gladly given. The commission was accordingly issued October 9, to date (to "rank") from September 17, the date of the battle of Antietam and the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman.* On the 14th the new Colonel was in Columbus, received his commission, and was mustered-in.

Captain Ogden Street, of Company C, was then promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, to succeed Coleman, and (Major Jackson having resigned) Captain Asa Higgins, of Company G, was promoted to Major. Both these officers were highly capable, and the regiment now had a body of field-officers who could hardly have been excelled in ability in any regiment in the field. In Company K First-Lieutenant George Johnson was promoted to Captain, in place of Lane, promoted.

There was for the present a plenty of work for all field and staff officers, to bring the regiment up to that plane of discipline and military value which they, or at

* See page 135.

least the Colonel, intended. From the death of Colonel Coleman and Adjutant Alexander the command and administration had been poor and ineffective, and the regiment had fallen off much from the pride and self-respect it had shown while they were in office.

Colonel Lane spent a few days clearing up the recruiting business, and then, on the 17th, left Cincinnati to join his regiment at Clarksburg. He arrived on Sunday the 19th, with 180 of the recruits. Other parties had been forwarded and more were yet to come. The first two days he spent in learning conditions and making preparations for his first orders, so that when he formally took command (on the 21st) the much-needed reforms were at once initiated. He had found the regiment (as he wrote in a private letter) "in bad condition, the men dispirited, lacking in discipline, in order and cleanliness, lacking in clothing, some without shoes, some without shirts, some without trousers, and the sick not well cared for." But he also found a responsive spirit. The mere fact of the presence of a permanent commander would have a certain moral influence, and the well-known determination and zeal of the new colonel added much more. Improvement began from the hour of the first order and developed rapidly.

The recruits, of course, required much attention. They now constituted more than one third of the men, they had had but little training in the rendezvous in Ohio, many of them none at all, but they had at once the great advantage of living and working side by side with "old" soldiers. This close association with experienced troops is, probably, of more value to recruits, in practical ways, than any drilling or school of instruction. It rouses their pride and spirit of emulation. The criticism or ridicule of a veteran has a kind of terror for a recruit.

The second morning, tho he knew the present camp was but temporary, the Colonel began regular daily drill, battalion and company; but he was able to get in only three days of it.

XI

1862: OCTOBER — DECEMBER

Fourth Kanawha Campaign — Continuous Storms Obstruct — Colonel Lane Commands Post of Summerville — Builds Sawmills and Improves the Town — Expedition to Cold Knob and Capture of Rebels' Camp — Extraordinary Winter Storm — Impassable Roads — Winter-quarters — End of Year 1862

ON the 24th came the marching order, and at eight a. m. of the 25th the column was on the road for the Kanawha, distant about one hundred and twenty miles. It was then called Crook's Division, composed of the Eleventh, Twelfth, Twenty-third, Twenty-eighth, Thirtieth and Thirty-sixth Ohio infantry and three batteries of artillery. And there was a long wagon-train of rations, forage, ammunition and baggage. The road was by Weston, Jackson, Bulltown, Sutton, Big Bush and Summerville, to Gauley Bridge, all of it hilly and a part very rough. There was the ill luck of a great storm, with cold winds. The night of the 27th, when Jackson was reached, was "a terrible night of rain and cold,—the worst of the war," the Colonel wrote. It was so bad that all the next day there was not even an attempt to march; and still on the 29th the road was so heavy with mud that, tho the men moved very slowly, the train lagged far behind them, keeping back the tents and reducing the food for the remainder of the march.

General Crook halted the division at Summerville November 3, and held it in camp there a week, waiting for the laborious dragging up of the supplies. But General Cox was a little ahead with the other division, having occupied Charleston on the 31st and Gauley Bridge on the 2nd.

Loring had just begun the evacuation of the valley,

upon news of the arrival of Cox's troops at Clarksburg, when he was relieved by order and sent to another command. General Echols, on the 17th of October, on his way west to take Loring's place, found three of Loring's brigades moving up New river and turned them back for Charleston, where he remained in command till the 27th, when Cox was moving up the Kanawha and Crook was well on his way to cut him off at Gauley. On that day he (Echols) heard that the enemy, 12,000 strong, was within ten miles. This was far from true, as to either numbers or distance; but he left Charleston that night and, by forced marches, reached safety, at Fayetteville, on the 29th.

It is interesting to note that Echols judged, "from the strength of the enemy and size of their trains", that "They will endeavor to penetrate to the Virginia & Tennessee railroad". So he "would make a stand, but it is impossible to get forage." He was then near Raleigh Court-House, and says he is looking for forage to be sent him from Lynchburg! — that is, more than a hundred miles and across all the mountain ranges. Coincident with these prophecies of Echols appears a remark in Colonel Lane's diary, which shows that it was expected also in Cox's army that it would undertake a campaign against the Virginia & Tennessee road as soon as the Kanawha valley was recovered, tho this may have been due only to their knowledge that they had been, for more than a year, expected to make such a campaign and now saw that their movement was in that direction. If there was any such purpose, however, at Washington or department headquarters, it was effectually prevented by the early and terrible winter weather in the Virginia mountains, making wagon transportation literally impossible.

On the 11th of November General Crook moved on toward Gauley with four of his regiments, leaving the Eleventh and Twelfth Ohio at Summerville under command of Colonel Lane. Two days later Lane was ordered by Crook to send the Twelfth on to Gauley and to remain with the Eleventh in command at Summerville as a permanent outpost.

This was the most important command he had yet held. It was the principal outpost for both Charleston and

Gauley Bridge and it was peculiarly exposed to attack, especially by raiding cavalry. It had been captured by the enemy three times within a year, twice with the most of its garrison, tho on each of these occasions the garrison was small. He felt his responsibility and was proud of it. He set about the improvement of the defensive earth-works, kept his officers on the alert in scouting and reconnoitring parties, and personally looked after his picket-posts. A week after he was ordered to remain, seeing that he was likely to be held there all winter, he moved the camp near the town, placed it in a position for best protection and quick movement, and kept the men busy with devices for better shelter and comfort. They could build chimneys to their tents and sheds with the few bricks they could get, stones, sticks, mud and emptied barrels, but for other purposes they much wanted boards and other sawed material. An old saw-mill for water-power was found, and the Colonel directed the repair of it, intending to set it up on a creek near the town. At the same time he was building an oven for bread-making, which seems to show that he had some flour, tho it may be he only expected to have it. All other rations had fallen short and hard-bread was gone. The train from Clarksburg had not arrived, did not arrive, in fact, until nearly two weeks after the troops, so that it must be that at least limited supplies were received from Gauley Bridge by the 10th or 12th.

He also undertook some improvement of the town. It had been a beautiful little town, the "seat" of a prosperous county (Nicholas) and the home of many well-established families, but the war had brought ruin. It had been occupied and reoccupied by the troops of both sides, suffering from one side because of its Union citizens and from the other because of its Secessionists. Several engagements had been fought in or near it; and now two families, of low degree, were all that were left. The abandoned houses had all been used by the armies for one purpose or another, the court-house had been destroyed, the jail used as a military guard-house, and the principal church had been cleared of pews, pulpit and windows, and used as a stable for cavalry. If it must be a town of soldiers, Colonel Lane meant it should be at

least a decent one, orderly, clean and healthful. And one of his first reforms was to redeem the dishonored church and restore it to its proper use.

But on November 23d these active and zealous employments were interrupted by an order to Colonel Lane to march on the 24th. A camp of rebel cavalry had been reported on the Cranberry branch of Gauley river, about fifty miles east of Summerville. General Crook ordered a raid upon it, to be made by the Eleventh Ohio, 500 men, under Colonel Lane, and the Second Virginia cavalry, 400, under Colonel Paxton. It seems that neither colonel was given command of the whole, but the two were directed to meet on the "Cranberry road" on Cold Knob, at eight o'clock a. m. of the 26th, forty miles from Summerville. Colonel Lane wrote a brief note, only acknowledging the order and saying he would "be there on time". If he had known what was to happen he would have said the same thing, but would have been much troubled. He marched early on the 24th, crossed the Gauley by noon, and spent the rest of the day on the long ascent toward Job's Knob, a lofty and conspicuous peak. The next day's march began in rain which continued steadily till evening, when there was a change to sleet and snow with wind and rapidly increasing cold. No one could escape getting wet. In the night they reached the top of Job's Knob, forty miles from camp, in severe cold. Here there was to be a bivouac, but only small fires could be permitted, as the enemy was, or was supposed to be, near and discovery must be avoided. Clothing and shoes were frozen and some or many of the men had to be kept moving about ("in a circle," it is said) for fear they would freeze. It was a terrible night. The storm ceased before morning, but the cold on the mountain top was intense. At daybreak the column moved on and reached Cranberry road on Cold Knob at eight o'clock, the place and time appointed; but the cavalry was not there, and the Eleventh waited for it four hours, still exposed to the bitter cold wind.

When the cavalry came the two colonels conferred and agreed upon their action. The position of the rebel camp, as reported, was six or eight miles ahead, no enemy had been met, and a surprise seemed to be assured.

As agreed, Colonel Lane moved forward in advance as rapidly as practicable, with the cavalry close behind, until he uncovered and drove in the rebel picket-post, when he halted and opened his ranks to let the cavalry through. Colonel Paxton at once dashed forward in a mounted charge upon the camp, with a complete success. As the camp could not be wholly surrounded on the instant a portion of the rebels escaped, but 20 or 30 were killed or wounded, 117 captured, with about 100 horses, a lot of arms and ammunition, and all the camp equipage.

Colonel Paxton wanted to go on, in pursuit or to extend the expedition, but Colonel Lane declined. His men had just walked fifty miles under exceptionally hard conditions while Paxton's were mounted. He had been directed to take but five days' rations and, even if he set out for camp at once, he would have to reduce the ration before he got thro: to go further into the wilderness would be imprudent, to say the least. There could be no reasonable chance of catching the flying rebel cavalry, especially not with infantry, and the men were already worn out by their long march and climbing, while the snow lay deep in all the region. Colonel Lane was clear that he ought to return to Summerville, and he started as soon as the men had rested and eaten; and Paxton could do nothing but follow.

The march was picturesque enough, but pitiful. The deep snow was now frozen and the northwest wind was in the faces of the silent, plodding column. As far as one could see there was only the unbroken wilderness of mountain and forest, all white in the snow. In spite of the hardships of the march and his fears for his men, Colonel Lane was much interested in the wonderful beauty of the scene, especially in crossing Job's Knob the next morning. This bold summit gave a view unlimited in all directions. In the crystal atmosphere after the winter storm he saw, in rare clearness, the endless expanse of hills and mountains, nearly all more or less covered with forests of evergreens, which all now hung heavy with frozen snow. The rising sun behind filled the whole scene in front with brilliant, sparkling light, and, in quick succession, appeared to set all the eastern slopes on fire, while the deep valleys and gorges lay in dark

shadows. No wonder the Colonel's letter showed his delight in what they saw that morning, nor that the toiling soldiers forgot their sufferings while the wonderful spectacle was impressed upon their memories for life.

As they dragged on down into the lower lands they found less snow, but also they had less food. The last two days there was little more than coffee and sugar left; but they had the luck to find a few cattle and at least escaped hunger. They reached Summerville the evening of the 28th, without the loss of a man, and "thought they had got to Paradise". Colonel Paxton's command stayed there with them till next day, and then went on to Gauley Bridge. An entry in Colonel Lane's diary the next day brings to an old soldier a sympathetic memory: "The Second Virginia Cavalry destroyed and stole half we had in camp".

The second day after the return was Sunday, the day of "inspection", when all officers are expected to see that their camps and men, with their clothing, arms and equipage, are all in the best condition and order; and all the men are formally paraded for those purposes. Colonel Lane's controlling sense of duty is illustrated by the entry in his diary, as if failing in what he ought to do, that on that day he did not order inspection because it was "so stormy and cold",— a quite sufficient reason, considering that any weather described by him in those words would be called very harsh indeed by almost any one else.

The early coming of winter in these persistent storms was causing much trouble for the army in the Kanawha valley, and especially at Summerville. All the supplies had to be hauled in wagons from the steamboat landing, fifty miles, the rains and snows, the freezing and thawing, had made the clay roads almost impassable and, for some reason not given, the wagons and teams for Summerville were very few. They could not take animals or wagons from the supply line even for hauling the necessary fire-wood, and that the men had to carry on their backs. Wagons were sometimes four to five days working their way from the river to Summerville. And now there was a fear that the river would freeze and block the receipt of supplies, preventing the steamboats from

going down and others from coming up, while land transportation would be, to say the least, extremely difficult and slow.

In the midst of these harassing conditions fate, in the shape of an indiscreet invitation given by the Colonel, added another. About the middle of November, feeling pleased with his post and having a mansion of six whole rooms, he wrote to his wife that the weather was good, that he had rooms for "boarders", and proposed her coming, saying that, if she could get two or three other ladies (the wives of certain officers) to come with her for company, he could provide for them and would send an ambulance to the steamboat landing to bring them out.

He did not hear from her, did not know that she had received his letter (many letters were lost in those times), and meantime conditions had greatly changed. The persistent winter storms had brought great discomfort, made the roads nearly impassable for wheels and the supply of provisions uncertain, and he had frequent reports of the movement of guerrilla horsemen. He had, indeed, in a later letter, told her not to think of coming until warm weather, but did not know that she had received that letter. To his mind it was all in the settled past, when, three weeks after the proposal, a telegram came to him from Charleston, that his "wife and family" were there, ready to be brought out to Summerville. His astonishment, his emotions and sentiments, may, perhaps, be imagined, but they can hardly be described. He would have given anything to have them come up, but it would have been recklessly imprudent. Even if he were to go down on horseback, he would be two days on the way, and meantime the river might freeze and prevent return to Cincinnati for an indefinite time. If they were to come up, he must send an ambulance and four horses, they would be at the best three days on the way, because of the deep mud and many hills, they would have to sleep and live in the ambulance, and it might be seized by guerrillas. He cut the knot by telegraphing her to turn back at once and go home.

What she thought and felt may also be left to the imagination. She had been invited to come, had traveled a hundred and forty miles, and was now, as it seemed to

her, only a short distance from his camp. If she thought of the possibility of a change of conditions during the interval, she did not consider it as likely to present a serious obstacle. But she knew that his telegram was to be acted upon immediately, and she took the next boat down the river. It does not appear how many of the children she had with her, but the Colonel's sister Ellen was in the party,—an unhappy, disconsolate party. The Colonel was a long time getting over the misfortune. He wrote to her a long letter, explaining the conditions and difficulties and adding that, under present circumstances, he might any day be ordered away upon an expedition and that he could not bear the thought of leaving her and the children alone at Summerville, exposed, as they would be, to privation and danger.

But, if he could not forget the domestic episode, he had enough to do to keep his thoughts busy. The work already laid out and the difficulties to be overcome in obtaining materials for it and the constant struggle with the heavy roads in bringing up the necessary supplies from the river left no room for leisure or quiet. The water saw-mill had to be given up, because the stream proved too fitful and uncertain in supplying the wheel. A circular saw, carriage and boiler, designed for steam-power, were found (the parts "scattered all over the country" and incomplete), and the Colonel undertook the construction of a steam-mill. With his devices in repairs, supplying missing parts and adding necessary apparatus, this mill succeeded; and great improvements in the camp and the town soon followed. After sawing materials for the better shelter of the men and animals and the supplies, as well as for walks in the camps and along the streets where especially needed, the repair of buildings was undertaken.

In this latter work a chief purpose was the restoration of the principal church. The Colonel sent to Gallipolis, at his own cost, for window-sash, glass and hardware, had the building thoroly cleaned and renovated, a pulpit built and benches to fill the place of the pews, put in all new windows, restored the doors, repaired the roof and exterior walls, and with a couple of weeks of work by willing hands, had the church completed and ready for use. Chaplain Lyle arrived from Ohio while this work was

going on and was zealously identified with it to the end. The sash and glass were slow in coming, but on the last Sunday in the year the Chaplain held a service in the church,—a kind of dedication,—and the crowd was so great that hardly half could get in, so that another service was held in the afternoon.

When Mr. Lyle arrived from Ohio this time he brought a large quantity of "donations" for the regiment, but they reached Summerville after him, his wagons making only ten or twelve miles a day in the deep mire and taking five days from the river. On the 16th of December he and all the regiment were immensely pleased in the distribution, most of them receiving packages from their own homes or friends and the others sharing liberally in the general supply.

Among the many efficient chaplains in the volunteer army, Mr. Lyle seems to have been in the first class. He had great good sense, bore the hardships of the field cheerfully and on equal terms with the men, was remarkably well adapted for the services he rendered, and was held in high respect and esteem thro all his army career. Other chaplains did much for the spiritual welfare or personal comfort of their men, but Mr. Lyle was unceasingly employed, with excellent judgment, in a successful combination of religious care and practical service.* The "donation party" above mentioned was only one of several that he organized and personally promoted during his time, going to Ohio, travelling thro several counties in collecting the goods, and bringing them into the field several wagon loads at a time. At the same time his religious services in the camp were always treated with respect and well attended, usually drawing men from other camps, perhaps especially because he had a remarkable skill or "gift" in public addresses. One of them, just before the regiment went into battle at Chickamauga, will be spoken of later — the most striking and effective

* There were, unfortunately, many others who were not effective,—unfitted by temperament for the life, mistaken in their conceptions of their practical duties and opportunities, and so in their methods in dealing with the men. There was thus a great number of failures and resignations among them, bringing the office more or less into contempt in the minds of the men.

scene on the religious side of the army life that I know of. Chaplain Lyle could have said, at the end of his services in the Eleventh Ohio, that every man in it was his friend; but especially between him and Colonel Lane there grew up a personal respect and attachment that lasted, unmarred, until the separation of death.

The end of the year 1862 brought the Eleventh Ohio nearly to the end of its service in Virginia. It happened that that service covered just the period of the struggle of the western part of the State for the overthrow of secession and the erection of a new State. The slave-holders and politicians of the eastern part of the State (it would be a juster limitation to say the southeastern part), in their mad attempt to impose secession upon the whole State,* made the fatal mistake which led directly to a permanent geographical and political division and reduced their State from its proud position as one of the greatest of the States in territory, population and political power. In December, 1862, the many disappointments, sacrifices and sufferings of the Unionists in the forty western counties were rewarded by the assured creation of the new state of West Virginia; and our Eleventh Ohio had the credit and honor of a conspicuous share in the work of its redemption and final establishment. After that time, tho Union troops were maintained at different places in defense against raiding and guerrilla bands and took part in certain campaigns in aid of operations in eastern Virginia, there was never any danger of reoccupation by Confederate forces.

Tho a winter campaign in West Virginia was now impracticable, as already said, rumors still persisted in the camps of a campaign the immediate object of which would be the Virginia & Tennessee railroad; but the War Department could hardly have considered seriously such a campaign. The difficulties of winter transportation over the mountains would alone have prevented or defeated it.

* See the history of the regular convention, which sat in Richmond, February-April, 1861, and of the other (self-appointed) convention, which was organized and sat in another hall, near by, during the latter part of that period and openly threatened and intimidated the regular convention,—an amazing and shocking proceeding.

The service of the regiment, however, was busy enough, — constant, indeed, and interrupted only in some parts when storms were at their worst. The heavy picket-guarding and unceasing fatigue details, with reconnoitering or scouting marches, may have been thought by the men sufficient employment, but the Colonel steadily maintained drills, except in impossible weather, and seldom permitted even a storm to prevent his Sunday inspections, which were made in a very close and exacting manner, including every officer and soldier within the camp. He also established a "School for Officers" which, under the Army Regulations, all officers not actually on other duty at the time are required to attend. It may be remarked that this duty of commanding-officers, under the military law, was much neglected in most of the volunteer regiments. Another of the duties, in regular course, of a regimental commander was the "muster" of his regiment at stated intervals. The last day of 1862 was muster-day, but that day was marked by another burst of weather, making any formal action on the parade-ground quite impracticable. But Colonel Lane had his church. He says that in a "furious snow-storm" he turned the regiment out and mustered it in the church! — the last act of the service of 1862.

XII

1863: JANUARY — MARCH

The Kanawha Brigade Sent to Nashville — Desertions on the Way — Joins the "Army of the Cumberland" — Colonel Lane Loses His Regiment

[As compared with the year 1862, not much can now be learned of the particulars of the service of Colonel Lane and his regiment during 1863. They had become part of a great army in the field operating together toward one object, and in such service the work of any one commander or regiment is not often conspicuous in relation to that of the others. Then Colonel Lane made but few official written reports. It looks as if he never made them unless directly ordered to do it. His brigade commanders seem to have done not much better. And, altho the great campaign of Chickamauga, occupying three months, comes within the year, bringing out a vast quantity of printed reports and accounts, there is but little to distinguish in detail any one colonel or organization.

The letters preserved of those he wrote during the year, tho as many as in 1862, tell not so much of his daily service as those did. But this was only the natural effect of accumulated experience. As we grow more and more accustomed to any kind of life the familiar things drop from attention, and only the larger seem worth any thought. Finally, if the Colonel kept a diary in 1863, it has been lost.

So, altho there are several sources of information for 1863, none of them are full or without gaps and uncertainties; and the personal story must be pieced out from scanty and disconnected materials.]

The beginning of the year brought a great change for Colonel Lane and his regiment. Their service in the Kanawha and New river region had seemed to them interminable and unprofitable. A constant succession of marches up and down, back and forth, on the same roads, always with hard labor, scouting the rough mountain ways in search of elusive bands of rebels or guerrillas, petty and inglorious fighting now and then, only one campaign of importance undertaken and that abruptly ended when hardly begun, no service that appeared to them to

have any practical bearing on the war, except in one instance. They were all tired of it. That exception was in the detachment of the brigade in August, 1862, for service in eastern Virginia and Maryland, where, in the campaign of Antietam, they did bear a very honorable part, as already told in the ninth chapter. But no sooner were McClellan's battles fought than they were hurried back, to be buried again in the western mountains.

That was the way they thought of it in the Kanawha Brigade, from the general down to the last private, and they all longed for a wider and (as it seemed to them) more effective service. They looked particularly to the western fields, where the year 1862 had witnessed great campaigns, brilliant successes, and the conquest of large territories, contrasting strikingly with the futile operations of the year in the east. Colonel Lane was especially filled with interest in these western campaigns. He read over and over again the news of Fort Donelson, Mill Spring, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Perryville and Corinth; and talked with zealous admiration of the energy and successes of Grant, Thomas and Rosecrans.

But still the brigade seemed condemned to confinement indefinitely in the Kanawha valley, and when winter overtook them there the men went on grumbly improving the shelter of their quarters against the constant succession of winter storms. At the Summerville post these improvements were kept busily in progress under the zealous oversight of Colonel Lane. The diary says the saw-mill was "running nearly all the time" to supply the demand for lumber for many uses. Finally a warehouse was undertaken, to relieve the Catholic church, which up to that time had been used for storage of supplies.

In the midst of this work came an exciting promise of furloughs. As there seemed to be certainty of a long time in the camps in the valley, General Cox conferred with the colonels upon a scheme of furloughing a certain proportion of each regiment. In the first lot from the Eleventh Ohio the number was thirty-five. The choice was made by an open selection after careful inquiry into circumstances, and the lucky ones had a hearty send-off from their comrades left behind, who expected their own

turns to come in due course. But the hopes of the others were soon dashed and the whole scheme brought to naught by an order to move the brigade to Tennessee.

There was much sadness in the camp of the Eleventh at this time, from the death of the Sergeant-Major, Thomas M. Mitchell, who was killed by the accidental discharge of a gun. He had been one of the victims of Colonel DeVilliers. He had the distinction (rare in a Sergeant-Major!) of being very popular in his regiment, and was held in high regard by both officers and men.

A great battle usually has effects reaching far in the general field of the armies, altering positions and causing movements of troops at distant places. The defeated or retreating army calls loudly for reinforcement, to prevent its ruin or the abandonment of the country. The victorious army at once wants more men, to make up its losses and to provide for moving on to further conquest.

The battle of "Stone's River" (Murfreesboro, Tenn.), December 31, 1862, is an apt illustration. Both sides claimed a victory, but there was no victory, tho two days after the battle Bragg did retreat to the south, leaving the field to be occupied by his adversary, Rosecrans, who did not know he was gone.

But Bragg halted at Shelbyville, twenty-five miles from Murfreesboro, established headquarters at Tullahoma, a few miles further to the southeast, and began calling for reinforcements. Rosecrans remained in camp at Murfreesboro and did the same thing. The Confederate government found it very difficult to get more troops to Bragg, and he had no substantial increase until seven or eight months later, on the eve of the battle of Chickamauga, while Rosecrans received large additions almost immediately, and more from time to time until September, his forces nearly all that time being much heavier than those of Bragg; but yet he lay idle in camp for nearly six months after the "victory", making no attempt upon a campaign.

Among the troops sent to Rosecrans from other fields directly after "Stone's River" (in January, 1863) were four regiments from the Kanawha. General Crook, then in immediate command in the Kanawha valley, had, on December 29, reported to the department commander the

positions and numbers of the rebel forces in his district, and gave his opinion that nine regiments could hold the country and protect the citizens until spring. So, when, a little later, General Cox was called upon for troops to reinforce Rosecrans, he admitted that several regiments could safely be sent. Upon that, on January 19, 1863, General Wright, commanding the Department of the Ohio, ordered Cox to send four regiments. Crook's own brigade, composed of the Eleventh, Thirty-sixth, Eighty-ninth and Ninety-second Ohio, was chosen, perhaps as a kind of distinction or special favor, perhaps to gratify Crook's ambition for a larger field. But then all the troops also wanted a larger field.

The order came to Colonel Lane at Summerville without warning and without previous news of any movement. His camp had settled into the assurance of remaining at the post until spring, and improvements in the winter quarters were being devised and worked upon every day. The night of January 23 he wrote to his wife that he had just received an order to move his regiment immediately to Camp Piatt,—above Charleston, at the head of Kanawha navigation. The regiment marched early the next morning, and, by keeping it up until late in the nights, and leaving its train to drag in the mud far behind, it reached Camp Piatt on the 27th. The distance was only about fifty miles, but the labor on, or in, the dreadful roads must have been very great. A few days before the Colonel had written "It rains or snows here nearly all the time", and the day after going on the boats he wrote "A storm has been raging 36 hours". Toward the end of the march to Camp Piatt he received an order from Crook's Adjutant-General, requiring the regiment to be at the landing at a certain hour, which he acknowledged with the reply "You require an impossibility. We are twelve miles from the landing. It will take us six hours to make that by daylight and longer at night."

Fortunately the boats were ready and the men did not have to lie or wait at the landing, but went aboard at once. There were eleven boats in the fleet, filled by the four regiments. From the colonels down no one knew where they were going; and it was with great pleasure that, at the mouth of the Kanawha, they saw the boats

turn down the Ohio. They had feared they were to go up the river and again to the Army of the Potomac, and they much preferred service in the west.

Then at once the men asked for leave to land at Cincinnati and visit their friends there and in that part of the State. But General Crook could not allow it. His order required him to take the troops directly to Nashville, and he halted at Cincinnati only to take on coal. As a precaution he anchored the boats in the stream. The deep disappointment of the men broke out among the turbulent ones in violent language and threats; and a considerable number, who found the guards not too rigid, managed to get ashore and deserted. More escapes occurred below Cincinnati, and at Louisville many more. Colonel Lane wrote, after leaving Louisville — “We have lost a large number of men. It is frightful. Not less than 150 have deserted. Company K has lost 30, A 34.” A few days later he wrote of being pleased with the change from Virginia, “but it has been at a cost of 170 deserters from my regiment.” A month later, however, he speaks of the voluntary return of many of these men, and says “The conscript law and the proclamation are sending them back by hundreds, and all profess themselves ashamed of their conduct.”

This lawless spirit broke out at different times in many of the volunteer regiments. There were cases of the “arrest” of a whole regiment, and now and then of some punishment, for a general and wilful disobedience of orders; but the penalty was rarely, if ever, adequate. Usually, when the rebels returned to obedience the offense was simply condoned. The vicious result of this tolerance was that there was a general belief in the volunteer army that there was no serious danger in merely being “absent without leave,” and that no desertion was likely to be punished unless it was “to the enemy.”*

* An illustration of this “independence”, or lawlessness, is in the fact that, even after the war, two of the officers of the Eleventh Ohio, joining in a book (“The History of the Eleventh Ohio”) characterized the refusal of leaves at Cincinnati as “fiendish treatment”—“a specimen of refined cruelty worthy the devils of the slaughter-pen at Andersonville”. And they add, with evident satisfaction, that “Many of the men succeeded in getting ashore and taking ‘French leave’, visited their homes and

The fleet was ordered to rendezvous at Dover (Fort Donelson), on the Cumberland, till all the boats arrived, and then to proceed to Nashville, convoyed by gun-boats; for the rivers of Tennessee were at that time harried by rebel cavalry, moving rapidly, with field guns, and finding unarmed transports easy victims.

The head of the fleet reached Dover the night of February 3d, and on the 6th the whole fleet proceeded, in close order, with gun-boats in front and rear — it must have been a stately procession,— up to Nashville, where they stopped and landed a part of the troops on the 7th. But the greater part, including Crook's brigade, remained quartered on the boats for several days while awaiting the coming up of their tents. This brigade was not landed, indeed, until the 13th, when it marched two miles out from the landing and encamped on an elevated site, in a beautiful oak wood. Here it remained ten days, awaiting orders.

The troops thus brought to Nashville from other departments numbered 20,000. They were not yet assigned to position in Rosecrans's army. In fact they appeared to be in the "Army of Kentucky" (whatever that was); but later Rosecrans did place them, under the command of General Gordon Granger, in a provisional "Reserve Corps".

During this interval Colonel Lane seems to have gone to Cincinnati, on some special service. It is known now only by a letter he wrote at Louisville, on the 26th, on his way back to Nashville. The dates show that he could not have been at Cincinnati or in Ohio more than a few days. He was two days getting from Louisville to Nashville by rail, delayed by a raid by rebel cavalry, who had cap-

returned at their pleasure", while others "availed themselves of opportunity at Louisville and returned to Ohio". And "a number of these men, in view of the heartless course pursued toward them, never returned, and on the rolls of their companies are reported as deserters". Apparently they were not deserters, but only "on the rolls as deserters"! These judicial historians, in the roster of the regiment printed in their book, mention only 4 men as "deserted" in all the career of the regiment, tho they name 135 others as having "left the Company" on such or such a day, that is, left and never returned.

tured and burned the train preceding his and damaged a bridge.

When he reached Nashville, on the 28th, he found that his regiment and brigade were gone and could not learn where they were, nor anything more than that they had been sent up the Cumberland on boats. He was told that they had embarked on the 24th, under Crook's command, with forty days' rations, for some unknown service up the river. After some days news was received at Nashville headquarters that Crook had landed at Carthage, in Tennessee, one hundred and fifty miles by river above Nashville; but there was no means of transportation, the country between was roamed by guerrillas or rebel cavalry, and the Colonel was compelled to await some occasion for the sending up of a gunboat. General Mitchell, in command at Nashville, could promise only a permission to go up on such a gunboat if he should learn that the brigade was not to return to Nashville.

He was thus compelled to lie at Nashville seventeen days, much mortified by having lost his regiment and full of anxiety as to what was happening in it. The irksomeness of this blank in his service was made the worse by the singular fact that no boat came down from Carthage, nor any news of Crook's movements or experiences, for about two weeks. The current belief at Nashville (and even of General Mitchell) was, that Crook's expedition was temporary and that he would soon return; but the order from Rosecrans under which Crook had moved gave no such promise. In fact it indicated an indefinite time of service.

XIII

1863: MARCH — JUNE

Service at Carthage on the Cumberland, as Outpost of Rosecrans's Army at Murfreesboro — Disaster in Eleventh Ohio in Colonel Lane's Absence — His Successful Expeditions and Reprisals — Engagements with John Morgan's Cavalry — On Court-martial Duty — Conviction and Execution of a Spy — Conflict with General Crook "On Principle" — Refuses to Obey Orders — The "Principle" Saved — Recurrence of Ill Health — Decides to Resign, but to Await an Expected Campaign

While other brigades of the rebel cavalry were making trouble for Rosecrans west and north of Nashville, the brigade (or division) of the famous John Morgan was harrying the country south of the upper Cumberland and was now reported to be intending a great raid thro Kentucky and up to the Ohio. Upon that Rosecrans ordered Granger to send Crook with his brigade (called "division" in the order) up to Carthage, to prevent Morgan's crossing the Cumberland. Whether he succeeded in that purpose or not, he was to "take post at Carthage, establish a depot there, make expeditions and scour that country".

General Rosecrans could hardly have expected a brigade of infantry to impede Morgan's movements materially, tho it could put him to some inconvenience in respect to supplies and equipment and could protect a certain area of the country against the forays of his detachments and their persecutions of the Unionists. Another object no doubt in Rosecrans's mind, tho not referred to in his order, was the advantage of a strong outpost on the upper Cumberland, to cover his left flank and at the same time reach well toward General Burnside's field of operations.

in Kentucky. Burnside's department, with headquarters at Cincinnati, included eastern Kentucky. Once at Carthage, General Crook would surely remain for some time.

The importance of the post was soon proved. The operations of the rebel cavalry and the "partisan"** bands in a wide region of Tennessee and Kentucky were much

* The name "partisans" was the euphemistic cover used by the Richmond government for these detestable freebooters, whose lawless forays it mistakenly assumed to be of value to the "great cause". On the contrary, they damaged the cause and helped to defeat it by embittering the Union men in the border States, increasing their enlistment in the Union army, and inducing the sternest reprisals upon the miscreants when they were caught. Their formation and operations were especially favored by President Davis, tho, when their atrocities in certain notorious instances were charged upon him by the Washington government, he indignantly denied responsibility for them. But it has appeared since the war that he advised and approved a law under which he alone was to direct the organization of "Partisan Rangers", determine their numbers and appoint their officers, that they were to have the same pay and rations as Confederate soldiers, and that they were to "be paid their full value" for any "arms and munitions" they captured. The word "munitions" could be stretched to cover anything, and the provision was an incitement to indiscriminate plunder, any owner being easily classed as an "enemy". There is evidence that they cared little, or knew nothing, of any law for such organizations, or their officers, but gathered into loosely formed bands with the double purpose of escaping regular enlistment or conscription and of having a free field for rapine and revenge upon personal enemies and Union men, but when moved by temptation or need they plundered Secessionists without scruple. Many were the complaints of their outrages made to Confederate authorities by real Secessionists, without effect. Their cruelties were nearly incredible. In Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Missouri and Kansas they committed, literally, thousands of murders, burned dwellings and towns, drove out the families of their victims, and plundered houses and stores without number. They became so notorious, indeed, that the Richmond government felt compelled, for its own credit, to attempt some control, at least on paper. An order was issued June 12, 1863, based upon "the irregularities reported to this department as having been committed by such corps", and (not ordering, but) "authorizing department commanders to combine" the gangs into battalions or regiments under the same regulations as other soldiers as to discipline and movements. But this order expressly excepted from its operation "Such partisan corps as are serving within the enemy's lines." This exception would, at that time, include nearly all of them, so it would seem that the order was insincere and issued only for "effect".

interfered with and restricted, and large quantities of corn and other supplies which would have been taken by them were gathered for the use of the Union army.

Whatever was to be the time of the stay of the brigade at Carthage, Colonel Lane wanted much to be with his regiment. Still more when he received, as he did on March 12th or 13th at Nashville, the very disturbing news of a disaster. Two companies of the regiment (G and K), sent out from Carthage on the 8th, on a foraging expedition, were attacked by a much larger body of rebel cavalry, with a loss of several men wounded and three officers and fifty men and all the forage train captured. The Colonel's anxiety now became distress; but at the same time several boats came in from the Ohio, which were to be loaded with supplies and sent up to Carthage. He had the good fortune to be put in command, and he took no rest until the fleet was ready. One of the boats (*the Orient*) was fitted as a "gun-boat". Three 6-pounder field-guns were mounted on her and the gunwales were lined with bales of hay for the shelter of sharpshooters.

New arms had been ordered for the brigade, and they had arrived at Nashville while he was waiting there. He says they were "rifles", tho he does not tell of what kind (probably "Enfield", then considered the most effective gun for infantry), and he was much pleased with them. He took all the men of the brigade he found at Nashville (about 250), issued the new guns to them, distributed them on the four boats, taking the greater part on the "gun-boat" with himself; and on the 17th, at dawn, set out up the river, his own boat in advance. An attack was expected, but nothing happened on the 17th. On the 18th he found the southern bank occupied by rebel sharpshooters, who kept up a rifle fusillade continuously for ten miles. They had no artillery, however, and his own guns and sharpshooters compelled them to keep concealed or at a safe distance. He had two men wounded, both on his boat, but he tells with satisfaction of seeing "two of the scoundrels roll down the bank".

Reaching Carthage and landing the night of the 18th, his first concern was the character and extent of the disaster of the 8th. He found that none had been killed, that three were wounded (two so severely that they were left

with citizens near the field), and that Captain Johnson of K, Lieutenants Arthur and Roney of G, and about fifty men of the two companies had been captured. Among the captured was "Charley" Bosworth of K, a brother of Mrs. Lane; but all the captured men had been paroled by the rebel officers and sent to Carthage, while the three officers were still held prisoners; and all the captured had been plundered of all personal property, including hats, shoes and all but the scantiest clothing. The paroled men had now to be sent to a camp of paroled prisoners in Ohio, to await exchange; but the three officers were, within a few weeks, exchanged at Murfreesboro and returned to duty. It was a sore trial for the Colonel, but he loyally defended the men against an imputation that they had not fought well, and protested indignantly against a newspaper report in Cincinnati to the contrary.* It is fair to say, further, that General Crook, a severe critic, in his report of the affair, spoke well of Captain Johnson, the commander of the detachment, as a "good officer", tho he thought he had been "flurried". However weak Johnson's fighting may have been on this occasion, in later engagements he quite justified Crook's commendation of him.

Colonel Lane was gratified to find, however, that the account with the enemy was at least nearly balanced. A few days before this loss his regiment, on a scout near Rome (on the Cumberland, below Carthage), struck a detachment of Morgan's cavalry and captured 10, with 16 horses and equipments. And a few days after he arrived at Carthage he went himself, with his regiment, on an expedition, in which he attacked a body of rebels guarding a train, and, after a running fight of several hours, captured the whole train, with 28 rebels and their captain (Reese) and some 60 horses and mules. Upon this he felt better, especially in that he was "complimented by the General" for his management and success.

This kind of service continued thro March, April and May. With experience the officers and men of these scout-

* The enemy in this affair was not a "party of guerrillas," as in one official report, but was from Morgan's cavalry. The leader was Colonel Ward, commanding the "Second Brigade, Morgan's Division, C. S. Army".

ing and foraging expeditions became more wary and at the same time more bold; for the enemy most often met were treacherous and cowardly, aided and sheltered usually by Secessionist citizens pretending to be Union men, and usually unwilling to fight unless from ambush or when having much advantage in numbers.

The one movement of a force from Bragg's army appearing to be an attempt upon Carthage was discovered by Colonel Lane, on the Middleton road, south of Carthage, April 15th. On the 13th he marched, in command of the available men of the brigade, about 1300, but without artillery, to Rome (on the river below Carthage), to protect a fleet then passing. That done, he returned by a detour, south and east, as a reconnaissance in force. No enemy was found until within a few miles of Carthage, when his advance guard was fired upon.

To learn the character and weight of the enemy (it was a wooded country) he moved on cautiously, using his skirmish line only to "feel" the enemy. After two hours of this, the enemy appeared to move off. Colonel Lane suspected a pretended retreat, designed to induce him to pursue. If this were so, the rebel force was surely the larger. He remembered the case of a Colonel Coburn, who had recently been "trapped and ruined" by that device. He declined to follow, held his line, and awaited events. Upon this the enemy moved forward into position, developing a larger force of cavalry, with artillery. Colonel Lane fell back a mile or so, till he found a position adapted to defense, sent a fast horseman to Carthage, to report and ask for guns, and then put his command into position to meet attack. General Crook at once sent out three guns, but also sent another brigade, under General Spears.

Colonel Lane wanted to fight, now that the enemy's guns could be met, but General Spears thought that imprudent and, having the higher rank, ordered the whole command back to Carthage. This order was probably right, but the Colonel was much vexed by it, and afterward said he was sure he could have "whipped the dogs" if he had been allowed to try with the three guns and his brigade. The demonstration of the two brigades, however, probably satisfied the enemy that Carthage was

too strong for attack, as he moved away with no further threat. It was afterward learned that the enemy was the cavalry brigades of Morgan and Wharton, believed to number three to four thousand men, with six or eight guns, and it was said that Wheeler, Bragg's Chief-of-Cavalry, was in command. Colonel Lane's small brigade of infantry would have found it, to say the least, a serious undertaking to engage such a body of cavalry.

The enemy's cavalry was very active in the Cumberland valley all the spring and summer and these expeditions and scouts from Carthage were frequent. Meantime the troops under Crook were increased until they became a provisional division of two, at one time three, brigades of infantry. On April 23d the Eleventh Ohio went out for three days under Major Higgins, Colonel Lane being on duty in camp in a court-martial and Lieutenant-Colonel Street then serving on Crook's staff, but no enemy was met. There was no material loss of men in any of these movements, nor any misfortune after that of the 8th of March.

The engineering skill of Colonel Lane was brought into service during this period in the construction of fortifications at Carthage, but we do not learn the character or extent or position of the works, except that they were on the north side of the river. The camps had been moved across from the south side, for greater security. The works were begun in March and were probably finished about the middle of April, as we find Colonel Lane otherwise occupied all the latter part of April and thro May.

A new experience for him while at Carthage was service on a court-martial, the only time, as it happened, that he had that duty while he was in the army. It was a "general" court (that is, "for the trial of such prisoners as may be brought before it"), composed of eight officers, and, as he was the "ranking" officer, he was President. Seven captains, from other regiments, were the rest.

The court sat daily for two weeks and must have had many cases before it. The records are not accessible (or not easily accessible) and Colonel Lane's papers mention only one of the cases. Probably there was the usual list of several officers charged with drinking to excess or when

on duty, or with neglect of duty, and of soldiers charged with insubordination, or cursing or striking an officer, or absence without leave, etc.

The one case the Colonel speaks of was that of "Joseph Smith" (supposed to be a false name), a citizen or rebel soldier who was arrested in the camp as a spy. The evidence against him has not been found, but it seems to have been conclusive, and the court convicted him and sentenced him to the death of a spy. This was on or shortly before May 2d. The proceedings were forwarded to Department Headquarters, where they were approved and the sentence confirmed, and where, on May 8th, an order was issued for Smith's execution. Accordingly, on the 11th, under General Crook's direction, he was hung. Colonel Lane believed the man was only "an ignorant dupe" of more responsible persons; and it is evidently with great regret that he writes, in a letter at the time, "it fell to my lot to sign his death-warrant". But this does not mean literally what it says. The conviction or sentence by the court-martial could have been disapproved by higher authority, and the real "death-warrant" was the order for execution.

There was a small internal war at Carthage in April and May, the occasion being magnified by the men beyond its real importance, and Colonel Lane finding himself in what he thought irreconcilable conflict with his immediate superior in office. There was a struggle between him and General Crook over the burning of some fence-rails by men of the Eleventh Ohio and the other regiments. He thought a great principle was involved where the General saw only a case of discipline for the men who had violated his order against destroying private property.

Colonel Lane's "principle" was, that the United States government ought not to protect the Secessionists who were making war against it. General Crook, who was a "regular", bred at West Point, meant to do his duty under the army regulations and orders, which required him to prevent the soldiers from taking or destroying private property without authority; and he was a rather harsh, dogmatic man. He could not admit any difference between volunteers and regular soldiers in respect to obedience to

orders. But the volunteers were entirely sure there was a wide difference.

From end to end of the army lines there were standing orders against any encroachment upon the property rights of citizens; but it was a *civil* war and the people of the two sides had a sense of deep personal hostility toward each other, a sense especially marked among many of the Northern volunteers when they found themselves surrounded in the south by citizens professing to be neutral or non-combatant while really aiding the rebels. The charge or suspicion was, no doubt, often mistaken or unjust or exaggerated, but it was more often well-founded. Naturally the volunteers resented being required to guard or protect the property of people they believed to be their enemies, tho of course they could not be justified in disobeying orders. But they did more or less disobey, and did it with the connivance or indulgence of many of their officers. So the enforcement of the orders by the stricter or more conscientious officers was everywhere difficult and uncertain, and the soldiers everywhere took food and forage from "the Secesh" and used their fence rails for camp fires. Fence rails are admirably adapted for camp fires, whether for cooking or heating; and often there was no other wood to be had in sufficient quantity.

The camp at Carthage was on the land of one Cullum, who owned a large tract. Colonel Lane says he was a noted Secessionist, who had raised two companies of men for the rebel army. As was natural and usual with large planters, whether Secessionist or Union, he cultivated friendly social relations with the nearest Union general; and there were quite too many Union generals indiscreet enough to encourage such relations,—an indiscretion which led sometimes to serious trouble.

General Crook had posted guards over Cullum's property (a very general and proper practice when the protected man had "taken the oath", as no doubt Cullum had done), but the service was extremely distasteful to the volunteers, who distrusted him so much as that they even suspected the General himself of sympathy with the rebel "cause" because of his favoring him.

Colonel Lane, in his intense patriotism and burning hatred of secessionism, was very restive under such con-

ditions. He wrote "We are obliged to guard his property and everything is sacred that he claims. My men have burned a few of his rails, perhaps 50, and I expect an order for us to make new ones to replace them. If the order is issued I shall disobey it and take the consequences. I am here for a principle; and I will sacrifice myself to military law before I will disgrace myself and my men by making rails for rebels in arms against us." Ten days later he wrote "The rail question is not settled yet. General Crook is cursed from end to end of the camp. Making rails for a known rebel does not suit us very well." And a week still later "The rail question is not decided yet, but before this leaves camp I may be able to say I am under arrest again".

The order was issued, and it included several, or all, the regiments in the brigade. A copy of it, or of its specific requirements, is not found, but, in view of what followed, it must have required the regiments to replace the rails they had taken from Cullum's fences. It seems, but is not clear, that the other regiments in the order, after rebelling with the Eleventh Ohio, yielded; but Colonel Lane was obdurate. The order was repeated. He wrote to his wife that he had "received three positive orders to make the rails immediately", but had ignored them, and that he looked for an arrest. He feared he would "perhaps be dismissed from the service." He does not seem to have considered the question, whether in a court-martial the order would be held to be a proper one. Quite surely it would not be. Even tho the General had the power to inflict summary punishment upon individuals who took the rails, by making them produce new ones, he could have no power to include the innocent in the punishment. He probably realized this in time.

The matter seems to have hung unsettled for three weeks or more in April and May. Colonel Lane was silent from the time he received the first order, only waiting the next step, but every man in the brigade knew of the deadlock and speculated on the result. Finally, the General must have determined upon a conciliatory policy or have had some advice or direction from a superior officer. He then issued another order, in which it was stated that the rails to be made were required for a pen for the beef

cattle of the Commissary Department and were to be delivered at a certain place for that purpose. For that purpose the work would be in the regular line of "fatigue" duty of soldiers, and the Colonel then ordered the rails made. His next letter says that the expected trouble with General Crook "is now settled, and, instead of being under arrest, I am now in command of the Second Brigade."

Of course there may have been a misunderstanding all the way thro as to the use intended for the rails, or Cul-lum may have received, in a roundabout way, some rails originally intended for another use; but the Colonel and his men were sure that the last order was only a device to escape a troublesome dilemma,— which was a good guess. The probability is that the General saw that he could reach the Colonel only by making charges against him in a court-martial, and that a situation might arise there which he would rather not meet.

The Eleventh and the Colonel supposed that the General had been beaten thro the interference of some higher officer, and when, on leaving Carthage for the army, a little later, he was relieved of the command of the division and resumed command of his brigade, they were sure that that was a kind of punishment for him. But his "division" had been only a provisional one, being simply all the troops arriving at Carthage at different times while he was in command of that post, while his proper, permanent, command was the "Kanawha Brigade", as it was still called. In fact, soon after joining the army in the field under Rosecrans, he was advanced to the command of a regular division. And it was a division of cavalry, which was probably just what he wanted. At the same time, the assignment of Colonel Lane to the command of the brigade was not a reward for insubordination, nor a peace-offering from General Crook. He was the second colonel in rank in the brigade, and the senior colonel just then went away on leave or duty; but no doubt the General was particularly glad, under the circumstances, to make the order directing Colonel Lane to take command. And he remained in command until General Crook resumed it himself, as already mentioned.

Another experience that troubled the Colonel's mind dur-

ing this period was a recurrence of ill health. It is probable that he had never fully recovered from the strain of the great labor, exposure and anxieties of the campaigns in West Virginia. The first hot weather in the low camp on the Cumberland was debilitating, and he had to go under medical treatment. He stuck to his work, however, tho compelled at times to rest abed during the intervals of an hour or two between the regular duties of the day. The excitement of a scouting expedition would brace him up for a day or two, but on the whole he could not regain his normal strength. There was, indeed, much debilitating illness in the regiment and the brigade at that time, and a number of the men died from camp diseases. But when he marched, in June, on a great campaign, he was in better condition, and then, for three months, the high purpose of the campaign and its constant demands kept him up to all his duties.

XIV

1863: JUNE — JULY

Kanawha Brigade Ordered to Murfreesboro — Now in Fourteenth Army Corps, Under General Thomas — Campaign of Tullahoma — Capture of Hoover's Gap — Bragg Flanked Out of Position — Battle Expected — Bragg Escapes and Occupies Chattanooga — Rosecrans Fails to Attack and Fails in Pursuit — Lies in Camp, Quarreling With War Department — Lincoln Takes a Hand — Eleventh Ohio at Big Spring and University Place — General Turchin Succeeds to Command of the Brigade — News of Vicksburg and Gettysburg

Late in May, under much urging by Rosecrans, troops were sent by Burnside, then commanding at Cincinnati, to relieve Crook's troops at Carthage; and then, on the 3d of June, the "Kanawha Brigade" was electrified by an order from Rosecrans to move immediately to Murfreesboro.

With much rejoicing the brigade broke camp, packed a big wagon train, and marched early on the 4th. There were the five regiments of Crook's immediate command — the Eleventh, Thirty-sixth, Eighty-ninth and Ninety-second Ohio and Eighteenth Kentucky infantry, one squadron of cavalry, one battery of 6 guns and a train of 150 wagons. The village of Liberty, twenty-two miles south from Carthage, was reached on the 5th. There was met Colonel Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, sent up from Murfreesboro against the chance of an attack upon Crook by Bragg's cavalry. Wilder's appearance was timely. There was a brigade of rebel cavalry threatening on the east, which he promptly attacked. Crook held his brigade ready in support, but Wilder alone defeated the enemy and drove them off in haste. This detained Crook's brigade at Liberty on the 6th. Then Crook rode on

toward Murfreesboro, with the cavalry, directing Colonel Lane to take command of the brigade and bring it on, which he did without further incident, arriving at Murfreesboro on the 8th.

General Crook, being a day ahead, had already received an assignment for his brigade, by which it became the Third Brigade of the Fifth Division of the Fourteenth Army Corps, and on its arrival he resumed command, relieving Colonel Lane. But the same day, in a readjustment, the Fifth Division became the Fourth, the brigades remaining as they were. The Eighteenth Kentucky infantry had already, at Carthage, been added to Crook's brigade. The division was then commanded by Major-General Joseph J. Reynolds, contained about 9000 men, in three brigades, the First commanded by Colonel John T. Wilder, four regiments of mounted infantry,* the Second by Colonel Albert S. Hall, five regiments of infantry, and the Third by Brigadier-General George Crook, five regiments of infantry, and three batteries of field artillery, the Eighteenth,* Nineteenth and Twenty-first Indiana.

The Fourteenth Corps was then commanded by the famous General George H. Thomas, by far the ablest general in that army. All of his officers and men had, then and always, unbounded confidence in and respect for him. Colonel Lane and his regiment and brigade had the proud distinction, three months later, of holding out with him on the field to the bitter end of the tremendous battle in which he earned the great title of "The Rock of Chickamauga."

The Eleventh Ohio now at last, after two years' service, was part of a great army. For nearly a month, however, it had nothing in particular to do, and, with its brigade, only lay in camp waiting for General Rosecrans to decide upon the beginning of his campaign. But it was not idle. Colonel Lane never permitted it to get rusty for lack of training. It was drilled and put thro the manuals and maneuvers every day practicable and regularly inspected every Sunday. It found itself famous in the division, and men and officers came from other camps

* This brigade, under Colonel A. O. Miller, with the Eighteenth Indiana Battery, was afterward in Wilson's Cavalry Corps in the great Selma campaign of March-May, 1865.

to its drill and parade grounds for the pleasure of seeing its fine drill and evolutions. Of course the men were proud of their distinction, tho, if they were like other volunteers, many of them grumbled much at the practice required to achieve it.

They had a great pleasure at this time in another of those bountiful supplies of enticing food and other things which their Chaplain so successfully collected in Ohio and brought to them. This one was a big lot. Again the Colonel could write that nearly every man had at least one package direct, while all shared well in the general supply; and he found it "beneficial to their health."

At the same time he says the whole command is well pleased with the change from Carthage, more than ever determined to fight the war out to victory, eager for news of action in other fields and to know when they are to get off upon their own great campaign. They were, in fact, on the eve of it at that moment.

For five months the authorities at Washington had been trying to satisfy Rosecrans in his calls for troops and equipment and listening to his accounts of difficulties and obstacles, but frequently urging, and finally insisting upon, action. It appeared to them that, if he had defeated Bragg at "Stone's River" and Bragg's reinforcement since had been much less than his own, he must be able to defeat him again. The correspondence, by telegraph and letter, was active. Rosecrans was much given to talking and writing; and his peculiar mental idiosyncrasies were strong upon him. Not only the suggestions and advice from superior officers, but their orders and instructions, he looked upon as subjects for debate and criticism. He seldom obeyed even a direct order without questioning it; and he even descended to McClellan's level by intimating that, if failure followed his operations under orders, the responsibility would not be upon himself.

Among the many reasons he found for delay, the two most conspicuous (after large reinforcements of infantry had been sent him) were the bad roads and a lack of cavalry. There is usually much rain in Tennessee during the winter and spring, but in April, May and most of June that year the handicap of marching troops there was not mud,

but deep dust. It was an ironical comment upon the condition of "impassable roads" which held up Rosecrans's campaign during the spring, that, after many weeks of dusty roads, on the day late in June when he did move great rains began, which went on with little intermission for ten days or more, making all the roads he used quite as bad as they had been in the spring; but yet, when he did march, no one of the many complicated movements required by his plans, in all directions, over a country forty miles broad, was either prevented or greatly delayed by bad roads.

As to the cavalry, his understanding was equally distorted. He exaggerated the enemy's cavalry and minimized his own. The least estimate he made of Bragg's was that it doubled his own, but he often saw it more than double, and once wrote General Halleck that it was five times his own. Early in the year, before Rosecrans's cavalry was reinforced, the cavalry in Bragg's department was nearly double the number in Rosecrans's, but later the advantage in numbers was on Rosecrans's side. Even after Bragg was reinforced by 7500 cavalry from Mississippi, under VanDorn, the official reports (May) show that he had about 16,000 and Rosecrans about 12,500; but just after that Bragg detached Morgan's command (variously stated at from 2000 to 3000), for an attempt upon Louisville (which Morgan perverted into the famous raid into Indiana and Ohio), by which the disparity in numbers was nearly wiped out.

Probably the real cause of his trouble about cavalry was that, like other generals, he found his less efficient than the enemy's and did not know how to improve it. There had never been any experience worth mention in the use of cavalry in the United States armies (except in small, detached bodies), and, incredible as it now seems, the Civil war had been in progress two years before there was any understanding of cavalry or its best uses, or any attempt to give it intelligent, systematic care and training. Up to that time the War Department and the army commanders acted and spoke precisely as if their idea was that, when a body of men was armed and mounted, it at once became cavalry and ought to do anything that any cavalry ever did.

If to any reader this language appears extreme, let him read the records of "Streight's Raid" in April, 1863. Tho Rosecrans then had at least 10,000 cavalry whose experience in the field averaged a year or more, he approved the scheme of a rash volunteer colonel of infantry and authorized him to take 1500 infantrymen, mount them on such mules as he could get from the quartermaster or pick up in the country, get such arms and equipments as he could and take two mountain howitzers (a small, light, smooth-bore shell gun of short range), and make a raid thro north Alabama upon the railroad and bridge at Rome, Georgia, about 250 miles. Both of them knew that the enemy's cavalry, in considerable numbers, was in the country of the proposed march. There were, in fact, two brigades of regular Confederate cavalry, each having a battery of rifled field guns, and commanded by the already famous cavalry leaders Forrest and Roddey.

Streight was brave enough, but he had allowed his preparations and purpose to become well known. Forrest was soon on his track, his horses easily overtook the mules, Streight was quickly defeated, and he and all his survivors captured. But the ideas of the time were so crude that this mad-cap adventure and wretched waste of men and materials was looked upon as another proof of the inefficiency of cavalry; and Rosecrans was not blamed.

Whatever the disparity in cavalry, however, between Rosecrans and Bragg, Rosecrans had about double Bragg's number of infantry all the time from February down nearly to the battle of Chickamauga, and was much superior in artillery. No sufficient reason appears why, at any time after the spring rains were over, he did not move out against Bragg and defeat him. His own reports and correspondence justify this view and Bragg's confirm it. Even when Halleck informed him that Johnston had gone to Mississippi (in May) to command the forces resisting Grant's advance upon Vicksburg, with two divisions of Bragg's troops, he hesitated, and waited more than a month.*

* It is amusing to note that one reason Rosecrans gave for inaction (June, 1863) was, that if he should move against Bragg and take Chattanooga, that would release all of Bragg's remaining forces and they would be sent to Mississippi against Grant. That

The Washington authorities were entirely right in pushing the dilatory general on to action.* At last General Halleck (no doubt at the instance of Lincoln, whose patience was worn thin), telegraphed Rosecrans, June 11th,— “ I deem it my duty to repeat to you the great dissatisfaction that is felt here at your inactivity. There seems to be no doubt that a part of Bragg’s force has gone to Johnston ”.

Rosecrans’s answer to this despatch (not now available) must have been delayed and evasive, for, on the 16th, Halleck telegraphed him the curt, stern command — “ Is it your intention to make an immediate movement forward? A definite answer, yes or no, is required.” This language was little less than a threat of removal from command. He must have seen that, but yet could not resist his habit of quibbling. He replied the same day, at 6.30 p. m. — “ In reply to your inquiry, if immediate means to-night or to-morrow, no. If as soon as all things are ready, say five days, yes ”. This must have been accepted as a promise to move in five days, and so was not answered. And he did make preliminary movements on the seventh day and the general movement on the eighth.

On receiving Halleck’s message on the 11th he called a council of his generals, and then reported to Halleck that the council was unanimously opposed to an advance, at least as long as the event of Grant’s struggle at Vicksburg was undecided. He said there were seventeen other generals present, but he did not count his Chief-of-Staff, General Garfield, who was there and opposed the decision. Garfield was, indeed, decidedly opposed, and the next day he showed Rosecrans a written statement to prove that

is, the best use he could make of his great army was to keep it inactive and decline a decisive victory, so as to prevent his adversary from gaining a victory somewhere else! Bewildering reasoning, but characteristic of the chop-logic and ingenious irrelevancy of Rosecrans’s mental operations.

* It is interesting that the Richmond government were doing just the same to Bragg,— trying to get him out to attack Rosecrans! But Bragg (or rather, Johnston, for he commanded the department in which Bragg commanded the army) had a better reason for hesitation, knowing that Rosecrans was much stronger and that a defeat for him would be much harder to repair than a defeat for Rosecrans.

he could then "put 65,137 bayonets and sabers into action against Bragg's 41,680, allowing the most liberal estimates of his force".

General Garfield must have taken reduced figures in some way in computing Rosecrans's number, for his official field returns of June 30 next (after the casualties of the extremely hard turning campaign and the two days' fighting of the 24th and 25th) show 69,522, while Bragg's official returns of June 10 show 43,214, which included Morgan's cavalry, then on a great raid in Kentucky and numbering probably 2500.

When Rosecrans reported to Halleck the judgment of his council and the curious reason for it found in the Vicksburg campaign, he added, with his peculiar, irritating assumption of being certainly in the right in any controversy, a bit of advice: "I therefore counsel caution and patience. Better wait a little, to get all we can ready to insure the best results, if by so doing we observe a great military axiom, not to risk two great and decisive battles at the same time".

Halleck, who was a soldier of maxims, could not resist commenting upon this perversion, that "the maxim applies only to a single army, not to two armies acting independently," and followed this blow with a malicious cut in * * * "another military axiom, that 'councils of war never fight'!" — a wholesome old saw that would have made Grant or Sherman chuckle.

Apparently it took Rosecrans some days to recover from this. He did not answer till the 21st, when his message showed a distinct change of mind, tho put in hedging language, to save his self-respect. He said that "for Bragg to materially aid Johnston he must abandon our front substantially, and then we can move to our ultimate work with more rapidity".

Now, having satisfied his temperamental necessity for controversy, he set out with alacrity to do the very thing he had so long contended would be a great error, bad strategy, and too dangerous.

TULLAHOMA

On June 24th, ten days before the Vicksburg campaign reached a result, he moved against Bragg with high spirit,

energy and skill, and, under a tremendous handicap of bad weather and bad roads, within ten days forced him out of Tullahoma and beyond the Tennessee, with a remarkably small loss of men.

The grand objective was the possession of Chattanooga, then the most important railway position in the South, excepting, perhaps, Richmond. It was the rail gateway between the north and east and all the country west and south to the Gulf. It was also literally a stronghold, protected by mountains near on every side. Even the approach by the Tennessee river, from north or west, is thro narrow and crooked gorges, the mountains crowding up close to the shores. A comparatively small force in possession could hold the place indefinitely, unless cut off from supplies.

But Bragg was now defending Chattanooga outside and far to westward. To get it Rosecrans must either bring him to battle where he was and defeat him decisively, or turn his right flank and get and hold all roads leading eastward as far south as the Tennessee. Why he did not force such a battle I do not know. Looking back, that was clearly his right course. As it was, his maneuvering only flanked Bragg out of his present positions, tho in that he succeeded quickly and with small loss. This, however, drove Bragg right into Chattanooga; so that the work had to be done all over again, under greater difficulties and ultimately with an awful sacrifice of life.

On leaving Murfreesboro, early in January, Bragg had taken his main position and fixed his headquarters at Tullahoma, a station on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad thirty-five miles southeast from Murfreesboro. His left he placed, in strong force, at Shelbyville, a town on Duck river twenty-five miles directly south from Murfreesboro and an important center of wagonroads. He fortified these two positions, chiefly the latter, and screened his whole front by keeping his cavalry in changing positions from Spring Hill, thirty miles northwest of Shelbyville, by way of the mountain gaps mentioned in the next paragraph, to McMinnville, forty miles northeast. Bragg's lines confronting Rosecrans thus lay in the form of a broad inward curve, the infantry and artillery reaching about twenty-five miles and the cavalry in front about

seventy miles. He had not men enough to hold either line safely, and, if steadily attacked at any one point, would be compelled to weaken another to bring up support. But this embarrassment would be the least likely to occur if Rosecrans should begin with an attempt to break his left wing at Shelbyville; and Bragg made the mistake of expecting Rosecrans to do that, and of keeping, therefore, the stronger part of his forces there.

Murfreesboro is on a large plain which is bounded on the east and south, at a distance of eight or ten miles, by a curved range of rough hills, the outlying western ridge of the Cumberland mountains. There are two "gaps" in this range east of the town and three south, thro which all roads must pass. Of course if Bragg could hold these gaps he could check any movement by Rosecrans, unless made by a great detour, in which he would be in danger of being cut off from his supplies. He did hold those on the south in force (called "Guy's", "Liberty" and "Bell Buckle"), but at the critical hour he was weak in the two on the east ("Hoover's" and "Bradyville"),—a condition not creditable to his judgment.

Immediately east of this range of hills is the valley of Duck river (which there flows southwesterly), thro which ran a branch railway from Tullahoma up to McMinnville, thirty-five miles. On this railway, eight miles northeast of Tullahoma and twenty-five directly east of Shelbyville, was the village of Manchester, also a center of wagon-roads.

From Tullahoma to Chattanooga, in an air line, it is about fifty-five miles, but by the railway then it was not less than eighty and by the wagonroads over the mountains nearly as much. The railway ran southeast to Decherd, fifteen miles, near the base of the main range of the Cumberlands, and thence southerly thirty miles, to Stevenson in Alabama, near the Tennessee, where it was merged in the Memphis-Charleston road, which, from there, ran northeast, crossed to the south side of the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and then kept the south side of that river to Chattanooga. Finally, the best or easiest wagon-roads from Tullahoma to Chattanooga ran southeast by east, about thirty-five miles to the Tennessee at Bridgeport and Jasper, the latter a little north of the river, in

the valley of Battle creek. Bragg's army, if retreating, would have to go by these roads, except in so far as it might be able to use the railroad.

Now, looking at a map showing the places mentioned and the topography of the country, it is clear that if Rosecrans should attack Bragg's left wing, at or west of Shelbyville, and should succeed, but without a general victory, he would only compel him to fall back upon Tullahoma, or, at the worst, retreat down the railway or the wagonroads last mentioned toward Chattanooga, while, if he could pass the hills next east of Murfreesboro, get into Duck river valley and hold against Bragg's right wing, he could then move down that valley to Manchester, and thus compel Bragg to fight a general battle or evacuate both Tullahoma and Shelbyville and retreat in haste southward beyond the Tennessee, thus losing Chattanooga. But in the latter movement there would be one serious risk for Rosecrans, namely, that, if he were defeated in the battle, he might find Bragg blocking his roads of retreat toward Nashville, which was probably the consideration upon which Bragg expected that any decisive action would occur on his western flank. But success on the east would be much better for Rosecrans and much worse for Bragg, and Rosecrans decided to take the risk.

Bragg's troops for the defense were the two army corps of Generals Polk and Hardee (later D. H. Hill), containing five or six divisions and numbering in all about 30,000, Jackson's separate brigade of about 2000, an artillery reserve of about 1000, and Wheeler's and Forrest's cavalry, in three divisions, about 11,000. His artillery is not mentioned in detail or numbers; but it may be assumed that, with such forces of infantry and cavalry, he had about 25 batteries, with more than 100 guns.

Rosecrans's troops were in five corps: The Fourteenth, under General George H. Thomas, about 28,000 men, in four divisions under Generals Rousseau, Negley, Brannan and Reynolds,— the Twentieth, under General Alexander McD. McCook, about 17,000, in three divisions under Generals Davis, Johnson and Sheridan,— the Twenty-first, under General Thomas L. Crittenden, about 18,000, in three divisions under Generals Wood, Palmer and Van Cleve,— part of the Reserve Corps of General Gordon

Granger, about 7000, being one division of infantry under General Baird and one brigade of cavalry under Colonel Watkins,— and a Cavalry Corps under General David S. Stanley, about 12,000, in two divisions under Generals Mitchell and Turchin and one unattached regiment of mounted infantry under Colonel Harrison.

Each of the infantry divisions contained three brigades, of four or five regiments each, and had three batteries of artillery, except Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps, which had four. Each of the cavalry divisions contained two brigades, of five or six regiments each, and one battery, and Watkins's brigade of cavalry had one battery. There were thus 37 batteries, averaging about 6 guns each, there being 208 guns in all. But Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps (thirteen regiments and three batteries) was left for the immediate defense of Murfreesboro and remained within the fortifications.

Rosecrans's first movement was a feint upon Shelbyville. Early on the 23d two divisions of Granger's corps, led by Watkins's cavalry, moved from the extreme right eastward, as if to get between Murfreesboro and Shelbyville, with Mitchell's cavalry on their right flank, and bivouacked eight miles southwest of Murfreesboro. To Bragg this looked like the first step in an attack upon Shelbyville, and the idea was confirmed in the morning by the abrupt appearance of two of McCook's divisions in front of Guy's Gap, on Granger's left, while McCook's third division moved on three miles further east and made a show of attack upon Liberty Gap. But behind McCook's divisions one division of Thomas's corps (Brannan) was marching steadily eastward, to join his three others for a real attack upon Hoover's Gap and a descent into Duck river valley. Bragg was completely deceived. All day the 24th he held his army anxiously awaiting attack at Shelbyville, and did not realize his peril at Hoover's Gap until it was too late.

On the 23d, in the haste of preparation under the abrupt order to march, Colonel Lane wrote to his wife—"I snatch a moment to say this army moves to-morrow, 4 a. m., for—I don't know where. Roads very dusty, but weather not very warm. Health good and in good spirits, and that is so of all my men and the whole army."

All the troops for the field were ordered to march at 4 a. m., of the 24th. In the night of the 23d began a rain which ended a long period of drouth and dust, fell heavily all the next day, followed by an extraordinary succession of rains for ten days. Every movement was made with great difficulty, some of the roads becoming well-nigh impassable. In the spring Rosecrans had declared that a campaign under such conditions was impossible: now, in the irony of fate, he was compelled to go on and do it whether he would or no; but he did it with great energy and success.

Thomas left his camps at 4 a. m. the 24th, with the three divisions of Rousseau, Negley and Reynolds, the latter division leading, with its First brigade (Wilder's mounted infantry) in front and the Third brigade (containing Colonel Lane's regiment) third in order of march. At the same early hour Crittenden was marching with two divisions of his corps southeasterly on a road to the left of Thomas, for the gap at Bradyville, and his advanced brigade of cavalry drove off the weak force Bragg had posted there. But this position would be of little value to Rosecrans without Hoover's Gap, which was, indeed, the key of his plan of campaign.

This gap presented great natural advantages for defense. It is a narrow pass, with steep sides (at that time covered with forest), beginning ten miles southeast of Murfreesboro, rising gradually four miles to its summit, then descending two miles to McBride's creek, which flows south, along the eastern base of the range, to Duck river. There was no other road over the hills between Bradyville and Bell-Buckle Gap. A small force, with a few guns and some defensive works, could have held Hoover's Gap against great odds, but Bragg seems to have done nothing but station a guard of one or two regiments in it.

Wilder struck this guard in the western end of the gap about ten o'clock, and, in constant attack, forced it back to the summit of the gap by noon. The Second and Third brigades kept close behind in support, but not directly engaged, and by two o'clock the gap was cleared and the enemy driven beyond McBride's creek. The news of this movement brought a rush of Bragg's troops up McBride's creek and, as more and more arrived, attacks were re-

peated upon Reynolds' division, holding the crossing of the creek and all its west bank, until night ended the attempt with nothing gained. During the night the whole of Stewart's division of Hardee's corps, with other forces and several batteries, arrived and got into position for a concerted attack in the morning. Stewart's guns shelled Reynolds' bivouac thro the night without effect. Thomas brought up Rousseau's and Negley's divisions in support, and Crittenden moved down from Bradyville, threatening the enemy's right. All day the 25th Stewart's artillery tried to open the way for an assault, and several times a heavy charge of infantry was made, to force a crossing of the creek; but Thomas, engaging only his artillery and a portion of his infantry, simply held his ground.

This was the day referred to by Colonel Lane, in a letter two weeks later, in which he says, of his brigade — "We were in front of all the infantry and lay under fire 24 hours, guarding our battery, without firing a gun, which is a hard test for soldiers. Solid shot, shell, grape and musket-balls fell among us in great numbers, but none in my regiment were hurt."

Early on the 26th Thomas took the aggressive against Stewart, who thereupon retreated toward Tullahoma, and on the 27th the advance of Reynolds' division, on the left in Thomas's movement, drove the enemy out of Manchester and took possession. Rosecrans's turning operation was complete and Tullahoma directly threatened.

Bragg's mistake was past mending then, and he hastily shifted his forces from Shelbyville and its front to Tullahoma. Rosecrans could have completed his discomfiture and, at the least, compelled him to retreat into Alabama, by promptly advancing upon Tullahoma. He had brought seven divisions up to and near Manchester, which was but eight miles from Tullahoma, and Bragg was two days in getting his troops into position there. The only obstacle was the mud in the roads, but the troops had already moved over such roads for three days, heavy rains having fallen in all the region from the hour of leaving Murfreesboro. But he remained three days at Manchester, occupied only in moving up his trains and disposing his lines in front of Bragg's positions, allowing Bragg plenty of time to place his troops and improve his works for defense.

Both Rosecrans and Bragg say, in their reports, that they expected and were ready for a battle at Tullahoma; but neither of them acted as if he were willing. Rosecrans did, indeed, consider a movement to turn Bragg's right and get the railroad, but had hardly received his engineer's report on the route proposed when, on the morning of the first of July, Thomas reported from the front that Tullahoma was evacuated.

Three days before this Thomas had tried to break up the railroad by a mounted raid. He had sent the daring Wilder, with his brigade of mounted infantry. Wilder forded the Elk river with great difficulty, eight miles east of Tullahoma, and made an attempt upon the railroad bridge on the Elk, but found it so heavily guarded that he could not reach it. He then turned upon Decherd, on the railroad three miles further east, where he drove out the fortified garrison, destroyed the station, and was tearing up the track when a division of the enemy, hurried down from Elk bridge by train, compelled him to retire. Then he crossed the Cumberland mountain, on a circuit to the north by University Place, and tried to reach the railroad in the valley of Big Crow creek; but he found this valley a deep gorge and was afraid to spend the time required to get into and out of it while, as he believed, the enemy's cavalry was pursuing him. So he turned back, and soon found that Forrest's cavalry was on the road. He escaped this danger by a skilful and dramatic concealment, and returned to Thomas's command by the night of the 30th.

On the 29th Bragg increased the cavalry forces on his right front and flank and well up the Elk, a movement which Rosecrans either did not learn of or did not understand. It was a screen behind which, during the night of the 29th and all the 30th, Bragg was leaving the field. By dawn of the first of July all of his army and equipment was safely beyond the Elk, except a part of his cavalry, remaining to check any pursuit. By the railroad bridge, one or two wagon bridges near it, and two or three fords, he had skilfully withdrawn from the front of Rosecrans's guns without discovery, an achievement which was highly creditable to him and discreditable to Rosecrans.

After hearing of the evacuation Rosecrans spent all that

day (July 1) in moving troops into Tullahoma, making no order for the pursuit of Bragg, a part of whose forces, at least, might have been caught west of the Cumberland mountain; tho Thomas did, on his own judgment, move on toward the Elk, with Reynolds's division, until checked near the river by Bragg's cavalry. On the 2nd, however, a general advance was ordered by Rosecrans, and at night several divisions had reached the Elk, only to find that river swollen by another great rain. Bragg had, of course, destroyed all bridges. All day the 3d, at five or six fords within a reach of ten miles, the different divisions were trying to get across the Elk. The water fell in the night and several divisions made the passage with their guns, and pushed on to the foot of the mountain at Cowan. But the only sign of the enemy was the last of his rearguard. That day Bragg had all his army and trains on or near the Tennessee, and on the 7th he was in Chattanooga, busy in preparations for its defense.

There was not even a nominal pursuit beyond Cowan. In fact Rosecrans himself did not even cross the Elk. He considered that he had achieved a great victory, and therefore settled himself in camp at Winchester (a village near Decherd, where several wagonroads met), where he received congratulations from and wrote reports and letters to Washington. His achievement was, indeed, in itself, highly creditable, accomplished, as it was, with energy and speed under remarkably adverse conditions of weather and roads; and yet he was far superior to Bragg in strength and could, and ought to, have done much more. He could and ought to have prevented Bragg from crossing the mountains and brought him to signal defeat, if not destruction.

And now this erratic general, always either moving with nervous energy, reckless of risks, or lying indolently in camp complaining of difficulties and of neglect by his superiors, could not be induced to act for six weeks. He encamped the greater part of his troops between Elk river and the Cumberland range, across the railroad, with a division or brigade or regiment back at Shelbyville, at Tullahoma, Manchester, McMinnville, Murfreesboro and other places. He did, however, repair the railroad, so that within two weeks his transportation was complete from

Nashville to Cowan, and a little later to Bridgeport on the Tennessee.

Meantime, of course, Bragg improved the time thus allowed him, strengthened his position at Chattanooga and got in reinforcements, guns and ammunition, until he was much more formidable than at any time since Rosecrans first entered the field against him. Stone's River and Tullahoma had to be all done over again, at far greater labor and cost and thro a tremendous and most destructive battle.

In the disposition of the troops after giving up the pursuit of Bragg, Thomas's corps was placed at Decherd. After a day or two Reynolds's brigades were regularly encamped near Big Spring, two miles from Decherd, where they remained to the end of the month. This remarkable water is a pool, filled from beneath, fifty yards or more across and of great depth. Several of the Eleventh Ohio tell of the delightful camp-life there, after provisions (which had been scanty for a week or more) were again regularly supplied.

Colonel Lane wrote a number of letters from this camp. One, of July 5, speaks of a rumor that there had been "a battle between Lee and Hooker (or some say General Meade) and that Lee was badly defeated", and of another rumor that "Grant had had some success at Vicksburg". That is, they received on the same day their first news of the great events at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. On the 7th he tells of persistent reports of the defeat of Lee, but nothing more from Vicksburg. On the 8th, five days after the event, he says there is official news of the fall of Vicksburg and "a National Salute was fired from all the batteries on our entire front." To this he adds — "This is the beginning of the end. * * * My faith has never deserted me. It is no stronger now than it ever was. I have felt that God was just and that he would not allow such an outrage as the Southern Confederacy to prosper."

From that time on he repeatedly writes of his desire and purpose to resign and go home, as he believes the work now practically done, or at least the victorious end assured, while his family and business obligations constantly press upon his mind. On the 12th he writes "We suppose Bragg is still running.* We are satisfied Lee is being

worsted. Would give \$10 for a copy of this or to-morrow's date of the Cincinnati Gazette. * * * The fall of Vicksburg will have a great influence in the operations of this army."

On the 19th — "The war really looks nearly over. The Potomac army can close it now, if they will whip Lee. I wish they would send for the Army of the Cumberland, which would annihilate Lee in 24 hours."

He says they have an official announcement that the Mississippi is opened and that Grant is driving Johnston to and beyond Jackson. And then that he hopes to be at home before the first of January, and adds — "I shall leave the army as soon as active operations seem to be over." He became more cautious, however, within a few days, and on the 29th wrote — "I hope we are now seeing the end, but there is an army of 300,000 (of the rebels) in the field yet, and it may take months"; and adds "I hope I may soon, consistently with my duty, be able to leave the army."

On the 31st there was a rearrangement of portions of the troops, in which Reynolds's and Rousseau's divisions of Thomas's corps were moved up the McMinnville road a few miles, to a point where another road led across the mountain southeast, by University Place, to descend by the valley of Battle creek ("Sweedens Cove") to the Tennessee, and the Third brigade of Reynolds (the Eleventh Ohio's) was sent up to University Place.

The brigade was greatly pleased now to have a new commander,— Brigadier-General John B. Turchin. There had been a singular exchange of command. General Turchin had been a long time in command of a division in Stanley's Cavalry Corps. General Crook now, under orders, changed places with him, tho the exchange seems to have been agreeable to both. General Turchin was very successful in the Third brigade, and a personal friendship grew up between him and Colonel Lane which lasted until death intervened.

The brigade moved up the mountain by the road over Brakefield Point (a long spur projecting to the west), a

* He was not at all running, but preparing a great defense at Chattanooga.

very steep and difficult road, Colonel Lane says "The roughest and most difficult road I ever saw." It arrived and encamped near "the University" on the first of August and remained there until the 16th, when it marched on the next campaign. This position was directly on the top of the mountain, there more than two thousand feet above the sea, and in a wilderness of forest extending many miles in all directions.

The singular name of this place in a wilderness was due to an ambitious undertaking, some years before the war, to establish there a great university, "The University of the South."* Some stone had been brought and extensive wooden buildings had been erected for workmen and materials, and the corner-stone had been laid with great ceremony, much speech-making, a "barbecue" etc. But now weeds and brushwood covered the place and the buildings were dilapidated, tho the brigade found them of use for various purposes.

Here nothing of special note occurred to vary the routine of camp life, except in one incident. A body of recruits was reported in Ohio for the Eleventh infantry, and the Colonel sent a few officers and men to bring them to the regiment. The number of the recruits is not mentioned, but the regiment must have been much reduced during the year of service since Colonel Lane filled it up.†

What news reached this distant camp told of no important action on either side in the war, and the Colonel's letters continue to show his opinion that the rebellion was broken, that the army would act chiefly as an army of occupation, and that he could soon, in good conscience, resign. But it still remained, as he thought, that the Army of the Potomac must defeat Lee decisively in Virginia. He saw no sign of movement in his own army and had no

* It was a "Protestant-Episcopal" institution and the conspicuous figure in the work was the famous "Militant Bishop" Leonidas Polk, who was a general in the rebel army in the campaign now treated of and who was killed in action in the Atlanta campaign in 1864. The work was stopped by the approach of the war and during the war, but the first building was completed and opened a few years afterward; and the institution has since become important under the name "Sewanee."

† See pages 131, 139, 140.

expectation of any. If he had known what was going on at Rosecrans's headquarters down at Winchester these ideas would not have occurred to him. That balky general had been urged to action by his superiors from the middle of July, with no response but in controversy and restatement of difficulties. The duty and advantages of following up Bragg as soon as the railroad could be repaired were obvious. To delay was to give Bragg time for better defense, to recover the morale of his army, and to increase it by reinforcement. All these gains he was, indeed, already making.

The conduct of Rosecrans was inexplicable to the War Department, and even to his own Chief-of-Staff, General Garfield, who wrote privately, July 27, to a friend, that "on the 18th the bridges were rebuilt and the cars running from Nashville to the Tennessee and I have since then urged with all the earnestness I possess a rapid advance while Bragg's army was shattered and under cover and before Johnston and he can effect a junction. Thus far the General has been singularly disinclined to grasp the situation with a strong hand and make the advantage his own."

It happened, strikingly, that just as the railroad was opened to the Tennessee, as Garfield said, Sherman defeated Johnston at Jackson, Miss., and drove him east of the Pearl. Johnston had then near 30,000 men, and the half of them could now be sent for service out of Mississippi. Within a few weeks about 15,000 of them joined Bragg, and when Chickamauga was fought as many more had come from other quarters. Garfield could well say that Rosecrans was "singularly disinclined to grasp the situation."

The War Department was so fixed in the purpose of his prompt advance that all thro July it was urgently pressing Burnside to act upon the orders already sent him, to move thro Kentucky upon Knoxville, which would be both a diversion in favor of Rosecrans and a support to him, Knoxville being but eighty miles from Chattanooga and connected by railway; but Burnside, tho quite unlike Rosecrans in being always willing, was quite like him in being always dilatory. He could not get himself started

until late in August and did not get to Knoxville until in September, when his action was of little practical value to Rosecrans.

Meantime Rosecrans only went on writing complaints and arguments, even in matters which had been settled by time and events. He represented that it was nearly impossible to overcome the obstacles of mountains and rivers in any campaign against Chattanooga. Among other great obstacles he said that "the roads were worse than anywhere in the world and the difficulties of keeping up supplies greater, the number of animals he had being always inadequate". This was in a letter to Lincoln, who replied with great consideration and kindness, but asked a few of those simple, pithy questions with which he could so easily throw a problem into practical shape. "Does your preparation advance at all?" he said; "do you not consume supplies as fast as you get them? Have you not been furnished more animals since Stone's River than your entire present stock? Is not the same true as to your mounted force?"*

This was about the same as to tell a man that the fault was probably in himself; that if he were not yet ready to move *he* never would be ready. It would seem that it had effect, as directly afterward, like a balky horse, Rosecrans suddenly and actively began his march. Perhaps he found another spur in a letter he received at the same time from Halleck, to whom he had written another long letter, complaining that the Secretary of War had "a personal hostility" to him and did not want him to succeed. Halleck answered, August 9, that he was "much mistaken", but that "still many of your dispatches have been exceedingly annoying to the War Department * * * conveying the impression that you were not disposed to carry out the wishes of the Department", tho "No doubt such was not your intention." * * * "It is said that you do not draw straight in the traces, but are continually

* Official reports show that during that period Rosecrans had received 27,707 horses and 20,396 mules. With those he already had this would (probably) give every cavalryman 4 horses and supply every wagon with 6 or 8 full teams. It proves a terrible waste of animals and an inexcusably bad state of discipline and oversight in their care.

kicking out and getting one leg over."* "But," he added, "no one doubts your good intentions."

Rosecrans's "familiar spirit" could not let such an opportunity pass, tho, if he could wait two weeks, one would think he might as well let it alone. On the 22d he wrote to Halleck in a singularly conciliatory tone, only mildly chiding, but persisting in the idea that there was hostility toward him at Washington and seriously arguing that the simile of the horse's leg was unjust to him.

It is remarkable that these two letters of Lincoln and Halleck were written but a few days after curt and unqualified orders to move at once had been sent to Rosecrans. On August 4th he was ordered to "move forward without further delay, and report daily the movement of each corps until you cross the Tennessee". To this he replied, not that he would move, but that he "had determined to cross the river and was making preparations", reminded Halleck of Hooker's fate (on the Rappahannock, three months before), and asked if the order was "intended to take away my discretion as to time and manner of moving my troops". This bit of trivial fencing Halleck met at once with stern brevity: "The orders for the advance of your army and daily report of its movements are peremptory." But even this did not subdue the inveterate irritater. To another querulous message from him the next day Halleck telegraphed — "I have communicated to you the wishes of the Government in plain and unequivocal terms. You have been directed to lose no time. The means you are to employ and the roads you are to follow are left to your own discretion. If you wish to carry out promptly the wishes of the Government you will not stop to discuss mere details". Nevertheless, two days later, Halleck wrote the conciliatory, tho hardly flattering, letter of August 9, above quoted.

The fact was that Lincoln, Halleck and Stanton all had, or had had, a high opinion of Rosecrans's military abilities,— much higher than his achievements on the whole could justify. A study of his career discloses no military

* This last is pretty surely a quotation from Lincoln, one of the homely illustrations from country life he so often and so aptly used. He probably said it in commenting on Rosecrans in one of his discussions with Halleck or Stanton.

quality in which he rose above the average but one, tho he often fell below it. That one was obstinate fighting after he once got into a fight, tho even that quality failed at Chickamauga. For the rest, he was dilatory, erratic, insubordinate, reckless in assuming authority not intended, jealous of the fame and position of other generals, always magnifying difficulties, and never ceasing his criticisms of and objections to any plans or orders not his own. And at Corinth, at Stone's River, at Tullahoma, the three greatest events in his career up to that time, he had signally failed even to try to complete the victories he claimed by following his adversary to total defeat. All of his fighting had been courageous and all his flanking operations "brilliant", but not all of them together could support the high reputation they had brought him as a general, in view of his repeatedly proven incapacity in other respects essential to real success or permanent fame. Now he was charged with the highest opportunity of his military career and he was not equal to it. He was to enter upon a campaign in which, by the greatest flanking movement of the war, he forced Bragg out of the stronghold of Chattanooga without a battle, only to have Bragg immediately force him into battle under great disadvantages thro his own obvious blunders, with the result of the greatest disaster of the war.

XV

1863: AUGUST — SEPTEMBER

CHATTANOOGA — CHICKAMAUGA

Rosecrans Driven to Action — Campaign Against Chattanooga — Makes Grand Feint on the North — Crosses the Tennessee and the Mountains on the South — Bragg Surprised, Evacuates Chattanooga — Deceives Rosecrans by Apparent Retreat — Rosecrans Imprudently Divides his Army — Bragg Seizes the Opportunity to Force Battle

Having permitted Bragg to get away from Tullahoma and move to Chattanooga with his army intact, Rosecrans was now compelled to march upon his new position with his whole army, with great care and harassing labor and at great risk. For Chattanooga was remarkably difficult of access by military movement. Bragg's new position was much stronger than the old and much better situated for supply.

From Virginia to Chattanooga the general course of the Tennessee is southwesterly.* Just before reaching the town it turns, like a sharp elbow, to the west, and, after making four or five deep bends, north and south, enclosing long tongues of land, crosses the boundary of Alabama at a point about twenty miles west of Chattanooga, and then makes a long reach southwest. These bends are due to the projecting feet of rugged and precipitous mountains, which interlock like cogs on opposing wheels, so that the river must find its way thro tortuous and narrow gorges. On the right or northern bank these mountains, for about fifteen miles west of the town, leave

* There will be occasion from time to time in this chapter to refer to a map. The appended sketch will answer fairly if a better map be not at hand.

no room for a road. On the southern side there is scant space for a wagonroad and the Memphis & Charleston (Nashville & Chattanooga) railway. So, to move an army eastward along the river, against a determined defense of the town by even a small force, would be impracticable.

The approach of Rosecrans must be, therefore, from either the north or the south. If an army could be moved into the valley of the Tennessee north of the town and supplied there, it could move down the west side of the river, to a point directly opposite the town, but it would still have the river to cross in the face of an enemy protected by fortifications. But, to get into that valley, it would have to climb, and drag with it immense wagon trains, by very steep and rough roads, over the Cumberland mountain and Walden's Ridge, and the distances from Tullahoma would be sixty to seventy miles. Still, given time, labor and cost enough, that route was at least feasible. For a southern route, it would be necessary to cross the river twenty to thirty miles west of Chattanooga, in Alabama or near the border, and, by a wide circuit to the south and east, reach the mouths of the small north-and-south valleys which open northward upon the small plain on which the town stands. But the topography of the region to be traversed seemed almost absolutely to forbid such a route.

The whole country immediately south of Chattanooga is filled with mountains. They take the form of parallel ridges, more or less irregular in form, extending southwestward across the corner of Georgia and into Alabama. These ridges stand close to each other, so that the valleys between are narrow and rough, and in each valley there is a stream, all of the streams flowing northward into the Tennessee, except the one furthest east, which flows southward into the Coosa, a tributary of the Alabama. These mountains rise to from 1600 to 2200 feet above tide, and are remarkably rough. At the time of the campaign they were all covered with the primitive forests and the only roads across them were a few of the earliest type, mere wagon tracks or bridle paths, passing thro "gaps" nearly as high and steep as the ridges.

The western ridge is Sand Mountain, which has the Tennessee running along its western base. Next to the

east is Lookout Mountain, with Lookout creek flowing between. Then comes Chattanooga river and then Missionary Ridge, then West Chickamauga creek, then Pigeon Mountain, then Chattooga river, and then Taylor's Ridge. Eastward of Taylor's Ridge the mountains are lower and irregular in form, and much of the country is practicable for roads and agriculture.

Thirty miles south of Chattanooga the Lookout and Pigeon ranges are joined and Missionary Ridge, the shortest of the ridges, lies between them, as between the tines of a fork. Between the south end of Missionary Ridge and the junction of the Lookout and Pigeon ranges there is a valley, eight or ten miles long north and south, two or three wide, and hilly, called McLemore's Cove. Both Chattanooga river and West Chickamauga creek take their rise in the southern end of this cove. It was from McLemore's Cove northward along the west side of West Chickamauga creek and on the eastern spurs of Missionary Ridge that the great battle of "Chickamauga" was fought.

At that time there was no railway in any of these valleys, except a short branch in Lookout valley, and the only one from Chattanooga into Georgia, to get a practicable route, had to run first to the east some twelve miles, to reach a valley belonging to the Gulf watershed, where it turned south and wound a crooked way along a tributary of the Coosa and then one of the Chattahoochee, to Atlanta. On this railway, about twenty-five miles (in a direct line) southeast of Chattanooga, was the town of Dalton. Another station, twenty miles south of Dalton, was Kingston, and a few miles west of this place, on a branch railway, was Rome.

The possession of Rome and Kingston by Rosecrans would be a great blow to Bragg. It would probably compel the evacuation of Chattanooga, threaten Atlanta, and put the army a long way toward that important city. But to reach Rome from Rosecrans's position near Bridgeport would require a march of seventy or eighty miles, thro a country entirely mountainous, and the vast labor of transportation and the ease with which cavalry raids could be made upon the line of supplies were prohibitory.

Rosecrans gave that route some consideration, but set-

tled upon a much shorter one, altho it included, for some days, a much more difficult mountain passage. It would take less time and would be more likely to escape for a time the enemy's observation. He determined to move directly over the Sand and Lookout mountains to McLemore's Cove. That march would be only twenty-five or thirty miles and would place him hardly twenty miles south of Chattanooga and but twelve or fifteen from Dalton, which place could then be reached by his cavalry for the breaking up of the Atlanta railway. But, in choosing this route, one of his chief reasons lay in his judgment that Bragg would think it impracticable or so hazardous as not to be considered, as, indeed, Bragg did.

Having decided upon his route, Rosecrans set out upon an elaborate scheme to make sure of misleading Bragg and inducing him to withdraw his forces from the south of Chattanooga. No other movement of a like kind was made on so great a scale during the war. It was Tullahoma repeated, but far larger. All the country within fifty miles west and north of Chattanooga appeared to be filled with Union troops moving east, as if intending to occupy the Tennessee valley from near Knoxville down. In fact only one corps was employed, with two mounted brigades, but the purpose was fully gained.

Returning now to Rosecrans's preparations for the campaign, spoken of in his despatch of August 4 to Halleck, there was at that time little outward evidence of them, tho there had been movements of some troops toward the Tennessee during the last days of July and the railroad had been repaired from Tullahoma to Bridgeport. These movements of troops were of the cavalry far out to the right, on the Elk, and thence down into Alabama, and to the left to the upper Sequatchie as far as Kingston, near Knoxville, while, from the main body of the infantry, two divisions of Thomas's corps (Rousseau and Negley) were placed at Cowan, on the railroad at the foot of Cumberland Mountain, and the remainder of Reynolds's division was sent up to University Place, to join its Third brigade (Turchin), followed by Brannan's division. Two brigades of Sheridan's division of McCook's corps were sent over the mountain southward and along the railroad, to the

Alabama border, with a small body of cavalry scouting in front as far as the Tennessee.

But none of these movements could fairly be called "preparations for a forward movement", as intimated to Halleck. They were, rather, prudent dispositions of the army against a forward movement by the enemy, which was not only possible, but was in Rosecrans's mind and was repeatedly urged upon Bragg by the Richmond government. However, letting ten days pass after receiving peremptory orders to move, just as he had done before when ordered to move from Murfreesboro upon Bragg, Rosecrans suddenly put all his army upon the march; and he moved upon a comprehensive plan, carefully laid, with a sure hand and with striking success, again gaining great fame as a practical tactician.

The physical difficulties were certainly great. Between him and Chattanooga, north of the Tennessee, were two high ranges of barren mountains; no forage in the country and long distances without water; roads few and far apart (the natural "dirt" roads), narrow, crooked and very steep and rough. The men could climb and descend slowly, but for the guns and the hundreds of wagons, laden with provisions and ammunition, there was great labor and creeping progress.

On August 13th Rosecrans sent to the Adjutant-General at Washington a message, in effect, that his advance had begun. This referred to Reynolds's division on the road from University Place southeast to Jasper, but the message was hardly frank, as Reynolds was not actually marching, tho in a position to do so. Orders for marching were, in fact, not issued until the 15th, and the march of the first division was begun the morning of the 16th. Then the first columns and trains so crowded the few narrow roads that it was three or four days before all were fairly on the way.

Colonel Lane heard on the 13th that some movement was intended, but his brigade did not get marching orders until the 17th. That division had already done half its work, however, in climbing the mountain to University Place.

The Second brigade had marched on the 16th, leading the way across the plateau of the Cumberland mountain

and descending southeasterly, by Sweeden's Cove (the valley of Battle creek), along which a road was practicable, coming on the 18th within a mile or two of the Tennessee, near the mouth of Battle creek, crossing that stream northerly, and halting to camp on the east side of it, five miles from the village of Jasper. Reynolds reported this to Thomas and said "Turchin's brigade will be up tomorrow."

But the Eighty-ninth Ohio had just before been detached from Turchin's brigade and sent back to Tracy City, north of University Place, as a guard for that post. It followed the army to the field of Chickamauga, however, with Granger's Reserve Corps, and reached there in time to suffer a heavy blow in the second day's battle, in which it lost more in killed and wounded than any other regiment in the brigade and lost half its remainder by capture.

Brannan's division followed Reynolds down Sweeden's Cove, Reynolds having command of both. Wilder's brigade (mounted infantry) of Reynolds's division marched up to Tracy City and thence east across the Cumberland range, the Sequatchie river and Walden's Ridge, to the Tennessee, and thence south toward Chattanooga.

It should have been said that the Sequatchie river flows southwesterly, along the eastern base of the Cumberland range, in a narrow valley parallel with that of the Tennessee and separated from it by Walden's Ridge, a long mountain of the Cumberland system, but lower than the main range, both valleys being little more than great gorges.

Crittenden's corps moved up the western base of the main Cumberland range, and its three divisions turned east separately and crossed the mountain, by different roads, into the Sequatchie valley, Wood's division coming out first, at Therman on the Sequatchie, about twenty miles northeast of Jasper, then Palmer's at Dunlap, seven or eight miles above Therman, and Van Cleve's at Pikeville, twenty miles above Dunlap. From Wood's division one brigade (Wagner) and from Palmer's one (Hazen) were then sent east, across Walden's Ridge, into the Tennessee valley, where they moved south, on the west side of the river, toward Chattanooga, and took positions

separately in support of Wilder's mounted brigade, the movements of which were at times (as intended to be) observed from the town.

Thus we see two of Thomas's divisions posted near the Tennessee and the mouth of the Sequatchie and the three of Crittenden northward at different points on the latter river, making a line of forty-five miles nearly facing Chattanooga, while three brigades were in front, over in the Tennessee valley, directly north of the town.

The two other divisions of Thomas were moved down to Stevenson in Alabama (near Bridgeport on the Tennessee), where all of McCook's corps was concentrated and where Rosecrans now established his headquarters, while the greater part of the cavalry was kept well to the west of Stevenson, from the Elk to the Tennessee, to prevent any attack or near reconnaissance by the rebel cavalry.

With the beginning of these movements Minty's brigade of Crook's division of cavalry was sent on a rapid march forty miles north of Manchester, to Sparta, where it defeated a brigade of rebel cavalry, an outlying part of Forrest's command under General Dibrell, and then marched rapidly toward Kingston on the Tennessee. This was done to create the belief that a strong cavalry force was coming into the Tennessee valley as the left of Rosecrans's forces.

Then Wilder appeared on the river just north of Chattanooga, with a large battery, and began to throw shell into the town. At the same time King's brigade of Reynolds's division, supported by Turchin's, appeared on the north side of the river, east of the Sequatchie, about fifteen miles west of Chattanooga, and shelled a station on the railway on the south side called Shell Mound.


All of these operations north of the Alabama border were easily observed by the enemy, as it was intended they should be. They were on so many roads and so evidently directed to the occupation of the Tennessee valley that Bragg believed that a large army was employed in them. The advance by Burnside thro Kentucky upon Knoxville at the same time appeared to him to be preliminary to reinforcing Rosecrans from that point. The troops seen near Bridgeport (the most of the troops there were kept back some miles from the river for conceal-

ment) he thought were only for the prudent holding of that crossing against any attempt upon Rosecrans's right while engaged in an attack upon Chattanooga from the north. Accordingly Bragg moved the greater part of his forces up the river on the east side, above Chattanooga, his right reaching as far as opposite Van Cleve at Pikeville, while Forrest's cavalry held the space from there on to Loudon and Kingston. The country south of Chattanooga, therefore, which Rosecrans wanted to reach, Bragg left almost bare of troops.

It is surprising that Bragg was so deceived, the more since he had already been deceived by Rosecrans by a similar device when he was flanked out of Shelbyville; but yet the records show that he and his immediate advisers assumed, as of course, that a movement across the mountains south of Chattanooga, from Bridgeport, was, practically, beyond attempt.

Meantime McCook's divisions and the two of Thomas at Stevenson, Reynolds's above the Sequatchie, opposite the railway station at Shell Mound, and Brannan's a little below, at the mouth of Battle creek, were busily employed upon the means of crossing the river. The railway bridge at Bridgeport was to be repaired and fitted for the passage of guns and wagon-trains, but it was under observation from the hills on the opposite shore. Sheridan found a way to cross a small force there, which drove out the rebels and held the hills, and then the bridge work was pushed with great energy. The pontoon-train had boats enough for one bridge, but hardly half enough for another, and for the second a low trestle-work was run out from the shore to supply the lack. Reynolds's men had been hunting for and raising some flat-boats which had been sunk by the enemy above Bridgeport, and building others, and Brannan's were building rafts.

On the 21st Colonel King, of the Sixty-eighth Indiana, now commanding Reynolds's Second brigade, posted just east of the mouth of the Sequatchie, took a small party across the river by night, in canoes, and burned a bridge on the railway near Shell Mound, thus cutting off Bragg's use of the road between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. On the 28th, again at night, he crossed on the flat-boats, with 300 men, and reconnoitered the road six miles



toward Chattanooga, ran upon the enemy's picket, at once attacked and broke up the camp of the regiment which supported it, captured a number of men and horses, and returned to Shell Mound and recrossed the same night. In the night of the 30th he moved his whole brigade across, with a battalion of cavalry, sent the cavalry up the road to find the enemy's outpost, which it found at the foot of Lookout Mountain, only three miles from Chattanooga, and encamped his brigade near Shell Mound. This was the first permanent crossing of the army for the great campaign. The next night (31st) Turchin's brigade crossed on the flat-boats and Brannan's division (or most of it) on the rafts, all camping near Shell Mound. On the first of September the railway bridge was ready for the wagon-trains, a pontoon bridge was done at Caperton's Ferry, eight miles below Bridgeport, and between those places the pontoon-and-trestle bridge was nearly done.

Crittenden's divisions had been ordered down from the Sequatchie valley (but Wilder's, Hazen's and Wagner's brigades were left opposite Chattanooga, to make a show for the present) and moved rapidly, by Jasper, to the crossings of Reynolds and Brannan, where they made the passage within the first days of September.

On the first of September, then, all the troops except Granger's Reserve Corps (which was still back near the Elk) were either over or crossing or awaiting their turn on the shore. The cavalry went on the first and second, mostly by a long ford a little below Bridgeport, McCook's corps and the divisions of Rousseau and Negley of Thomas's corps by the pontoons, and the wagon-trains by the railway bridge. By the night of the 4th practically the whole army (except Granger's Reserve Corps) was on the south (and east) shore. Crittenden moved at once up the railway to Wauhatchie, in the mouth of the Lookout valley, and the army then held all the roads and gaps on the north and west fronts of Sand Mountain, from Wauhatchie thirty miles down to Bolton's Ferry, below Caperton's.

The movements of the different parts of the army leading up to the fall of Chattanooga and the battle of Chickamauga will not appear in detail in this book, because the

narrative is limited to Colonel Lane and his own command, the actions of other troops being brought in only to show the causes of his movements and their relation to the general field of action. Further, indeed, the movements and experiences of the different corps, divisions, brigades and regiments during the three weeks from the crossing of the river to the end of the battle were so numerous and so complicated, and during the last days so confused, that it would hardly be possible to recount them with certainty or clearness. Within a space about fifteen miles wide and thirty-five long these movements were back and forth and crossing and recrossing each other in all directions so many times, with so many objects, that to almost any reader they would be bewildering. During the days of the battle, and especially on the 20th, there were so many changes in orders and movements and such haste and confusion that there were instances of parts of a division or brigade or regiment moving in different directions, with different objects, at the same time, the parts being separated from each other by orders of different commanders or by misunderstandings in the exigencies of the moment. Under the tremendous demands of the battle for which the commanding-general was not ready, in which his enemy outnumbered him and constantly held the aggressive, the most of the field being very rough and thickly wooded, it often happened that divisions of different corps, brigades of different divisions, regiments of different brigades, and even companies of different regiments were separated, joined to others, and moved here or there by different commanders, while sometimes colonels, brigade commanders, even division commanders, did not know where they were in relation to the field nor what was next expected of them, and so at times had to act each upon his own responsibility. The official reports therefore show a number of instances of a subordinate commanding officer moving or fighting as it appeared to him the immediate circumstances required, in some cases showing ability and courage of high order.

The report of General Rosecrans himself is strikingly meager and inadequate, showing much less than it ought to of the general ordering and co-ordination of movements after the battle began, tho of course it must have been

difficult enough for him to write at all of a campaign and battle which ended in so shocking a catastrophe.

From the 2d to the 6th of September the 40,000 men of McCook's and Thomas's corps were climbing over the huge back of Sand Mountain, which rises 1800 feet above the river level and has a very rough top or plateau six or eight miles broad, by four or five different routes, each worse than any other for roughness and steepness, dragging with them about 150 guns and about 2000 wagons. Dragging is literally the right word, for, in many of the steep places the mules or horses were unable to pull their loads and the power of the soldiers was added, twenty or thirty to a wagon or gun, with ropes and levers. The route of Reynolds's division, followed by Brannan's, was from Shell Mound south and easterly, ascending thro a gorge (like all the other routes used, there being no gap all the way across the mountain) and then crossing the plateau southeasterly and descending, by a gorge, into the valley of Lookout creek at Squirrel Springs. The descent was only less difficult for the wheels than the ascent, and the toilsome movement took two days, tho the distance from Shell Mound was hardly fourteen miles. The next morning the two divisions moved on up Lookout valley a few miles, to Trenton, a small village and the "county-seat" of Dade County.

Colonel Lane's letter from here says that "the county is famous for seceding from the State of Georgia."* Also, that the division arrived on Sunday and that, "it being the custom of this army to rest on Sunday, if possible," there was "a service in the rude village church" (an army chaplain, probably); and he, as well as General Reynolds and his staff, attended.

The two divisions remained at Trenton from the 6th to the 9th, the other troops filling the only roads as they slowly climbed over Lookout Mountain. On the 9th they moved up Lookout valley to Johnson's Crook, where they lay by a small creek till the 11th. Johnson's Crook is a

* I don't know the story of this "secession", but there were several instances, in different States, of counties seceding from the State, or attempting or threatening to do so, because of opposition to the secession from the Union or of hostility to the Confederate government.

singular, rounded projection (like a shoulder or bent knee) of Lookout Mountain, which there recedes abruptly eastward two or three miles, the Sand Mountain opposite advancing so as to partly fill the bay. Its importance lies in the fact that behind the shoulder is a long gorge thro which a very crooked road reaches the top of the mountain, the only crossing of it within thirty miles south of the Tennessee, except "Nickajack Trace" and "Powell's Trace", which are (or were then) mere bridle paths.

But meantime more important events were occurring. The Cavalry corps (now commanded by General Robert B. Mitchell, in the absence of General Stanley), excepting Minty's brigade, crossed both the Sand and Lookout mountains by the 4th and 5th, by a route several miles south of Johnson's Crook, and appeared in the valleys of Chattooga river, forty miles or more directly south of Chattanooga, and was reconnoitring toward LaFayette and Rome, while the whole of McCook's corps of infantry was following on the same roads. Crittenden's corps, crossing the Tennessee at Shell Mound on the 5th and 6th, advanced along the railroad toward Chattanooga, as already told, and struck Bragg's outpost at the foot of Lookout Mountain, near Wauhatchie.

When he learned of these movements, Bragg, greatly surprised, immediately decided that Chattanooga was untenable, and ordered evacuation. It was not literally untenable, since it was hardly practicable for Rosecrans to make a complete investment. Even if he could place troops in sufficient force on the east side, where the railroads came in from South Carolina and southern Georgia, the difficulties in the way of supporting and supplying them there would be too great. But Bragg rightly preferred, under the circumstances, to have his army in the open field. He had severely criticised the Confederate management at Vicksburg, where, he said, "an army had been backed up against a river to be surrounded and captured". In fact, he counted upon returning to Chattanooga after defeating Rosecrans in battle. Accordingly he issued his orders, recalled his forces from the east side of the Tennessee above the town, and on the 8th was moving south up the valleys of the West and Middle Chickamauga.

On the 9th, early, Colonel Atkins, with the Ninety-eighth Illinois, mounted infantry (of Wilder's brigade, Reynolds's division), temporarily serving in front of Crittenden's corps near Wauhatchie, found no enemy on the Chattanooga road and moved on into the town. Crittenden sent forward a brigade of infantry and ordered Wagner's and Hazen's brigades, which had been left north of the town on the first, to come across.

Rosecrans, greatly elated by the news, assumed that Bragg was retreating. Deserters and excited citizens told him that Bragg was trying to save his army by moving to Atlanta,* and the cavalry actually found some of his troops on the roads to Rome far south of Chattanooga. Delighted with another great victory, holding the prize of the long, laborious campaign, seeing the enemy, as he believed, in full retreat and his own troops now moving directly upon their right flank, he undertook to add a great defeat of the flying army to the capture of the stronghold. He was grossly deceived, he had not a cool head, and he committed a dreadful blunder.

He ordered Crittenden's corps directly across the Chattanooga and Chickamauga valleys, just south of the town, to Ringgold, fourteen miles southeast of it, to reach the rear of the supposed retreat, and urged forward over Lookout Mountain McCook's corps on the extreme right and Thomas's in the center, to strike Bragg's right flank. He had high hopes of destroying Bragg's army.

On the 10th, accordingly, Crittenden was near Ringgold (which was already occupied by Wilder's mounted infantry), Thomas's advanced divisions (the First and Second, under Baird and Negley — Baird had succeeded Rousseau), after crossing Lookout Mountain by Johnson's Crook and the Stevens and Cooper gaps, reached the east side of McLemore's Cove, in front of the two gaps of Pigeon Mountain (Dug and Catlett's), while McCook, ascending Lookout Mountain by Valley Head and Winston's Gap and descending by Henderson's Gap, appeared at

* Bragg constantly practiced the device of sending spies into his enemy's lines (pretending to be deserters and friendly Union citizens) to tell of this or that pretended purpose or movement on his part. Rosecrans had had enough experience of this practice to induce more caution than he exercised.

Alpine, in Broomtown Valley (upper Chattooga river), twenty miles to the right of Negley's division. Thomas was expected to pass thro the gaps in Pigeon Mountain and reach LaFayette, he and McCook then to strike Bragg's retreating columns on their right flank. Mitchell's cavalry was then to be on the right of McCook, in Broomtown Valley.

These movements ordered and their success, in his mind, assured, on the 9th Rosecrans sent to Washington an exuberant report of his brilliant achievement and his prevision of the coming destruction of Bragg's army.* He did not realize that he was, in fact, in a most perilous position. His line—or, rather, his chain of troops, in broken form, with wide intervals—was forty miles long, two corps facing east and one south, in a field too narrow for movement except north and south and the most of it filled with the rough and thickly wooded foot-hills of the Lookout and Missionary ridges. He knew that he must depend upon Chattanooga for a base, from which he could be cut off by a successful attack upon his left. He was late in learning and too late in understanding the momentous movements of his enemy.

Bragg had no idea of retreating. His leaving Chattanooga was only strategical. Tho he always minimized his forces, he knew he was much stronger than when, as he had said, he was ready for decisive battle with Rosecrans at Tullahoma, and, being a capable soldier, he saw clearly the very disadvantageous position in which Rosecrans was now placing himself. He took position in a short, compact line of hardly ten miles, facing west, just east of Pigeon Mountain, his right lying on the east side of West Chickamauga creek† and his left along the upper stream of Chattooga river, with Forrest's two divisions of cavalry on his right and Wheeler's two divisions on his left.

* He said "Chattanooga is ours and without a struggle and east Tennessee is free. Our move on the enemy's flank progresses and the tail of his retreating column will not escape molestation."

† There are three Chickamauga creeks—the West, Middle and East—all joining in one before they reach the Tennessee, but, tho the Middle and East were reached in preliminary operations, only the West branch was the "Chickamauga" of the battle.

His purpose was to make energetic attacks upon Rosecrans's separated divisions as they came down into the valleys from Lookout Mountain. If all his generals had been as energetic as he expected them to be this plan might well have been successful, and the disaster to Rosecrans, great tho it was, might have been yet greater, but they failed him on both the right and the left. For a long time after the battle he was involved with three or four of them in charges and countercharges and recriminations, a situation which had its close parallel on the Union side.

From the 10th each day's developments more and more disturbed Rosecrans's assurance and opened his eyes. Wilder's mounted brigade, which had crossed the Tennessee by fording at Friar's Island, above Chattanooga, and, by fast riding, had reached Ringgold on the 10th, had then pushed on, with sharp fighting, toward Dalton and found the enemy there in force, whereupon, under orders, it returned to Ringgold. Crittenden's infantry, moving up West Chickamauga creek to Lee & Gordon's mill, found the enemy near there and in position for battle only two miles eastward; and the same day Negley, with his division of Thomas's corps, found him in strong force defending the gaps in Pigeon Mountain above Lee & Gordon's. And at all these places he obstinately refused to give way. On the contrary, early on the 11th his forces at the gaps of Pigeon Mountain advanced against Negley and Baird. Foreseeing this, from the aggressive character of their skirmishing on the evening before, the two generals decided to fall back. They got their trains safely ahead and their countermarch begun before the attack was made, but they had to face about and fight repeated assaults upon their columns,—the most important engagement of the campaign preceding the great battle. The enemy gave it up, however, and the two divisions moved on west to Stevens's Gap, as intended, and went into camp.

The next day (12th) brought another evidence of the position and purpose of the enemy. Rosecrans ordered Wilder, then at Ringgold, to rejoin his corps (Thomas) at La Fayette. His road was up the west side of Middle Chickamauga creek by way of Leet's tanyard, a point five miles east of Lee & Gordon's mill. But a few miles from Ringgold he struck Forrest's cavalry picket. While

driving ahead, fighting, he found another cavalry force striking at his rear. At Leet's the resistance was stronger, and not far beyond he came upon a brigade of cavalry in battle line. He instantly attacked and drove it back, and at the same time discovered another brigade advancing on his left. Feeling to the right, he found a brigade of enemy infantry (Strahl's, of Cheatham's division). Always ready for action, he immediately made a demonstration by strong skirmishing parties to the front and rear and left, and then boldly charged upon Strahl, rode down his resistance, and reached Crittenden's lines at Lee & Gordon's mill with small loss.

Thomas was not at La Fayette. The news from Negley's affair at Pigeon Mountain satisfied him that it was not Bragg's moving right flank, but his fixed battle-front, that must be met; and he approved of Negley's prudent withdrawal. But Rosecrans criticised it as a lack of courage, and criticised Thomas for not pushing on to La Fayette. McCook, however, had not gone even as far forward as Thomas. He waited at Alpine until he got a report from Negley of the forces in front and a report of the same kind from Mitchell's cavalry; and he too decided to await further orders. The fact was, as afterward found, that Bragg had six divisions posted at and near Pigeon Mountain, under orders to make a determined attack upon Rosecrans's right, and that it was delayed by the necessity of cutting out the obstructions in the gaps, where his own men had felled the trees to prevent the passage of Rosecrans's. So this difficulty for Bragg probably prevented either a terrible punishment of Negley and Baird for getting too far forward or a general engagement of the armies in McLemore's Cove.

These accumulated evidences, with thickening other reports, at last, a week after the evacuation, forced the reluctant Rosecrans to see that Bragg had not retreated, but was deliberately prepared to hold his present ground and put the fate of Chattanooga to the issue of a great battle. He was filled with alarm, perhaps chiefly because of the unfortunate position of his troops; and his reports to Washington took a different and ominous tone.

It seems clear since the campaign that he ought to have, instantly and with every possible effort, moved his in-

fantry and trains down the Chattanooga and Lookout valleys and his cavalry down the West Chickamauga, and taken position in front of Chattanooga, a few miles to the south and southeast. He may have been attacked on his right or rear while moving, but he could have met that then without much concern. In that position he would have made secure the immediate object of the campaign — the possession of Chattanooga — and could have decided for himself whether the next use of his army should be in an offensive or a defensive campaign. And, as his adversary was (or was then becoming) the stronger, he would probably, for the present, have chosen the defensive. He could not have been reasonably criticised for considering his campaign rightly ended in the capture of Chattanooga. But he seems to have had now a despairing idea that he was compelled to accept a general battle, and that where his enemy chose to force it; tho he does say, in his official report, that "it was absolutely necessary to secure our concentration and cover Chattanooga."

But his hesitation made his orders for the concentration two days late, and there is no adequate explanation of the slowness of movement after the orders were made. A capable general, deciding that it was "absolutely necessary to cover Chattanooga", would have had the army in position in front of it (moving from McLemore's Cove) by the 15th, but the army was caught half way on the march, the evening of the 18th, while moving, and was forced to face about and fight a decisive battle in such positions as the enemy's assaults compelled.

XVI

1863 : SEPTEMBER 13-21

Battles on the Chickamauga — Minor Preceding Engagements — The Opposing Forces — Bragg Attacks Rosecrans on his March — Thomas on Forced Night March — Holds Left Wing Against all Attacks — Succession of Battles on the 19th — Reynolds Holds Right of Thomas's Line (Eleventh Ohio) — That Night Rosecrans Reports Success to Washington. Expects Complete Victory — The 20th Again a Succession of Battles — Left Wing, Under Thomas, Repels all Assaults — Right Wing, Directed by Rosecrans, Broken by Longstreet — Rosecrans Abandons the Field — McCook and Crittenden Follow — Thomas's "Horseshoe": He Holds it With His Corps and Parts of the Others Till Night — "The Rock of Chickamauga" — His Great Achievement in Retreat — Turchin's Brigade (Eleventh Ohio) Makes the Last Charge, Wins the Last Battle — Colonel Lane and Eleventh Ohio Lost on the Field — Recovers Position — The Last to Leave the Field of Chickamauga

The night of the 13th found the army halted,— McCook's corps at Alpine in Broomtown Valley, forty-two miles south (in a direct line) from Chattanooga; Mitchell's cavalry (except Minty's brigade) to the south and front of McCook; Crittenden's corps along the West Chickamauga at Lee & Gordon's mill, eleven miles south of Chattanooga and thirty-two northeast of McCook; Thomas's corps in front of the Stevens and Cooper gaps in Lookout Mountain, thirteen miles southwest of Chattanooga, twelve southwest of Crittenden and twenty-four north of McCook. Extraordinary and extremely dangerous intervals, even if in a plain country. Nearly all the country between these places was then covered by forest and thicket and was hilly and rough, even over the valley called Mc-

Lemore's Cove, so that the roads were crooked, narrow and difficult for the loaded trains, only one of them being "improved"—the "State" or La Fayette road, running from Chattanooga to La Fayette by Lee & Gordon's mill.

Minty's brigade of cavalry, detached from Mitchell's command, was far to the northeast, reconnoitring in the vicinity of Ringgold. Reynolds's and Brannan's divisions of Thomas's corps were, on the 11th, moved from Lookout valley, around Johnson's Crook and over the mountain, and, on the 12th, descended by the Stevens and Cooper gaps, where they took position with their fellow divisions of Negley and Baird. Wilder's brigade of Reynolds's division, was, as already told, with Crittenden at Lee & Gordon's mill.

General Rosecrans had his headquarters at Crawfish Spring, near Lee & Gordon's mill. General Bragg had his at La Fayette, his right wing covering Lee & Gordon's mill, protected on the north by Forrest's two divisions of cavalry, and his line extended southwesterly along the eastern side of Pigeon Mountain, with Wheeler's two divisions of cavalry on its left and front.

The Rosecrans, on the 12th, hastily criticised Thomas and Negley for halting their advance upon La Fayette, he was privately much disturbed by their reports of the situation, confirming definitely, as they did, the evidences he had been getting for two days; and by that night he reached a decision in practical approval of their prudent course. He was very loth to give up the belief in Bragg's defeat and retreat; but now, if Bragg really had halted and taken position behind Pigeon Mountain, he was nearer to either McCook or Crittenden than they were to each other and could strike either of them before Thomas could join. Common caution required that they be brought together at once.

He then sent to McCook an order to close up with all speed upon Thomas's right at Stevens' Gap, leaving two brigades at Dougherty's Gap, the point where Pigeon and Lookout Mountains are joined. McCook moved early on the 13th, but he took the singular course of a long circuit, going directly west over Lookout Mountain by Henderson's and Winston's Gaps, to Valley Head, and thence down Lookout creek to Johnson's Crook and over the

mountain east again by Stevens' Gap. If he could move two brigades over from Alpine to Dougherty's Gap, there would seem to be no reason why he could not move the whole corps that way, thus marching directly north thro McLemore's Cove, hardly more than twenty-five miles, with one crossing of the mountain, instead of over forty miles, with two crossings. As it was, he was five days on the movement, and did not join Thomas till the 17th.

On the 13th Crittenden was ordered to leave one division at Lee & Gordon's mill, as an outpost, and move the others back west, to the south end of Missionary Ridge, connecting his right with Thomas's left; and Thomas was directed to post one division in his front, at Pond Spring, keeping one brigade east of West Chickamauga creek in close watch of the gaps in Pigeon Mountain. Reynolds's division was assigned to this service, and Turchin's brigade took the first turn of heavy picketing in front of Dug and Catlett's Gaps.

In this march, on the 14th, Turchin's brigade crossed the West Chickamauga and advanced to the mouth of Catlett's Gap, meeting the enemy at the creek and skirmishing thence all the way. Here the brigade had a hard service of three days. Colonel Lane writes that they were on picket two days without relief and continually fired upon, getting no rest and almost no sleep. He says the enemy was Hood's division (of Longstreet's corps), but it was probably one of Buckner's divisions, which were at that time posted at Pigeon Mountain. Twice on the 16th Turchin's brigade advanced in force to the mouths of Dug and Catlett's Gaps, only to find the enemy in them and determined to stay. On the 17th the Second (King's) brigade of the division came up to relieve Turchin, and his men had their first night of sleep for a week.

Wilder's brigade of the division now came to Pond Spring from Lee & Gordon's mill and rejoined, after an independent service of more than a month, and Brannan's division of the corps was sent forward to Pond Spring, to support Reynolds, taking post on his right, with one brigade advanced to the creek.

As soon as McCook appeared at Stevens' Gap on the 17th, Crittenden was returned to his former position at Lee & Gordon's mill and Thomas was directed to move

his whole corps into line on Crittenden's right, with his own right near Pond Spring, and McCook to leave one division at Stevens' Gap, with the two others take the position just vacated by Reynolds and Brannan near Pond Spring, and then close up to the left, to Gower's house. But the order to Thomas had required him to fill the same space and his men were already moving in, so that McCook's right was finally established above (south of) Pond Spring. The cavalry, of course, moved down (north) into McLemore's Cove, to keep within reach of the right of the infantry.

Rosecrans had now got his three corps concentrated, without as yet any dangerous attack, and then began pushing feverishly to the left, that is, for Chattanooga. He had no longer any doubt as to the position and purpose of his enemy: he feared an attack at any hour. His fortune in escaping it was due only to Bragg's lack of aggressive quality. The nearer he could get to Chattanooga the better in every way his position for battle would be. All day and night of the 18th the movement went on, much encumbered by the trains. There appears no reason why the bulk of the trains could not have been sent from McLemore's Cove down the valley of the Chattanooga river, leaving the roads along the Chickamauga as free as possible for the marching men. Many precious hours were lost by trying to move the trains along the same roads with the columns.

The plan of movement seems to have been to take out from the center Thomas's corps and move it, by the rear of Crittenden, to a position beyond Crittenden's left, while bringing up McCook to take Thomas's place. This would keep a practically close front toward the enemy and place the strongest corps on the left, where an attack would be the most dangerous. But the enemy did not permit this movement to be made more than once; this first attempt, indeed, was not completed when the storm broke.

Under the order for this march on the 18th Thomas's column reached Crawfish Spring by night, Baird's division in advance, Brannan's next and Reynolds's third. Negley's was left for the present in position on the creek, in front of Catlett's Gap.

When night fell without an order to halt and go into bivouac and the march still went on, Thomas's men saw that the purpose must be highly important, tho they could only guess at it. They had known, in a general way, what the purpose of Rosecrans was in crossing the mountains, and they knew that Chattanooga had fallen into their hands; and for a few days thereafter they all believed that their marches were made in pursuit of a beaten and retreating enemy. But now they had come upon a stubborn and resisting enemy, and the whole army was concentrating and moving away from the enemy. The case looked to them very serious.

Thomas had been directed to secure a position near the Kelly house on the "State" road (Chattanooga to La Fayette) by dawn of the 19th. Kelly's was about twelve miles, by the roads, north of Pond Spring and ten southeast of Chattanooga. About two and a half miles east of Kelly's was Reed's bridge over the Chickamauga and at a rather shorter distance southeast was Alexander's bridge,—the only bridges over the creek within many miles, tho there were numerous fords available at low water. Good roads from these bridges converged near Kelly's, which, obviously, the enemy must not be permitted to control. It was this consideration that determined the limit of Thomas's present movement to the north.

Reynolds's division being the rear of the corps, its march was the slowest and oftenest halted by one cause or another ahead,—always the irksome experience of the rear portion of a long marching column. It was a cold night, a hilly, stony road, all of it thro forests, except that here and there a "clearing" gave room for a field or two. Some soldier started a fire by the road-side, others followed, and fires sprang up all along the column. Colonel Lane, who had a poetic imagination, wrote an account of the weird scene, picturing the endless procession of armed men, plodding under their loads along the rough, narrow road, while the varying fires lighted up fitfully the bordering woods and thickets, leaving the depths densely black and mysterious.

Thomas reached Kelly's at daybreak of the 19th. Baird's division, being in advance, moved at once into position east of the State road, at the fork of the roads

leading to the two bridges. Brannan's arriving next took place on Baird's left, covering particularly the Reed's bridge road. But Reynolds's division in the rear was not yet fully past Crawfish Spring, four miles or more back, and Negley's had not been ordered to move. McCook closed up after Thomas, but, marching on a road further west and less obstructed, one of his divisions got to the State road and on the battle-field before Reynolds.

On the same day of this march (18th) Minty's brigade of cavalry, at Reed's bridge, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, at Alexander's bridge, were separately attacked by larger forces and, in spite of stubborn resistance, both were driven away. It appeared later that Forrest had two divisions of cavalry in that region. Later in the day two or more divisions of Bragg's infantry were discovered moving directly upon the crossing at Lee & Gordon's mill; and Crittenden's divisions had to be hastily returned to their position covering it.

Rosecrans was caught before he was ready, while he was still moving, but he had at least the negative good fortune of escaping the much worse position in which attack would have caught him any day for a week before. That is, if Rosecrans was too late in his action, so also was Bragg in his; and, in a military sense, Bragg was more reprehensible than Rosecrans. When Rosecrans once realized his mistake in separating his forces he moved for concentration with one of his characteristic spurts of energy and with as much success as any general might have had, allowing for McCook's inexcusable loss of time in moving up from Alpine; but Bragg, with his army practically massed and his opportunity lying within reach of his hand, hesitated and dallied until his plan of striking Rosecrans's divisions in detail was lost. Even then he delayed a whole day more, permitting Rosecrans to get into better position and at least to begin an orderly formation for battle. He did finally gain a victory, but it was essentially incomplete, since he failed to get Chattanooga. And he knew he had failed (tho he wrote official reports of glorious success), as is shown by his acrimonious quarrels with several of his generals after the battle, charging them with neglect of orders and worse, which prevented him from recovering Chattanooga.


CHICKAMAUGA

The battle of Saturday, September 19

Now came upon General Rosecrans the dire penalty for his long dallying at Winchester while his enemy was busily increasing his strength. When Bragg retreated from Tullahoma and entered Chattanooga his forces were far less than Rosecrans's — probably 25,000 less. Rosecrans had had some small gains, but not enough to make up his loss by the natural casualties of the service, so that when he crossed the Tennessee his numbers were materially smaller than when he took Tullahoma. And he had allowed to Bragg at Chattanooga full two months time for recuperation, in which he succeeded in bringing back at least a part of his many absentees and picking up here and there in his department a regiment or two, while he was constantly calling upon the authorities at Richmond and his department commander (Johnston) for fresh divisions. Two divisions already ordered from Johnston's Mississippi army were long on the way, but, thanks to Rosecrans's delay, they arrived in good time for the great battle. His War Department authorized him to bring Buckner's troops from Knoxville, and they came as a corps of his own two divisions of infantry, two brigades of cavalry, and a third small division of infantry which had been operating separately under General Johnson; and, finally, he was promised a heavy detachment from Lee's army in Virginia, which proved to be two good divisions of Longstreet's corps, with the very able Longstreet in command. Thus Bragg's additions amounted to nearly or quite 40,000 men, with the usual complement of artillery. All of these came before Rosecrans crossed the Tennessee, except Longstreet's men, who did not arrive until the eve of battle, part of them only the night of the first day.

After the battle both Rosecrans and Bragg minimized their forces, Bragg to an absurd extent, but the fact was that on the morning of the 19th the opposing armies stood nearly equal in numbers, Bragg (without Longstreet) being, perhaps, 2000 the stronger. But Rosecrans's number was reached by his bringing forward from Bridgeport, at a late day and under Bragg's threat of battle,

11
12



General Granger with 5000 men of the Reserve Corps,—one division, under General Steedman. This division arrived at Rossville, near Chattanooga, in time to take part in the battle, and proved to be of such great value, under the fine conduct of Granger and Steedman, that it may fairly be said to have saved Rosecrans from an actual rout.

With the arrival of Longstreet's divisions, however, (about 12,000 men) the balance was rather strongly on Bragg's side, his numbers being over 71,000 and Rosecrans's nearly 57,000. Bragg had five corps of infantry (Polk, Hill, Walker, Buckner and Longstreet), containing eleven divisions, and two corps of cavalry (Wheeler and Forrest), containing four divisions. Rosecrans's organization was in three corps of infantry (Thomas, McCook and Crittenden), containing ten divisions, and one corps of cavalry (Mitchell), containing two divisions, to which are to be added one division of infantry (Steedman) of Granger's Reserve Corps and one small unattached regiment (Harrison's Thirty-ninth Indiana) of mounted infantry. The divisions on either side ranged from about 3000 to about 6000.*

* General Rosecrans and his defenders (and, naturally, many of the officers and soldiers of his army) have insisted that Bragg had vastly greater forces, but that is certainly wrong. Bragg too, altho the victor, belittled his numbers still more than Rosecrans did his, making the astonishing statement, in an official report, that (including his reinforcements from Johnston and Buckner) he had but 35,000 men exclusive of the cavalry.

His last preceding official return of strength, dated August 10, before Buckner joined him, shows "Present for duty, 53,418", and nothing occurred to reduce that number between that date and the battle but the ordinary camp casualties. Deducting 12,000 for his cavalry (which is more than he would admit), he must have had over 41,000 infantry at the time of that return, and he had yet to receive the five divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry of Buckner and Longstreet. In a memorandum statement he made soon after the battle, when he was minimizing his forces in his appeal to Richmond for reinforcement, he put down Buckner and Longstreet at 15,000. But his losses in the battle averaged over 25 per cent. (by his statement they would be not less than 40 per cent.) so that Buckner and Longstreet must have brought him over 20,000. Allowing, then, for the ordinary sickness and casualties of one month of inaction, he must have had at the beginning of the battle well over 70,000.

The field of operations at the beginning of the battle, tho much too long, now had its northern limit near McDannel's house, three miles southeast from Rossville and seven from Chattanooga, its southern limit on a line drawn eastward from Johnson's Crook to Catlett's Gap, its eastern along West Chickamauga creek, and its western from Stevens's Gap north along the crest of Missionary Ridge. This space is about twelve miles long and varies

The Confederate President, who was constitutionally unable to write on the war without distorting facts and building upon half-truths, says (in his "Rise and Fall, etc."), with details, that at Chickamauga Bragg had 47,321 and Rosecrans 64,892. Deducting from the 47,321 the two divisions sent by Johnston and the five divisions and two brigades brought by Buckner and Longstreet (less three brigades of Longstreet, said to have arrived late), certainly not less than 31,000, there remain only about 16,000 for the whole of Bragg's own army, altho it was composed of three corps of infantry (Polk, Hill and Walker), in six divisions, and two corps of cavalry (Wheeler and Forrest), in four divisions! Too ridiculous to dwell upon.

At the same time an examination of Davis's 64,302 figures shows that he copied them from Rosecrans's report of his whole command on June 30, from which he makes no allowance for the casualties and detachments of two and a half months nor for the troops necessarily left behind to guard the crossings of the Tennessee and garrison Chattanooga. And that disingenuous statesman had the same access to Rosecrans's later reports, when he wrote, that he had to the reports of June 30.

But Bragg himself disposes of Davis's figures (and of his own) in a report he made September 20, a few days after the battle. In that he states his then "effective strength", infantry and artillery, as 38,846. Adding his four divisions of cavalry at the very low estimate of 10,000 "effectives", the whole must have been not less than 49,000. At the same time he reports his losses in the battle as "nearly, if not quite, 18,000". Thus he shows he had 67,000 in "effectives" alone at the battle; and there still remains to be added the difference between the reported "effectives" and the "present for duty", the former being, in Confederate reports, always much less than the latter, tho no known Confederate document or statement allows for that difference in stating the numbers of Union forces.

A highly competent student and critic of the campaigns of the war, himself an officer in active service in Sherman's command from the beginning to Atlanta (Colonel E. C. Dawes of Cincinnati) has made a very careful examination of all the related records in the War Department on both sides, from which he shows that Bragg's army in the field at Chickamauga numbered 71,551 and Rosecrans's 56,975. (And these figures prove, that, being on the defensive, Rosecrans ought not to have been defeated.)

from two to three miles wide, but the battle soon crowded itself into the middle part of the north half.

At Rossville there is a gap in Missionary Ridge, thro which there was a good road east to Ringgold. From this gap the Ridge extends in a straight line southwesterly six miles, with a crest four hundred to five hundred feet higher than the Chickamauga creeks, and then falls away into McLemore's Cove. About midway it is broken by McFarland's Gap, thro which there was then a steep and narrow road, connecting the valleys of the Chattanooga and the Chickamauga.

The eastern front of these six miles of the ridge is filled with a mass of irregular foot-hills, separated only by ravines and "hollows" and rising to crests in peaks and ridges from one hundred to three hundred feet high.* From Crawfish Spring to Hall's ford, on the West Chickamauga, about three miles, these foot-hills abut directly upon the creek, but from Hall's north there is a space between them and the creek varying from nothing to a mile or more in width. Tho not a level valley, this region was occupied by a number of plantations in forest clearings, and, in diminishing number and size, plantations or farms were also scattered on the slopes of the foot-hills westward up to the foot of the main ridge. But everywhere outside the plantations and clearings stretched the primitive forest, much of it filled with dense thickets.

This was the terrain of the great battle, and few of greater difficulties in action are found in military history. Yet, two months later, these same armies (both reinforced) fought a battle on one more difficult only a few miles away,—on the north end of the same Missionary Ridge and the north end of Lookout Mountain.

But Rosecrans was oppressed by more difficulties than those of the terrain. Bragg and he were equally at loss in the fact that neither could see the major movements of

* It was within that portion of these foot-hills between the Glenn and Mullis, Kelly and Vidito houses, less than two miles long and one wide, that Rosecrans's forces were compressed when the set battle was begun on the morning of the 20th (the second day's battle) and in the final struggle the fighting remnant, under Thomas, was crowded into an area that barely included the Kelly and Snodgrass houses, less than a mile long east and west and little more than half a mile north and south.

the other, because of the hills and forests, nor even, at most times, the minor movements of the troops until they came within musket range; but Rosecrans had the worst of it, because he was struck when moving in long columns across Bragg's front, while Bragg was operating from an organized base upon a fixed plan covering precisely the field in which he compelled the battle. Tho there was a good deal of confusion in Bragg's army, due to the peculiar obstacles of the field and the varying demands of the prolonged battle, there was much more in Rosecrans's, where the same troubles prevailed, with the greater one that he had got only the head of his columns into position when he was compelled to go into action. From that moment, assaulted here or there without warning, constantly hurrying up this or that marching column, already all night on the march, he had to take his troops for reinforcement or support from any command he might happen to reach, and throughout the battle, during both days, his corps, divisions, even brigades, were divided and moved here or there and more or less kept separated, to the great embarrassment and trouble of the generals, high and low. But the tenacity and fighting spirit of Rosecrans's troops reduced Bragg to much the same condition. Steadily repelling his assaults and often pursuing the assailants, making successful countercharges and compelling him to find troops to fill the gaps, they harried him until his lines became hardly less ragged and entangled than their own.

It would, therefore, be difficult and tedious to describe the battle in detail; and indeed, for the purpose of this narrative, it is hardly necessary. But a sketch of the field would give some aid, and one is appended, showing the places mentioned and something of the topography, tho the scale is not large enough to present the latter well.

Early on the 19th General Granger, in position east of Rossville, had a brigade out on reconnoisance near the Chickamauga, and the colonel who commanded it reported to General Thomas, near Kelly's house, that he had found that a brigade of the enemy's cavalry had crossed to the west side of West Chickamauga creek and was isolated between the Reed and Alexander bridges. Thomas directed Brannan to advance with two brigades, to learn the situation and, if practicable, capture the lone brigade; and,

in precaution, he moved Baird's division forward within reach of Brannan's right. This was about 9 a. m.

The result was the beginning of the great battle. The enemy proved to be three brigades of Forrest's cavalry and one division of infantry (Liddell's, of Walker's corps), while on the left of this division (as learned later), between it and Lee & Gordon's mill, the greater part of Bragg's infantry was across and in position.

About 10 o'clock the advanced brigade of Brannan's division, on the Alexander's bridge road, was resisted by Forrest's cavalry. Colonel Croxton,* commanding the brigade, at once attacked and drove the rebels back half a mile toward the creek, but then found them determined to stand. Under order from Thomas, Baird then moved forward his whole division and drove them steadily ahead, taking many prisoners, while Brannan came up on his left and aided in clearing the whole front. Baird then found heavier forces of infantry advancing to envelop his right, and moved back that part of his line to a position that was better for receiving an attack. At this awkward moment the enemy, whose numbers had not been seen because of the thick woods, advanced rapidly in a furious assault upon the exposed brigade and threw that one and the next on its left into much disorder, taking many prisoners and a whole battery of guns,—of the Fifth U. S. Artillery, of General John H. King's brigade, Baird's division. The left of Crittenden's corps, stretching north from Lee & Gordon's mill, was not yet within supporting distance, but the head division (Johnson's) of McCook's corps, having (as already told) reached the field before Reynolds, just then came up, and was hurriedly run into line, protecting Baird's right and enabling him to recover. And Thomas intended to put the two brigades of Reynolds on the right of Johnson as soon as they arrived.

The battle was on. But not half of Rosecrans's army was yet in position, and the positions held were not chosen, but forced upon him by the enemy's aggression. Rosecrans, unfortunately, was not fit for the hour of trial mentally or physically. For a whole week now, since he had

* Later highly distinguished as a brigadier of cavalry in Wilson's Cavalry Corps in the great Selma campaign. See "Story of a Cavalry Regiment."

begun to see his mistake as to Bragg's retreat, he had been in terrible anxiety and overbusy night and day in plans and orders, under great difficulties, for saving his army by moving to the north. He was not a man of deep or broad reflection, he had little self-control — "a bundle of nerves", as the saying goes,— and he was very much alarmed. He hurried about from place to place and kept his staff officers still more hurried with orders and directions more or less conflicting and more or less beyond compliance within the time required. Thomas thus, naturally and from force of character, assumed the responsibility and exercised the command of the whole left wing. The one great good fortune that Rosecrans had was to have this man of cool head, sane judgment, unshakable nerves and perfect courage in that dominating position in the battle. Without him, or with a lesser man in his place, Chickamauga would have been wholly a disaster.

It was clear now that Bragg's purpose was to crush Rosecrans's left by sheer weight, and get between it and Chattanooga. He was compelled to change the plan which, on the 18th, he had written and sent to his generals. This was to cross the creek at Reed's and Alexander's bridges and the fords above, wheel to the left and sweep up the west side of the valley upon Lee & Gordon's mill. He expected in this to drive Rosecrans southward and get possession of the Chattanooga roads. It was Thomas's forced march thro the night of the 18th and his appearance in front of the Reed and Alexander bridges that broke up Bragg's grand scheme and compelled him hastily to rearrange his forces to fight to the north and west instead of the south.

Of course Rosecrans's first orders were for bringing forward all the troops available. Crittenden was ordered to leave one division (Wood's) at Lee & Gordon's mill and move the two others (Palmer and Van Cleve), by the left flank, toward the battle-field. Negley's division (of Thomas's corps) was left in its position southeasterly of Crawfish Spring, covering the crossings in front of Pigeon Mountain, and Sheridan's division (McCook's corps) was placed between that position and Wood's at Lee & Gordon's mill, supporting both, while McCook's last division (Davis) and Thomas's last (Reynolds) were pushed on

toward the battle by way of Widow Glenn's house.

We left Reynolds's men (except Wilder's brigade) south of Crawfish Spring, marching north all the night and thro forests, their road lighted by an endless string of fires. Daylight found them north of the Spring, still tramping on, but about sunrise, between Gordon's house and Osborne's, they were halted to make coffee and get breakfast. The water had to be brought from a distance, which extended the halt to over an hour. They had to fill their canteens for the march (the weather was still hot by day and the roads very dusty), but there was not enough water near and a detail of fifty men from each regiment was sent, with all the canteens, to fill them at a creek half a mile away. Before these men could return came an urgent order to move on at once, to go into action. The guns of their corps, already fighting in front, could be heard. The division was thus left for many hours without water and without the means of getting it, and, what was worse, each regiment was short fifty men.

Turchin's brigade was in advance, King's following. On arrival at Glenn's they were sent toward Kelly's, by a cross-road, their thoughts and feelings intensely occupied by the battle going on only a mile ahead, when they were halted near Withers's tanyard. This was probably to await directions as to the position in which they were to be placed in front. They could not see the fighting lines of either side, because of the hills and woods, which made more intense the strain on their nerves.

This was the time and place of that remarkable scene in which Chaplain Lyle was the central figure, referred to on page 150. At the Chaplain's request Colonel Lane moved the companies into suitable position for hearing, the Chaplain rode to the front and, still on his horse, spoke to them in such simple, direct, eloquent language that more than one of his hearers believed it to be inspired. In a clear, strong voice, ringing with restrained emotion, he spoke of the great cause for which they were to fight that day, which he said was not the cause of aggression or of glory, but that of home and country, of truth and liberty, of God and Humanity. He adjured them to be brave, to be manly, and to remember their old flag and

what it covers. He reminded them of their duty to God and His relation to them, and prayed that He would cover their heads this day in the battle storm.

It was brief, and at the end he said "It is but little that I can do for you in the hour of battle, but there is one thing I will do,— I will pray for you, as thousands all over the land are praying for you this morning". Then, while the flag of many battle-fields was drooped and the men leaned on their rifles with their heads bowed, he prayed fervently the blessing of God upon the army, the officers, the soldiers, the country and the cause, and His love and mercy for those who might fall. Then he rose in his stirrups, waved his hat over his head, and loudly cried "God bless you this day and make you strong and brave! Strike for Liberty and Union! Strike for God and Humanity!"*

Surely such a service, at such a time and place, in the very verge of battle, deeply moved every one who was there, and few could restrain their tears. General Reynolds, who was riding by, with several of his staff, stopped and remained to the end, and responded, with all — "Amen!" He too was in tears as he thanked the Chaplain, in the presence of the men, for what he had done.

Aptly enough, this episode was hardly ended when the two brigades were ordered by General Rosecrans to march at once up the State road toward McDannel's house, to take position for action, but, when approaching McDannel's, an order was received from General Thomas to countermarch in quick time to Kelly's house. Then, before Kelly's was reached, Turchin learned that two of his regiments, the Ninety-second Ohio and Eighteenth Kentucky (probably the two in the rear), had been taken off by General Reynolds and placed somewhere in the battle-front, and a staff-officer who told him of this undertook to lead him to their position, with his two other regiments, the Eleventh and Thirty-sixth Ohio. The Eighty-ninth

* The account and language here given are taken partly from Colonel Lane and partly from the letter of a newspaper correspondent written on the field at the time. Scenes more or less similar to this, no doubt often occurred during the war, but, in four years' service, I never saw one, nor did I ever hear of one so apt and striking as this.

Ohio, of this brigade, was still absent, with Granger's corps.

The Eleventh Ohio went into the action with 20 officers and 413 men. The Lieutenant-Colonel was absent, sick, but Major Higgins proved to be a most efficient right hand for the Colonel.

None of the reports show precisely where this position was. Colonel Lane says it was "northeast of Gordon's", he thinks two miles, and "on a hill"; but it must have been four miles from Gordon's and the country is all hills. It was certainly east of the State road, not far from Kelly's. I think it was four or five hundred yards east of that road, about east of Kelly's house, and in defense of the cross-roads northeast of Kelly's.

General Reynolds was just sending his Second brigade (King's) from Kelly's, to take position on Turchin's right, when General Palmer saw him and told him that his division (of Crittenden's corps) was in action in front and gaining ground, but was nearly out of ammunition, and he asked temporary relief. No troops but King's being in sight and the need being imminent, and knowing Palmer's position to be on the left of that he was himself assigned to, Reynolds sent King and three of his regiments with Palmer. Then, with King's remaining regiment and one of Wilder's mounted infantry — the Ninety-second Illinois, now dismounted,— and the two batteries of Turchin and King, he established a reserve near Kelly's house.

Several hours were consumed in these movements. General Turchin's report has it about three o'clock when he at last found his position, but the brigade took part in a renewal of the battle on this front which was fought and ended by or soon after two o'clock. It seems to be sure that the two brigades ended their march at Kelly's about one o'clock and were in position by half past one.

Their position in the line of battle was now on the right of Palmer's division, which was on right of Johnson's of McCook's corps, and that on the right of Baird and Brannan of Thomas's. Wilder's brigade of Reynolds's division, again detached, was posted near Vineyard's house, half a mile to the right, except the Ninety-second Illinois, now serving dismounted directly with Reynolds.

This gap in the line gave the enemy an opportunity which he took advantage of in his next assault, in an attempt to overwhelm Reynolds's division, but Van Cleve's division of McCook's corps was moving up to occupy the space.

Tho this is called a line, it was, in form, a very irregular one, as compelled by the ground,—an area of hills, hollows and ravines, nearly all covered with woods and thickets. Often the line of a regiment or brigade was not at all the line of the next regiment or brigade, and in most places it was impossible to see men beyond a hundred yards,—a condition full of perplexity and difficulty to commanding officers, whose judgment often had to be based upon guess.

The enemy's success in driving back Baird's right was quickly made a failure. When Thomas got Johnson's and part of Reynolds's divisions into position he ordered the whole line forward, at the same time that Brannan, by a right wheel, was driving in on the enemy's right. Brannan fully revenged Baird, defeating the enemy in his front by a fierce assault and retaking the whole of the Fifth United States battery in a bayonet charge made by his Ninth Ohio regiment, while the rest of the line forced the enemy back upon his reserves at the creek. This brought a lull in the fighting for an hour, during which time Thomas improved his position by taking better ground in parts of his line and closing up.

Defeated thus in his attempt to break Thomas's left, Bragg massed several divisions and, about three o'clock, made a furious assault upon his right. This struck, first, the exposed right of Reynolds's brigades and severely shook them. Up to this time the Eleventh Ohio had not been on the firing line, being held back with the Thirty-sixth Ohio in a second line, but both were now moved forward and the Thirty-sixth was sent into position where the two other regiments of the brigade were. This left Colonel Lane with his regiment alone and without orders.*

* It should be borne in mind that one small regiment, in two ranks, would occupy hardly 150 yards and that the four or five divisions in front stretched, in a curve, probably over two miles, and, being in the woods, were quite out of sight from Lane's position.

The roar of the battle directly in front was tremendous, and it seemed to come nearer, as if the rebels were gaining. The wounded were seen coming and carried back to the rear in increasing numbers. Colonel Lane was very impatient and troubled. A mounted officer appeared, in nervous haste, and, seeing a regiment not engaged, appealed to the Colonel to move up to the help of his men, one of his regiments, he said, being nearly out of ammunition. It was General Hazen, who had a brigade in Palmer's division, Crittenden's corps. The Colonel could only answer that he was expecting orders from his own commander, and asked him to apply to General Turchin, but neither of them knew just where Turchin was, and Hazen hurried away to find him. Directly afterward the line in front appeared to be breaking, a part of it, at least, being seen falling back.* Colonel Lane took the responsibility of action and at once led his men up to fill the threatened gap. He soon found himself again alone and in conflict with the enemy, at the edge of a field in the forest. He pushed the attack and drove his enemy beyond the field, to the shelter of the forest on the other side. The men were so much pleased with their success in this action that they "clamored" (as the Colonel expresses it) for leave to carry it into a charge. They got it, and in a very few minutes the whole regiment had rushed the field, in the face of fire, and plunged into the rebels in the wood, driving them off, scattered in confusion, and taking many prisoners. In the middle of this charge the color-bearer, Sergeant John H. Peck, fell with the colors, severely wounded.† His brother, Lieutenant George E. Peck, seized the colors and bore them in the front thro the action.‡ The rebels the regiment met in this affair

This experience of Colonel Lane was like that of other, perhaps many other, regimental commanders that day and the next. Literally, he did not know where he was in relation to the position of any other troops on the field, not even to those of his own division. For some time he was even lost from his own brigade,—alone in the midst of a great battle-field, without any orders or any information.

* This proved to be the Ninety-second Ohio, of Turchin's brigade, which had run nearly out of cartridges.

† He died in hospital at Chattanooga a month later.

‡ Killed in action two months later, leading his company in the battle of Missionary Ridge. These brothers were Cincinnatians.

appear to have belonged to the same Stewart's division it had met in action at Hoover's Gap, June 25.

Finding no other Union troops near after holding his position half an hour, Colonel Lane moved back until he found himself near the right of the Thirty-sixth Ohio, then in action, when he formed in its support. He did not then know that his attack and success had been made possible by the aid of Croxton's brigade of Brannan's division, which Thomas had hurried by the rear to the right and which had arrived just in time to prevent the enemy from breaking Reynolds's exposed flank. At the same time Reynolds was strenuously at work, trying to check the falling back seen in both divisions; and, getting another battery, he had eighteen guns and two of Wilder's howitzers in position near Poe's house, pouring all their fire into the enemy's positions.

The movements of the different divisions in repelling these attacks and pursuing the beaten enemy had thrown the whole line out of place again, and it had to be readjusted. Baird's division was left in its position on the low ridge across the roads from McDannel's to the Reed and Alexander bridges, the divisions of Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds in the same order as before, extending to the right along the crest of another ridge, so that Reynolds's extreme right was about half a mile directly east of Withers's tanyard, while Brannan's was moved by the rear, along the State road, to near the tanyard, to be a reserve for the right in case of another attack.

Brannan was not yet in position when the enemy again advanced to battle, this time striking first the center, on Johnson's division, and later Reynolds' on the right, in a most furious assault. The impetus and fierceness of the charge gave some promise of success, causing some confusion in Johnson's line and a little on Baird's right, but this was only temporary. Johnson and Baird made a fine counter-charge, and the rebels again fled faster than they had come. The attack upon Reynolds was promptly met and repulsed, and turned into a spirited counter-attack, in which Turchin's brigade was especially distinguished.

This was soon after Colonel Lane's regiment had joined the Thirty-sixth, as told above. The two regiments were

moved back and to the right, where they joined General Turchin with the Ninety-second Ohio and Eighteenth Kentucky of their brigade. With replenished ammunition, they now advanced, changing front to the right, to meet the fresh assault just mentioned. It was their hottest battle of the day. After a short, fierce struggle, almost at close quarters because of the thick woods, the whole brigade threw itself upon the enemy in a determined charge, led by Turchin and backed up by King's brigade on the right, broke the rebels and drove them, it is said, a mile and a half (tho that is certainly too far), captured two guns and many prisoners, including a number of officers. But they suffered severely in killed and wounded, among whom were Colonel King,* of the Sixty-eighth Indiana, commanding the Second brigade, and Colonel Jones, of the Thirty-sixth Ohio, killed, and Colonel Fearing, of the Ninety-second Ohio, and the majors of the Ninety-second Ohio and Eighteenth Kentucky badly wounded. The enemy encountered by Turchin's brigade in this last battle was Law's division of Longstreet's (now Hood's) corps.

The desperate struggle was over for the day, and the advantage certainly lay with Rosecrans. In spite of the great awkwardness of his position when attacked and the difficulties met in getting his troops into place under repeated attacks, they had repulsed six set assaults and prevented the enemy from gaining any position he had attempted.

Rosecrans had been unable to put into action more than five of his divisions of infantry,—three of Thomas's, one of Crittenden's and one of McCook's. His cavalry was occupied many miles to the south, with little fighting, in keeping off Wheeler's cavalry, which was trying to cross the creek into McLemore's Cove. Bragg, on the other hand, had crossed and thrown into the contest, at one time or another, eight of his eleven divisions of infantry and the two of Forrest's cavalry, and was moving up his three other divisions of infantry when his last attack was repulsed. In great disappointment he ceased all operations,

* Edward A. King. He was succeeded in the command of the brigade by Colonel Milton S. Robinson, of the Seventy-fifth Indiana.

tho there was yet an hour or two of daylight. His plans had been laid upon a fixed determination to finish and win the battle that day. Now he must withdraw from the field or try another day's battle, with his forces seriously diminished in number, and not a little in morale from the failure of all their attacks; tho, in respect to losses, Rosecrans had suffered about as much in proportion as himself.

But Rosecrans considered that Bragg was defeated, at least for the present, and was in worse condition than himself for a renewal of the battle. He had the advantage as to ground, he had five divisions not yet engaged and a sixth (Steedman's) at Rossville, while, as he believed, Bragg had used all or nearly all of his. He was sure that Bragg's losses in men and guns were greater than his own, his men felt that they had won so far, and his position was still to be on the defensive. He might reasonably look for complete success in any further contest. But he was confident of it, and he telegraphed that night to Washington, in effect, that he had beaten Bragg and that his defeat would be made complete the next day. This prophecy was to be expected from his sanguine mind, but one cannot fail to see a certain apprehension and caution in his despatch,* perhaps because he realized that, if Bragg should attack again, it would be after thorough preparation and choice of positions in the night and with greater determination than ever.

The battle of Sunday, September 20

When it was certain that the fighting was ended Saturday evening the troops that had been engaged were moved back more or less, to get more commanding ground, and bivouacked on their arms, while the others were brought

* It read—"We have just concluded a terrific day's fighting and have another in prospect for tomorrow. The enemy attempted to turn our left, but his design was anticipated and a sufficient force placed there to render his attempt abortive. * * * "The enemy was greatly our superior in numbers." (Just the language of Bragg's report to Richmond!) * * * "The army is in excellent condition and spirits, and, by the blessing of Providence, the defeat of the enemy will be total tomorrow."

up nearer. Thomas had hardly got these dispositions substantially made when he was called to Rosecrans's headquarters, with all the principal generals, for a conference, which lasted until midnight; and the resulting plans and orders of the Commanding-General were made known to them all. Their importance was greater to Thomas than to any other, as he held the left, where the heaviest and most persistent attack was to be expected. He had borne the brunt of the battle on Saturday and he was to bear it again on Sunday. As it turned out, he became responsible, practically, for the whole battle.

Soon after Thomas returned to his quarters, about two o'clock, he had a report from General Baird, who had been ordered to take a strong position on the road from McDannel's to Reed's bridge, that his left did not reach that road and could not be made to reach it without weakening his line too much. He at once wrote a note to Rosecrans, stating the fact and asking to have his own Second division (Negley's) sent to take position on the left and rear of Baird, to make sure against an assault there. He was immediately answered, without question, that Negley would be sent at once, but the promise was neglected,—one of the two conspicuously fatal faults of Rosecrans on that fateful day.

At that time Rosecrans's divisions were in position, from left to right, as follows: Of the six immediately under Thomas, Baird's was on the extreme left and just to the left of Kelly's cross-roads, tho too weak to reach to the road of chief importance, from McDannel's to Reed's bridge; Johnson's was on Baird's right and a little further front, lying across the Alexander's bridge road; Palmer's at the right and rear of Johnson's; Reynolds's (two brigades) on Palmer's right, Turchin's brigade being east of the State road and a little northeast of Poe's house and King's (now Robinson's) just west of that road and nearly in front of Poe's house; Brannan's further west of that road and just north of Dyer's house, in reserve in column of brigades; Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry (dismounted, with its horses concealed some distance to the west) still near (west of) Vineyard's house. Van Cleve's and Wood's of Crittenden's corps and Davis's and Sheridan's of McCook's (except one brigade of Davis, which

had been posted at Stevens's Gap) were all moving up on the roads between Glenn's house and Lee & Gordon's mill.

Negley's division had been withdrawn from Crawfish Spring to the north the evening before and had reached Brotherton's house just as the enemy's last attack was being driven off east of Kelly's. Negley found on arriving that a division of the enemy had reached the State road near Brotherton's, and he at once made a spirited attack upon his own responsibility, and successfully. He then took position west of Brotherton's and in front of the Withers tanyard.

Mitchell's cavalry, closing up in McLemore's Cove to keep near the infantry, was near Crawfish Spring (except Minty's brigade), but was wholly employed in keeping Wheeler's cavalry out of the battle. Minty's brigade, which had been placed during the day (19th) in rear of the Glenn house and not employed, had been sent, at dark, by way of McFarland's Gap and Rossville, to reconnoiter the lower Chickamauga in the vicinity of Ringgold.

Bragg had been, of course, as busy during the night as Rosecrans. He now had the whole of his army west of the Chickamauga, except Wheeler's cavalry, still on the east side, six miles south of the field of action, held there by Mitchell. He organized his army for the battle of the 20th in two wings. The right wing, commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk, was composed of Forrest's cavalry corps on the right, with Pegram's division on the extreme right, a little north of Jay's mill, mounted, and Armstrong's on its left, dismounted; then, from the left of Armstrong, five divisions of infantry, being Liddell's and Gist's of Walker's corps, Cleburne's and Breckinridge's of Hill's corps and Cheatham's of his own corps. In his left wing, commanded by Lieutenant-General Longstreet, were six divisions of infantry, being Law's and Kershaw's of his own corps (now commanded by General Hood), Stewart's, Preston's and Johnson's of Buckner's corps, and Hindman's of Polk's corps. The extreme left — Preston's division — rested on the creek, near Hall's ford, a mile north of Lee & Gordon's mill, and the whole line, from Jay's mill to Hall's ford, closely filled a space of nearly three miles. Stewart's division, of the left wing, was bivouacked within rifle-shot of the State road, near

Brotherton's house, a position which gave Thomas much trouble early in the morning.

Thus Bragg had eleven divisions of infantry* and two of cavalry set for battle against Rosecrans's ten divisions of infantry, less two brigades, one of which was the garrison in Chattanooga and the other on post at Stevens' Gap, fifteen miles away, tho he (Rosecrans) had another division of infantry (Steedman's of Granger's corps) at McAfee's church, on the Rossville-Ringgold road, four miles to the north.

Tho Rosecrans, the night before, felt assured of victory and the men generally believed the rebels were beaten, since they had seen every assault defeated, there was deep anxiety in all minds. Thomas, especially, put every minute to use in preparation, knowing that Bragg's chief purpose must be to break down his left and gain the road between him and Chattanooga. With Negley's division — if he had it — he could reach the McDannel cross-roads; but, with his habitual caution, he made secure a chosen position half a mile south of McDannel's. This was on rising ground in front (west) of Kelly's cross-roads. Here, in a rough crescent or semi-circle around Kelly's house, the base of which was seven or eight hundred yards along the State road, he established a defensive line and protected it by having trees slashed and logs and rails placed so as to form a barricade, a provision which proved to be of great value in the battle. The axes were heard on Bragg's lines, and Bragg understood the purpose.

The first gleam of dawn found Thomas riding the lines, giving final directions and looking anxiously for the arrival of Negley's division, to hold the cross-roads on his left. Not yet at seven o'clock had Negley appeared, altho the promise to send him was given four or five hours before and his position was then not ten minutes walk from Rosecrans's headquarters. But the enemy's attack was delayed, for some reason not known to Thomas, and, at eight o'clock, he took the responsibility of sending direct to Negley an order to move up. Negley's report says that that was the first order he received; that he at once began

* But Bragg's report says that three brigades of Longstreet's had not yet arrived from Virginia.

to move and had one brigade out on the road when the enemy was reported advancing in his front and attacking his skirmish line; that General Rosecrans then ordered him to hold the position until he could be relieved by other troops; that he sent to Thomas, however, the one brigade drawn out (John Beatty's), and that no relief for the others appeared until nine-thirty.

Thomas, thus compelled to give up his hope of holding McDannel's cross-roads (with what thoughts can be imagined, since the enemy now had an open road across his left), did the next best thing by disposing his men to hold the State road and Kelly's cross-roads from his position at the barricades. He placed twelve brigades in the semi-circle,— Dodge's of Johnson's division of McCook's corps, on the extreme left, with its left resting on the State road, then, to the right, John Beatty's, of Negley's division of his own corps, then John King's, Scribner's and Starkweather's, of Baird's division of his own corps, then Berry's and Willich's, of Johnson's division, then Cruft's, Hazen's and Grose's, of Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps, and then Turchin's and Edward A. King's (now Robinson's), of Reynolds's division of his own corps. The right of Turchin's brigade reached nearly to the State road, a little north of Poe's house, and faced to the southeast, and King's was placed just to the right of the road and had the same face.

The other troops were placed by direct orders from Rosecrans as follows: On the right of King (Robinson) and parallel with the road the three brigades of Brannan's division and the two remaining of Negley's, both of Thomas's corps; then, turning much to the right south of the tanyard, five brigades of McCook's corps, being Davis's two remaining brigades and Sheridan's three. This part of the line ran by the Glenn house and a few hundred yards west of it. Still to the west, and forming the extreme right, were the mounted infantry, Harrison's regiment and Wilder's brigade. Then Crittenden's two remaining divisions, Van Cleve and Wood, were placed in the rear of the center, to the right of Vidito's house and just west of the Dry Valley road, as a reserve to the whole line. It was about two and a half miles, in direct line from the extreme right to the extreme left. All these troops

were up to or north of the Glenn house before dark of the 19th.

To the question, why General Rosecrans did not then undertake to move on the three or four miles to the Ross-ville-Ringgold road, where his position would be much better and where he could not be cut off from Chattanooga, the only answer is, that he flattered himself that he had already, practically, defeated Bragg.

Bragg had ordered the attack to begin at daybreak by Polk's advance up the Reed's bridge road, to strike and, if possible, turn Rosecrans's left, and, immediately after Polk's beginning, to open rapidly from right to left until the whole line was engaged. But Polk did no better this morning than the last. Bragg was out, with his horse held ready, before dawn, waiting to hear Polk's guns. After sunrise he sent an officer to him, to learn the cause of the delay. The officer did not find him with his troops, but finally found him beyond the creek, where he had spent the night comfortably in a house, but he had not yet ordered the attack. Bragg rode off to him (probably not at a walk!) and found that he had made no preparations beyond sending two messengers during the night to General Hill, both of whom had failed to find him. Hill, in turn, when found, said he had had no orders, that his men were then getting breakfast and he would not call them off. The fact was, that neither of the two had any great love for Bragg, nor was any lost between themselves. They did get started at last, and began the battle at nearly eleven o'clock, as Bragg says, but there is better evidence that it was not later than ten o'clock.

When it did begin, however, there was no lack of resolution or energy. The crash along the whole line on and near the State road was tremendous, but heaviest on Thomas's left. Repeated assaults there finally forced Baird partly out of position. The enemy was not only able to make this attack in heavy force, but to move two divisions past Baird, across the State road and partly in the rear of Thomas's position. This could not have been done if Negley's division had been sent as Rosecrans had promised, or an equivalent force; but now one of Brannan's brigades (Van Derveer) and one of Negley's (Stanley) were hurried to the left (two of Van Cleve's

brigades also were ordered there, but did not arrive), and, with the aid of two batteries rushed to the ridge at Snodgrass's house, broke up this very dangerous situation and forced the enemy off the State road and back toward the creek.*

Meantime the attack upon Reynolds and Palmer (by Stewart's and Cleburne's divisions) was hotly pressed, renewed again and again, but always repulsed. Stewart especially threw his three brigades against the two of Turchin and Robinson, coming almost to close quarters with Turchin's men, whose position was the most exposed, but there was no shaking them or stopping their fire; and about noon, after more than two hours of the contest, the enemy withdrew and left that part of the line inactive for several hours.

But he was exceedingly active elsewhere. Failing to break Thomas's left or any part of his barricaded position, and learning or assuming that the right of Rosecrans's line was weaker, Longstreet undertook to break thro there. Rosecrans's line to the right of Reynolds then stood: First, from Thomas's corps, two brigades of Brannan's division on the right of Robinson's brigade of Reynolds's division and a little further back from the State road (Brannan had been placed there at first as a support to Reynolds, which would put him a little to the rear, tho within immediate reach); then, from Crittenden's corps, Wood's division on the right of Brannan and a little in advance of him; then, from McCook's corps, Davis's division (two brigades) on the right of Wood and, finally, Sheridan's division on the right of Davis, with the mounted infantry (dismounted, to fight on foot) still further to the right. Van Cleve (of Crittenden's corps), with two of his brigades, was in the rear, near Dyer's house.

General Rosecrans realized that this line was too long for the number of troops in it, and before eleven o'clock decided to draw it in. He, naturally, first ordered Sheridan, who was on the far right, to move by the rear to the left and support Thomas. Then Van Cleve, with his two brigades near Dyer's house, was ordered to move to

* In this battle the rebel General Helm, commanding a brigade in Breckinridge's division, whose wife was a sister of Mrs. Lincoln, was killed.

Thomas. Then Davis's division was to be moved to the left. But it was too late: the enemy interfered, and the results were terrible. Tho neither side knew the other's situation, it happened, by singular fatality, that Bragg's strongest position in all the battle and Rosecrans's weakest exactly coincided in both time and place.

A young aide-de-camp, riding from the right with some message for General Thomas, saw what he thought was a gap in the line between Reynolds and Wood. He made no investigation or inquiry, as he probably would have done if older, but, with more zeal than good sense, volunteered the report that there was a gap in the line. If he had ridden only a hundred yards into the gap (it was in the woods) he must have seen that it was occupied by Brannan. But he was too careless or "too fresh", and he opened the gate to the great tide that swept away the whole right wing and lost the day.

By another fatality Rosecrans had ordered Brannan to join, in turn, in the movement to the left, and when this news of a gap came to him he supposed that Brannan had moved as so ordered, but when Brannan received the order he had a report of movement by the enemy in his front and discreetly judged that he ought to wait a little for any development. He reported this decision to Rosecrans, but before his report was received Rosecrans ordered Wood to fill the supposed gap by moving left to Reynolds. Thus, with Sheridan moved to the left, as ordered, and Davis closed up with Wood, he would have reduced his line by the length of two whole divisions and made it practically safe.

Now came another blow for the troubled General, a cruel punishment for his lack of care in giving an important order. His order to Wood he left to a young officer, a captain and aide-de-camp on his staff. If not himself or his chief-of-staff, then some officer of rank and experience ought to have taken the order to Wood in person. But this aide-de-camp wrote it, and sent it to Wood by still another or an orderly. It read "The General Commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as rapidly as possibly and support him". It does not appear whether Rosecrans dictated this order, but, whoever was responsible for it, it was inexcusably obscure. In ordinary usage,

to "close up on Reynolds" meant to connect in line with him, but "support him" meant, usually, a position somewhat to his rear and not in line with him. To do both was impossible, and Wood had to decide how to act. He was a West Point officer, had had long experience in the army and was distinguished for several high military qualities. He knew that Brannan was in place, that there was in fact no interval, and he actually thought, as any one would, that the order was made under some mistake. It was his duty to obey orders, but none the less his duty to exercise discretion where obedience would, probably, not be expected if the situation were fully known. That is, knowing Brannan was there, he ought to have reported that fact and held his position while awaiting further instructions. He was a masterful, self-reliant man, and surely had often before acted upon his own discretion. But what he did now was to "obey orders" without discretion, and leave the general who mistakenly sent the order to take the consequences; but, having thrown away discretion to make himself technically safe in obeying the order, he immediately used discretion in acting upon one part of the order rather than the other. He decided not to "close up on" Reynolds, but to move to his rear, to "support him". Even then he did not move directly toward Reynolds, across Brannan's front, but around his rear, by a long circuit.* The only care he took was to ask General Davis to move to the left and take the place he was leaving, but Davis had only two brigades, both small and much too weak for the duty, tho he attempted it.

Now, when Polk's wing had been broken on the rock of Thomas's defense and that part of the field looked hopeless ("nearly all parts of the right wing were in turn repulsed, with heavy losses", reports Bragg), Long-

* Of course Wood was severely criticised after the battle for this performance, but he had the defense that he had "obeyed orders". But he was too intelligent a man and too capable a soldier to have entire faith in that defense. The real explanation may have been in private antagonism to Rosecrans, a state of mind not uncommon among the generals and lesser officers in that army. In fact many of them had little or no confidence in him as a general, and, therefore, little respect for or fear of him personally.

street set out to show that the battle could be won. He was far the ablest fighting general in Bragg's army, and his lieutenant, Hood, was conspicuous for daring and indifference to fire. Singularly enough, Bragg in no way mentions this movement distinctively in his reports; Longstreet had thought of it and sent for leave to make it, but before his messenger returned, he found one or two of his divisions moving forward by Bragg's direct order, made without reference to him. He then took charge, massed three of the best divisions in column, led by Hood, had another division follow in close support, and moved straight upon the middle of Rosecrans's right wing, regardless of any fire. Most unhappily, it was just at the moment when Wood, Davis, Sheridan and Van Cleve were all out of position and moving, as already told, with their right flanks exposed, that this tremendous blow was struck. All of Bragg's struggles and losses up to this time were as nothing compared with this decisive advantage that fell to him by accident.

It was Davis who first met the charging column. He had got one brigade into the gap left by Wood and the other was following. Sheridan's advance had just reached the space and Van Cleve's rear was not yet across it. Hood's column rolled thro Davis and swept him aside without a halt, broke off the right of Brannan's line, knocked off the head of Sheridan's column and the rear of Van Cleve's, and threw both these divisions into great confusion; and within an hour the four assaulting divisions were ranged in a semicircle around Rosecrans on the south, from the right of Reynolds's division, by the way of the Dyer house, to a point northwest of Vidito's. Half the field was lost and half his army knocked out of action.

It happened that Rosecrans was a witness to the awful scene of disaster. He saw part of the overwhelming assault, saw Davis's men, a large part of Van Cleve's and part of Sheridan's running in disorder to the west, not to stop until they were over the Ridge and in the Chattanooga valley. He knew the remainder of Sheridan's division was cut off, as well as Harrison's and Wilder's regiments; he assumed that the rebel success had swept all along his lines, that Thomas too, if not already broken, would inevitably break under another shock; he feared

that all his cavalry in McLemore's Cove was lost, and that Bragg would soon be marching on Chattanooga.

His mind was not equal to any disaster. Once rattled, it saw nothing but disaster. And his experiences during the last three weeks, especially during the last week, were more than enough to rattle badly such a man. He had been in mental terror of the consequences of his mistakes, and now they were come, piled in an hour upon his head, a crushing avalanche. His severest critic, his worst enemy, must have been pained to see his present plight. He was somewhere in the angle between the Snodgrass, Dyer and Vidito houses, his headquarters having hastily abandoned the Glenn house to escape the enemy. If he made any effort to reach Thomas or communicate with him he did not press it.* If he had seen him, or only sent to learn, he would have found that masterful general in full control of his post and of himself. So he did not get information to Thomas of the break, but left him to find it out by chance.

It does not appear how long he remained on the field after the break. It may be guessed that he remained until he believed or fancied the enemy's left was pushing past his own right. Whatever the time he was unfit for any service and attempted none, tho at least a part of his staff and his mounted escort were with him. He thought he saw the whole situation in that shocking part of it near him. Completely unnerved, he rode away by McFarland's Gap, with his staff and escort. He probably reached the west base of Missionary Ridge before the troops of Sheridan, as the sight of a body of his troops in order would, perhaps, have roused his hopes. Riding thence down the Chattanooga valley, he must have suffered yet deeper humiliation in finding himself for miles in a hurrying mob of soldiers, guns, caissons, wagons,—his own army, broken, scared, flying. He did not stop until he reached Chattanooga, which could not have been later than two o'clock, so that he must have left the field before one.

The situation of his two corps generals Crittenden and

* He does say that he tried to get to Thomas and could not; but, if he was actually cut off by the enemy, he certainly would have said that; and there is no report of either side showing that the enemy was far enough forward to separate them.

McCook was little more to be envied. Each of them had one division in the steady fighting line, but was not with it. Thomas was in general command there. Each of them, remaining at his post behind his two other divisions on the right, had found them moved here or there, by parts or the whole, by direct orders of the Commanding-General, learning of the orders usually only after the movement was made, until each was left on the field without troops to command.

A discussion as to what they ought to have done under such circumstances is hardly required here. Crittenden's account is, that he was literally cut off by the enemy, tried to get thro to the field and could not, supposed that the whole army was routed and Rosecrans lost, and that his duty was to go to Chattanooga and take command of the surviving remnant as it came in; McCook's, that he too was unable to reach the field again, and, with the same idea of a general rout, that he went to Rossville. Each of them, if he had remained as near the field as he could, or even as far away as the west end of McFarland's Gap, would have found one of his divisions, not much reduced, and part of another. With Wilder's and Harrison's mounted infantry (cut off with Sheridan), they would have had then three divisions, small ones, it is true, but numbering in all probably five or six thousand. Such a force, marching back thro the Gap, could have got onto the field easily, and would be strong enough at least to check Longstreet's left, if not to defeat it. Thomas would have given the world to have them there, and with them he would then have won the day. But they both rode away, with only their staffs, and were not ready for action again until next morning, far too late.

It is true that Rosecrans thought, when he left the field or while on the way, that he might yet save Chattanooga and that he must go there to prepare for defense. Chattanooga ought to be ready for defense, of course, but it was certainly not the work for the Commanding-General at that time; and he soon learned that there were corps and division generals unemployed who could have been charged with it.

But General Garfield, his Chief-of-Staff, who was with him on the road for Chattanooga, could not endure the

apparent abandonment of duty on the field. He asked leave to go back and join Thomas, if he was still on the field. Rosecrans refused, saying they must go on and prepare for defense at Chattanooga; but he finally consented, and Garfield rode back, with part of the escort. On the way they took, eastward over the Ridge, they met some of the enemy and had some fighting, but they found Thomas about four o'clock; and it was from Garfield, at that late hour, that Thomas learned definitely, for the first time, what had happened to bring the enemy in heavy force upon his right and rear, what had become of the right and center of the army, and where Rosecrans and the other generals were. For three hours he had been defending his position in the dark, knowing only that it had to be done.

Sheridan was another unbroken spirit, tho he had a more practical idea than Garfield of a way to redeem the day. He made at least a heroic effort, which, if he could have had an hour more, might have redeemed Chickamauga. He was moving at double-quick, in column, from his position on the right, under Rosecrans's order to reach Thomas, when Longstreet's assault struck across the head of his column, carried away part of the first brigade and threw the remainder into confusion. With quick and strenuous efforts, he got his men halted and in order, and moved to his left, for the Dry Valley road, taking into his column the scattered men of other commands he found on the way, and attempted to get around Longstreet's left by that road and then east to join Thomas. It was too late: he reached the road only to find Longstreet's troops on it ahead. Then he turned to the west, got across the main Ridge somehow, and reached the Chattanooga valley road, at the west end of McFarland's Gap. He found Davis there with his remnant, and halted there for some time (tho he speaks as if it were short), but he did get most of his own division into order, picked up parts of Negley's, Wood's and Van Cleve's, thus having 3000 or 4000 men, and with this new column hurried down the valley to Rossville, turned to the right and south, and marched for Thomas's left, thus going completely around Longstreet and part of Missionary Ridge. This he believed the shortest way, tho it does not appear why he did not

go thro the Gap and take the road by the Mullis house. There is no evidence that the enemy had reached that road. By Rossville his route was quite six miles, the first two or three obstructed by the tangled mass of the disordered retreat; but he did get nearly to McDannel's house, within a mile of Thomas's men, only to be turned back by news that Thomas was ordered to move to Rossville. And Thomas did not know he had come!

Davis, too, got into order, near McFarland's house, the most of his two brigades, put in with them several regiments and fragments of other commands he found there, mustering in all 3500 to 4000, and marched back thro the Gap. He says he reached Thomas's right and was forming lines for action when he got the same news; but he does not say and it does not appear that Thomas knew of this.

Tho it may seem singular that Thomas and his men on the left did not know for some hours that the right had suffered a sweeping reverse, they knew, from repeated great firing in that direction, that a succession of attacks had been made there; but they assumed that all such attacks had failed, just as all had failed in their part of the field.* The minor officers and the men under him, indeed, did not know of the great disaster till long after they left the field that night.†

Thomas had been told by Rosecrans before eleven that Sheridan's division would be moved to his support. Not seeing or hearing from Sheridan, he went himself, about two o'clock, toward his supposed position on the right. Reaching the head of the valley of a small stream opening south on the east of Dyer's house, he met one of his staff officers, who told him that a large body of the enemy was advancing up that valley. This was incredible. It was just where Sheridan would be coming toward him: the enemy surely could not be there. But the coming troops

* The extent of the field, all of it irregular hills and hollows, mostly covered with woods, must be kept in mind.

† A report of a brigade-commander in the crescent (Colonel Berry) on the left of Turchin, shows that he (and so, probably, the other commanding officers there) was entirely surprised to find, when withdrawn in the evening, that they were on a retreat, his only knowledge being that of defeating the enemy in every conflict of the two days.

could now be seen, and several officers present disputed as to whether they were Sheridan's or Bragg's. The uncertainty was soon ended in Brannan's attack upon them.

Thomas found himself in an appalling situation. The most of the Crittenden's and McCook's corps gone from the field, the Commanding-General and his staff not heard from, and a successful enemy moving in heavy force against his right flank and rear. He could learn nothing of the two other corps generals; but if he had known where they were and why they had gone, if he had known the whole awful extent of the abandonment of the field, he would have held to his post with no less determination and courage. If he thought of an attempt to retreat, he knew that that, by day, would be much more dangerous than holding on. It is, perhaps, fortunate that he did not know the details of the frightful event nor the actual situation of the troops of the right wing, tho he feared that Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden were all dead or captured. He must have thought of the whole body being overwhelmed, tho that must have seemed incredible. He knew that some brigadier-generals and colonels commanding brigades had been killed or disabled. In fact there were then seven. But thirteen more generals (four division and nine brigade commanders) were gone, as the two corps generals and the Commanding-General were gone; all the cavalry had been cut off in McLemore's Cove, and its commander had shown nothing of the initiative or daring that make the first qualities of a cavalry general; a large part of the artillery had been captured and a larger part of it taken off the field by General Negley (to save it from capture, he reports, tho his explanation is not convincing, and he had been specially placed in charge of it, with orders for planting it in certain positions and keeping it in action); and, finally, as if all other calamities were to be crowned by the greatest, somebody had wildly taken the whole ammunition train away in the retreat, and the men had but little left in their cartridge boxes!*

Thomas received the terrible shock of this last fact thro

* The only mention of or reference to this climax of calamity made in his reports by this man of a great soul is this: "our ammunition train was ordered to Rossville by some unauthorized person"!

the urgent calls from all along the lines for cartridges. His officers and messengers found not one ammunition wagon left on the field.

A stouter heart than that of "Old Pap" Thomas — "The Rock of Chickamauga",— where could it be found? He never lost his head or nerve. If there was to be no help, he would fight it out himself. Fortunately, on the right of his position, he had another lion in General Brannan, commander of the Third division of his own corps. He went to him at once, had him fall back to a strong position, on a ridge extending westward from the Snodgrass house, and then sent to him more troops, all he could get not already in position on his left, chiefly those General Wood had rallied, among them one of his own brigades intact (Harker's).* At the same time he sent word to Reynolds, that the right had been turned and that the enemy was in his rear in force.

Tremendous news for Reynolds, with his two small brigades holding the right of the crescent position and another enemy "in force" in his front. The fire of Longstreet's artillery in his rear was already reaching his Second brigade. He moved back the right of this brigade, so as to face this new enemy and thus at least escape an enfilading fire. In his report of this movement he goes on to say, that he then "learned that the enemy was between us and our ammunition train" and that "but for this circumstance we could have maintained our position indefinitely".†

The left wing had maintained its position around Kelly's house all the morning, suffering no ill-fortune but the temporary forcing back of part of Baird's command in the enemy's first attack upon his left flank. This faithful line in the crescent had, in fact, beaten Bragg's right wing in every assault, and so effectively that there was no renewal of attack for several hours after noon,— so effectively that when Longstreet, checked and driven back by Brannan and Wood, sent to ask Bragg for reinforcement from Polk's wing, Bragg answered that Polk's men had

* One brigade of Wood's three had been left at Chattanooga, as garrison, and another had been mostly swept away in the storm.

† Exactly the language one of his colonels — Lane — would have used!

been "repulsed in every assault and beaten so badly that they could be of no service".

Turchin's four regiments, now sadly reduced, were in the front on the right of the crescent and, with Robinson's, had borne more attacks in number than any other part of that line (because these brigades there held the main road) and never wavered, tho they saw, with increasing anxiety, their ammunition getting very low.

With Brannan's division posted, as described, on the right, Thomas placed the four brigades and parts of brigades of the other corps that had survived the break between Reynolds's right and Brannan's left, that is, at a right angle with the State road and from it to the Snodgrass house. With the curved line on the east side of the State road, he was thus in the famous "Horseshoe", which is still the great pride of the survivors of the Army of the Cumberland, and which was never to be beaten or broken, tho assailed again and again and again, from the south, the east and the west, by an exulting enemy more than double the number of its defenders. It was here that the unconquerable soul of General Thomas gained for him that great name, unequalled in all the war,— "The Rock of Chickamauga".

In this "Horseshoe" he then had, nominally, eighteen brigades of infantry, all of them much reduced by the battles and vicissitudes of the campaign and some of them now reduced to mere remnants by the disaster. These men, in their splendid isolation and devotion, ought to be distinguished here, if only by their brigades.* From left to right (tho the positions of several were changed at

* As to regiments, many of them in the two broken corps could not now be identified with certainty as being in the Horseshoe, at any rate not without very tedious search, and even then some would be found only as small fragments, the greater part gone in the retreat. Of Thomas's corps there were there about 40 regiments, of McCook's about 15 and of Crittenden's about 20, but all of them reduced by casualties in killed and wounded and some in captured and dispersed, until the average must have been much under 300 men to a regiment.

It is not intended by this to show any special superiority in Thomas's men. If it had been their fortune to be put into the same situation in which the Commanding-General so imprudently put the others, it is quite likely they would have met the same fate.

times, as occasion compelled) they stood: Dodge, Grose, John King, Scribner, Starkweather, Berry (succeeding Baldwin, killed), John Beatty, Cruft, Hazen, Turchin, Robinson (succeeding Edward King, killed), Willich, Hays (succeeding Croxton, wounded), Harker, Buell, Stoughton (succeeding Stanley, wounded), Van Derveer and Barnes. Nine of these belonged to Thomas's corps, (John King, Scribner, Starkweather, John Beatty, Turchin, Robinson, Hays, Stoughton and Van Derveer), six to Crittenden's (Grose, Cruft, Hazen, Harker, Buell and Barnes), and three to McCook's (Dodge, Berry, and Willich). But parts, large or small, of some of these and all of the twelve other infantry brigades were gone in the flight. Before the battle was ended, however, two brigades (Whitaker and Mitchell) of Steedman's division of the Reserve Corps came up and shared fully and very effectively in it to the end.

In the Horseshoe he had not exceeding 20,000 men — probably less until Steedman arrived — and their ammunition was so low that they were constantly urged to great care in using it. Surrounding him, east, south and west, was an enemy numbering not less than 45,000,* strengthened by a large quantity of captured artillery, small arms and ammunition. And the contact was so close that retreat was impossible (at least by day), even if he thought of retreat.

If the deserting generals had known what was happening behind them, they would have had more hopeful spirits, and some of them, at least, would have tried to get back upon the field, with whatever men and guns they could bring. The fact was, that Longstreet's drive was short, and he met a very destructive check, losing nearly as many men on that field as all the rest of Bragg's army in the two days. Even the small body of mounted infantry (Wilder's brigade and Harrison's regiment), dismounted and on Rosecrans's extreme right, attacked Hindman's division on Longstreet's left with such courage and effect as to compel its retreat as far back as the State

* This deducts all of Bragg's reported losses in the two days battles and the fighting of the 18th and all of Wheeler's cavalry and a margin for error or possible detachments, tho none are reported.

road, tho they had to give way before a renewed and extended attack and move up on to the Ridge. And Brannan, with two of his brigades and Harker's one, effectually checked and forced back Longstreet's center, so that that enterprising general was limited all the remainder of the day to a practically settled line, extending from opposite Reynolds's right to the right of Brannan's command west of the Snodgrass house.

But he was not content to remain there. He knew he had seriously damaged Rosecrans's army, but he could not know how much and he supposed the forces now opposing him to be much heavier than they were. He made a set assault upon Brannan and was repulsed, and another and another. He had a brave and determined soldier to deal with; Brannan never shook. He only closed up his men after each attack, improved his position from time to time, and kept at it. His ammunition was nearly out, tho the boxes of the killed and wounded were stripped, and he ordered the bayonet to be used in the next repulse.

It was during this struggle that Longstreet sent to Bragg for reinforcement from the right wing and was answered (as already told) that the right wing was too much beaten to be of use to him. But probably Bragg had not realized the extent of Longstreet's achievement. It is certain, from all the records, that he (Bragg) was discouraged and nearly of the mind that he had lost the battle. And he believed he was still confronted by forces much larger than his own. About two o'clock, however, he was roused to hope by news from Longstreet, and then undertook to help him by a final effort to get his right wing into action again. He sent written orders to Polk (and later, distrustfully, followed them up in person), to "assault the enemy in his front (Thomas's left) with his whole force and to persist until he should get their position". At the same time he directed Longstreet to renew the attack upon Thomas's right. Longstreet attacked vigorously, putting into action everything he had but one division (Preston's), which he reserved for the final blow when the right moment should come. This was met as before by the sturdy Brannan, who lost no ground, but

gained some in improving his position, and used the bayonet in his repelling charges for lack of cartridges.

On Thomas's left Polk's men were not so aggressive. Tho they did advance they kept a safer distance than Longstreet's and made no definite charge upon the crescent, but they kept up a more or less continuous fire, especially by artillery and sharpshooters, the latter causing the most loss, at least in Turchin's brigade and in the Eleventh Ohio, until driven off temporarily, by a daring charge by Turchin's men, into their cover in the woods.

The enemy's shells started a fire in the barricade in front of Turchin's brigade, which threatened to be worse for it than the attack. To put it out the men would have to be exposed to the enemy's fire and be without their guns. In front of the Eleventh Ohio the fire was rapidly spreading. Colonel Lane called for volunteers. Lieutenant Hardenbrook, with his Company B, at once volunteered, and these brave men sprang to the work energetically, speedily beat out the fire and saved the protecting screen.

The struggle continued in a more or less fitful way along the crescent until about four o'clock, when Bragg, under a new alarm, again personally urged forward the sullen Polk and Hill. They crowded a last attack upon all this part of the line and succeeded in flanking its left and pushing troops to the west across the State road and toward Baird's rear.* Reynolds's right rear was already exposed to Longstreet, but a direct attack there had not yet been made. A desperate situation for the faithful men in the crescent, but they obstinately held on. There too, as with Brannan, cartridges were almost gone, and the killed and wounded were stripped of theirs as fast as they fell.

Bragg's alarm, just spoken of, was probably caused by a dramatic interposition of fortune in Thomas's favor. General Granger had been posted at McAfee's church, two miles east of Rossville, to hold the Ringgold road. This was about three miles north of the battle field. He had

* Baird then commanded the brigades in the left of the crescent, Palmer those in the center, and Reynolds those on the right.

there three brigades of his Reserve Corps, numbering about 3600, commanded as a division by General Steedman. He had no orders as to the battle, he had not heard of the break, did not know that Rosecrans was gone, but he had heard the guns, and, from the great increase in the fire about two o'clock, he judged that the situation was perilous for the Union troops. He decided to risk his present orders and go to their relief. Steedman heartily approved, and together they marched, at quick time, led by the sound of the guns. On the road, near the Cloud house, they struck the enemy (Forrest's dismounted cavalry or Liddell's infantry), who offered fight, but Granger would not be delayed by what he thought a minor part of the enemy's forces. He only drove them off the road eastward and pushed on, leaving one brigade and a battery at the Cloud house, under Colonel Dan McCook, to protect his rear. From there he hurried, as it happened, directly toward Thomas himself, between the Snodgrass and Vidito houses, where Longstreet was just making another attack.

One can imagine something of Thomas's feelings on meeting this Godsend. It was then half past three and every man he had surviving had been under the fearful strain for five or six hours. Under his direction Steedman rushed his two brigades (Whitaker's and Mitchell's) into position on the right of Brannan, where the enemy was already overlapping, and was at once in a battle as hot as any of the day, in which he drove the rebels back and out of the position they had gained.

And Longstreet soon made it hotter. He guessed that fresh troops had been set against him, and he was compelled to throw in his last division, giving up the hope for which he had carefully kept it out of action,—that of using it to strike the breaking blow. If Thomas had only known that! If he had had only one division more, or but two brigades, to hurl upon Longstreet now, he would have won the battle. But Steedman's men fought with unshaken courage against the great odds. Another attack was made upon his (Steedman's) whole line, with a concentrated rush upon his extreme right, which succeeded in cutting off part of his right brigade. His loss in killed and wounded there was shocking and nearly 450 men

were captured.* Still undaunted, Steedman only changed his front, to suit his reduced line, and held on.

Thomas was now literally surrounded in a continuous two-thirds of a circle, having a radius of less than one mile, by thirty-nine brigades of the enemy, commanded by four lieutenant-generals, nine major-generals and thirty-four brigadiers, with artillery and ammunition more than they could use, while on his side there were twenty brigades and portions of brigades, commanded by four major-generals and nine brigadiers, with only a few pieces of artillery and nearly all ammunition gone. General Steedman had brought up only the ammunition for his own brigades, but he immediately divided with the other generals. It is touching to see in the official reports the gratefulness of the other generals for this allowance of a few rounds to the man.

Now came the humiliating end to this gigantic struggle. Soon after four o'clock, when the renewed assault was crashing from end to end of the line, Thomas received an order from Rosecrans, written in Chattanooga, the first word he had from him after eleven. Rosecrans had been roused from despair by news that the army was not routed, not even beaten, for Thomas was still fighting and holding his post just where he had left him. This lifted his hopes and pluck wonderfully. He still had an army! and he would win the battle yet. But he did not return to the field. His order directed Thomas to "assume command of all the forces, move to Rossville and, with Crittenden and McCook, take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude".

If Thomas made any comment upon this order he let no one know it. There was, indeed, comment enough in merely repeating its language. He had already, hours before, "assumed command of all the forces" left, compelled to do so by the Commanding-General's abandonment of the field. How he was to move to Rossville when heavily superior forces were fighting him at close range on three of four sides the order did not tell him, nobody could tell him. The order to "assume a threatening

* About two-fifths of these captured were from the Eighty-ninth Ohio, which belonged to Turchin's brigade, but was temporarily serving in Granger's corps.

attitude " at Rossville was now the height of irony : would the enemy permit him to abandon the " threatening attitude " he already held ?

Nothing can be clearer than that Rosecrans's only duty and best plan now, seeing that Thomas was still on the field and therefore holding it, was to send word to him to use his own judgment in all things and that more troops, ammunition and supplies were being hurried up to him with utmost urgency. Troops enough were at Rossville and they could have reached him within two hours after the order did. In fact Sheridan was already almost there. But Crittenden was not at Rossville, as the order implied. He was at Chattanooga till two o'clock next morning, when he left Rosecrans to go to Rossville ; but McCook was at Rossville from two o'clock that afternoon, and had, as he reports, the Twentieth Corps assembled there in good order by night. Most of his troops, however, had been there long before night.

But Rosecrans was the Commanding-General and Thomas was a soldier who obeyed orders. He did not obey at once, tho, since that was impossible. The enemy was still making assaults which even Thomas describes as " fierce " and " furious ". It was only the timely coming of Steedman and his small supply of ammunition that had enabled him to hold out till this hour. Whether he wanted to stay and try again in the morning, or would have done it if left to his own judgment, in no way appears from anything he has said in the records ; but he said nothing, did nothing, that in any way indicated any other purpose than that. And the records of the enemy prove that he would have won.

Bragg bivouacked on the field, but he and his generals believed that the Union army was there too ; and his despatch to Richmond that night shows that he thought the battle still in doubt and that he expected more fighting the next day,* while he had now no fresh troops. If Thomas had remained he would have won. He would certainly have had Sheridan's new division, with ammunition. Not much later would come Davis, with his reorganized force ; and, with Steedman's brigade left near the

* See the despatch, page 261.

Cloud house and the rallied troops at Rossville, Thomas would, or could, have been reinforced by at least 10,000 men, with a plenty of ammunition, within the sixteen hours from Rosecrans's order to the time when any fighting could begin in the morning. In short, Thomas had won the battle of Chickamauga and Rosecrans threw it away.

The execution of the order laid another great anxiety upon Thomas. To retreat from the front of an enemy when a battle is only threatened is an extremely delicate and dangerous operation, but to retreat when the enemy is attacking at musket range on three sides must be vastly more perilous. But Thomas did it, and did it successfully; and, tho actually fighting as he left his lines, the enemy did not suspect his purpose.

He must have the cover of darkness because of the danger of discovery and attack in the rear, which would bring ruin, and yet he must not delay. The sun would sink behind Lookout Mountain and the light begin to fail before six. He conferred with Reynolds at five o'clock and gave him the order and instructions for withdrawing. Retirement from either flank would be more likely to be discovered than from the center, and Reynolds had the center. No other general was yet told, so that when, a little after five, Reynolds began to withdraw, quietly and without haste, it looked like only a change of position.

The line of the right wing, running from east to west as it did, from the position of Reynolds to that of Steedman, served as a screen behind which the troops of the left wing could move across westward to McFarland's Gap, thro which it was intended to move most, if not all, of the remaining army, as the shortest way to a road the enemy could not reach in force. After Reynolds was well on the way, in the dusk, the brigades on the left and then on the right were to retire, quietly, and move directly toward the Gap. The last to move would thus be after dark.

But the enemy kept firing viciously as long as there was good light, especially upon Baird's men on the extreme left and Brannan's and Steedman's on the extreme right; and just as Reynolds was drawing out his men from the center there was a definite attack upon each of these points. The object appeared to be to force back the two

extremities of Thomas's line and extend the encircling line at both ends still further around him. If this was the object, it failed on Thomas's right, where Steedman and Brannan steadily held their place, but it partially succeeded on his left, where Baird was compelled to retire his left flank to protect his rear, so that part of his line now faced to the northwest.

Thomas guessed what would follow that movement and immediately acted. Reynolds's two brigades, on leaving the front, marched each brigade in double column, the four columns abreast. This formation was taken with a double purpose,—to get this division quickly out of the way of the division to follow, so as to avoid causing any halt, and to be able to face either right or left (north or south) in double line, if attacked on either flank. It was, in fact "running a gauntlet", or would have been if the enemy had known of it. The double column was headed west for McFarland's Gap, but had barely crossed the State road when Thomas ordered them right face and forward (to the north). This brought Turchin's brigade in front, and his two columns into two lines. Then the two brigades, in line of battle, moved rapidly north thro the woods, along the west side of the road.

Thomas himself, with Reynolds, led this counterstroke. As he had foreseen, the enemy, using the last attack upon Baird as a screen, had pushed west across the State road, between his left and McDannel's house. This proved to be Liddell's division of Walker's corps, supported on its right by Armstrong's dismounted cavalry, but only a part of them had then passed the road, the movement being checked by the battery of Colonel Dan McCook's brigade which Granger had prudently left in position on a hill southwest of Cloud's house, as already told.

When Reynolds's column was nearing McDannel's, Thomas said to him, pointing in the direction of Cloud's house, "There they are! Clear them out!" The double lines pushed on in quick time, Robinson's brigade obliquing to the left, double-quick, to get a clear front to the enemy. The movement was made with such precision and the whole body moved on so steadily that different officers have described the scene with great admiration.

It was a short, hot battle. The enemy threw shot and

shell with remarkable rapidity from a battery directly in front, near McDannel's, and another battery on the left, toward the Ridge, was quite as active with a cross-fire.* Reynolds's men believed they were raked by artillery both in front and on the flank, but the battery on the left was of their own army. It was Colonel McCook's, which had already checked the movement of Liddell's division in crossing the State road and was now firing upon it across the front of Reynolds's line. But the Reynolds men knew nothing of the presence of other Union troops and thought they were under fire of the enemy's forces of unknown strength in two positions.

As soon as the line was near enough a charge at double-quick was ordered, the men whose cartridges were exhausted running with fixed bayonets; and the climax of this separate battle was reached. General Turchin's horse was killed, but he went on afoot. General Reynolds himself led, mounted, and his men expected to see him fall at any moment. The Eleventh Ohio, Colonel Lane leading, mounted, must have been on the extreme right, nearest to the State road, the Ninety-second Ohio holding the left of the brigade. Under this daring charge the rebels broke. The survivors fled in complete disorder across the road eastward toward the creek, losing, besides their dead and wounded, their battery, overrun and taken in the charge, and several hundred prisoners.

This was a brilliant deed, and the more remarkable in that it came at the end of three days of most strenuous work, two days filled with battles. Even in the dry and matter-of-fact reports of Thomas we read that it was a "splendid advance" * * * "Turchin threw his brigade upon the rebel force, routing them and driving them in utter confusion a mile and a half and entirely beyond Baird's left", * * * "Turchin's handsome charge upon the enemy, who had closed in on our left." And Turchin, tho his report is very brief, feels bound to distinguish one regiment, saying that "Colonel Lane and Major Higgins of the Eleventh Ohio most gallantly directed the movements of their regiment."

* Colonel Lane's description of the concentrated fire, the tremendous crash of all arms in the forest, and the darkness under the cloud of smoke is an effective one.

General Reynolds continued the advance on the State road, with Colonel Lane and the Eleventh Ohio immediately following, and had reached a point north of McDaniel's when the division became separated thro a misunderstanding of orders, which resulted, in Turchin's brigade, in one of the many remarkable events of this extraordinary series of battles. As General Reynolds understood from Thomas, the movement was intended to open the road to Rossville, but he (Reynolds) did not know of the road thro McFarland's Gap and believed the State road was the one meant. Nor did he know that Thomas's object in this minor battle was only to clear the enemy off from his (now) right flank and prevent interference with his withdrawal westward. Turchin, however, seems to have had an order directly from Thomas, after the charge, to bear to the left and take position on high ground in rear of Colonel McCook's brigade at Cloud's, while Robinson, by the same order, was sent to take position in Turchin's rear, the object being still to protect the movement of the other divisions direct from the "Horseshoe" thro the Gap.

Reynolds accordingly led right ahead on the State road, followed by the troops nearest him, who knew of no order except the one to move forward. So Colonel Lane, with his regiment (or part of it) and part of the Thirty-sixth and Ninety-second Ohio, followed Reynolds, all supposing that the remainder of the division was coming behind. They reached "the forks of the road" and found the rebels there in front. Then they discovered, in dismay, that they were only a remnant,—a small part of Turchin's brigade. They supposed the main body of the division had, somehow, been cut off and captured. It was a most trying situation. The "forks of the road" must have been the one seen on the map next south of Hein's house. It was in a dense forest. General Reynolds took a few men and reconnoitered both the roads, and found rebels on both,—probably only pickets of small forces, but, under the circumstances, they would be supposed to be the front of a substantial body on either road or both; and, if the remainder of the division was captured, the enemy must also be on the road in the rear. It looked much as if they were lost. There were, some say 150, others 200, men

there, with their company officers and Colonel Lane and General Reynolds. Colonel Lane of course assumed command, as his rank required him to do; and, in a conference between him and the General, it was agreed that, tho the chances were much against success, they would undertake to fight their way out on the left-hand road, believed to be the one to Rossville, but that they would not move until it was dark enough to conceal their number, unless attacked from the rear while there was yet light. They accordingly disposed themselves in the woods to the left of the road and waited. The particular place is not mentioned, but it must have been in the northwest angle made by the State road and the branch road to Cloud's house.

Soon after this a single soldier was seen approaching on the left, and the men on guard there were about to seize him when they saw he wore their own uniform. When he was hurried to General Reynolds, it appeared that he belonged to Colonel McCook's brigade, which he said was near Cloud's house, with its picket-line hardly more than two-hundred yards away. It was more than that, but the lost remnant got over the ground between with swift steps, and then hearing that some troops had a little earlier moved into position behind McCook's battery, they went still faster, and fairly ran into their lost comrades. Each party had believed the other captured, and loud was the cheering and rejoicing. Colonel Lane says they shook hands all around and that "many an eye was moist". And well there might have been: it would have been a dreadful grief to suffer such a disaster as all had feared there was, after two days' successful battling side by side under such soul-trying conditions.

Willich's brigade of Johnson's division (McCook's corps) on its way to McFarland's Gap, was turned aside and posted west of Cloud's, near Turchin's and Robinson's, and the three brigades stood there, facing east, covering the movement of the other troops into the Gap, thus being the last on the field.

While all this was going on the other divisions were moving out of the crescent, brigade after brigade, and across the country west to the Gap. Those in the center marched in perfect order and unmolested, those on the left were attacked in the act of drawing out and one bri-

gade was, temporarily, somewhat disordered, but Baird held his ground, meeting the attack and keeping up his defense long enough to enable his regiments to move steadily out on the line of march toward the Gap, the enemy making no attempt to follow, prevented, probably, by a wholesome apprehension caused by Reynolds's successful attack near McDannel's.

Then, from left to right, Thomas brought out his right wing, Wood's, Brannan's and Steedman's men, from the face of Bragg's left wing, moving first, as far as practicable, the regiments without ammunition. To make up partly for this weakness, half of Robinson's brigade was brought over from near Cloud's and put under Brannan's command. Another attack was made upon this front between six and seven, but it was quickly repulsed, and when the men at last withdrew there was entire quiet there. At half past seven Steedman was well on his way to the Gap, the whole front was cleared, and Thomas ordered the brigades now left on guard near Cloud's to fall in behind Steedman.

There appears no report showing which of these brigades moved first. Robinson's report, if he made one, has not been preserved, while Willich and Turchin speak only of their own movements, without reference to any other troops. The three were so posted, however, that Willich was nearest the Gap, Robinson next, and Turchin beyond Robinson, which makes it more than probable that Turchin's men were the last of the army to quit the terrible field of Chickamauga.

It was eight o'clock when they began their march and quite dark. Colonel McCook's brigade had begun to draw out from its position near Cloud's, north of Turchin's brigade, to take a road directly toward Rossville, along the east base of the Ridge, and his battery had just fired its last round, as a defiance to the enemy or a warning to keep off — the last guns of the great battle. The echoes of these guns were still sounding among the hills as the Eleventh Ohio and its comrade regiments of the brigade left their ground. After the last echo the only sound they heard in the dark forest thro which wound the narrow road into the Gap was the low tone of their tramping.

At Rossville, about ten o'clock, the division went into

bivouac, while the generals spent the night in trying to bring order out of the great confusion. For the whole army was now at Rossville, excepting only those lost on the field and the stragglers who had gone on to Chattanooga. Large details were made from all commands, for a heavy picket line from Chattanooga river on the right, over the Ridge south of Rossville, and on to Chickamauga creek; and this heavy guard was maintained until early in the morning of the 22d, when all the army was cautiously drawn off and put into position for defense within the fortifications surrounding Chattanooga.

The volume of writing on the campaign and battles of Chickamauga is almost immeasurable, but only rarely and briefly has anything been written of the retreat from the "Horseshoe". Yet it was by far the most remarkable exploit of all. Many generals have been distinguished for genius and energy in planning and conducting campaigns, many more for skill and daring in making attacks, and still more for spirit and courage in fighting on the field, but rarer than any of these abilities are those which must be possessed by the general who plans and successfully conducts the retreat of an army from a position in the face of the guns of an enemy superior in numbers and armament. Military history contains a few examples of brilliant retreat under adverse conditions, each proving abilities of a high order in the general conducting it, but none of these was more difficult than Thomas's retreat at Chickamauga, none so difficult as that. There is no parallel to it in the Civil War, there is no close parallel that I know of in any foreign war.

At the time he began the movement his lines were at least two miles long, running irregularly over hills and thro forests and every foot within rifle-shot of an enemy much superior in numbers and guns. In the very act of beginning the movement he was attacked and compelled to fight on both flanks, while he knew that if the enemy could but push a little further on either flank they would gain one of the two roads, possibly both, by which alone the retreat was practicable. He must therefore rely only upon courage and steadiness in moving parts of his troops while other parts were fighting, or held ready to fight, as a

cover to the movement, and then rely upon darkness to hide the bodies moving last. And yet he lost not a step in the movement, lost not a man or a gun, and his enemy did not discover what he was doing, nor know until the next day that it was done.

During all the war no general fought his troops better than Thomas did at Chickamauga, no troops fought better than those he commanded there, but the fame he gained in that battle, or in the many he fought successfully before and after it, can never outrank that he ought to have for his retreat from that famous field of heroic deeds.

Whether he did or did not realize, when he received the order to retreat, that he was at the verge of success cannot be learned from anything in his public papers. If he had remained and Bragg had renewed the battle the next day, Bragg would have been defeated. Thomas would have been prepared, with increased forces and guns and ample ammunition, to meet any assault even better than on the 20th, when he had repulsed every one the enemy had made where he was in command. He would have been then strong enough to insure victory over an enemy already much weakened and dispirited by an unbroken series of repulses on his right wing and a substantially equal defeat at the end of the day on his left wing. It is an old maxim in war, that the battle goes to him who can throw in the last fresh division; and the morning would have found Thomas with several practically fresh divisions. What would have happened to Bragg if only the two of Sheridan and Davis were then thrown against him, with replenished ammunition, is almost beyond any doubt.

The reports and boasts written by Bragg, Longstreet and their lesser officers days, weeks or months, after the battle, tell only of complete, unparalleled victory, but they are, in that respect, exuberant figments. The conduct of these officers at the time and Bragg's official report, sent to Richmond the night of the 20th, tell the real mind of the enemy. After noon of the 20th Bragg had no hope but in Longstreet's struggle on his left, as is shown by his own statement to Longstreet, already quoted, that the right wing was beaten. He must have been influenced by the indomitable spirit of Longstreet (who, tho beaten, still was ready to fight) when he wrote his report to

Richmond that night. In that he said "After two days hard fighting we have driven the enemy after a desperate resistance from several positions and now hold the field; but he still confronts us. The losses are heavy on both sides, especially so in our officers". In a later report he wrote (speaking of the end of the second day) "The enemy, tho driven from his line, still confronted us and desultory firing was heard until eight p. m. Other noises indicating movements and dispositions for the morrow, continued until a late hour of the night."

This is not the language of a general who has defeated his enemy or won the battle. It is the language of one still in doubt and apprehension. Other claims of absolute victory, along with the trumpeting of lesser officers after they recovered from their surprise and joy in finding themselves actually in possession of the field, are only the bragging so commonly met with in war, in which Southerners were characteristically unrestrained. Such claims by those in Polk's wing are especially untrue, since their only experience, from the morning of the 19th till their last unqualified rout in the charge of Turchin's brigade in the evening of the 20th, was that of unbroken defeats. If Bragg had a victory it was Longstreet alone who won it. What really happened was just what happened between him and Rosecrans at Murfreesboro nine months before, when Rosecrans was astonished, the morning after the unfinished battle, to find that Bragg had left him on the field during the night. But, for that occasion, Bragg and all Confederate writers have insisted that Rosecrans had no victory, as indeed Northern critics also contend.

The fact was that Bragg turned out on the morning of the 21st still undecided as to what he would or could do. He had not even given any orders during the night. He had, indeed, no great strength left for any action. He rode over to Polk's quarters, to learn the condition of his right wing. He says he went there after sunrise. There is other evidence that it was about ten o'clock. As usual, Polk was not there; but he found there General Liddell (who was in command of his infantry on the extreme right), waiting for Polk; and Liddell told him that he had just come to report to Polk that his pickets found no signs of an enemy on that front. This was exciting news,

and Bragg quickly had his advanced troops feeling for an enemy all along his lines.* Then "there was a simultaneous and continuous shout from the two wings,"† and they all boldly advanced toward Rossville, while Wheeler's cavalry was pushed down the Chattanooga valley. But when Thomas's pickets were reached south of Rossville, no attack was made; Bragg contented himself in awaiting events. He probably looked for an attack upon himself. On the 22d, finding again that his enemy had disappeared from his front, he advanced, and finally drew his lines from Lookout valley on his left, across Chattanooga river and the main Chickamauga creek, and thence, by the way of the northern end of Missionary Ridge, up to the Tennessee river above the town. The Richmond authorities and also, in particular, General Longstreet, urged him to make an aggressive campaign, if not directly against the town, then to "turn" it by moving into the interior of Tennessee by the north or the west; but he judged all such plans impracticable and sat down to a siege, expecting to starve Rosecrans into either evacuation or surrender.

* He further reports that "Members of my staff, in passing thro the lines of our left wing (Longstreet's) (i. e. on the 21st, a. m.) were warned of danger and told they were entering on the neutral ground between us and the enemy. But this proved to be an error, and our cavalry soon came upon the enemy's rear-guard where the main road passes thro Missionary Ridge."—That is, his advanced cavalry did not reach McFarland's Gap until some time before noon of the 21st.

† Official report of Longstreet; but he makes it appear to have been the evening of the 20th, which Bragg's report shows was quite impossible. See above note and pages 258 and 261.

XVII

1863 : SEPTEMBER — OCTOBER

*At Chattanooga After the Battle — Confederate Reports
— Bragg Did Not Know He Had Won — Colonel Lane's
Report — Rosecrans in Despair — Holds Chattanooga,
But Neglects Protection and Supply of the Army — At
Last Removed, Superseded by Thomas — Grant in Su-
preme Command in Mississippi Valley*

Chickamauga was the most destructive of the great battles of the war. There were small engagements in which one side, or both, lost a greater proportion of the men engaged, but these do not attract attention because the loss in number is not large. But Chickamauga may fairly be said to have been twenty battles in one. Every brigade under Thomas's command, except the two of Steedman which came into action near the end, must have been in eight or ten distinct engagements.

The whole losses of Bragg were larger than those of Rosecrans, but then he had larger numbers engaged (especially during the afternoon of the 20th), and his action was aggressive while Rosecrans's was chiefly defensive. There are many erroneous and some extravagant statements made of the losses on both sides, but the final revised official reports (except as to one brigade of Long-street's command, the report of which had not been received) show that Bragg lost 2389 killed, 13,412 wounded and 2003 captured or missing,— total, 17,804. If the loss of the missing brigade be taken at the average of the others, these numbers become 2452 killed, 13,765 wounded and 2056 captured or missing,— total 18,273. Rosecrans's revised reports show 1656 killed, 9749 wounded and 4774 captured or missing,— total 16,179.

Bragg's army as a whole was one-fourth larger than Rosecrans's, but his loss in killed was about one-half larger

and in wounded about two-fifths larger. Taking only the men actually engaged, however (that is, excluding on Bragg's side all of Wheeler's cavalry and on Rosecrans's side all of his cavalry and — for part of the time — his troops that left the field on the 20th), the number of Rosecrans's killed and wounded, relatively, was greater than Bragg's. Taking the armies in the whole and the captured or missing as lost (the usual method in counting losses), Rosecrans lost a little over 27 per cent of his forces and Bragg a little less than 26 per cent of his. No other battle of the Civil War brought losses so heavy, nor any great battle in any other country in modern times, if ever. Of course this statement is intended to exclude small engagements, some of which were, proportionately, more destructive, as well as those cases in which defeat involved the surrender of the whole or a large part of an army.

The common experience in the exaggeration and unreliability of reports of battles, made even by officers in high positions, is illustrated in Longstreet's report. He says he took into action on the 20th, 22,882 men and officers and lost 7867 in killed in wounded. That is, out of less than one-half the army, fighting little more than one-half a day, his loss was nearly one-half that of Bragg's whole army in the two days' fighting, or, relatively, four times that of all the rest of the army. This could have been the case, but it is, to say the least, highly improbable. Then he says he captured over 3000 prisoners, not less than 40 pieces of artillery, and 17,645 small arms. Rosecrans's mustering of his men after the battle accounted for all but 4774, who were therefore the captured and missing. Thus Longstreet's captures, made in half a day, would be about three times as many as all the rest of Bragg's army made in two days, a claim that would certainly have excited resentment in the men of Polk's wing, if they did not beat it by their own claim. The Chief of Ordnance of Rosecrans's army, whose duty it was to keep accounts of all arms, reported officially after the battle that 36 pieces of artillery were missing and nearly 9000 small arms. So that Longstreet alone captured more artillery than Rosecrans lost and Polk got none at all; and he captured nearly twice as many small arms as Rosecrans

lost, which leaves Polk far behind. But these things are written for amusement rather than profit. Any battle, big or little, is likely to produce this kind of foolish boasting.

When the troops were settled in their positions around Chattanooga and it was seen that Bragg had no immediate purpose of attacking, all commanding officers were directed to make the reports usually following a campaign or engagement. The report of Colonel Lane — one of the very few (and the longest) he wrote during the war*— is here given. It will come in the more aptly now, as being near the end of this story, and it will serve to show the simple way in which he wrote of his own experiences :

Chattanooga, Tenn., September 26, 1863.

Sir: I have the honor to report the following details of the part taken by the Eleventh Regt. Ohio Vol. Inf. in the action of the 19th and 20th inst.

The effective strength of the regiment was 413 enlisted men and 20 commissioned officers, all our commissioned officers being present except Captains Duncan and Layman and Lieutenant Morris, absent on recruiting service in Ohio, and Lieutenant-Colonel Street, sick in hospital.

We arrived on the battle field at 9 a. m. on the morning of the 19th inst., and were soon after placed in a position to support the Ninety-second Ohio Regiment, then under fire. Soon after General Hazen† notified me that one of his regiments to my front and right was out of ammunition and was falling back, and wished me to occupy its position. I referred him to you,‡ but in the meantime the regiment fell back and I took the responsibility of ordering my regiment forward to fill the gap, but before this movement was completed I received your order to occupy the position.§ The Ninety-second Ohio was soon after relieved and the Thirty-sixth Ohio moved up on our left; the enemy kept up a brisk fire on our front and right flank; my regiment was ordered to charge, which was done with spirit and we drove the enemy from a field in our front and captured a number of prisoners. At the commencement of the charge the Color-bearer was struck and fell. The colors were

* Some reports made by him have been lost thro accident or the carelessness of officials after he sent them in,— the fate of many papers in the army during the war.

† Of Crittenden's Corps.

‡ General Turchin.

§ That is, General Hazen, who had hurried away to find General Turchin, had found him. See page 227.

seized by Lieutenant Peck of Company E and carried at the head of the line. We held the ground gained for half an hour or more, and then I moved the regiment by the left flank under cover of timber and supported the Thirty-sixth Ohio Regiment, which was then lying to the left and rear and exposed to a heavy fire on their right. We were then ordered to fall back to our first position, more to the right, to meet the enemy, who were making heavy demonstrations in that direction. The Eleventh (being) on the left and the Thirty-sixth on the right, we were ordered to make a second charge, which was done successfully, cleaning out the front of the enemy and taking a number of prisoners. We then fell back to our first position, which we held until dark.

On the morning of the 20th, we were stationed in the second line to support the Thirty-sixth Ohio Regiment, in rear of a rude fortification* on the left of the Second Brigade. We were kept alternately on left and rear until the afternoon, all the time under a brisk fire. During the hardest fire our rude fortification caught fire and Second-Lieutenant Hardenbrook, Company B, took a part of his company and separated the timber to prevent its spreading and destroying the protection it afforded us. Company D, deployed as skirmishers† on the left of our line, lost 13 killed and wounded in a short time. We were withdrawn from this position to make a charge on the enemy, who were moving in our rear. The charge was made by the rear rank and the line became much broken, but it was made with spirit and success, taking a large number of prisoners.

We followed up the enemy some 3 miles on the Rossville road. By some misunderstanding more than two-thirds of the regiment marched by the left flank soon after the first line of the enemy was broken. The other third and about the same proportion of the Thirty-sixth kept to the front, led by Major-General Reynolds. We found the enemy in force on the Rossville road, about 3 miles from the point we started from. We halted here and formed the fragments of the Eleventh, Thirty-sixth and Ninety-second Ohio Regiments, and marched by the left flank and joined General Granger's command, where we found our brigade. Our loss during the two days was 5 killed, 36 wounded and 22 missing. The missing are probably nearly all prisoners, as they were sent to the rear with prisoners on our last charge, and the enemy being in that vicinity our men and their prisoners were captured. Up to the time of our last charge not more than 6 of my men were missing.

The officers and men of my regiment endured every hardship and braved every danger with cheerfulness. Many of our men were without water for twelve or fifteen hours. Nearly all of our

* A barricade, hastily made of felled trees, logs and rails, described on page 233.

† "Deployed as skirmishers" is placed in advance, in a line, with intervals of many yards or rods between each two. They are easily picked off by enemy skirmishers or sharpshooters.

wounded of the 20th were left on the field. Our hospital arrangements were a total failure; neither surgeons, hospital corps or ambulances were to be found.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. P. LANE,

Colonel, Comdg Eleventh Regt. Ohio Vol. Inf.

J. B. TURCHIN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Third Brigade.

But the action of Colonel Lane was not to be left to his own commonplace and modest account. The reports of his brigade and division generals speak of him with high praise, and the formal full report of the campaign by the Commanding-General, made January 7, 1864, contains a list of those honored in "Special Mention", in which appears "Colonel Philander P. Lane, Eleventh Ohio Volunteers, commended for his gallantry."

He would have had substantial recognition by promotion to brigadier-general if he had remained in the army a little longer.

The battle of Chickamauga produced a great and very painful sensation in the North, fully corresponding to the elation and encouragement in the South. The contrast between the brilliant promise of the campaign and its disastrous outcome was shocking. For the moment the great gains of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, two months before, seemed to be wiped out, and the end of the war, which those victories had seemed to assure, now looked far off. The disheartened and complaining reports and correspondence of Rosecrans even caused a great fear that Chattanooga would be lost. But before all the facts were known the officials at Washington (except Stanton and some other members of the Cabinet) were disposed to look upon the defeat as only a great misfortune, which it was the duty of all to try to recover from as quickly as possible. Stanton had already lost confidence in Rosecrans, and now intolerantly insisted that the disaster was due directly to his incapacity and that he ought to be removed at once.

Lincoln and Halleck were wiser for the present. They steadily tried to encourage Rosecrans, and energetically set to work to reinforce him and make sure of his holding

Chattanooga. Tho they could not understand how his numbers could be so small, or the enemy's so large, as he represented, they ordered large reinforcements to him. Two army corps were sent from the Army of the Potomac, the Eleventh and Twelfth, about 20,000 men, under the erratic " Fighting Joe Hooker "; the Fifteenth Corps, under General Sherman, was ordered from Vicksburg; two divisions were organized at Memphis and forwarded; and Lincoln wrote to Rosecrans several remarkably patient and hopeful letters. The purpose was to make sure of the position at Chattanooga and at the same time provide for a later aggressive campaign.

But Rosecrans did not respond well to encouragement. He had reached and got beyond his limit of abilities, but his egoism made it impossible for him to see that there was such a limit. The failure was due to causes quite outside of himself or his plans. The physical difficulties of the country were greater than any general had ever before had to meet, and the Government had left him to struggle without hearty co-operation and without adequate means. These two tremendous imagined handicaps were never out of his mind. He knew that no one could have succeeded against them. His wasting of time in camp thro July and August, while Bragg was getting rest and reinforcements, his passing the mountains with his wings forty miles apart in a strange country, not knowing where his enemy was, his obstinate clinging to the belief that Bragg was defeated without battle and in full retreat when he was in fact massed for battle directly in his front, his slow and badly managed movements for concentration when he learned where Bragg was, his hasty and conflicting orders for the movements of troops to and on the battle-field, and his own abandonment of the field when his troops still held possession of it,— none of these things seem to have affected his judgment of the final event.

He could not recover his courage or his head. On the 21st, before he could have had any idea of what Bragg was doing or could do, without reflecting that Bragg's forces must be at least as badly crippled as his own, he telegraphed to Washington — " We have no certainty of maintaining our position here ". He must have been think-

ing of evacuating Chattanooga when he wrote that; but two days later Lincoln had a Richmond newspaper containing Bragg's report sent the night of the 20th,* and he immediately telegraphed it to Rosecrans, to show him that Bragg did not consider him beaten, whereupon the mercurial spirit braced up and sent to Lincoln a very different message: "We hold this point and I cannot be dislodged unless by very superior numbers and after a great battle".

But he displayed little energy in preparing for further action. He seemed to think the responsibility was not now on him, but on the Government, and that he could only wait until a great army was concentrated at Chattanooga for him. He thought that such an army should be at least from 100,000 to 125,000. Yet he neglected even the obvious precaution of holding, or at least trying to hold, the northern ends of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain. Getting possession of the whole of Missionary Ridge, Bragg was able to extend his line so as to cover the whole east side of Chattanooga, up to the left bank of the Tennessee river; and, what was much more important for his purpose of besieging the place, he found the north end of Lookout Mountain unoccupied, planted some of his long-range artillery there, posted troops at the mouth of Lookout valley, and thus cut off Rosecrans's transportation between Bridgeport and Chattanooga by the river, the railroad, and the wagon roads along the river. This last could have been prevented by only ordinary foresight, and the failure to prevent it can only be called gross negligence. Rosecrans was then compelled to rely upon army wagons, hauling his supplies by a circuit of sixty miles to the north, from Bridgeport by the rough and steep roads over Walden's Ridge, and the wagons soon proved to be hopelessly inadequate. Within a few days all the men and the animals were on short rations and within two weeks the alternative of starvation or evacuation was openly discussed. The men showed the effects of insufficient food and the horses and mules engaged in hauling died by hundreds. Whenever there was a rain the poor animals were unable to pull thro

* See page 261.

the mud, and the whole course of the road was marked by abandoned wagons and broken down or dead animals. The morale of the army, already much affected by the shame of defeat, was lowered still more by a discontented and rebellious feeling that both government and generals were neglecting even its essential needs.

But they were mistaken as to the government: its duty was being done remarkably well, both in reinforcements and supplies, the latter reaching Bridgeport by rail from Nashville immediately and in ample quantity. The practical obstacle was only in transportation from Bridgeport, and that was a military obstacle which it was Rosecrans's duty to remove by action, if he should not evade it by retreat over the Cumberland mountains. He says that he had given great attention to this difficulty and that as early as the 4th of October he had fixed upon a plan for reopening the direct line from Bridgeport and was building boats to carry the troops his plan required; but, if he had such a plan, he had not acted upon it up to the 20th, when he was superseded.

The severe public and military criticism of his management preceding and during the battle, the surprising accounts sent to the War Department by its representative at his headquarters of his employment of his time in unimportant and petty things and controversial defenses of the campaign while the army was under siege, practically cut off from all supplies, and when duties of the very highest importance lay upon him, the loss of confidence in him in the army, and especially his own persistent distrust of success and exaggeration of difficulties, at last brought the Government to the point of replacing him. But even then a chance was left for him, as will appear in the next paragraph. It was still willing to retain him (under a certain intended reorganization), tho probably not so much to gratify him as to escape, if possible, the bad effect upon the country of the news of the removal of another general for incapacity.

This course being decided upon, General Grant was sent for. He was then at New Orleans and was ordered by Secretary of War Stanton to go to Cairo, tho not informed of the purpose. At Cairo he found an order to go to Louisville, still not telling him what for. On the way he

was intercepted by the Secretary himself, who went on with him. Stanton showed him two orders and asked him to take his choice. They were identical except in one respect. Each of them created the new "Military Division of the Mississippi" (embracing the whole Mississippi valley, except that part under General Banks in Louisiana), and put him in command of it, with all the departments and armies in it; but one left Rosecrans the command of the Department and Army of the Cumberland and the other gave it to Thomas. Grant at once chose the latter.

A day was spent at Louisville (October 18) in conference between the two and plans were agreed upon, but that night Stanton received a telegram from his Assistant-Secretary, Dana, who was at Chattanooga, to the effect that Rosecrans would retreat unless prevented, and advising a peremptory order against it. Stanton's excitement and anger ran high. Grant immediately issued an order, assuming command of the new Military Division, telegraphed it to Rosecrans, then telegraphed to him the order relieving him of command and appointing Thomas; and then repeated this to Thomas and directed him to hold Chattanooga at all hazards. Thomas promptly replied in eight words: "We will hold the town till we starve".

The next day Grant started for Chattanooga by a special train, reached Stevenson (Bridgeport) the night of the 21st and Chattanooga (by the wagon road over Walden's Ridge, on horseback) the night of the 23d. At Stevenson he met Rosecrans (on his way north), who discussed the situation "freely" and "made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done". On this Grant's naive comment was — "My only wonder was that he had not carried them out".

Here is another of the striking illustrations of Rosecrans's limit as a general. He was full of ideas, could make plans of high merit and, after much hesitation and spurring, issue elaborate and adequate orders for their execution, but the power to direct their execution personally in the field was not in him. Each of his greater battles fell into confusion and had to take the chances of developing in the action a capable subordinate.

But he took his removal in good spirit, at least without any resentment that appeared publicly, tho he was grieved

to think of the unhappy condition of the army when deprived of his control.*

* He received the order relieving him the night of the 19th of October, and left Chattanooga at dawn of the 20th, without any formal announcement to the army and without bidding good-bye to any but those nearest him. His reason for this extraordinary course was, he says, his "fear of exciting profound sorrow and discontent in the Army of the Cumberland, which my continued presence after it (the order relieving him) became known would increase." The fact was that his departure dispelled a general discontent, which had increased to a point dangerously near mutiny. He had many warm personal friends, who excused and defended him, but generally the army had lost both confidence in him and respect for him.

XVIII

1863 : SEPTEMBER — OCTOBER

SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA

Reorganization of the Army — Reinforced by Hooker and Sherman — Bragg Undertakes a Siege — Thomas Re-opens "The Cracker-line" — Brilliant Capture of Brown's Ferry — Colonel Lane and Eleventh Ohio Share in it — Bragg Sends Longstreet to Recover Look-out Valley — Meets Total Defeat

The confused state of the army at Chattanooga after the battle made a reorganization imperative. The suspension from command of the two corps generals,* the loss in the campaign and battle of several division and brigade generals, many other field officers and more than one quarter of the troops, so that regiments and brigades were reduced to numbers too small for the most efficient management, and the appearance of much discontent, not to say disaffection, especially in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps,— all called for immediate consideration and action.

* A court-of-inquiry was appointed to consider the conduct of McCook and Crittenden in leaving the field at Chickamauga and of Negley in leaving his post on the field and taking with him most of the artillery, but it was several months before the court sat and its proceedings were slow. But there was no inquiry into Rosecrans's conduct, and he was called as a witness by the accused generals. They all offered elaborate explanations, assuming the impossibility of acting otherwise than as they did and their right and duty to exercise each his own judgment under the circumstances; and Rosecrans, in his testimony, supported them as far as he dared, being unable to condemn or criticise their conduct without admitting that his own was still more to be condemned. The court-of-inquiry finally reported, advising against a court-martial, and the three generals were exonerated. They were relieved of the suspension and assigned to duty, but not again in the Army of the Cumberland.

Accordingly, under date of September 28, the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps were discontinued and the Fourth Corps (a new Fourth — the old one, in the Army of the Potomac, having been recently discontinued) was organized, with General Gordon Granger, who had acted with such good judgment and promptness in the battle, in command. This corps was composed of part of Granger's Reserve Corps and the greater part of the Twentieth and Twenty-first, the remainder going into the Fourteenth. The Fourth Division (Reynolds's) in the Fourteenth Corps was discontinued and its brigades were assigned to the other divisions, which were also reorganized. Turchin's brigade became the First Brigade of the Third Division. To make up for the small size of its regiments, three more were added — the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio and Sixty-eighth Indiana; but the Eighteenth Kentucky was put into another division. The depletion had been so great that, of the seven regiments now in Turchin's brigade, only two had colonels. Three others were commanded by lieutenant-colonels, one by a major and one by a captain.

In this reorganization several generals who had been distinguished by good conduct in the battle were advanced, as well as Granger mentioned above. General Reynolds became Chief-of-Staff to Thomas; General Brannan was made Chief-of-Artillery and all the artillery put directly under his command (a significant and great improvement upon the former condition of a lack of intelligent co-ordination); and General Baird, who had temporarily commanded the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps, was given permanently the Third Division. A little later General Palmer, who had had a division in the Twenty-first Corps and had directed it in the "Horseshoe" with characteristic bravery and success, was put in command of the Fourteenth Corps.

This radical reconstruction brought the Army of the Cumberland into a compact form, resulting at once in greater ease of management, as it soon would in greater efficiency, and did much to restore the heart and confidence of the troops, who no longer saw the small and weak brigades or divisions, and who highly appreciated the selection for command of generals whom they had seen

tried in great emergencies and by fire. Tho their morale was still much affected by the lack of supplies and the fear in the camps that a retreat might be compelled,* the opening of the "cracker line" thro Brown's Ferry (described later) instantly dispelled the clouds, high confidence and hopefulness prevailed, and the splendid deeds of the Army of the Cumberland in the great battle of Chattanooga (or "Missionary Ridge") on November 25 proved that it was essentially sound, and the equal in enterprise, daring and achievement of any army in the war.

Grant's first work on taking command was to get food and clothing for the army, and a permanent supply; for he did not even think of giving up Chattanooga. Thomas was a tower of strength for him, with his steady judgment and unquestioning execution of orders, and supported, as he was, by an army which, especially since the great battle, idolized him.

The plan which General Rosecrans claimed as his own for the relief of the army was also claimed by his Chief-Engineer, General William F. Smith (known in the army as "Baldy Smith") †; and he and his friends have always fought any attempt to deprive him of the sole credit for it. But a commission of army officers appointed by the Secretary of War many years after the time, after much inquiry, reported in favor of Rosecrans, leaving the promotion and execution of the plan to Smith. When Grant arrived and examined it, and had ridden over the field of proposed operation, he fully approved; and he added to Smith's authority the command of the troops required to carry it out.

A share in the daring and picturesque adventure which followed fell to Colonel Lane and his regiment; and it was the last service of special importance he was to render during the war.

General Rosecrans's gross carelessness or lack of judgment in making no effort to hold the north end of Lookout Mountain when he retired to Chattonooga has already been spoken of. He must have seen his blunder when

* General Rosecrans and his staff assiduously kept up the belief in the camps that Bragg's army was vastly superior in numbers.

† See page 270.

too late. General Bragg promptly seized the great advantage offered him, planted ample long-range guns at the front of the crest, supported by a strong force on the mountain and in the mouth of the Lookout valley, with outposts on the south bank of the river at all places of possible crossing down to Bridgeport. He thus had absolute control of the railroad, the only direct wagonroad, and all the river. His confidence, then, in the recovery of Chattanooga without a battle was so great that he reported to Richmond that Rosecrans's "surrender or destruction was only a question of time". In his judgment Rosecrans was reduced to the alternative of surrender or an attempt at retreat north of the river, and retreat would have to be either up the river toward Knoxville, which he had provided against by posting a heavy part of his army on the river above the town, or westward over the barren Walden and Cumberland mountains, where he would have no supplies and "could not live". So he sat under the tree waiting for the ripening plum to fall, while his army had no employment but that of guard and the occasional amusement of throwing shells into Chattanooga and Rosecrans's camps from the top of Lookout Mountain. It proved to be not a plum tree, but a persimmon, and the fruit he found to be very sour and bitter.*

Looking at the map,† one sees that a little west of Chattanooga the river turns south, then runs west a couple of miles along the northern foot of Lookout Mountain (which there has a precipitous front, close to the river), and then turns abruptly north for a reach of six or eight miles, then turns west and southerly and runs nearly as far, making another and larger tongue of land, which is the northern spur of Raccoon Mountain. The tongue in the bend first described is known as Moccasin Point. It was not occupied by the rebels, but its southern half was completely dominated by their guns on the point of Lookout Mountain. They occupied the Raccoon bend, however, by outposts, especially at Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry. The map shows a road from Chattanooga, beginning on the north

* On his failure and total defeat at Chattanooga, he was superseded by General William J. Hardee and never afterward had a command in the field.

† The sketch opposite page 200 will do.

side of the river and running west a few miles, across the base of Moccasin Point, to Brown's Ferry; thence, from the left bank, there were two roads,— one going directly south, about five miles, to join the railroad and wagon-road just west of Lookout creek, near the station called Wauhatchie, the other across the base of the Raccoon tongue to Kelly's Ferry, and thence, from the right bank, keeping along the river until it again turns south, when it goes on directly west to Jasper. This last road was shorter than the one Rosecrans's wagon trains were compelled to use, which ran from Jasper farther to the north, over the south end of Walden's Ridge, but the use of it was prevented by Bragg's control of that piece of it across the Raccoon tongue. In that part of the river from Brown's Ferry around to Kelly's was "The Narrows", a place where it ran thro a narrow gorge with great force, so that boats were moved up stream there only with great difficulty and labor; but from Kelly's to Bridgeport the passage was easy.

Now the plan of General Smith was, to seize Brown's and Kelly's Ferries by surprise, fortify the position at Brown's (which could easily be reinforced from Chattanooga within two hours), while a heavy force from Hooker's command was to move from Bridgeport up along the railroad to Wauhatchie, drive the enemy out of the mouth of Lookout valley, and hold permanently that position and the road from Wauhatchie north to Brown's Ferry. The enemy would still control the railroad and wagonroad immediately around the foot of Lookout Mountain (tho unable to use them), but, if all this were accomplished, supplies could be brought by rail to Wauhatchie or by boat up to Kelly's Ferry, and thence from either point, hauled by wagons to Chattanooga, only eight miles, with no difficult hills to climb.

The night of the 24th (October), after Grant's tour of inspection, he gave Smith full authority to execute the plan and the command of 4000 men for that purpose. These men, apparently, were chosen by Thomas. They were the two brigades of Generals Hazen and Turchin. Hazen's had been in Crittenden's Twenty-first Corps and, in the reorganization of the army, was now in Granger's Fourth Corps. Turchin's (as already told) was now the

First Brigade of the Third Division in the Fourteenth Corps. The selection was probably intended as a distinction earned by the fine action of these brigades in the great battle and to get the service of the two generals who had shown such prompt judgment and inspiring courage on that field.

On the 26th Smith had all his men and materials ready for movement on the north side of the river at Chattanooga, keeping all concealed from observation from Lookout Mountain. Up the river, out of sight, he had improvised a saw-mill, cut the planks and timbers required, and built sixty boats or barges, to be used, first, for transport of the men down the river and then for pontoons in a bridge he intended to lay on the river at Brown's Ferry.

In the night of the 26th-27th, under the immediate command of General Hazen, fifty-two of these boats were filled with men, well armed and equipped for any service, 24 men and one selected officer in each boat, with axes and intrenching tools. Hazen was to command on the flotilla, and about 1200 of the men were from his own brigade; the remainder and their officers (about 100) were selected from Turchin's brigade, as being experienced in river boating, and were all from the Thirty-sixth and Ninety-second Ohio. The remainder of both brigades was commanded by Turchin and was to march across the country to a point near Brown's Ferry, timed to arrive with the boats. Colonel Lane and the Eleventh Ohio were in this division, and so did not share in the dramatic and exciting (but yet, as it proved, entirely quiet) voyage. All the generals concerned had carefully inspected all the ground, and the whole movement was managed with thorough instructions and a clock-like regularity that reduced to the last degree the chances of failure or delay. Even the work of shipping of the men was assigned to a selected colonel and his regiment (another Ohio regiment — the Eighteenth infantry) who were not to move on the expedition, so as to cut off any doubling of duties or chance of confusion.

At three o'clock in the morning of the 27th the boats were released and drifted down on the current. Oars had been provided for emergencies, but they were not used: the rudders were the only guides. Absolute silence was

ordered and no lights permitted for any purpose. Almost immediately the boats came within range of the enemy's guns on Lookout Mountain and were then within range almost until they reached their goal; and for two or three miles, while rounding the bend directly at the foot of Lookout Mountain, they were within easy rifle shot of the enemy's pickets and patrols on the south bank; but they kept as much in the north part of the current as was practicable and wholly escaped discovery until near the landing at Brown's Ferry.

At five o'clock and the end of the nine miles drift, the advanced boats rounded to for landing on the left bank, when a volley from the bank showed that they were in front of the rebel pickets. The answer was a vigorous use of the oars, a quick landing, and a dash for the ferry road, which brought the capture of the ferry landing and part of the guard.

A chain of rounded, steep hills stands close along the river there, and the road from the ferry landing runs west thro the ravine between two of them. Before the reserve of the rebel outpost, whose camp was just west of these hills, could get into the ravine, Hazen had possession of it, and at its western front, in the dim light of dawn, fought the whole force with such spirit and daring that he soon defeated it and drove it off.

The marching troops, led by Smith and Turchin, arrived just on time. As fast as the boats discharged on the west side they pulled for the east side, to bring them over. The remainder of Hazen's brigade were taken first, so that that brigade could be used as a whole in gaining the two hills in the chain next south of the road. Immediately after them came Turchin's men, who turned to the right and struck for the two hills to the north. But they were not in time to take a direct part in the battle. Hazen's men had finished that, got possession of their two hills; and, as the light increased, had the satisfaction of seeing the defeated rebels marching hurriedly southward. Bragg had made the serious mistake of posting only two regiments to hold this very important post.

Before Turchin's men were all over the energetic Smith was slinging the boats into position and directing as many men as could possibly work in the construction of a pon-

toon bridge. By ten o'clock it was finished, six-hundred feet or more in length, and the guns were rolling over. At the same time all the other men were quite as busy in the work of fortifying the hills for the defense of the position, Hazen's having the left of the line and Turchin's the right. Within a few hours more the two brigades were secure against attack, even if made by several times their own number, and their guns were in command of the river and the roads at the foot of Lookout Mountain, so that Bragg could only reinforce his position in the Lookout valley by sending troops over the mountain, a slow and difficult movement. Meantime Smith had sent a small force on a rapid march west across the neck, thro a gap in Raccoon Mountain, and captured the enemy outpost at Kelly's Ferry.

This completed the recovery of one of the two short and easy routes of supply to the army, and it remained only to hold it. But within one day more the other route (by Wauhatchie) was to be gained, with the total wreck of Bragg's assurance of victory by siege.

General Hooker had arrived at Stevenson (near Bridgeport) two weeks before, with his reinforcement from Virginia — the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, about 20,000 men,*— had received from Thomas (before Grant came) provisional orders for his share in the operations for opening the supply lines; and now, on the 25th, he was ordered to move at once from Bridgeport along the railway to Wauhatchie in the lower Lookout valley. The possession of this place and the road from there north to Brown's Ferry would complete Thomas's movements, give him a secure line from Chattanooga around Bragg's left, make his (Bragg's) position on Lookout Mountain practically useless, and at the same time put the permanent supply of the army beyond any question.

On the 26th Hooker's advance surprised the enemy's outpost opposite Bridgeport and his column began crossing the river. General Howard led, with the two divisions of his corps (the Eleventh), followed by one division

* Hooker moved this large body of troops, with all their artillery and baggage, from the Rappahannock, via Wheeling, Cincinnati, Louisville and Nashville, to Stevenson within eight days,— an exploit very remarkable indeed for those days.

(Geary's) of the Twelfth. Howard reached Wauhatchie on the morning of the 28th, struck the enemy brigade posted there, quickly disposed of it, and moved north and connected with Smith at Brown's Ferry, thus completing the chain. Geary turned south at Wauhatchie, moved a mile or so up Lookout valley, took a strong position on some small hills on the road, and became the extreme right of Grant's line. Now, with some repairs of the railway, supplies could be brought by rail from Nashville nearly to the foot of Lookout Mountain. A second and quicker route of supply was open, the only wagon-haul being from Wauhatchie over the pontoon at Brown's Ferry, eight miles.

The telegraph started the urgent movement of food, clothing and ammunition by both routes, the news flew thro the camps like lightning; "the cracker line", as the soldiers called it, was restored, and the day was filled with the noises of great joy. The cheering was so general and continuous that in Bragg's camps, where the cause was not yet known, it was supposed that there had been a great battle somewhere and that the "Yankees" were celebrating a victory.

The achievement at Brown's Ferry, marked by such high skill and courage, by perfect success and immeasurable value to the army, would be sure to be generously appreciated and publicly recognized by General Thomas. He issued General Order No. 265, Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, November 9, 1863, in which he said "The skill and cool gallantry of the officers and men composing the expedition under Brigadier-General William F. Smith, consisting of the Brigades of Brigadier-Generals Turchin and Hazen, in effecting a lodgment on the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry deserve the highest praise"; and on November 20 he specially recommended Generals Smith, Turchin and Hazen "to favorable consideration for gallantry and skilful conduct displayed by them in the battle of Chickamauga and in the operations at Brown's Ferry on the night of October 26, 1863."

The news from Wauhatchie, following closely upon that from Brown's Ferry, was a terrible shock to Bragg. Not a shred was left of his plan of siege, in which he had seen no defect. Unless he recovered Lookout Valley at once

he must withdraw to the east of Lookout Mountain and face a decision by battle instead of the starvation of his enemy. No enemy of his could have wished him a more bitter feeling of humiliated pride than that he must then have had. He must act quickly if at all, and he sent his best general and best troops (Longstreet and his Corps) to "drive the enemy out of Lookout Valley."

Longstreet had never approved of the besieging plan; he had urged upon Bragg an aggressive campaign, and his report of this attack in Lookout Valley rather clearly indicates that he had little faith or hope of success in it. The position of Hazen and Turchin at Brown's Ferry made it impossible for him to march on the level ground around the front of Lookout Mountain, and he was compelled to go over it, altho time was of vital importance. He made the attempt, however, and moved with such energy that he got into the valley, below Trenton, when Hooker had but one division (Geary's) there, and attacked before a reinforcing division could be brought up; but he was badly beaten and had to retreat.

He marched back into Chattanooga Valley, by Johnson's Crook, and reported total failure to Bragg, with an "I told you so!" in tone, if not in language, that must have increased his chagrin and irritableness to their deepest. In his (Longstreet's) opinion, it would be folly to make any further attack in Lookout Valley. There was no place on the mountain from which artillery could reach the position, the passage around its northern base was already effectually cut off by the capture of Brown's Ferry, and a frontal attack down the valley from Trenton would be far too costly in life and would probably fail in any event. Bragg had to give it up and see that the only choice he now had was between attacking an enemy fortified, reinforced and well supplied, and waiting to be himself attacked. He chose the latter, and the result, within a month, was a total defeat and disastrous retreat, which far outweighed his success at Chickamauga and brought his removal from command.

XIX

1863 : OCTOBER — NOVEMBER

COLONEL LANE'S SERVICE ENDED

Brown's Ferry His Last Engagement — He Offers His Resignation — It is Accepted — Reaches Home in November

But these later events do not belong to this story. In the brilliant affair of Brown's Ferry we have reached the end of the service of Colonel Lane in the army. Like his first service in the field, on the Kanawha in July, 1861, and others between, it highly distinguished him and his regiment. It was a fitting close to a soldier's career,— filled with great labors, great hardships and many battles, but always honorable and of immeasurable value to his country.

The reasons for his leaving the field, which had appeared to him six months before to be urgent, had become imperative. He was not of robust constitution, and at the time the war broke upon the country he was further hampered by the wearing effect of many years of unrelieved industry and long hours in building up and carrying on an important and complicated manufacturing business, so that it was his peculiar nervous energy and tenacity of spirit, with an intense patriotic fervor, rather than his physical powers, that carried him thro the exposure and hardships of the first year and a half in the field. In the spring of 1863 he saw that he probably could not endure such a life much longer; his severe illness and slow recovery at Carthage in May and June (tho he did not wholly give up his official duties) were the inevitable reaction; and he decided then that he must resign. But he was not willing to leave the field when a great campaign was impending. To go then seemed to him something like shirking a plain duty; and, in his optimistic or

hopeful view, the great cause was then assured of success and the end of the war near. He wanted exceedingly to be in at the end. In this mind he went thro the Tullahoma campaign of June-July; and, fortunately, the climate of southern Tennessee was much better for him than that of West Virginia, while the physical hardships of the campaign were less severe than those he had had to endure before. But, like all the Army of the Cumberland, he considered the taking of Chattanooga as part, and the only fitting end, of the Tullahoma campaign; and no one imagined that Rosecrans would delay as long as he did the march upon Chattanooga. So he hesitated and withheld his resignation in the hope of reaching Chattanooga before offering it.

Meantime his anxieties for his family, whom he constantly felt he was neglecting, and about the condition of his business, which had been much injured by the war and which he certainly was neglecting, were more and more increased. It was thus in a much troubled mind that he marched upon the final campaign for Chattanooga. But the road to Chattanooga proved to be long and toilsome and filled with great events; and the duty of the present hour put any one's personal affairs far out of mind. But when the stronghold was taken and finally held, and the great object of the campaign was thus achieved, he thought that his time to retire had come.

A fitter time could hardly have been found. A long period of lying in camp then seemed sure, both the great campaigns had succeeded, and he and his regiment had gained a distinction for courage and faithfulness which could hardly have been excelled anywhere in the army. Yet, while Bragg was threatening the retaking of Chattanooga and Rosecrans's army was suffering from incompetent management and lack of supplies, he still hesitated to resign because that looked, again, like shirking a duty and leaving his regiment when it was oppressed by misfortune. He knew that an officer who left the army now was, as he expressed it, "liable to have his motives misconstrued." But, after a month without an attempt upon the town by Bragg, and when Hooker's reinforcement had come from Virginia and Sherman's was known to be on the way from the west, there remained no doubt of the

security of the army and the position. Further, he supposed the Confederate army to be much larger than it really was (the belief of all around him), and that it would be a long time before his regiment was called into an aggressive campaign.

So, on the 23d of October, he wrote and sent in his resignation. If he had waited but one day, he would probably have waited for another campaign. For General Grant arrived at Chattanooga the night of the 23d, to take general command. The presence of the hero of Donelson and Vicksburg was, no doubt, an assurance of a new and better order of things, as well as of an early aggressive campaign and the ultimate defeat of Bragg. He must, therefore, have felt keen regrets over his resignation when he learned, on the 24th or 25th, that Grant was in command; but, in view of the reasons he had given for offering it, he could not recall it, and had to find what comfort he could in the assurance that it was unmistakably necessary.

An officer resigning his commission is required to state his reasons, and they must be certain and practical. And especially in time of war they must be such as to show, on their face, that it would be unjust or unnecessary to retain him in the army. Under this rule a man of dignity and pride would not be willing to speak of his family, nor even of his health, if he could avoid it. So he used only two reasons, one, that his business and pecuniary affairs, in the two and a half years of his absence, had become so seriously affected as that his personal attention was necessary to prevent further complication and avoid disaster, and the other, that his presence with the regiment was not practically necessary, inasmuch as the two other field officers were there and the regiment was now so reduced in number that three would not be allowed under the existing army regulations;* and he added that, in view of the short time remaining of the term of enlistment of the regiment, he had but little hope that it would be filled up again.

Under these circumstances there could be no reasonable

* Under the army regulations, when a regiment fell below the "minimum" in numbers, if there was a vacancy among the field officers, it would not be filled, the others being deemed sufficient.

doubt that his resignation would be accepted; but the Colonel did not permit that consideration to affect his view of duty. He went right on as usual in the performance of all duties, his conscience not permitting him to stop until he was officially relieved. He could have had relief from duty while awaiting official action upon the resignation, if he had asked for it (a common practice of officers), but he knew he was still legally in the service and he would not evade it. So when he marched on the Brown's Ferry expedition (which was thought to be especially perilous) he had resigned; and the day when his resignation was accepted (October 27*) and he was thus officially released, he was crossing the river in that famous movement and strenuously occupied in fortifying the heights near the Ferry, in preparation for a battle which, if it should occur, would certainly be fought fiercely.

Altho the acceptance of his resignation was dated October 27 he did not learn of it till some days later. We cannot now tell what day it was. A letter he wrote to his wife on the second of November may be read as indicating that he had received either the acceptance or an assurance that it had been ordered. It tells her for the first time that he had resigned and speaks confidently of being at home "within two or three weeks". He probably received the formal acceptance on the third of November, or, perhaps, on the fourth, for his farewell order to the regiment was dated the fourth. This paper was evidently written in deep feeling, for he had a high regard for the men of his regiment and great confidence in them, as indeed he might well have whenever he thought of their bravery and devotion on the field of Chickamauga.

The "two or three weeks" in the letter to his wife written November second meant that it would take some time for official action in respect to his resignation and more afterward for the closing of his accounts as commander of the regiment, to get the formal acquittance necessary before he could be mustered out of the army. No doubt he left for home at once on muster-out, but I find no paper indicating the date of that last step. It was probably on or near November 15. A letter written to

* Also reported as October 26.

him by an officer of the Eleventh, dated at Chattanooga November 26, shows that he had then been heard from as being in Cincinnati; so it is certain that there was a double Thanksgiving at his home on the day of the great national feast in that year, with the returned soldier at the head of the table.

If, on coming to the end of this story, one thinks of finding there an encomium, he may be reminded that there is a better encomium than any one else could write in the papers and records left by and relating to Colonel Lane, from which the story is drawn. Clearly do these show forth an honest man, of strong but simple mind, a kind and courteous gentleman, seeking only to be just, intolerant only of injustice and secession, a zealous patriot, ready on the instant for any service, for the sacrifice of any personal interest, for the endurance of any hardship; always a faithful soldier and a thorough and efficient officer, fighting in the front with perfect courage many battles against the enemies of his country.

XX

1863-1864: NOVEMBER — JUNE

Closing Career of Eleventh Ohio — Grant's Campaign of Chattanooga — His Great Victory at Missionary Ridge — Eleventh Ohio Engaged — “Battle Above the Clouds” — Thomas's Campaign Against Johnston — Battle of Buzzard Roost — Campaign Against Atlanta — Battle of Resaca, Last Battle of the Eleventh Ohio — End of its Three-years Term — Sent to Ohio and Mustered-out — Veterans and Recruits Remain as Eleventh Battalion — Served to the End of the War — Mustered-out at Washington, June, 1865

There ought to be some further account of the career of the Eleventh Ohio, the men with whom Colonel Lane had been so long and so intimately associated and whose fortunes had been so much in his keeping. When men share together the hardships and dangers of war there is sure to come a deep mutual respect and affection; and, altho he left them in the field before the work was all done, he was glad to maintain all his life a friendship with them that nothing could mar.

The regiment continued in service under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Street until the expiration of its three-years term. This was not measured, however, as the men had assumed, from the date of enlistment, but from the date of muster-in, so that the muster-out did not come until June, 1864.

Until that time it went on in a very effective career, with one more great battle and several lesser ones. As soon as the line of supplies to Chattanooga was restored General Grant devoted himself to preparation for an active aggressive campaign, tho intending not to move until General Sherman arrived with the Fifteenth Corps. But all was ready against that day. Sherman's troops, accord-

ingly, were not halted at the town but moved on to a camp position some miles north of it, to be used on the left in the coming attack. They were to cross the river eastward and strike Bragg's right, which held the hills adjoining the north end of Missionary Ridge proper, about three miles northeast of the town.

Hooker held the right wing, in Lookout Valley, and Thomas the center, directly in front of the middle of the northern section or half of Missionary Ridge.*

On the 23d of November the preliminary movement in the attack upon Bragg was made. This was an assault by Thomas's two corps, the Fourth and Fourteenth, directly upon the enemy's position in his front on the west side of the Ridge. Baird's division, containing Turchin's brigade, was at first held in support of Sheridan's division on the right of the Fourth Corps, but later moved into the front line, the remainder of the Fourteenth Corps being held in reserve. At two o'clock the advance was begun, and the troops moved to battle with such regularity and precision that the enemy, seeing them in open country from the high ground, supposed there was a grand drill or parade in progress and were put to some confusion by the suddenness of the attack. They had the advantage, however, of higher ground and a line of fortifications along the lower slope of the Ridge, and there was a hot battle for two hours. Thomas carried the day, gained a mile to the front all along his lines, took the fortifications, and by night had them so far reconstructed that he could turn them against the enemy.

The same night Sherman successfully crossed the Tennessee eastward, two or three miles above the town, and the next day, with three divisions, made a vigorous attack upon Bragg's right, drove it from the hills north of the end of Missionary Ridge, and captured the north end of the Ridge itself. While Sherman was beginning this attack Hooker moved upon Bragg's left on Lookout Mountain, ran over the division posted between Lookout creek and the mountain and, with three divisions, performed the

* It is of peculiar interest to note, that Bragg defeated Rosecrans on the eastern slope of the southern section of Missionary Ridge, and Grant defeated Bragg, two months later, on the western slope of the northern section, only five miles away.

extraordinary feat of climbing the steep mountain (on the west side near the north end), and assaulting the position on top. It was a gray and misty day, with clouds settling from time to time on the top of the mountain, tho occasionally the sun broke thro. This was the famous "Battle above the Clouds". It was a complete and brilliant success, and has been the source of much unrestrained poetry and rhetorical writing.

Both of Bragg's wings were now severely clipped and all his front line along Missionary Ridge lost.

The next morning, the 25th, beautifully clear and bright, began the great Battle of Chattanooga (or Missionary Ridge). It was almost wholly a struggle for the possession of the section of the Ridge from Rossville north, about five miles. Immediately in front of the main Ridge were placed four divisions of Thomas's army, Baird's division having the left of the line. Sherman was on the north end of the Ridge and Hooker was moving across Chattanooga river against the south end at Rossville.

Thomas's men steadily advanced under fire until the base of the main Ridge was reached, when they were ordered to charge, Grant and Thomas looking on from Orchard Knob, a bare hill in the rear which gave them view of the whole ground. Twelve brigades, in a connected line, moved to this assault, Turchin's being the third from the left. Grant's order to charge was intended to include only the enemy's first position, a fortified line part way up the slope of the Ridge, and that was the only objective he mentioned to the generals commanding; but he was to learn something more that day of the character of soldiers experienced and full of confidence. They advanced rapidly and with such uniformity of action and spirit that the whole of Bragg's first line was captured in hardly an hour's fighting.

But then the charging troops did not stop. Without orders, moved only by their great zeal and determination, they pushed right up the steep front of the Ridge, fighting from tree to tree, from rock to rock, and always advancing, until they reached the enemy's last position on the crest. Baird's division, as it happened, had the hardest and most costly work, because in its front Bragg's troops had been massed to resist Sherman moving south along

the crest. To Turchin's brigade fell the share of assaulting a separated knob on which the enemy had mounted a battery. Compelled to fall back once, a short distance, it only reformed and returned to the charge, carried the position with a rush, the surviving enemy flying down the eastern slope, and found itself alone, the other brigades, on either hand, being out of sight. It is more than interesting to read General Turchin's report of this battle: it cannot be read without a thrill.*

Bragg's defeat was total and irremediable. In great haste and confusion his troops abandoned all the ground, hurried across the Chickamauga at and near Ringgold, and moved south, leaving to capture large numbers of prisoners, guns and wagons, and littering the road with the debris of a flying army.

The Eleventh Ohio and the other regiments of Turchin's old brigade could now add to their great pride in the memory of holding the last ground on the field of Chickamauga that of their conspicuous share in the ample revenge of the defeat of their army there.

The pursuit of Bragg could not be pushed far because of the difficulties of supply by wagons, and he was allowed to halt about Dalton. Grant's army was then returned to Chattanooga and its vicinity, and both armies finally settled into winter quarters.

Early in March following Grant was called to Washington, promoted to Lieutenant-General, and put in command of all the armies and military departments. He then prepared plans for the operation of all the armies, assigned the generals to the work required; and, among them, put Sherman in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, which included the army at Chattanooga, and gave him general instructions for a campaign against Atlanta.

This brought the Eleventh Ohio (still in Turchin's brigade) again into an aggressive campaign,—Sherman's famous campaign against Atlanta, begun from Chattanooga early in May, 1864, and ending, after many battles, in the capture of Atlanta early in September.

Before this, however, in February, Grant (then at St.

* Official Records, War Dept.; Vol. XXXI, Part II, page 512.

Louis) had ordered Thomas to move out upon Dalton, threatening a campaign against Atlanta, the immediate object being to prevent Johnston from sending more troops against Sherman, who was then on his "Meridian" campaign in Mississippi. Thomas was slow, as he too often was, but he did move ten days later, on the 22d, with the Fourteenth Corps. On the 25th Baird's division was in advance, Turchin's brigade leading, when the enemy was struck near Rocky-Face Ridge, twenty miles below Ringgold and forty from Chattanooga. The Eleventh Ohio, under Lieutenant-Colonel Street, was in front and first in the battle of "Buzzard Roost" (the name of part of the Ridge), which was carried on fitfully, in advance and retreat, all day. The Eleventh had none killed, tho a considerable number wounded. The next morning the enemy had fallen back to the south; but Thomas returned to Ringgold, reporting that his transportation was so unequal to the work that further advance was dangerous. A week later, however, Sherman arrived and took command of the campaign in person.

Bragg had been superseded on his failure at Chattanooga by Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee, and then General Joseph E. Johnston, who commanded the grand department, appeared and took command of the whole field of the defense of Atlanta. Johnston resisted Sherman steadily from Dalton down, but was forced back step by step, by flanking and fighting, until the little town of Resaca, on the Etowah river, was reached. Here there was a hot battle on the 15th of May, in which Turchin's brigade was engaged. The Eleventh Ohio, in particular, happened, in a charge, to get into a very difficult and dangerous position, from which it was extricated only under cover of night, its loss, however, being only a few wounded.

This was the last engagement of the Eleventh Ohio as a regiment. The army remained in camp about Resaca several weeks. The three years of the regiment were to end in June, and it was to be discharged. It had not been recruited to the regulation number (which now justified one of Colonel Lane's reasons for resigning), but some of the men had reenlisted as "Veterans" under the law of 1863 and the series of orders of the War Department following, tho not enough in number to preserve the organiza-

tion as a "Veteran" regiment. So, as a regiment, it must be mustered out of the service.

Accordingly, on the 10th of June, all the men and officers who had served three years and had not become "Veterans" set out for home, marched to Chattanooga, and went thence by rail to Louisvile and by boat to Cincinnati, where, on the 15th, the citizens gave them a grand "reception". And then, at Camp Dennison, where the regiment had been originally organized and begun its career, they were mustered-out on the 21st of June, 1864.

The career of this regiment was different from that of many others in the war in this, that the whole of its three years was in active service in the field. Its only respite was in the winter-quarters of 1861-62 on the Ohio. With that exception, it had to keep out its pickets every day against a present or expected enemy. The first year and a half, spent in western Virginia (excepting six weeks on the Antietam campaign), was filled with great labors, often exposed to wretchedly bad weather and severe cold, and marked by many small battles; and all (as the men believed) with little gain to the cause and no reward to themselves. The difference between that service and that of the next year and a half, in Tennessee and Georgia, was so great that, to the men, only the latter seemed to be worth while.

Yet, besides many minor engagements, the regiment is officially credited with the battles of Hawk's Nest (Lewisburg Pike), August 20, 1861; Gauley Bridge (Cotton Hill), November 10, 1861; Princeton, May 15-18, 1862; Bull Run Bridge, August 27, 1862; Frederick, September 12, 1862; South Mountain, September 14, 1862; Antietam, September 17, 1862; Hoover's Gap, June 25, 1863; Tullahoma, July 1, 1863; Chickamauga, September 19 and 20, 1863; Lookout Mountain, November 24, 1863; Mission Ridge, November 25, 1863; Buzzard Roost, February 25, 1864; and Resaca, May 15, 1864.

This list seems to be mistaken as to "Princeton" and "Lookout Mountain". The Eleventh Ohio was not in either of these engagements. But then the list omits four others that ought to be included: Big Creek (on New river), November 21, 1861; Catlett's Gap, September 14

and 15, 1863; Brown's Ferry, October 27, 1863; and Mission Ridge (Thomas's preliminary assault), November 23, 1863.

Those who had enlisted later than the original organization, being the two companies (E and I) organized in 1862, with all recruits received at different times, and, above all, those who had honored the regiment and themselves by reenlisting as "Veterans", were formed into a battalion, known from June, 1864, as the Eleventh Battalion Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

This battalion was organized in four companies (C, E, H, and I) and numbered on its rolls, in the aggregate, about 370. It was commanded by Captain D. Clinton Stubbs, of this Company E, who had been Sergeant-Major of the regiment. He was later commissioned Lieutenant-Colonel, but the command was too small to permit his muster in that rank under army regulations. Three sergeants commissioned as Lieutenants were refused muster for the same reason, so that two captains and five lieutenants were all the officers in the battalion.

This plucky little band remained in Baird's division in the Fourteenth Corps, marched and fought with Sherman through the tremendous campaign ending in the taking of Atlanta in September, thence on with Sherman in the famous March-to-the-Sea, and thence north with him thro the Carolinas, to the final surrender of the last rebel army east of the Mississippi. And then they marched thro Washington in the magnificent closing review of May 14-15, 1865. Surely they had glory enough to compensate their holding on to the end.

They were encamped near Washington until the 11th of June, when they too were mustered-out and began their journey home, free from all "orders", surely the happiest men of all the famous regiment, because they were a part of the glorious ending of the war.

XXI

AFTER THE WAR

The Colonel Lane, after resigning, was very much and anxiously employed in recovering his ground in his long-neglected business and in the care and education of his children, his mind was at the same time never off the war. He had a most disquieting sense that he had left the army before its work was done; and his disappointment in finding himself mistaken in the judgment that Gettysburg and Vicksburg marked, practically, the end, caused him many regrets. He was eager for every piece of news and watched all the movements of the armies with keenest concern, keeping up constantly a correspondence with friends remaining in the field. With Grant's defeat of Lee and investment of Richmond and Sherman's capture of Atlanta, however, his optimistic assurance was re-established: the final victory then no one could doubt.

As long as he lived after the war he was filled with an untiring interest in its events. He was a conspicuous member of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, and nothing pleased him so much as meeting any of the surviving officers and soldiers, especially those of his own regiment and brigades. He was fond of calling "reunions" at his own home, near Cincinnati, where his large grounds offered a fine field for an "encampment" of the veterans. Some of his addresses on these occasions have been preserved; and he wrote a number of other papers, relating to the events and experiences of the war, for different occasions.

But his interest in the veterans was also of a more practical kind. Numberless were the instances of his kindness and substantial aid in their lives, tho often these deeds were discovered by his friends only by chance.

In the recovery and further development of his manufacturing business he showed the same spirit and zeal as

of old, tho the hard service in the field had much shaken his physical powers. Under his management, however, the business grew in extent and importance until it became one of the largest and best-known in the west; and the Corliss and other engines built by his firm made it widely famous.

The inevitable result followed, tho he struggled against it indomitably for years. About 1890 his physical decline was unmistakable, and then steadily increased, tho he still kept partly at work. At last he was compelled to retire, and then could only await the progress of his illness, which he did with great fortitude and patience. He died at his home on the 6th of December, 1899, praised and lamented by the whole community and followed to his grave in Spring Grove Cemetery by many distinguished citizens and all the surviving officers and soldiers of the Great War who could reach the funeral.

THE END

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